PERCEPTION

THE PRATYAKṢA KHAṆḌA

OF

THE TATTVACINTĀMAṆI

(With Introduction, Sanskrit Text,
Translation and Explanation)

VOLUME - II

V.P. BHATTA

EASTERN BOOK LINKERS
DELHI : : (INDIA)

Published by :
EASTERN BOOK LINKERS
H.O.: 5825, New Chandrawal,
Jawahar Nagar, Delhi-110007
Phone : 23850287, 9811232913
Showroom : 4806/24, Bharat Ram Road,
Daryaganj, New Delhi-110002
Phone : 23285413
email : books@eblindology.com
e-mail : ebl@vsnl.net
Website : www.eblindology.com

First Edition : 2012

Price : ₹ 4500.00 (2 vols set)

ISBN : 978-81-7854-219-5

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Printed at : R.K. Print Services

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I. i.

Theory of Benediction

(Tattva Cintamaṇau Pratyakṣakhaṇḍe Mangala Vādaḥ)

Benediction

I.i.1. Salutation to the lord Īśvara, the slayer of the three Puras and of infinite greatness; who, though being beyond qualities, is of unfailing resolve, is the cause of universe through three qualities, is of the nature of three eternal aspects, is of three forms and performs the activities of creation, maintainance and destruction, and is the ocean of mercy and the single ulitimate refuge of all the three worlds.

Explanation

Gangeśa begins his work 'Thought jewel of reality' (Tattva Cintāmaṇi) with the theory of benediction (Maṅgala Vāda). He salutes the lord Īśvara for the speedy completion of the work without obstacles and for critical appriciation. He describes the lord Īśvara as of apperant contradiction that he, though being beyond qualities (*guṇātīta*), is of unfailing resolve (*Īśa*), is the cause of universe through the three qualities (*triguṇa saciva*); is of the nature of three eternal aspects, viz. knowledge, desire and effort (*tryakṣara maya*); is of three forms, viz. Brahmā, Viṣṇu and Maheśvara (*trimūrti*); is engaged in the activities of creation, maintainance and destruction (*svarga sthiti vilaya*), is the occeason of mercy (*kṛpāpārāvāra*) and is the ultimate refuge (*parama gati*) of all the three worlds.

Anubandhas of Tattvacintāmaṇi

I. i. 2. Having learnt the science of logic from the teachers, having known the theory of the Gurus, i.e. Prābhākara Mīmāsakas, having observed the entire essence of both the schools through the divine eyes of thought, Gangeśa, the preceptor of the teachings of the conclusive theories in the case of the rules which are most difficult to tread on account of the host of faults, composes the thought jewel of reality with measured words.

Explanation

The author mentions the name of the composer, viz. Gangeśa, and the name of the composition, viz. 'Thought jewel of reality' (TattvaCintamaṇi)

soliciting the study of the work. Further he mentions the subject matter (*viṣaya*), viz. science of logic (*anvīkṣā naya*); objective (*prayojana*), viz. understanding the reality (*tattvacintā*) by understanding the assence (*sāra*) of logic and the theory of Prābhākaras; relation of the work (*sambandha*), viz. similarity between the subject matters of Nyāya and Mīmāmsā; and finally the entitled person for the study of the work (*adhikārin*), viz, student interseted in understanding the rules (*tantra*) which are most difficult to tread on. Thus, all the four connecting links (*anubandhas*) have been explained to exist.

Justification of the Title

I. i. 3. The act of polishing of the jewel (of thought) by the scholars means the act of removing of the darkness (ignorance) of the formidable atheists (Buddhists). This is possible, because neither the skill in the investigation can be traced in the views of the opponents (Buddhists etc.), nor the poverty can be traced in the words establishing the conclusive theory of one's own system (Nyāya).

Explanation

Gangeśa now justifies the title 'Thought jewel of reality' (TatvvaCintāmaṇi) for the proposed composition. According to him, there is a great similarly between the thought jewel and real jewel; and hence the title is justified. For instance, while the thought jewel removes the darkness (ignorance) of the formidable opponents (Buddhists), the real jewel removes the darkness and helps the investigation of theives (*pracaṇḍa pāṣaṇḍa tamas*). Also the opponents' view (*vipakṣa pakṣa*) lacks of any skill in the investigation (*vicāra cāturī*), and the words establishing the conclusive theory of one's own system (*svasididdhānta*) do not betray any poverty of expression (*daridratā*). Thus, the title Tattva Cintāmaṇi is a justfied tittle.

Justification for Benediction

I. i. 4. Here in this world, the people, desirous of the completion of the activities to be undertaken, perform the benediction at the time of the commencement of the activities which are admitted (to be fruitful) with syntactic unity, i.e. unanimously by all the learned traditional scholars of Mīmāmsā.

Explanation

Gangeśa introduces the traditional view of the Mīmāmsakas in order to justify the practice of benediction (*maṅgalācaraṇa*). According to the Mīmāmsakas, the people, desirous of completion of the activity to be undertaken (*tatsamāpti kāma*), perform benediction at the time of the

commencement of the activities (*karmārambha samaye*) which are admitted with syntactic unity or unanimously (*ekavākyatayā*) by all the traditional scholars. Therefore, practice of benediction is justified.

Objection : Causality of Benediction is untenable

I.i. 5. The Buddhists object now as follows: That in such cases, the causality of benediction cannot be ascertained through positive and negative concomitances; for, the activity performed by the careless Udayana is seen to be completed even without benediction. Also in such cases, benediction practiced at some other birth cannot be assumed; for, in that case mutual depence would arise (between the causality of benediction and assumeption of benediction). Further, such an assumption of benediction is rendered rundant by the causes that are already assumed on account of ordinary customs and practices.

It may be argued that the causality of benediction can be ascertained from the inference of exclusive specification. For instance, benediction can be established to be fruitful from the inference that 'Benediction is fruitful; for, it is the object of non-censured practice of the traditional scholars like that of the New moon and Full moon sacrifice',; thus the completion of the acitvity, which is desired to be undertaken, becomes regularly recollected, as the same is required to be present at the time. Also, any fruit other than completion cannot have the required nature; and the heavingness in assumption would occur in assuming some other fruit for benediction by the law of Viśvajit sacrifice. Thus, the causality of benediction becomes ascertained.

However, this is not correct. The causality of benediction is absent due to the deviation; and the absent causality cannot be grasped even from thousands of means.

Explanation

An objection is raised by the Buddhists now that the causality of benediction (*kāraṇatā*) cannot be ascertained through the positive and negative concomitances (*anvaya vyatireka*), as the activity undertaken by the careless Udayanācārya (*pramattānuṣṭhita*) is completed even without the benediction. Also it is not possible to argue that the benediction performed at some other birth is the cause, and produces the completion of the activity, as the mutual dependence (*anyo'nyāśraya*) becomes contigent (between the causality of benediction and the assumption of benediction). Further it should be noted that the assumption of benediction in other birth becomes redundant, as the causes already assumed out of ordinary practices can very well produce the completion of the activity in such cases.

The Mīmāmsakas propose that the causality of benediction (*kāraṇatā*) can be ascertained from the inference of exclusive specification (*pariśeṣā-numāna*). According to the Mīmāmskas, when the benediction is established to be fruitful (*saphala*) from the inference such as '*Maṅgalam saphalam avigīta śiṣṭācāra viṣayatvāt*', the completion of the activity to be desired to be undertaken (*prārīpsita samāpti*) becomes recollected; but since no fruit other than completion is tenable, only completion becomes established as the fruit from the exclusive specification.

However, the objector refutes the proposal on the ground that the causality is absent in the benediction due to the deviation of benediction in the case of the activities of the careless etc; and hence the same cannot be grasped.

Śruti is the proof

I. i. 6. However, the Mīmāmsakas establish that even so, only the scripture inferred from such a practice of the traditional scholars is the proof of benediction being the cause of the desired fruit of completion.

Further, no deviation of benediction arises from the completion of the activity undertaken by the careless Udayana in the case of Kiraṇāvalī. When valid knowledge is produced from the non-contradictory scripture that the benediction is the means of completion, the benediction belonging to another birth can be inferred even in the case of the completion of the activity undertaken by the careless through the same probans, i.e. the scripture. And such a benediction is the subsidiary rite of the commenced activity, as the traditional scholars perform the same with a desire to complete the activity. Further, benediction is the means of completion as the same benediction, while not having any other fruit, is performed regularly before the activity by the persons desirous of commencing the fruitful activity like the fore-offering in the case of New Moon and Full Moon sacrifices.

Further benediction needs to be admitted as the subsidiary rite to the activity to be undertaken (and as having the completion as its fruit); for, both the scripture based on tradition and inference teach benediction to have the state of being what is to be performed for completion with a desire to complete the activity and also they teach the state of having the completion of the activity as the fruit of benediction. However the commencement rite (Ārambhaṇīyā), though being regularly performed at the begining of the New Moon and the Full–Moon sacrifices, is not performed with the intention to complete the same New–Moon and Full-Moon sacrifices. Also since a distinct fruit is mentioned for the Ārambhaṇīyā rite, the same is a primary rite. Therefore, the deviation of cause and effectrelationship cannot occur between benediction and

completion on account of the commecement rite (Ārambhaṇīyā).

Explanation :

The Mīmāmsakas now establish that benediction (*maṅgala*) is the cause of the desired fruit of completion (*abhimata hetu*). According to them, the scripture (*śruti*), inferred from the practice of the traditional scholars (*śiṣṭā–cāra*), can be admitted to be the proof of benediction being the cause of completion of the activity.

Further, they point out that no deviation (*vyabhicāra*) of benediction from the completion occurs in the case of the activity of the careless, as the benediction belonging to some other birth (*janmāntarīya tad*) can be inferred from the same probans (*liṅga*), i.e. scripture, once the fruitfulness of benediction is known from the non-contradictory scripture (*niṣparipanthi śruti*). And such a benediction needs to be the subsidiary rite of the commenced activity (*ārabdha karmāṅga*), as the traditional scholars perform the same before the activity with a desire to complete the activity (*karmārthitā*). Further, benediction needs to be admitted to be mere subsidiary rite, as the person desirous of commencement of activity (*karmaprāripsamāna*) regularly performs it and no fruit excepting completion is the fruit of benediction.

Further the Mīmāmsakas point out that benediction needs to be practiced as the subsidiary rite, as the scripture and inference teach the benediction to have the state of being performed for the fruit of completion with a desire for the completion of activity (*tadarthitayā tat kartavyatva*) and they teach the state of having the same fruit of completion of the activity as its fruit (*tat phalaka tva*). Whereas the commencement - rite (Ārambhaṇīyeṣṭi), though performed regularly at the commencement of New–Moon and Full–Moon sacrifices, is not performed with the intention of completing the sacrifices; and therefore no deviation of the cause and effect-relationship occurs between benediction and completion due to the Ārambhaṇīyā rite.

Objection that Benediction cannot be Subsidiary

I. i. 7. On the basis of the Takṣasūtra (I. 7.) it may be objected now as follows : That benediction, being non-ordinary or Vedic cannot be a subsidiary cause in the case of completion of ordiany, i.e. non-Vedic activity. For, the completion of the non-Vedic activity can be tenable from merely the causes obtained from ordinary sources. That is why, both the fixing of iron bolt and the feeding of Brahmin are not the subsidiary causes in the cases of the main activities in 'Iron bolt is to be fixed when the supporting spoke in the house and chariot is broken' and 'Brahmin should be fed with food prepared with milk'. Rather, both are only main incidential causes. In the same way, let

benediction too be considered as the main incidental cause at the begining time that has the heaven as its fruit by the law of Viśvajit-sacrifice.

However, this objection is not correct. The aphorism of Takṣa that 'The non-ordinary, i.e. Vedic act cannot be the subsidiary cause in the case of ordinary, i.e. non-Vedic act' refers to the subsidiary act that produces the operation such as the transcendental merit. However, this one, i.e. the operation produced from benediction is a help in the form of the absence of impediment; and the same is only an associate cause of the completion of the activity understood from the ordinary source. For, the completion of the ordinary activity is not produced in the presence of an impediment. Whereas the transcendental merit is not so, i.e. is not the operation in the production of the fruit of completion from the ordinary non-Vedic activity. On the other hand, benediction is a subsidiary cause of completion through the destruction of impediment. It is not a subsidiary cause of fruit through the transcendental merit like the subsidiary cause, viz. the fore-offerings prescribed by the Takṣa-injunctions such as 'One ought to sacrifice with the refreshing dought'. Also the completion of the activity undertaken by an atheist, possessing the absence of impediment produced intrinsically by itself, is possible even without the transcendental merit produced from the benediction.

Further it should not be argued that this way benediction cannot be a subsidiary cause of the completion of the main activity through the destruction of the impediment, as the deviation is contingent in the case of an atheistic person. Benediction is the subsidiary cause through the destruction of impediment only when it (impediment) exists. Also, it should not be argued that only the destruction of impediment (and not transcendental merit), is the subsidiary cause of the Vedic fore-offerings etc. The transcendental merit (which is already assumed) has brevity compared to the destruction of impediment which is yet to be assumed.

Explanation :

The Pūrvapakṣin now raises an objection on the basis of the Takṣasūtra (I. 7.). According to him, the Takṣasūtra that 'The non-ordinary or Vedic rite (*alaukika*) such as benediction cannot be the subsidiary cause (*aṅga*) in the case of ordinary or non-Vedic activity (*laukika*), prevents benediction from being the subsidiary in the case of ordinary activity; and the completion can be facilitated from merely the cause understood from ordinary sources (*lokāvagata*). And therefore, like the fixing of iron bolt (*indrabāhu*) in '*āre bhagne indrabāhur baddhavyaḥ*' and the feeding of Brahmin in '*pāyasam brāhmaṇo bhojayitavyaḥ*', benediction too should be considered to be the incidental cause (*naimittika*), and not merely subsidiary to the activity; and thus it has only heaven as the fruit by the law of Viśvajit - sacrifice.

However, the Mīmāṁsakas refute the objection. According to them, the Takṣasūtra, viz. *'alaukikam laukike nāṅgam'* refers merely to the subsidiary cause (*aṅga viṣaya*) conducive to the operation such as the transcendental merit (*apūrva rūpa*). Whereas the operation produced from benediction such as the absence of impediment (*pratibandhakā bhāva*) is only an associate cause of the completion of activity obtained from the ordinary source such as composition. It should be noted that transcendental merit (*apūrva*) is not an operation in producing the fruit from ordinary non-Vedic act. Whereas benediction (*maṅgala*) is a subsidiary only through the destruction of obstackle (*vighnadhvaṁsa*), and not through the transcendental merit (*adṛṣṭa*), as the completion of the activity undertaken (*ārabdha nirvāha*) by an atheistic person, possessing the absence of obstackle intrinsically by oneself (*savatas siddha vighna viraha*), is possible even without the transcendental merit produced from benediction.

Further, the Mīmāṁsakas refute the argument that benediction (*maṅgala*) cannot be a subsidiary to the activity even through the destruction of obstackles (*vighna dhavaṁsa*), as the completion is possible even without benediction in the case of an atheistic person without obstackle. According to them, benediction is the subsidiary through the destruction of obstackle (*vighna dhvaṁsa*) only when obstackle exists; and since obstackle is absent in the case of an atheistic, it is a subsidiary independently. Also, the destruction of obstackle is the operation only in the case of ordinary acts, and not in the Vedic acts such as fore-offerings (*prayāja*), where only transcendental merit is the operation.

Absence of obstacle is operation

I.i. 8. As a matter of fact, since traditional scholars perform benediction regularly in the event of doubt regarding obstackle or ascertainment of the same obstackle, only absence of obstackle is intended to be the operation in the case of completion. However, in the view that benediction is perfomed only with the intention that the activity of composition be completed without obstackle, the operationness of the absence of obstackle is ascertained from the scriptures only.

Moreover, if benediction has transcendental merit as its operation, then the state of the same benediction being the ordinary subsidiary cause becomes contradicted. For, fruit of completion can be produced merely from the already assumed cause (such as absence of obstackle) and its is like house repair from the fixing of iron bolt in the case of broken spoke.

It may be argued now that how is it that activity of benediction is undertaken for the destruction of obstackle in the event of doubt regarding

obstackle? For, only the ascertainment of obstackle is the cause of the activity of the person desirous of the destruction of obstackle like ascertainment of sin is the cause of expiation.

However, this is not correct. Mere knowledge of obstackle is the cause of activity of benediction as the traditional scholars perform benediction regularly in the event of either the doubt regarding obstackle or ascertainment of the same obstackle. Also even the injunction, inferred from such a practice of benediction, teaches one desirous of the completion of the undertaken activity and knower of obstackle in general, to be the entitled person. However, in the case of expiation, only the one having ascertainment of obstackle is the entitled person, as the injunction teaches only such a person to be so. That is why, from this, even the following apprehension becomes refuted : "That since only ascertainment of obstackle is a qualification of the entitiled person, how can the activity of benediction be tenable in the event of doubt regarding obstackle? Activity is produced in the case of Vedic rites only from the ascertainment of entitlement." This is so because, only the person, who is entitled for the primary rite, has entitlement for the subsidiary rite,; one, does not have independent entitlement for benediction; for, then benediction would lose the subsidiaryness.

Explanation :

The Mīmāṁsakas now explain an alternative view. According to them, the traditional scholars (*śiṣṭa*) perform benediction in both doubt regarding obstacle (*vighna saṁśaya*) and ascertainment of obstackle (*tanniścaya*); and therefore only absence of obstackle (*vighnābhāva*) and not destruction of obstackle (*vighna dhvaṁsa*), needs to be the operation (*dvāra*) conducive to the completion of ordinary activity. Also in the view that benediction is performed only with the desire that *'nirvighnam karma samāpyatām'*, only the scripture *'samāpti kāmo maṅgalam ācaret'* teaches absence of obstackle to be the operation.

It should be noted that benediction cannot have transcendental merit (*apūrva*) as its operation (*dvāra*), as then the same benediction cannot be the ordinary subsidiary cause (*laukikāṅga*). When the fruit of completion of the activity (*samāpti*) can be obtained from the already assumed cause (absence of abstacle), assumption of a separate cause is contradictory.

The Mīmāṁsakas refute the argument that "Benediction is performed to destroy the obstackle; and therefore, benediction needs to be undertaken only at the time of the ascertainment of the obstackle (*vighna niścaya*), but not at the time of the doubt regarding obstackle (*vighna sandeha*); for, only the ascertainment of obstackle is the cause of the activity of the person desirous

of destruction of obstackle." According to the Mīmāmsakas, traditional scholars perfom benediction both at the time of doubt regarding obstackle and ascertainment of obstackle; and therefore knowledge of obstackle (*vighna jñāna*) in general is the cause of activity. It should be noted that even the injunction inferred from the practice of benediction (*tādṛśācārānumita vidhi*) teaches the person, desirous of the completion of the undertaken activity (*ārabdha samāpti kāma*) and having the knowledge of obstackle in general (*vighna jñāna*), to be the entitled person. Also therefore, even the objection that "The obstackle (*vighna*) is the qualification of entitled person (*adhikāri viśeṣaṇa*); and therefore activity towords benediction (*pravṛtti*) is not tenable in the case of the doubt regarding the obstackle (*tat sandeha*)" becomes refuted. For, unlike in the case of Vedic rites, activity is possible, even without the ascertainment of entitlement (*adhikāra niścaya*) in the ordinary rites. Further, it should be noted that the person, entitled for primary rite (*pradhānādhikārin*), has entitlement for the subsidiary rite (*aṅgādhikāra*) as the benediction is merely the subsidiary rite (*aṅga*).

Desire for completion is qualification

I. i. 9. It is not correct to argue that when the principal rite is desired to be commenced, obstackle becomes only the qualification of the entitled person. For, obstackle and qualification are contradictory. On the other hand, desire for completion of undertaken activity is the qualification; and the same is ascertained in the entitled person.

Some argue here as follows : That though in other cases, expiation etc, have the person of ascertained entitlement as the agent, benediction has only the person of doubtful entitlement as the agent; for, the Vedic scripture, inferred from the practice of the traditional scholars of doubtfull obstackle, teaches only such persons to be the agents.

However, this is not correct. Entitlement of person cannot be ascertained in terms of possessing obstackle. Also at times, activity is undertaken dispite the ascertainment of obstackle. Moreover, the examiners undertake the activity of benediction even for the removal of the doubtful undesired obstackle. It can be explained as follows : In the case of doubt regarding the poison produced from snake-bite, etc, activity of drinking medicine is undertaken for the destruction of poison. Also, activity is undertaken for the agriculture etc. on account of the ascertainment of the state of being the means dispite the doubt regarding the fruit of crop. In the same way, activity is undertaken for the benediction dispite doubt regarding obstackle. Supposing the activity is undertaken for the agriculture from the reasoning that fruit of crop is certainly produced from the agriculture in the presence of rain etc, then the activity

for the benediction too can be explained from the reasoning that fruit of the completion of the composition is certainly produced from the benediction in the presence of obstackle.

Explanation :

The Mīmāmsakas refute the argument that obstackle (*durita*) must be considered to be the qualification of the entitled person (*adhikāri viśeṣaṇa*) when the principal rite (*pradhāna*) is desired to be commenced. According to them, obstackle and qualification are mutually contradictory (*virodhāt*); and hence obstackle cannot be the qualification. Therefore, only the desire for the completion of the rite (*samāpti kāmanā*) is the qualification of the entitled person.

Some scholars argue here that since the Vedic scripture (Veda), inferred from the practice of the traditional scholars (*ācārāmumita*), teaches only the persons of doubtful entitlement (*sandigdhādhikāra*) to be the agents, benediction has only the persons doubtful of entitlement as the agents; and this is inspite of the fact that other activities such as expiation (*prāyaścitta*) have only the persons of ascertained entitlement (*niścitā dhikāra*) as the agents.

However, the Mīmāmsakas refute the argument on the ground that the entitlement of persons cannot be ascertained in terms of possessing obstackle (*vighna vattvena*). According to them, the examiners (*parīkṣakas*) undertake the activity (for benediction) even for removing the doubtful obstackle (*śaṅkitā niṣṭa*); and hence ascertainment of obstackle cannot be the qualification. Also it should be noted that activity is undertaken for the agriculture etc. (*kṛṣyādi*) from the ascertainment of being the means (*upāyatva niṣcaya*) dispite the doubt regarding the fruit crop (*phala samśaya*); and therefore, activity can be undertaken for the benediction dispite the doubt regarding the obstackle. Further, it should be noted that since activity is undertaken for the agriculture etc. merely from the reasoning that fruit of crop is necesserily produced from agriculture in the presence of rain, activity can be undertaken for the benediction from the reason that fruit of completion is produced necessarily from benediction in the presence of obstackle.

Avoidance of contradiction of sphyāśliṣṭejyādhikaraṇa and justification for benediction

I. i. 10. It may be objected now as follows : That in the case of the sacrifice necessitated by the sticking of food-particles, wherein the laddle is a constituent part of the New Moon and Full Moon sacrifices, by way of being stirring implement, the subsidiary rite of the installation of the deity, to be performed on the previous day as prescribed by the rule of transfer, is stated

not to be performed in the event of the doubt regarding the operation of sticking of food particles. And this instance is like the instance of the subsidiary activity of pounding, which is not to be performed in the event of the absence of the operation of dehusking in the case of golden Kalāya beans. Therefore, how is it tenable that benediction is performed in the event of the doubt regarding the operation of the destruction of obstackle due to the doubt regarding obstackle?

However, this is not correct. In the case of occasional rites, only the person, possessing the knowledge of incidental cause, is entitled for the performance. For instance, in the case of 'He makes offering in the event of breaking', only the person, having the knowledge of the breaking of the potsherd, is entitled for the performance. In the same way, in the present case of New and Full Moon sacrifice, only the person, having the knowledge of the skicking of food-particles, to the laddle, is entitled for the performance of installation. And since the ascertainment (knowledge) of the sticking of food-particles to the laddle is absent on the previous day, the non-performance of the installation of the deity is justified.

Moreover, performance of subsidiary rite is justified only in the case of the ascertainment of the performance of the principle sacrifice (rite). And the ascertainment of the sticking of food-particle is absent on the previous day in the case of the doubt regarding the sticking of food-particle to the laddle. Now, since the person does not have the entitlement for the performance of the principle rite, he does not have the entitilement for the performance of the subsidiary rite as well. Thus, the installation of deity, the subsidiary rite, is not justified on the previous day. Also supposing the installation of deity is performed in accordance with the law of supposition that "If the entitlement is absent"..., then the same installation would become fruitless, as the same is performed by the person without the entitlement.

It should be noted that in the case of the sticking of food-particles to the laddle, the installation of the diety is not tenable on the previous day, dispite the ascertainment of the performance of the principle sacrifice. For, the part of the subsidiary, viz. the previous day is absent on the following day. Thus, the subsidiary rite of the installation of the diety on the previous day is contradictory in the case of the principle sacrifice on the following day. Whereas, in the case of benediction, the person, having the mere knowledge of obstackle, is stated to be the entitled; and such an entitlement of the form of the knowledge of obstackle is quite tenable even in the case of doubt regarding obstackle. Further, since the ascertainment of the performance is quite possible with respect to the principle activity of composition, performance

of benediction is justified dispite the doubt regarding the operation (of the distruction of obstackle).

Explanation :

The Pūrvapakṣin raises the objection that in the case of the sacrifice necessitated by the sticking of food particles, wherein the laddle (*sphya*) is the constituent part of the New–Moon and Full–Moon sacrifices (*darśa dharma*), the subsidiary rite (*aṅga*) of the installation of deity (*devatāvāhana*) on the previous day is stated not to be performed in the event of the doubt regarding the operation (*dvāra saṁśaya*) of sticking of food-particles to the laddle (*sphyāśleṣa*). Similarly, in the case of benediction being the subsidiary of the principal activity of composition, the subsidiary rite of benediction need not be performed in the event of the doubt regarding the operation of the destruction of obstackle (*taddvāra saṁśaya*) due to the doubt regarding the obstackle (*vighna saṁśaya*).

However, the Mīmāṁsakas refute the objection. According to them, in the case of occasional rites (*naimittika*), only the person having the knowledge of incidental cause (*nimittavān*) is entitled to perform(*adhikārin*). Therefore, in the case of New and Full Moon sacrifices, only the person having the knowledge of the sticking of food-particles to the laddle (*āśleṣavān*) is entitled to perform the installation of deity; however, since the ascertainment of the sticking of food - particles (*āśleṣa niścaya*) is absent on the previous day, the non-performance of installation of deity (*ananuṣṭhāna*) is justified. The Mīmāṁsakas note that the performance of the subsidiary rite (*aṅgānuṣṭhāna*) follows the ascertainment of the performance of the principle rite (*ijyā kartavyatā niścaya*); and the ascertainment of the same performance, i.e. installation of deity (*āvāhana*), is not tenable on the previous day in the event of the doubt regarding the sticking of food particles to the laddle (*āśleṣa saṁśaya*). Now since the person does not have the entitlement for the subsidiary rite (*aṅge' dhikāra*), he does not have the entitlement for the principle rite (*pradhāne' dhikāra*) either; and therefore the installation of the deity (*āvāhana*), the subsidiary rite, is not justified on the previous day. Also, the installation cannot be performed in accordance with the law of '*yadi na syāt*', as then the performance of installation would become fruitless (*niṣphala*), as done by unentitled person.

Further the Mīmāṁsakas note that the installation of deity (*āvāhana*) is not tenable on the previous day, even at the ascertainment of the perfomance of the principle rite (*ijyā kartavyatā niścaya*), as the part of the subsidiary rite (*aṅga*), viz. previous day (*pūrvadina*) is absent on the following day. Thus the performance of the installation of deity is only contradictory in the case of

the principle rite on the previous day. However, on the contrary, in the case of benediction, even the person, possessing merely the knowledge of obstackle (*vighna jñāna*), is said to be the entitled person (*adhikārin*); and such an entitlement is possible even at the time of the doubt regarding obstackle (*saṁśaya*). Also since the ascertainment of the performance (*kartavyatā niścaya*) is quite possible in the case of principle act of composition (*pradhāne*), the performance of benediction is quite justificed even at the doubt regarding the operation of the destruction of obstackle (*dvāra saṁśaya*).

Benediction is subsidiary rite

I. i. 11. In the case of ordinary rites of prosperity such as future marriage, the person, merely possessing the knowledge of the incidental cause, is entitled to perform. For, only such is the practice.

It may be argued now as follows : That the subsidiary rites are to be enjoined only by the injunction of principle rites. And no injunction enjoining the principle rite of composition exists in the case of the completion of the textual composition etc. (Hence, benediction cannot be enjoined). And also no Vedic scripture can be part of the ordinary non-Vedic statement teaching the performance of subsidiary rite of benediction. For, the Vedic scripture is independant of the ordinary statement.

However, this is not correct. Only the Vedic subsidiary rites, that produce the transcendental merits, are so, i.e. are to be enjoined by the injunction of principle rites. Moreover, the scripture, inferred from the practice of the learned traditional scholars, can enjoin benediction to be the subsidiary of the composition even without a distinct injunction of principle rite, i.e. injuction of composition.

Moreover, the state of being the performance of the subsidiary rite, to be taught by what teaches the performance of the principle rite, is conducive, i.e. is pervasive of the subsidiary riteness. And such a subsidiary riteness is present in benediction also. Since the absence of impediment, i.e. distruction of obstackle is the cause of all effects (fruits) in general, even the ordinary non-Vedic statement teaching the performance of activity is dependent on the injunction teaching the performance of benediction. (which produces distruction of obstackle). It should not be argued, however, that the time and space of principle activity would be required to be related to the subsidiary rite, i.e. benediction, like in the case of Vedic sacrifices. The time and space of principle activity is related to the non-ordinary Vedic subsidiary rite which is extra ordinary and conducive to transcedental merit. That is why, the time and space of the principle activity is not related to the subsidiary rite of tying of tuft of hair.

Explanation :

The Mīmāmsakas now explain that in the case of ordinary rites (*ābhyudayike*) such as future marriage (*bhaviṣyd vivāha*), etc, person merely having the knowledge of the incidental cause (*nimitta jñāna vān*) is entitled (*adhikārin*), as only such is the practice.

Now, the Pūrvapakṣin raises the argument that the subsidiary rites (*aṅga*) are to be enjoined only by the injunction enjoining the principle rites (*pradhāna vidhi vidheya*); and since no principle injunction enjoining the completion of the text (*granthādi samāpti*) exists in the case of the completion of textual composition, benediction cannot be enjoined to be the subsidiary rite of textual compostion. Also the Pūrvapakṣin raises the argument that no Vedic scripture (*śāstra*) can be the part (*ekadeśa*) of the ordinary non-Vedic statement (*laukika pramāṇa*) teaching the subsidiary rite of benediction (*tatkartavyatā bodhaka*); and therefore, benediction can, in no way, be the subsidiary of textual composition.

However, the Mīmāmsakas refute the argument. According to them, only the Vedic subsidiary rites (*aṅga*), that produce the transcendental merits (*apūrva janaka*), are to be enjoined by the injunctions of principle rites; and hence benediction, being non-Vedic subsidiary rite, need not be enjoined by the injunction enjoining principle rite of composition. Also, the Mīmāmsakas point out that benediction can be enjoined to be the subsidiary rite of textual composition (*tadaṅga*) by the scripture inferred from practice (*ācārānumita śruti*); and hence the main injunction enjoing the principle rite of textual composition (*pradhāna vidhi*) is not neccessary.

Further, the Mīmāmsakas state that the state of being the performance of the subsidiary rite (*kartavyatākatva*), to be taught by what teaches the performance of the principle rite (*pradhānakartavyatā bodhaka*), is conducive (*prayojaka*), i.e. pervassive of the subsidiary riteness; and the same riteness is present in benediction. And since the absence of impediment, i.e. destruction of obstackle (*pratibandhakābhāva*), is the cause of the effect in general (*sakala kārya hetu*), the ordinary non-Vedic statement (*laukika pramāṇa*) depends on the statement teaching benediction which produces destruction of obstackle. Further the Mīmāmsakas refute the argument that when the subsidiary rite of benediction is taught by the statement teaching the principle activity, the space and time of principle activity would be required to be related to benediction. According to them, the space and time is related to only non-ordinary or Vedic subsidiary (*asādhāraṇa*) conducive to transcendental merit (*apūrva janaka*). For instance, therefore, the time and space of the principle activity (*pradhāna deśakāla*) are not related to the subsidiary act of tying of tuft of hair (*baddha śikhatva*).

Conclusion of the Traditional Mīmāmsakas

I. i. 12. It should not be argued that in the case where absence of obstackle is established intrinsically by the totality of causes of itself, the performance of benediction, along with its subsidiaries, becomes useless; and therefore the Vedic injunction enjoining the performance of such a benediction becomes invalid. For, only in the case where obstackle is known to have been produced, from the non-Vedic ordinary means, the Vedic injunction teaches benediction to be the cause of destruction of obstackle. However, the Vedic injunction does not teach benediction in the case where the absence of obstackle is established intrinsically by iteself by violating such a rule.

That is why, performance of prohibited activity by the person, having the true knowledge of the Ultimate reality, for the sake of mere enjoyment, does not produce any demerit due to the absence of fault or defect. Thus, the Vedic statement teaching the performance of such a prohibited activity does not become unauthoritative.

Further it may be argued that in the case of the absence of obstackle, obtained intrinsically by the totality of causes of itself, but known extrinsically from some other means, benediction is not performed by the traditional scholars; and therefore, compulsory performance of benediction, like that of obligatory rites, by the traditional scholars becomes violated. However, this is not correct. The traditional scholars aware of obstackle perform benediction in any case like obligatory rites. This is the traditional view of the Mīmāmsakas.

Explanation :

The traditional Mīmāmsakas conclude their view now. According to them, it is not correct to argue that the Vedic injunction teaching the performance of benediction (*tadveda*) becomes invalid (*aparmāṇa*) when the performance of benediction is useless (*niṣphala*) in the case of instrinsically established (*svataḥ siddha*) absence of obstacle (*duritābhāva*). For, the Vedic statement (Veda) teaches benediction to be the destroyer of obstackle (*tad dhvamsa janaka*) only in the case where the obstackle is known to have been produced from ordinary means (*lokāvagata kāraṇa*), and not otherwise.

Further the Mīmāmsakas explain that the performance of prohibited activity (*niṣiddhā nuṣthāna*) of the person having the knowledge of the Ultimate reality *(tattva jñāna vat)*, meant for the sake of enjoyment (*bhoga*), does not produce the wrong (*adharma janaka*); and therefore, the Vedic statement teaching such an activity does not become non-authoritative (*apramāṇa*). Finally, the Mīmāmsakas refute the argument that the compulsory performance of benediction (*tad anuṣthāna*), like obligatory rite (*nitya*), would become

untenable in the case where the absence of obstackle (*duritābhāva*), obtained intrinsically by the totality of causes of itself (*svataḥ siddha*), is known from other means. According to them, the traditional people, having the knowledge of obstackle (*vighna jñāna vān*), perform benediction compulsoryly in any case like obligatory rite; and hence performance of benediction gets established as the cause of completion of the intended activity like literary composition.

Refutation of Mīmāmsakas' view

I. i. 13. No, this view of the Mīmāmsakas is not correct. For, the activity, such as the composition of literary work, undertaken by the careless Udayana is seen to be completed even without the performance of benediction. And the rite (benediction) cannot be the subsidiary to the composition of literary work which becomes completed even without it (benediction). Also, the same rite (benediction), performed in an earlier birth cannot be the subsidiary. For, the tranditional scholars do not perform benediction in the earlier birth with the intention of completion of the literary composition in the next birth.

Now, it may be argued as follows : That in the case of sacrifice performed to obtain male childern, the birth of male children (in the next birth) is considered to be the fruit provided that the rite (sacrifice) is completed along with its subsidiary rites and no fruit (of child birth) has taken place in the present birth. In the same way, in the case of benediction, performed along with its subsidiaries, the completion of literacy composition in the next birth is the fruit provided that the fruit of completion is not obtained in the present birth. However, this argument is not correct. In the case of sacrifice performed to obtain male children, merely desire for male children (without specifying the time limit) is mentioned. However, in the present case of benediction, benediction is performed with the explicit intention of completing the literary composition to be undertaken in the present birth only. Therefore, the Vedic statements teaching such a completion needs to be inferred. And thus, only the completion of the literary composition to be commenced at the near future is the fruit of benediction like that in the case of Kārīrī sacrifice.

Now it may be argued again as follows : That neither the immediate, i.e. present, nor the relation of the immediate, i.e. future completion, is produced from benediction; and therefore, merely completion of literacy composition in general is the fruit of benediction. And such a fruit of composition is common to both present and future completions. However, this is not correct. The immediate time is indicative, i.e. inclusive of the completion occuring in only present time. Otherwise, even the Kārīrī sacrifice cannot be admitted to have the fruit occuring in the immediate present time. Therefore, benediction cannot be subsidiary to the literary composition due to deviation.

Explanation :

Gaṅgeśa refutes the traditional Mīmāmsakas' view that benediction (*maṅgala*) is subsidiary (*aṅga*) to the activity such as the literary composition etc. According to him, such a view is untenable, as the activity such as the literary composition undertaken by the careless Udayana (*pramattānuṣṭhita*) is seen to be completed even without benediction. Further the rite of benediction cannot be subsidiary to the literary composition which is completed without it. Also, the rite of benediction performed in an earlier birth (*janmāntrīya*) cannot be the subsidiary, as no traditional scholar performs benediction with the intention of completing the activity of composition in the next birth.

Also Gaṅgeśa refutes the argument that when no fruit of completion of literary composition (*phala*) is obtained, dispite the performance of benediction along with its subsidiary rites (*sāṅga maṅgala*), only the completion in the next birth (*āmuṣmika*) needs to be the fruit; and it is like when no fruit of male children is obtained in the present birth dispite the performance of sacrifice for male child (*putreṣṭi*) along with its subsidiary, only the male children in the next birth is considered to be the fruit. According to him, in the case of *putreṣṭi*, merely desire for the male children (*putramātra*) without specifying the time limit is mentioned; and therefore male children in the next birth can be the fruit; however in the present case, benediction is performed with the specific desire for the completion of undertaken literary composition (*prārīpsita samāpti kāmanā*) in the present birth only; and therefore the completion in the next birth cannot be the fruit. Thus, only the completion of the literary composition at the present time (*āsanna samāyā rabdha*) needs to be the fruit.

Also Gaṅgeśa refutes the argument that since neither present completion (*āsanna samaya*) nor future completion (*tat sambandha*) are to be produced by benediction, mere completion, common to both present and future completions (*aihikāmuṣmika sādhāraṇa*), is the fruit of benediction. According to him, the term 'immediate time' (*āsanna samaya*) is indicative of the completion occuring in it (*svavṛtti samāpti*); and therefore benediction cannot be admitted to be subsidiary (*aṅga*) to the activity of literary composition due to deviation.

Theory of Mīmāṁsakaikadeśins : Benediction is Principle

I. i. 14. Others, i.e. the Mīmāmsakaikadeśins hold here as follows: That benediction is a principle rite or activity; completion of the activity undertaken is the fruit through transcendental merit; and the person desirous of completion is the entitled one. At times, however, the absence of fruit is due to the imperfection in the performance of the activity etc like in the case of Kārīrī - sacrifice.

However, benediction is not the most efficient cause of completion at any other time than that of the commencement of activity (through transcendental merit). The Vedic scripture that 'The person who is desirous of the completion of the activity and who is going to commence the fruitful activity, ought to perform benediction inferred from the performance of benediction regularly at the commencement of the activity" teaches the performance of principle rite of benediction only at the time of the commencement of the activity. For instance, it is like the Vedic scripture that 'The person who is going to commence the New Moon and Full Moon sacrifices ought to offer the cake of eleven potsherds belonging to Viṣṇu to the fire' teaches the performance of the principle rite of *Ārambhaṇīyā* sacrifice at the commencement of the New Moon and the Full Moon - sacrifies. Though benediction is an optional activity to be performed on account of the desire for some fruit, it needs to be performed regularly at the commencement of the activity; for, the person, desirous of the completion of the undertaken activity, performs benediction necessarily as the means of completion.

It may be argued now as follows : That if benediction is an optional rite, then performance of benediction would become untenable even at the commencement of the fruitful activity in the absence of the desire for the completion of the undertaken activity. However, this is not correct. Since only the completed activity is competent to produce fruit, the person desirous of fruit would necessarily have a desire for the completion of the undertaken activity.

Explanation :

Gaṅgeśa now reports the theory of the Mīmāmsakaikadeśins. According to them, benediction is a principle rite or activity (*pradhāna*); completion of the undertaken activity (*ārabdha karma samāpti*) is fruit (*phala*); and the person desirous of completion (*tatkāma*) is entitled one (*adhikārin*). However, they note that absence of fruit of completion (*phalābhāva*), despite the performance, is due to the imperfection in the performance of the activity (*kāmādi vaikalya*); and hence performance of benediction is obligatory. Also the Mīmāmsakaikadeśins note that benediction cannot be the most efficient cause (*karaṇa*) of completion at any other time than that of commencement of activity (*anyadā*). According to them, the scripture that 'The person who is desirous of completion, (*samāpti kāma*) and who is going to commence the fruitful activity (*phalavat karmāripsamāna*) ought to perfom, benediction' (*maṅgalam ācaret*) teaches the performance of benediction of the commencement of activity. It should be noted that dispite benediction being an optional activity on account of desire for some fruit (*kāmanopādhikārya*),

it should be performed regularly at the commencement (*niyatam*), as the person desirous of completion of the undertaken activity (*ārabdhakarma samāptyarthin*) regularly performs it as a means of completion (*upāyatvena*).

Further, the Mīmāmsakaikadeśins refute the argument that if benediction is an optional rite (*kāmya*), then the performance of benediction would become untenable even at the time of commencement of fruitful activity (*phalavat karmārambha*) without the desire for completion (*parisamāpti kāmanā*). According to them, person desirous of fruit (*phalārthin*) necessarily has a desire for completion, as only completed activity (*samāpta karman*) can produce effect.

Refutation of the Mīmāmskaikadeśins' Theory

I. i. 15. However, this theory is not correct. Even the transcendental merit, produced from benediction, is the excellence produced from the enjoined principle rite or activity, like the excellence produced from the enjoined rite of Kārīrī - sacrifice is the excellence produced from the enjoined rite; and therefore, it constitutes the totality of causes that in turn facilitates fruit. Thus, the completion of the commenced work would become contingent in the present birth only. For, the Vedic activity is never performed without the ascertainment of the necessary production of fruit.

Further such a contingency cannot be a desired contingency. For, in spite of the fact that an abundant benediction, along with all its subsidiaries, is performed, the completion of commenced activity is absent in some cases like Kādambari. Also the future completion in the next birth cannot be the fruit, as all the Vedic rites or activities have only the completion in the present birth as the fruit. Further, the fruit in the present birth cannot be prevented from the future sin due to the rule of necessity of the production of fruit from the efficient cause. Moreover, benediction would become the cause of completion without the operation of the next person, like the Kārīrī - sacrifice, which is the cause of fruit without the operation of the next person. However, such cannot be the case. Also suppose the operation such as the throat - palate - contact is required due to being the cause known from ordinary practice, then let the same operation be the cause of completion; and hence what is the use of benediction?

Explanation :

Gaṅgeśa refutes the Mīmāmsakaikadeśins' theory. According to him, when benediction is a principle rite, the transcendental merit produced from benediction (*maṅgala janyāpūrva*) becomes the excellence produced from the enjoined principle rite (*vihita pradhāna janyātiśaya*); and therefore it needs

to constitute the totality of causes (*aśeṣa kāraṇasampādaka*) that in turn facilitates fruit (*phala sampādaka*). Thus, the completion of the commenced work (*ārabdha karma samāpti*) would become absolutely necessary in the present birth, as the Vedic rite is never performed without the ascertainment of the necessary production of fruit (*phalāvaśyambhāva*).

Also Gaṅgeśa refutes the argument that such a contingency of necessary production of fruit of completion (*phalāvaśyam bhāva*) in the present birth is only desired. According to him, at times, completion of commenced activity like Kādambari (*ārabdha samāpti*) is not attained dispite the performance of benediction along with subsidiary (*sāṅga*). Further, Gaṅgeśa refutes the argument that only future completion of work at the next birth (*āmuṣmika*) is the fruit of benediction. According to him, all Vedic activities have only present fruit (*aihika mātra*) as the fruit, as even future sin (*āgantuka durita*) cannot impede the necessary present fruit. Also it should be noted that benediction, like Kārīrī - sacrifice, cannot be the cause of fruit (completion) (*phala hetu*) without the operation of next (future) person (*agrima puruṣa*), as it is undescribed. And if quality such as throat - palate - contact (*kaṇṭha tālvabhighāta*) is the necessary operation, then only such an operation, and not benediction, needs to be admitted as the cause of completion of literary work.

Primafacie view : Benediction is not Means

I. i. 16. It may be held now as follows : That in the presence of the totality of known causes, producing commenced work, the Vedic scripture teaches benediction to be the means (cause) of completion of the commanced work; and this instance is like the Vedic scripture teaching the Putrakāmeṣṭi to be the means of obtaining male children. However, this position is not correct. Since in such a case, male children are not born in the presence of mere known causes, the sacrifice, performed to obtain male children, may be admitted to produce male children through the operation of transcendental merit.

Further it is not correct to argue that even in the presence of all the known causes, there arises some delay in the completion of the commenced literary work; and therefore, the transcendental merit produced from benediction is required to produce the completion. Also since the work undertaken by the careless atheist gets completed even without benediction, the same benediction cannot be the cause in the completion of the undertaken, i.e. commenced work.

It may be argued now that only the acquisition of merit in the other (earliar) birth is the cause of the completion of the work undertaken by the careless in this (present) birth. However, this is not correct either. Even then,

deviation from benediction would be contingent. You may argue now that there is an option that sometimes acquisition of merit (from actions in previous birth) and sometimes benediction (in the present birth) are the causes of completion like the option that sometimes paddy and sometimes barley grain are the causes. However, we shall reply that then in such an option the obligatory performance of benediction always with the hope of completion of the undertaken activity would become untenable. Further, both merit and benediction cannot be the causes prescribed by the Vedic scripture simultaneously like the paddy cannot be the cause in the option of the use of (both) barley grain (and paddy).

Explaination :

The Pūrvapaksin refutes the position that the Vedic scripture (*śruti*) teaches the state of being the means of completion (*samāpti sādhanatva*) to the benediction in the presence of the totality of known causes (*dṛṣta kāraṇa sampatti*), in the case of the completion of the undertaken activity like it teaches the state of being the means to the sacrifice performed to obtain male children. According to him, benediction need not be the means of the completion, as the totality of known causes itself can produce the completion, unlike the totality of known causes of obtaining male children.

The Pūrvapakṣin refutes the position that transcendental merit produced from benediction (*maṅgala janyādṛṣṭa*) is required, as the completion of literacy work is delayed even in the presence of all the known causes (*dṛṣṭa sakalahetu sampatti*). According to him, no delay occurs in the completion of literary work in the presence of all the causes. Also since the completion of the work undertaken by the careless (*pramattānuṣṭhita*) is experienced without benediction, the same benediction cannot be the cause.

Further the Pūrvapakṣin refutes the argument that acquisition of merit in another (earliar) birth (*janmāntarīya puṇyasampatti*) is the cause of completion in the present birth. According to him, deviation of benediction from completion cannot be overcome in such a position as well. Also, in the case of optional causality of both merit and benediction, the obligatory performance of benediction would become untenagble; and the Vedic scripture cannot prescribe both merit and benediction as the causes of completion, as option is contradictory to both being causes.

Refutation of further argument

I. i. 17. It may be argued now as follows : That the injunctive statement does not teach the necessary existence (practice) of benediction prior to the fruit of completion; rather, it teaches merely the necessity of production of fruit of completion from benediction. However, this is not correct. Only the

state of being the means to the desired goal of completion is the meaning of the injunctive statement.

It may be proposed now that deviation of cause from fruit is a fault only in the case where the causality is known from both positive and negative concomitances. However, the same deviation of cause is not a fault in the case where the causality is known from the Vedic scripture. That is why it has been stated that since the objective of completion is based on the Vedic scripture, deviation is not a fault. Thus, benediction and sacrifice etc can be the means to the heaven etc. However, this is not correct. The regular existence (practice) prior to the completion, which is to be known from the Vedic scripture, is absent in the benediction; and therefore, benediction cannot be taught to have the causality even from the scripture. Whereas only a particular generic property of fruitness is present in the case of the heaven produced from the sacrifice and the rain produced from the Kārīrī - sacrifice - respectively.

Explanation :

The Pūrvapakṣin refutes the argument that injunctive statement (*vidhivākya*) does not teach the necessary existence (practice) of benediction prior to the fruit of completion (*phala niyata pūrvasattva*); rather it teaches merely the necessity of production of fruit of completion (*phālavaśyam bhāva*) from benediction. According to him, only the state of being the means to the desired goal of completion (*iṣṭasādhanatva*) is the meaning of the injunctive statement (*vidhyartha*); and hence the injunctive statement cannot teach the necessity of fruit from benediction.

Also the Pūrvapakṣin refutes the argument that deviation of cause (benediction) (*vyabhicāra*) from fruit (completion) is a fault (*doṣa*), only when the causality is known merely from the possitive and negative concomitances (*anvaya vyatireka*), but it is not so when the same is known from the Vedic scripture (*āgama*); thus, dispite deviation, sacrifice and benediction etc. (*yāgādi*) can be the means to the heaven and completion etc. (*svargasādhana*). According to him, since the existence (practice) of benediction regularly before the completion (*niyatapūrva sattva*), which needs to be known (*grāhya*), is absent, even the Vedic scripture cannot teach the causality of benediction. Thus, benediction cannot be the cause of completion of undertaken activity, unlike sacrifice etc. which are means of producing heaven etc.

Position of Others

I. i. 18. Other scholars hold here as follows : That benediction has the state of producing the completion of commenced activity through the relational absence of obstackle; for, the absence of obstackle or impediment is the cause only as being the constant relational absence of obstackle. Such a relational

absence is either the destruction of the existing obstackle or the non-production of the future obstackle; and it continues to exist up to the time of the completion of the activity. And the anticedent absence (of the future abstackle) is the effect to be accomplished through the destruction of the causes of the obstruction. The state of being the effect to be accomplished from the cause of an effect constitutes the existence, i.e. the production of the effect in the next moment in the existence of the cause, and the same constitutes the non-existence, i.e. the non-production of the effect in the absence of the cause. However, such a state of being the effect does not constitute the existence, i.e. the production of what does not exist due to heaviness. And the antecedent absence of future obstackle does indeed have such a state of being the effect upon the destruction of the causes of obstackle. And the non-production of obstackle in the intervening time is not accomplished directly from the benediction; and therefore the same needs to be produced indirectly through the operation of transcendental merit. Thus, this way, practice or performance of benediction with the desire that 'Let the commenced activity be completed without obstackle' too becomes tenable.

From this the following objection that 'In the case where absence of obstackle is accomplished intrinsically by the lack of cause itself, benediction becomes non-conducive or non-productive of the absence of abstackle; hence the Vedic scripture enjoining benediction is non-authoritative' too becomes refuted. For, even in such cases, absence of future obstackles is to be produced from benediction. Also in the case of recitation of praise of Vināyaka etc, which consists of the Vedic scripture, viz. "All the obstackles subside by the praise of Vināyaka", the activity or rite performed by the careless becomes completed merely from the recitation of the praise of Vināyaka etc only. Thus, in this beginingless cycle of birth and rebirth, the praise of Vināyaka is necessarily performed by some one somewhere. Therefore, benediction is only an option to the praise of Vināyaka. Also, in the case where no fruit of completion is produced dispite the performance of benediction along with all the subsidiaries, the non-production of completion is due to the abundance (plentifulness) of obstackles.

Explanation :

Gaṅgeśa explains now the position of the Other scholars (Apare). According to them, benediction (*maṅgala*) has the state of producing the commenced activity (*ārabdha karma nirvāhakatva*) through the operation of the constant relational absence of obstackle (*vighna samsargābhāva*), as the absence of obstackle or impediment (*pratibandhākābhāva*) is the cause only as relational absence. And such an absence of obstackle continues to exist till the completion of the activity (*karma nirvāha*) either as being the destruction of the existing obstackle (*vighna dhvamsta*) or as being the antecedent absence of future obstackle (*anāgata vighna*). It should be noted that the antecedent absence of obstackle (*vighna prāgabhāva*) is the effect to be accomplished (*sādhya*) through the destruction of the causes of obstackle (*vighna kāraṇa nāśa*). Also the state of being the effect to be accomplished from the causes of effect (*tajjanyatva*) means the existence, i.e. the production of the effect in the next moment in the presence of the cause; and the same means the non-existence, i.e. the non-production of the effect in the absence of cause, but not the production of the non-existing entity (*asataḥ sattva*). The antecedent absence of the obstackle has such an effectness (*tattātva*), after the destruction of the cause of obstackle. However since the non-production of obstackle (*vighnānutpāda*) in the intervening time cannot be possible from benediction, the same is obtained indirectly through the operation of transcendental merit (*adṛṣṭadvārā*). Thus, the Others establish that the practice or performance of benediction with the desire, viz. 'Let the activity be completed without obstackle' (*nirvighnam parisamāpyatām*) becomes tenable. Further the Other scholars refute the objection that in the case where the absence of obstackle is accomplished intrinsically by lack of cause itself, benediction becomes non productive; and hence the Vedic scripture enjoining the performance of such a benediction is invalid or non-authoritative (*apramāṇa*). According to them, benediction produces only the absence of future obstackle (*anāgata vighnābhāva*) in such cases; and hence the Vedic scripture is authoritative. It should be noted that the praise of Vināyaka etc. is conducive to the completion of the activity performed by the careless (*pramattā nuṣṭhita*) etc; and hence in the case where the Vedic scripture enjoins the praise of Vināyaka etc, benediction (*maṅgala*) is only an option (*vikalpa*) to the praise of Vināyaka. And the deviation of benediction from the completion is to be avoided, in the case where the completion does not occur despite the performance of benediction along with its subsidiaries (*sāṅga maṅgala*), due to the abundance of obstackles (*vighna bhūyastva*).

Refutation of Others' view and Summary of Prima facie view

I. I. i. 19. However, this position of Others is not correct. Non-production or antecedent absence of obstackles is not justified to be the operation (in the production of completion of activity from benediction). For, the same non-production of obstackles is merely the associate cause (of completion) as being the constant relational absence.

It may be argued now that absence of obstackle is an operation in the form of being the relational absence; and the same state is present even in the antecedent absence. However, this is not correct. In that case, even

constant absence would need to become operation. Also suppose the absence of obstackle, accomplished intrinsically by the totality of causes of itself, does not have the causality, then such a contingency would become equally applicable to the antecedent absence of obstackle as well.

Moreover, in the case where benediction is performed, causes of obstackle need not be necessarily present, so that antecedent absence of obstackle could have been definitely accomplished through the destruction of causes of obstackle. Also therefore, benediction is not conducive to the destruction of obstackle in the case where non-origination (non-production) of obstackle too is accomplished instrinsically by the lack of cause itself. Also since destruction of obstackle and non-origination of obstackle, which continue to exist until the time of completion of the commenced activity, can be produced from benediction only, transcendental merit need not be the operation meant to produce destruction of obstackle etc. That is why, it has been stated that in the case where benediction is construed, i.e. performed merely as an option (to the praise of Vināyaka etc), the necessary performance of benediction by the traditional scholars would not be tenable.

Suppose benediction is the principle rite, then even benediction, along with its subsidiaries, would not sufice to be the cause of completion; for, completion of commenced activity is absent at times, dispite the presence of benediction. Also it cannot be argued that only abundant quantity of benediction is the cause of completion. For, fruit of completion is produced even from non-abundant quantity of benediction.

Further both abundant and non-abundant quantities of benediction cannot be the causes of completion; for, then lack of consecutiveness would become contingent. Also it is not possible to hold that large or abundant quantity of benediction is the cause of completion in the case of the commencement of large activity; and small quantity of benediction is the cause of completion in the case of the commencement of small activity. For, fruit of completion is absent (i.e. not produced) even from such large or abundant quantity of benediction at times; and fruit of completion is present (i.e. produced) even otherwise, i.e. in the absence of such large or abundant quantity of benediction at other times.

From this the following objection too becomes refuted : "That large quantity of benediction is the cause in the case of the doubt regarding large obstackle; and small quantity of benediction is the cause in the case of the doubt regarding small obstackle. For, the Vedic statement justifying such a causality of benediction can be assumed from the corresponding practices of benediction". For, at times, activity desired to be undertaken does not get

completed even from such large or abundant quantity of benediction; and, at other times, activity desired to be undertaken gets completed even otherwise, i.e. even in the absence of such a benediction. Further since the state of being the large or abundant quantity of benediction amounts to three or four times bigger, and the state of being small or non-abundant benediction amounts to one or two times smaller, large and small benediction cannot be generalized. Consequently, such benedictions cannot be taught by the Vedic scriptures assumed from such practices of learned scholars. Thus, benediction is neither subsidiary nor primary rite. This is the summary of the Prima facie view.

Explanation :

The Pūrvapakṣin now establishes his prima facie view by refuting the position of Others (*apare*). According to him, non-production or antecedent absence of obstackle (*vighnānutpāda*) cannot be admitted to be the operation (*vāyāpāra*) of benediction in producing completion of undertaken activity, as the same non-production or antecedent absence of obstackle is considered to be the cause of completion (*hetu*) in the form of being constant relational absence (*samsargābhāva*).

The Pūrvapakṣin refutes the position that absence of obstackle (*vighnābhāva*) is the operation (*vyāpāra*) in the form of being the relational absence (*tathaiva*); and therefore even the antecedent absence (*prāgabhāva)* can be the operation. According to him, such a position involves the danger of admitting even constant absence (*atyantābhāva*) to be the operation; and if the constant absence, which is accomplished intrinsically by the totality of causes of itself (*svatasiddha*), is excluded from being the cause, then the antecedent absence (*prāgabhāva*) too becomes excluded from being the cause, by way of being accomplished intrinsically by the lack of cause itself.

Further, the Pūrvapakṣin states that in the case where benediction is performed (*maṅgala*), the causes of obstackle (*vighnakāraṇa*) need not be present; and therefore, antecedent absence of obstackle is not necessarily accomplished through the destruction of causes of obstackle. Also therefore, benediction is not conducive to completion (*akiñcitkara*) in the case where non-production of obstackle (*vighnānutpāda*) is intrinsically accomplished by the totality of causes itself (*svatah siddha*). Further the Pūrvapakṣin states that since destruction of obstackle (*vighna dhvamsa*) and non-origination of obstackle (*vighnānutpāda*), continuing upto the completion of commenced activity (*ārabdha nirvāha*), can be produced from benediction only, transcendental merit (*adṛṣṭa*) need not be the operation (*dvāra*). Further, when benediction is mere option (*vikalpa*) to the praise of Vināyaka, necessary

performance of benediction by the learned traditional scholars would become untenable. Thus benediction need not be the cause of completion.

Further, the Pūrvapakṣin notes that when benediction is considered to be a principle rite (*pradhāna*), even benediction, along with its subsidiaries (*sāṅga*), cannot be the cause of completion, as the same completion is absent inspite of the presence of benediction at times. Also the Pūrvapakṣin notes that neither abundant quantity of benediction (*pracita*), nor both abundant and small quantities of benedictions can be considered to be the causes of completion. According to him, abundant quantity of benediction cannot be the cause, as completion is produced even from non-abundant quantity of benediction (*apracita*) at times; and both cannot be causes due to deviation. Also the Pūrvapakṣin notes that abundant quantity of benediction and small quantity of benediction are causes of completion in the case of the commencement of large activity (*gurukarman*) and that of small activity (*alpakarman*) respectively. According to him, fruit of completion is absent despite such a large and small benedictions are present at times; and fruit of completion is present despite such benedictions are absent at other times.

It should be noted that this view of the Pūrvapakṣin automatically caneells the position that large quantity of benediction (*bahutara*) is the cause of completion in the case of doubt regarding large obstackle (*bahuvighna*) and small quantity of benediction (*alpatara*) is the cause of completion in the case of doubt regarding small obstackle (*alpavighna*). For, the activity desired to be undertaken (*prāripsita*) is not completed at times even from such large or small benedictions; and sometimes the activity is completed despite such benedictions. Also large and small benedictions cannot be generalized properly. Thus, the Pūrvapakṣin concludes that benediction can neither be subsidiary (*aṅga*) nor be primary rite (*pradhāna*) that causes completion of the activity.

Conclusive view of Gangeśa: Mangala is the cause of Vighna dhramsa

I. i. 20. Conclusive view of Gangeśa is as follows : That benediction is neither a subsidiary rite nor a principle rite that is conducive to the completion of the commenced activity; for, it (benediction) is not the cause (of completion). Rather, it (benediction) is a primary rite like expiatory rite and destruction of obstackle is the fruit. For, benediction is performed with a desire that let obstackle be not produced in the completion of commenced activity; also the learned scholars perform benediction in both doubt and ascertainment of obstackle; also absence of obstackle is required for completion.

Suppose benediction is performed with a desire that 'Let the commenced activity be compled without obstackle', then too only the absence, i.e. destruction of obstackle is the fruit of benediction like the heaven is the fruit of the performence of sacrifice with a desire that 'May I become heaven-attainer', by the maxim that no cognition of the qualificand is produced without the grasping of the qualifier. However, completion of commenced activity cannot be the fruit of benediction due to the deviation both ways, i.e. due to lack of positive and negative concomitances. Completion of commenced activity is produced directly from the causes known through ordinary practices after the absence of impediment such as obstackle is produced. Destruction of obstackle is certainly produced separately from benediction performed along with its subsidiary such as large and small praise of deity. Therefore, one undertakes the performance of benediction due to the ascertainment of fruit in the case of Vedic rites.

It should not be objected that in that case, the Vedic scripture becomes invalid or non-authoritative. Absence of completion of the activity is, at times, due to the abundance of earlier obstackles; and it is, at other times, due to the obstackle produced after the performance of benediction; and it is, yet at other times, due to the absence of actual causes known from ordinary practices. However, destruction of the obstackle to the activity desired to be undertaken is not possible without benediction.

Explanation :

Gaṅgeśa now establishes his conclusive theory (*siddhānta*) of benediction. According to him, benediction (*maṅgala*) is neither subsidiary (*aṅga*) nor primary rite (*pradhāna*) conducive to the completion of the commenced activity (*ārabdha karma samāpti*); rather, it is only a primary activity conducive to the fruit of destruction of obstackle (*vighna dhvamsa*). It is so because, benediction is performed with the desire that 'Let obstackle not be produced in the completion of commenced activity' (*ārabdha karma nirvāha vighno mā bhūt*), and also because absence of obstackle (*vighnābhāva*) is required for the completion.

Further Gaṅgeśa points out that only destruction of obstackle (*vighnābhāva*) is the fruit of benediction even in the view that benediction is performed with the desire that 'Let the activity be completed without obstackle' (*nirvighnam samāpyatām*), as the cognition of the qualificand, i.e. completion of the activity, is not possible without the cognition of the qualifier, i.e. distruction of obstackle (*agṛhīta viśeṣaṇa*). And completion of activity (*samāpti*) cannot be the fruit of benediction due to the deviation both ways positively and negatively (*ubhayathā vyabhicārāt*) and also due to the fact that completion can be accomplished from the causes known through ordinary means (*lokāvagata kāraṇa*). Thus, Gaṅgeśa establishes that since destruction of obstackle is certainly possible from benediction performed along with its

subsidiary (*sāṅga maṅgala*), activity towards benediction is tenable from the ascertainment of fruit in the case of Vedic rites.

Gaṅgeśa refutes that when destruction of obstackle is considered to be the fruit of benediction, the Vedic scripture enjoining benediction for the completion becomes non-authoritative (*apramāṇa*). According to him, absence of completion of the commenced activity (*samāpty abhāva*) can be explained variously due to the abundance of obstackle (*vighna bhūyastva*), due to the obstackle produced after benediction, and due to the absence of ordinary causes (*kāraṇābhāva*) etc. Thus, benedicition is the cause of only destruction of obstackle, as the same destruction of obstackle is not possible without benediction.

Benediction leads to Vighna dhvamsa

I. i. 21. It cannot be argued that expiation is the cause of the destruction of doubtful obstackle. For, expiation is not prescribed in the case of the doubt regarding obstackle. It cannot be argued that if benediction has the state of being what is to be performed as conditioned by desire, then the regular performance of benediction would become untenable. Benediction is necessarily performed as the means of the absence of impediment to the cause of commenced activity. Completion of activity does not arise without benediction in the absence of the destruction of impediment.

Further it cannot be argued that when benediction is considered to be the primary rite producing the destruction of obstackle, the same cannot be performed at the non-existence of obstackle. The scripture, inferred from the practice of the learned scholars at regular times, prescribes the performance of benediction at the time of the commencement of desired activity. And it is like the performance of the Ārambhaṇīyā *iṣṭi* at the commencement of New Moon and Full Moon sacrifices. And relaional absence of obstackle is the cause, i.e. operation of completion of activity. And such an absence is, at times, accomplished intrinsically by the causes of activity itself; and at other times, accomplished from benediction. Therefore, the activity commenced by the careless and the atheist is completed even without benediction from the constant absence of obstackle continued from the previous birth.

It should not be argued that if absence of obstackle is accomplished intrisically by the causes of activity itself, then the ascertainment of performance of benediction becomes impossible. Undertaking or performance of benediction is necessary to overcome the doubtful obstackle; and therefore, benediction is performed until doubt regarding obstackle persists. That is why, benediction is performed even in the middle of activity provided that the doubt regarding obstackle persists. Also only abundant quantity of benediction is

performed at the commencement of large or big activity in the case of doubt regarding abundant quantity of obstackle. And it has been already stated as to how benediction is undertaken (performed) even at the doubt regarding obstackle.

Explanation :

Gangeśa now establishes his view that benediction leads to the destruction of obstackle (*vighna dhvamsa*). According to him, expiation (*prāyaścitta*) does not lead to the destruction of doubtful obstackle (*śaṅkita vighna vināśa*). For, expiation is not prescribed at the time of doubt regarding obstackle (*vighna samśaya*). Also, according to him, it is not correct to argue that regular performance of benediction (*niyatānuṣṭhāna*) would become untenable when benediction is admitted to be performed as conditioned by desire (*niyato pādhi kartavya*). For, benediction can certainly be performed as the means of the destruction of the impediment (*pratibandhakābhāva*) to the cause of the commenced activity. Thus, commenced activity is never completed without benediction in the absence of the destruction of impediment.

Further, Gangeśa refutes the arguement that when benediction is admitted to be the principle activity (*pradhāna*), leading to the destruction of obstackle (*vighna nāśa*), the same cannot be performed provided that the obstackle is absent. According to him, the scripture (*śruti*), inferred from the practice of traditional scholars (*śiṣṭācārānumita*), teaches the performance of benediction regularly at the commencement of activity (*karmārambha*); and hence the performance of benediction is not untenable. Also Gangeśa notes that relational absence of obstackle (*vighna samsargābhāva*) is the cause or operation of the completion of the activity (*samāpti hetu*); and the same absence can be accomplished either intrinsically by the causes of completion itself (*svataḥ siddha*) or from benediction (*maṅgala sādhya*). And the activity undertaken by the careless etc. is completed even without benediction from the constant absence of obstackle (*vighnātyantābhāva*) continued from the earlier birth.

Further Gangeśa refutes the argument that when the absence of obstackle is accomplished from the causes of the activity itself, the ascertainment of the performance of benediction (*adhyavasāya*) becomes untenable. According to him, benediction is performed until the absence of doubt regarding obstackle (*vighna śaṅkam*) persists. Thus, benediction is performed even in the middle of activity if the doubt regarding benediction arises; and abundant quantity of benediction (*bahu maṅgala*) is performed in the case of doubt regarding abundant quantity of obstackle (*bahu vighna śaṅkā*).

Nature of Benediction : Prācyas' view

I. i. 22. It might be so. However, what constitutes the state or nature of being the benediction in the injunction such as "One ought to perform benediction"? It cannot be the state of being the praise of the deity; for, it lacks of generalization or consecutiveness. Also the state being the benediction cannot be the state of being the activity producing the removal of obstackles impeding the rite desired to be undertaken or the state of being the activity having the destruction of obstackle as its extraordinary cause. For, the object of activity cannot be obtained in the case of the absence of qualificative cognition of either the qualified activity or the extraordinary cause of such an activity, i.e. praise etc. from the Vedas.

Also the state of being the benediction cannot be the state of being the object of the practice of the learned scholars with the desire that 'Let the activity undertaken be completed without obstackle'. For, the Vedas are not the effects produced from the practices of the learned scholars. Also the first ever practice of the learned scholars would become untenable from the Vedas due to the mutual dependence. Also the state of being the benediction cannot be either the state of being the activity prescribed by the Vedas with the intention for the completion of the activity, or the state of being the Vedic activity prescribed at the time of the commencement of the activity while being what completes the activity desired to be undertaken. For, there does not exist any other Veda that can prescribe the benediction. Also the state of being the benediction cannot be the state of being the activity which is mentioned as being the benediction in the Smṛti texts etc. For, the Vedas are not produced from the Smṛti texts. And the author of the Smṛti texts, then, cannot practise, the activities prescribed by the Vedas.

Here we, the Prācyas (Vaiśesū. I.i.1.) state our reply: The injunction is not that 'One ought to perform benediction'; rather, it is particularly that 'One, desirous of the completion of the activity without obstackle, ought to perform the praise of the deity' only. For, practice of the learned scholars is observed only in such a way. The learned scholars conventionally use the term 'benediction' in the sense of the praise of the deity and salution etc. by understanding that the state of being the benediction is the state of being the activity prescribed by the Vedas as being the cause of destruction of the obstackle of the activity or that it is the state of being the activity performed with the desire that the activity or rite undertaken ought to be completed without obstackle as assisted by the Vedic injunction.

Explanation :

Gaṅgeśa now describes the real nature of benediction. According to him, the state of being benediction (*maṅgalatva*) cannot be defined as the state of being the praise of deity (*devatāstutitva*), as the same lacks of generalization or consecutiveness (*ananugama*). Also according to him, it cannot be defined as the state of being the activity causing the removal of obstackle (*vighnopaśama hetu kriyātva*) or the state of being the activity having the destruction of obstackle as the extra ordinary cause (*vighnotsāraṇāsādhāraṇa kāraṇatva*), as the object of activity (*pravṛtti viṣaya*) cannot be obtained in the case of the absence of qualificative cognition (*viśiṣṭāparicaya*) of either the qualified activity (*kriyāviśeṣa*) or the extra ordinary cause of such an activity (*tad asādhāraṇa kāraṇa*).

Gangeśa refutes the argument that the state of being the benediction (*maṅgalatva)* can be defined to be the state of being the object of the practice of the learned scholars (*śiṣṭācāra viṣayatva*) with the desire that let the activity undertaken be completed without obstackles. According to him, then, the first ever practice of the learned scholars would become untenable from the Vedas due to the mutual dependence. Also he refutes the argument that the state of being the benediction can be defined either as the state of being the activity prescribed by the Vedas (*vedavihitatva*) or as the state of being the Vedic activity (*vaidika karmatva*) prescribed at the time of the commencement of the activity (*karmārambhakāle vihita*). According to him, no distinct Veda that can prescribe such an activity exists. Also Gangeśa notes that the state of being the benediction cannot be the state of being the activity mentioned as being the benediction (*maṅgalatvenatkīrtitatva*), as the Veda cannot be dependent on the Smṛti texts.

Following Kaṇāda (Vaiśesū I. i. 1.), the Prācyas conclude that the state of being the benediction (*maṅgalatva*) is the state of being the activity prescribed by the Vedas (*vedavihitatva*), with the intention that the activity undertaken should be completed without obstackle, or the same is the state of being the cause of the destruction of obstackle (*vighnopaśamahetu*); and therefore the learned scholars use the term 'benediction' in the sense of the praise of the deity (*devatā stuti*) and salutation (*namaskāra*) etc. that destroy obstackle. It should be noted that according to Gaṅgeśa, Vedic injunction is only of the form that 'One desirous of completion of the activity without obstackle (*nirvighna samāpti kāmaḥ*) ought to perform the praise of the deity' (*devatāstutim ācaret*), as only such is the practice of the learned scholars (*śiṣṭācāra*).

Benediction is polysemous

I. i. 23. Therefore, the act of bathing in the Ganges etc., though destroying the obstackle, does not constitute benediction. For, the Vedic scripture does not prescribe such an act to be so. Also the act of looking into

mirror at dawn etc., which are taught by the injunction that 'The people, who are engaged in the auspicious practices, who are always devoted to god, who are muttering and who sacrifice obtain no sin', are benedictions in a distinct way. However, they are not benedictions in the strict sense as being what destroy obstackle. Thus, the term 'benediction' is only polysemous in such cases. Otherwise, since such acts as looking into mirror at dawn etc become equal to salutation etc, the same would be required to be undertaken at the commencement of composition of text etc.

However, the word 'now' *(atha)* constitutes only benediction by being what destroys obstackle. For, the Smṛti text states that 'The words '*om*' and '*atha*' came out, earlier at the time of creation, by splitting the throat of the lord Brahmā open; and hence both words are benedictory'. It should not be argued that the word '*atha*' is merely indicative of the auspicious begining. For, in that case, the great sage Gautama would not be justified in his use of the same word in the begining of the science of logic etc. The act of praising of deity means the act of indicating the deity as the possesor of virtues. And the salutation of oneself to the god means the particular operation conducive to the indication of the inferiority of oneself compared to the god. And the particularity in the operation of salutation, which is of the form of physical, oral or mental operation, is only the particular generic property witnessed by the experience. For, the term 'salutation' is not used merely in the physical contact of hands with head. Rather, it is used even in the oral expression of reverence such as 'I am inferior to you'.

As an alternative, however, it can be held that injunction (of salutation) needs to be assumed separately in the physical, mental and oral operations. Thus, the term 'salutation' is only polysemous. However, some Prābhākaras hold as follows: That since the term 'salutation' is not used in the physical and other operations without the knowledge of the state of being what is preceded by the particular mental resolve, only the same mental resolve is the expressed sense of the term 'salutation'; and the term has only an indication in the other three operations. However, this position is not correct. The state of being preceded by the particular mental resolve is not known without understanding the particular operations such as the physical operation.

Explanation :

Gaṅgeśa now explains that the term 'benediction' (*maṅgala*) is polysemous (*nānārtha*). According to him, since the term is 'benediction' established conventionally in the praise of deity etc, the act of bathing at the Ganges (*gaṅgā snāna*) is not benediction dispite the same destroying obstackle

(*durita nāśaka*). Also the acts of looking into mirror at dawn (*ādarśa darśana*) etc. are benedictions distinctly in a separate way, as taught by the Smṛti texts; however, they do not constitute benedictions in the strict sense of the activities conducive to the destruction of obstackle (*vighna nivartaka*). Thus, the term 'benediction' (*maṅgala*) is polysemous (*nānārtha*), as such actions are not undertaken at the commencement of composition of texts.

Gaṅgeśa further suggests that the term 'now' (*atha*), used at the commencement of composition of texts, constitutes benediction by destroying obstackle (*vighnanivāraka*). According to him, the Smṛti 'The words '*om*' and '*atha*' ..... are benedictions' (*oṅkāraścāthaśabdaśca ... māṅgalikāv ubhau*) supports such a status. He refutes the argument that the term '*atha*' is merely indicative of auspicious begining (*śubha sūcaka*), on the ground that then the great sage Gautama could not use the same term at the begining of the science of logic etc. Gangeśa defines now the act of praising of deity (*stuti*), as the act of indicating deity as the possessor of virtues (*guṇavattayā jñāpana*); and the salutation (*namaskāra*) as the perticular operation conducive to the indication of the inferiority of oneself compared to the god (*svāpakarṣānukūlo vyāpāraḥ*). According to him, the term 'salutation' is not used merely in the sense of physical contact of hands with the head (*karaśiraḥ samyoga*); and therefore, the particularity in the operation of salutation is the particular generic property (*jāti viśeṣa*). Or the term 'salutation' (*namaskāra*) can be polysemous due to the assumption of particular injunctions in physical and other operations (*kāyikādi*).

Further Gangeśa refutes the alternative suggestion of the Prābhākaras that only the particular mental resolve (*mānasika vyāpāra*) is the expressed meaning of the term 'salutation', as the physical and other operations are not tenable without the mental resolve; and the other operations have only an indication of the term (*lakṣaṇā*). According to him, the state of being preceded by the particular mental resolve (*buddhi viśeṣa pūrvakatva*) is not tenable without the knowledge of particular physical operation etc (*kāyikādi vyāpāra*); and thus the term 'benediction' is only polysemous.

Nature of Śiṣṭa and Śiṣṭācāra

I. i. 24. One who has admitted the authority of the Vedas is learned traditional scholar. And the state of not being censured in the form of the state of not being prohibited by the Vedas needs to be the qualification in the practice of learned traditional scholars.

As an alternative, however, it can be admitted that only the state of being the practice of the learnedtraditional scholars, producing the transcendental merit, leads to the completion of commenced activity. And the state of being

the practice of the learned traditional scholars means the state of being the practice not produceed from the illusion. The knowledge of the theistic faithful and the atheistic unfaithful that produces the idea of practice of the learned traditional scholar with respect to the un-visitable place and to the salutation to the Caitya Sthūpa, is illusion. For, such practices are only the means to the greater undesired consequence and are not the means to the desired goal.

In the ordinary Non-Vedic linguistic community, the use of the term 'learned traditional scholar', as distinguished from that of the heritical or impious, is dependent on the acceptance of the authority of the Vedas. The uses of the terms 'traditional learned scholar' and 'non-traditional learned scholar', though pertaining to the Vedic authority, are dependent on the lack of-agency described by the action prohibited by the Vedas and the agency described by the action prohibited by the Vedas respectively.

Or as an alternative, it can be held that one is a traditional learned scholar at the moment when, who, while admitting the authority of the Vedas, does not practise the action prohibited by the Vedas; and one is a non-tranditional learned scholar at the moment when who, while admitting the authority of the Vedas, practises the same action. That is why, the Buddhist, though lacking in the agency described by the action prohibited by the Vedas, is not a learned traditional scholar. However, it cannot be admitted that one, who does not possess the agency described by the action prohibited by the Vedas, while without the knowledge of the state of producing the sin, is the learned traditional scholar. For, even some scholar, who admits the authority of the Vedas, may have the agency described by the action prohibited by the Vedas, while without the knowledge of the state of producing the sin.

Explanation :

Gangeśa now defines the nature of traditional learned scholar (*śiṣṭa*) and that of the practice of traditional learned scholar (*śiṣṭācāra*). According to him, traditional learned scholar (*śiṣṭa*) is one who has admitted the authority of the Vedas (*svīkṛta vedaprāmāṇyabhāva*). And the practice of the traditional learned scholars (*śiṣṭācāra*) must be qualified as (the action) not prohibited by the Vedas (*vedāniṣiddha*).

As an alternative, however, Gangeśa suggests that only the practice of the traditional learned scholars (*śiṣṭācāra*) producing the transcendental merit (*alaukika viṣaya*) leads to the completion of commenced activity (*hetu*). And in such an alternative, the practice of the traditional learned scholar means merely the action not produced from illusion (*bhramājanya*). Since the practices of visiting unvisitable place (*agamyāgamana*) and salutation to the Caitya Sthūpa (*caitya vandana*) are produced from the illusion, they need not

be the causes of completion of activity (*hetu*); rather, they are the means to the greater undesired consequences (*balavad aniṣṭānubandhin*).

It should be noted that the use of the term 'traditional learned scholar' (*śiṣṭa*), as excluded from that of the heritical (*pāṣaṇḍa vyatirikta*), is dependent on the admittance of the authority of the Vedas (*veda prāmāṇya*). And also the uses of the terms 'traditional learned scholar' (*śiṣṭa*) and 'non-traditional learned scholar' (*aśiṣṭa*) are dependent on the lack of agency described by the action prohibited by the Vedas (*vedas niṣiddhākartṛtva*) and the agency described by the same (*tatkartṛtva*) respectively.

As an alternative Gangeśa combines both the qualifications and states that traditional learned scholar (*śiṣṭa*) is one who does not practise the action prohibited by the Vedas (*vedaniṣiddhākartṛ*) while admitting the authority of the Vedas (*veda prāmāṇya*); where as traditional non-learned scholar (*aśiṣṭa*) is one who practises the action prohibited by the Vedas (*tatkartṛ*) while admitting the authority of the Vedas. And this definition helps us to exclude the Buddhist from being a traditional learned scholar, as he does not admit the authority of the Vedas. However, Gangeśa emphatically sets aside the view that 'traditional learned scholar' (*śiṣṭa*) is one who does not possess the agency described by the action prohibited by the Vedas (*vedaniṣiddha kartṛtva*). According to him, even the scholar, admitting the authority of the Vedas (*tairthika*), may have the agency described by the action prohibited by the Vedas; and hence such a definition is not logical.

Conclusion

I. i. 25. Some hold here as follows : That one who is devoid of passion and hatred is traditional learned scholar. And such a traditional scholar can be only Manu etc., as he needs to have omniscience. And the Vedas are inferred from the non-censured practice of traditional learned scholars. However, this position is not correct. In that case, modern scholars, who have not observed the practices of Manu etc., would not be entitled for the activity towards benediction.

It may be proposed now as follows : That a boy, i.e. an ordinary man may exert for benediction by inferring the practice of Manu etc. through the practice of modern traditional scholars; and then by inferring the Vedas through the practice of Manu etc. However, then it would follow that let only the practice of the modern scholars, which helps to infer the practice of Manu etc., be the cause of the inference of the Vedas; and thus what is the need for the inference of the practice of Manu etc. inferred from the modern scholars? Further even the modern scholars are actually being referred as traditional learned scholars. Thus, the Smṛti states as follows : "That the practice of people,

which has come down to us through the successive ages of tradition in a particular region, is considered to be the right practice due to the non-contradiction, i.e. the conformity, with the Vedic scriptures and the Smṛtis." And there exists no froof in the theory that only omniscients (Manu etc.) practice benediction first. It may be argued now as follows : That benediction is observed to have been practiced in the Smṛti texts composed by Manu etc. (and hence only the omniscient practice benediction). However, this is not correct. Inspite of the fact that the authors of Smṛtis are non-omniscient, they can compose Smṛti texts by understading the subject matter from the Vedas.

Yet Some others object that let only performance of benediction be inferred as the practice of traditional learned scholars; and what is the need for the inferrence of the Vedas as the authority prescribing benediction? However, we shall state our reply in this regard (in the Ucchannapracchanna-vāda) that the inference of the Vedas is necessary and is admitted by all. Thus, ends the 'Theory of Benediction' in the Perception in the Tattvacintāmaṇi composed by Śrī Mahāmahopādhyāya Gaṅgeśa.

Explanation :

Gaṅgeśa concludes his theory of benediction (*maṅgala vāda*) now. According to him, the position of Some (*yattu*) that 'Traditional learned scholar' (*śiṣṭa*) is one who is devoid of passion and hatred (*rāga dveṣa vihīna*); and only Manu etc. who have the omniscience (*sarvajñatva*) are traditional learned scholars; and also that the Veda can be inferred from the practice of Manu' is not tenable. For, then modern scholars who are not omniscient and have not observed the practice of Manu etc (*manvādyācāra*), cannot practice benediction etc. Also Gangeśa states that the position that a boy, i.e. an ordinary man exerts for benediction by inferring the practice of Manu etc. (*manvādy ācāra*) from the practice of modern scholars (*ādhunikācāra*) and then by inferring the Vedas from the practice of Manu etc. is not tenable. According to him, only the practice of modern scholars, which helps to infer the practice of Manu etc, can be held to cause to infer the Vedas (*vedānumāpaka*); and hence inference of the practice of Manu etc. inferred from the practice of modern scholars (*anumitā numāna*) is unnecessary. It should be noted that even modern scholars are considered as 'traditional learned scholars' (*śiṣṭa*); and the Smṛti texts that "The practice of people (*ācāra*), which has come down to us through the successive ages of tradition (*pāramparya krama*), is considered to be right practice (*sadācāra*) due to its conformity to the Śrutis and the Smṛtis" comfirm the same; and hence Gaṅgeśa's position is justified.

Further Gangeśa refutes the argument that benediction is observed to

have been performed in the Smṛti texts composed by the omniscient Manu etc.; and hence only the omnicients need to be admitted as practicing benediction. According to him, composers of Smṛti texts (*smṛtikartṛ*) need not be omnisceints to compose the Smṛti texts; and they can do so by understanding the subject matter from the Vedas; and hence only the omniscients need not practice benediction. Thus, any scholar who practices the tradition (benediction) that has come down to us through the ages is traditional scholar.

Gaṅgeśa concludes now that the inference of the Vedas as the authority from the practice of omniscient Manu etc. is necessary. According to him, only the performance of benediction (*kartavyatā*), as the practice of learned scholars (*śiṣṭācāra*), is not enough, as all the people admit only the Vedas as the authority.

The end of the Mangalavāda in the Pratyakṣakhaṇḍa.

I. II.

Theory of Validity or Authoritativeness (Prāmāṇya Vādaḥ)

A

THEORY OF ASCERTAINMENT OF VALIDITY (Jñapti Vādaḥ)

Statement of Purpose

I. ii. 1. After benediction, extremely compassionate sage Gautama, who desires to lift the world plunged into the mire of sorrow, composed the philosophy of logic, the most favourite science among the eighteen branches of science. In the begining of the philosophy of logic, the sage composed the rule that the attainment of the highest goal of salvation is produced from the knowledge of real nature of the sixteen categories such as the means of valid knowledge (Nyāy Sū. I. i. 1.) for explaining the activity of the prudent people towards the highest goal. However, since orderly distinction of all the sixteen categories depends on the (knowledge of first) category of means of valid knowledge, the real nature of the means of valid knowledge, i.e. the authoritativeness of first category of means of valid knowledge among the sixteen categories is first taken up for discussion.

Explanation :

After the exposition of the 'Theory of benediction' (Maṅgala Vāda), Gangeśa sets out to investigate the 'Theory of ascertainment of validity' (Jñapti vāda) in the 'Theory of validity or authoritativeness of first knowledge' (Prāmāṇyavāda). He states that the extremely compassionate sage Gautama composed philosophy of logic (Ānvīkṣikī or Nyāyasūtra), the most favoured science among the eighteen banches of science *(vidyā sthāna)*. It should be noted that in the begining of the Nyāya sūtra, the sage Gautama has composed the rūle (I. i. 1.) that the highest goal of salvation (*niśśreyasa*) is attained by the knowledge of real nature (*tattva jñāna*) of the sixteen categories (*ṣodaśa padārtha)* such as the means of valid knowledge, as only the knowledge of realnature of the categories is the cause of salvation. Now since all the sixteen categories of the Nyāya pholosophy can be explained by the knowledge of the

first category of the means of valid knowledge (*pramāṇa*), Gangeśa takes up the exposition of only the first category of the means of knowledge (*pramāṇa*) in his Tattva cintāmaṇi.

Objection of the Mādhyamikas

I. ii. 2. Now the Mādhyamikas among the Buddhists object as follows : That it is not justified that the Nyāya philosophy, which teaches the real nature of the sixteen categories such as the means of valid knowledge, is indirectly connected with, i.e. is conducive to the salvation; for, the ascertainment of the real nature of the means of valid knowledge is impossible. The ascertainment of the real nature of the means of valid knowledge depends on the ascertainment of the real nature of the valid knowledge. However, the same ascertainment is not possible either intrinsically by the totality of causes of knowledge itself or extraneously by the other means of knowledge. For, the same ascertainment is eclipsed by the host of faults to be stated. (cf.I.ii.27).

Here, the Pūrvapakṣin may argue as follows : That what is the use of the knowledge, i.e. the ascertainment of the validity or authoritativeness of first knowledge? The same knowledge or ascertainment of the authoritativeness is deviating from the human activity in general. And the activity of the eligible people towards the sacrifice, which is to be performed with expenditure of much money and exertion, is produced merely from the ascertainment of the necessary desired goal. Also it is not correct to state that the ascertainment of the authoritativeness of first knowledge, the doubt and the knowledge of absence of which (authoritativeness) are the impediments to the human activity towards the means (activity), is the cause of the activity towards the same means (activity). And this instance is similar to the instance of the ascertainment of the invariable concomitance which is conducive to the inference. For, when the doubt regarding the validity or authoritativeness of the first knowledge persists, the doubt regarding the objects of knowledge arises; and therefore, the lack of human activity towards the means can be facilitated merely by the lack of ascertainment of the objects. Thus the doubt and the knowledge of the absence of the authoritativeness of first knowledge need not be the impediments to the activity.

However, this argument of the Pūrvapakṣin is not correct. The ascertainment of (authoritativeness of) the object of knowledge, arising after the doubt regarding the authoritativeness of the first knowledge, which has the form that 'This is this way only' and which is the associate cause of unwavering human activity, depends on the ascertainment of the validity or authoritativeness of first knowledge.

Explanation :

The Mādhyamikas among the Buddhists do not recognize the validity of knowledge (*pramātva*) such as the state of referring to the qualifier in the substratum of the qualifier in general; and hence object to Gaṅgeśa's theory that the Nyāya philosophy is conducive to the atttainment of highest form of salvation (*niśśreyasa*) by teaching the real nature of the means of valid knowledge (*pramāṇa tattva*). According to them, the ascertainment of the real nature of the means of valid knowledge is dependent on the ascertainment of the real nature of valid knowledge (*pramā tattva*); and the same is neither possible intrinsically by the totality of causes of itself (*svataḥ*) nor possible extraneously by some other means (*parataḥ*) due to the faults to be stated later (cf. I. ii. 27).

The Pūrvapakṣin, however, raises the argument that the knowledge, i.e. ascertainment of the validity or authoritativeness of the first knowledge (*prāmāṇya jñāna*) is not necessary for the attainment of the highest salvation, as it is deviating from the activity in general (*pravṛtti mātre*); the activity is not undertaken even after the ascertainment of the authoritativeness in the case of ordinary actions; and the activity is undertaken merely after the ascertainment of the necessary goal of heaven in the case of sacrifices. Also the Pūrvapakṣin states that it is not correct that the ascertainment of the authoritativeness of the first knowledge, doubt and knowledge of absence of which (authoritativeness) (*yat saṁśaya vyatireka*) are the impediments to the activity, is the cause of the activity towards the same means (sacrifice). According to them, the lack of activity towards the means (activity etc) is possible merely by the lack of ascertainment of objects (*arthāniścaya*); and hence the doubt and the knowledge of absence of the validity or authoritativeness of the first knowledge need not be the impediments to the activity.

However, the Naiyāyikas reply to the Pūrvapakṣin's argument. According to them, ascertainment of the (authoritativeness of) objects of first knowledge such as 'This is this way only' (*idam ittham eva*), which produces the unwavering activity (*niṣkampa pravṛtti*), is dependent on the ascertainment of the validity or authoritativeness of first knowledge. Therefore, ascertainment of the validity or the authoritativeness of first knowledge is very much necessary.

Five forms of Vipratipattis in the Mīmāṁsakas' theory

I. ii. 3. The Mīmāṁsakas may state their theory as follows : That let the validity or the authoritativeness of first knowledge be ascertained (lit. described) intrinsically by the totality of causes of knowledge itself. However, the following five doubts arise regarding the ascertainment of the validity or the authoritativeness of first knowledge intrisically by the totality of causes of knowledge itself : That (i) whether the validity or the authoritativeness of first knowledge is to be ascertained by the totality of causes producing knowledge, while not producing the non-authoritativeness of knowledge or not? Or that (ii) whether the same validity or authoritativeness of knowledge is to be ascertained by the knowledge, not produced by the knowledge referring to the knowledge of the validity or authoritativeness itself or not? Further in the view that the validity or authoritativeness of first knowledge is to be ascertained extraneously by some other means, such as inference, the validity or authoritativeness is ascertained only in the knowledge that is already known. And in the view that the authoritativeness is to be ascertained intrinsically by (the totality of causes of knowledge) itself, only the knowledge possessing the validity or authoritativeness is ascertained. Or that (iii) whether it (the validity or authoritativeness of first knowledge) is ascertained by the causes that produce the substratum of the validity or authoritativeness, i.e. the knowledge or not? Or that (iv) whether it (the authoritativeness of first knowledge) is ascertained by the substratum of the authoritativeness, i.e. the first knowledge or not? Or that whether it is to be ascertained individually? Some argue here as follows : That since the validity or authoritativeness of the knowledge, is ascertained intrinsically by the substratum of the validity or authoritativeness i.e. the first knowledge itself, through the comprehensional relation characterized by the universal of the property produced by the mental concentration, the fault of establishment or proving of the already established or proved arises partially in the inference. Therefore, the state of not being produced by the property produced by the mental concentration needs to be the qualifier of the subject (validity or authoritativeness of first knowledge) of inference.

However, this argument is not correct. The validity or authoritativeness of first knowledge cannot be ascertained or proved in the case of other (than the knower). Also, it should be noted that in the view that merely the authoritativeness, excluding the substratum, is the subject of inference, the authoritativeness is only ascertained by the substratum of the authoritativeness; i.e. the first knowledge and therefore, the fault of proving of already proved does not arise partially, as the knowledge of the probandum cannot be established or proved.

Also the following doubt regarding the authoritativeness would arise : That whether (v) the validity or authoritativeness of the first knowledge such as 'This is a pot' is to be ascertained by the second or after knowledge (such as 'I know that this is a pot') or not?; Or that whether the validity orauthoritativeness of such a first knowledge is to be ascertained by the totality of causes producing the second or after knowledge or not?

in the substratum of the qualifier. For, the unwavering human activity is produced only by the ascertainment of such an authoritativeness of knowledge; also the same involves bravity and it cannot be defined as anything else due to the cumbersomeness.

Explanation :

The Gurus, The Mishras and the Bhāṭṭa Mīmāmsakas now present their prima facie views (*pūrvapakṣa*) regarding the examination of various definitions of the validity or authoritativeness of knowledge. (*prāmāṇya*). According to them, the authoritativeness of knowledge may be defined as the state of being the knowledge, not having the property excluded from the qualificand, as the qualifier (*viśeṣyāvṛtty aprakārakatvam); or* the state of being the knowledge referring to the property that is not already referred to (*agṛhīta grāhitvam*). Also according to them, in the view of the Gurus that all the knowledges are only valid or authoritative (*sarvadhī yathārthatva*), the same authoritativeness of knowledge may be admitted to be either the state of being the knowledge that is different from the recollection (*smaraṇānya jñānatva*) or the state of being the qualificative knowledge (*viśiṣta jñānatvā*), as the experience (*anubhava*), which can be both valid and invalid, is not admissible to them.

Some Mīmāmsakas, as a matter of fact, object that the validity or authoritativeness of knowledge (*prāmāṇya*) cannot be ascertained by either the first knowledge or by the second or after knowledge (*anuvyavasāya*). According to them, the qualifier (*viśeṣaṇa*) such as the state of being the knowledge, not having the property, excluded from the qualificand, as the qualifier (*viśeṣyāvṛtty aprakārakatvā*) etc cannot be known when the same is not perceived earlier. Also the Mīmāmsakas state that in the view that the knowledge is transcendental (*atīndriya*), the same authoritativeness cannot be ascertained by the inference of knowledge (*jñānānumiti*). According to them, the probans of the knowledge in general (*jñāna mātra liṅga*) such as the manifestation (*prākaṭya*) is deviating from the authoritativeness. Also the Mīmāmsakas state that the authoritativeness of knowledge cannot be ascertained by the particularity of the knownness (*jñātatā viśeṣa*), as the same cannot be described prior to the knowledge of the validity or authoritativeness in the first knowledge. According to them, otherwise, even the non-authoritativeness of knowledge (*aprāmāṇya*) would be required to be ascertained instrinsically (*svato grahāpatti*) by the particularity of the knownness obtained from invalid knowledge (*apramāhita*).

Neverthless, these Mīmāmsakas maintain that the validity or authoritativeness of knowledge (*prāmāṇya*) is either the state of being the

knowledge that refers to the property as the qualifier (*tatprakāra jñānatva*) in the substratum of the qualifier (*tadvati*); or the state of being the knowledge that refers to the qualification of the qualifier (*tadvaiṣiṣṭya jñānatva*) in the substratum of the qualifier (*tadvati*). According to them, such a definition is necessary, as the unwavering human activity (*niṣkampa vyavahāra*) is possible only from such a knowledge of the authoritativeness.

Pramātva is ascertained by jñānasāmagrī and Apramātva is ascertained by parataḥ

I. ii. 5. The Mīmāmsakas hold that such a validity or authoritativeness of knowledge is to be ascertained by the totality of causes of knowledge only. For instance, in the case of the first knowledge, the validity or authoritativeness, i.e. the state of possessing the property in the substratum of the property, or the state of referring to the property, as the qualifier in the substratum of the property, is ascertained by the totality of causes (of the knowledge in the view of the Gurus) or by the totality of causes of second or after-knowledge (in the view of the Mishras) or by the totality of causes of inferrence (in the view of the Bhattas) which are self-conscious. The knowledge of an object is to be describeḍ by its object. And therefore, the object of knowledge is to be known by the apprehension of knowledge. Consequently, when the first knowledge is being apprehended, even the qualification of the property, like the property and its substratum, becomes the object of first knowledge. For, the comprehensional relation of the form of first knowledge is equal to both the property and its qualfication. Also the first perceptual knowledge (This is silver) describes, i.e. refers to the relational adjunct as relating to the relational subjunct, when the same subjunct is being apprehended or known as possessing the form, i.e. the property, delimiting the relatedness of the relational subjunct; and therefore, the second or after knowledge (I know that this is silver) too refers to the object existing in front as being delimited by the silverness. Otherwise, the form of the second or after knowledge would only be that 'I know the object existing in front and also the silver'; however, it would not be that 'I know that this as being silver'. That is why, even the invalid knowledge is ascertained to be only valid knowledge partly. For, the second or after knowledge refers to the qualification of the object of illusory first knowledge in the substratum of the qualifier.

It should not be argued now that since the validity orauthoritativeness is not known first, the same cannot be imposed on the first invalid knowledge. Since the authoritativeness of knowledge is to be ascertained by the totality of causes that produces knowledge, the same is to be known by the apprehension of knowledge. And this instance is like the counterpositiveness

and the absenceness that are known by the totality of causes that produces the knowledge of the absence.

The invalidity or non-authoritativeness of knowledge, which is of the form of the state of being the knowledge referring to the property in the substratum of the absence of the property as the qualifier, is ascertained extraneously by something else. Since the state of being the substratum of the absence of the qualifier is not described by the illusion (i.e. is not the object of illusion), the same cannot be the object of second or after knowledge. It should not be argued that if, this way, second or after knowledge or recognition is admitted to be referring to all the objects of first knowledge as its objects, then, there would arise the undesired occasion of the co-mixture or cross-connection of the illusion and the knowledge of illusion. Such an occasion is indeed desired in the absence of contradiction. Also, in the presence of contradiction, the same would act as the impediment that prevents the cross-connection. Further, the illusion that produces the qualification of the silverness in the object (shell) in front is absent. That is why, the knower of other's illusion need not entertain any illusion for himself.

Explanation :

The Mīmāmsakas now propose that the validity or authoritativeness of knowledge (*prāmāṇya*) is ascertained intrindically by itself (*svataḥ*) means the same is ascertained by the totality of causes producing the knowledge itself (*jñāna grāhaka sāmagrī grāhya*). According to them, in the case of the first knowledge (*vyavasāya*), the authoritativeness, i.e. the state of possessing the knowledge (*vyavasāya*), the authoritativeness, i.e. the state of possessing the property in the substratum of the property (*viśeṣye taddharma vattva*) or the state of referring to the property, in the substratum of the property, as the qualifier (*taddharma prakārakatva*), is ascertained by the totality of causes of first knowledge in the theory of the Gurus, and it is ascertained by the totality of causes of second or after-after knowledge (*anuvyavasāya*) in the theory of Mishras and it is ascertained by the totality of causes of the inference (*anumiti*) in the theory of the Bhāṭṭas, which is self-conscious (*svā prakāśa*). Since knowledge (of the object) (*jñāna*) is to be described by the object (*viṣaya nirūpya*), the object becomes what is to be known or described by the apprehension of knowledge (*jñāna vitti vedya*); and therefore, even the qualification of the property (*dharma vaiśiṣṭya*), like the property and its substratum (*dharma dharmivat*), becomes the object (*viṣaya*) of first knowledge (*vyavasāya*) through the comprehesional relation of first knowledge (*vyavasāya pratyāsatti*). It should be noted that the first perceptual knowledge (*vyavasāya*) such as *idam rajatam* refers to the relational adjunct as existing in the relational subjunct (*sambandhin*) when the same subjunct is known as

having the property delimitting the relatedness (*sambandhitāvacchedaka rūpa*). Therefore, the after knowledge *(anu vyavasāya)* such as *idam rajatam iti jānāmi* refers to the object (shell) in front (*purovartin*) as delimited by the silverness (*rajatatvāvacchinnatva*). Thus, the form of the after-knowledge is only that '*purovartinam rajatatvena jānāmi*' but not that '*purovartinam rajatam ca jānāmi*'. According to these Mīmāmsakas, even invalid knowledge (*apramā*) is ascertained as only valid knowledge (*pramā*), as the after–knowledge refers to the qualification of the object of illusory knowledge (*bhrama viṣaya vaiśiṣṭya*) in the substratum of the qualifier. The Mīmāmsakas refute the argument that since the authoritativeness of knowledge (*prāmāṇya*) is not known first, the same cannot be imposed on first invalid knowledge; i.e. first invalid cannot be ascertained to be partly valid by after knowledge. According to them, the authroritativeness of knowledge is to be ascertained by the totality of causes producing the knowledge (*jñāna grāhaka sāmagrī grāhya*); and therefore, the same authoritativeness of the invalid knowledge can be ascertained or imposed by the apprehension of the knowledge (*jñāna vitti vedya*).

Further the Mīmāmsakas propose that the non-authoritativeness of knowledge (*aprāmāṇya*), which is of the form of being the knowledge referring to the property in the substratum of the absence of the property as the qualifier (*tadabhāvavati tat prakāraka jñānatva*), is to be ascertained extraneously by someting else (*parataḥ*). According to them, the state of being the substratum of the absence of property (*tadabhāvavattva*), being not described by the illusion, cannot be the object of second or after-knowledge. Also the Mīmāmsakas refute the argument that illusion (*bhrānti*) and knowledge of illusion (*bhrāntijñāna*) would become cross-connected (*saṅkara*), as both first knowledge (*vyavasāya*) and after-knowledge (*anu vyavasāya*) refer to the same objects (*vyavasāya viṣaya viṣayaka*). According to them, such a cross-connection is only desired in the absence of contradiction. Also since the illusion that produces the qualification of the silverness in the object (shell) in front (*upanāyaka bhrānti*) is absent, the knower of illusion of others (*anya bhrānti jña*) need not entertain any illusion for himself. Thus, while the authoritativeness of first knowledge is intrinsically ascertained by the causes of knowledge itself, the non-authoritativeness of knowledge is to be ascertained extraneously.

Mīmāmsakas' Refutation of the objection that Viśeṣaṇatāviśeṣa is not object

I. ii. 6. The Naiyāyikas may object here as follows : That the state of being the substratum of the qualifier (in the definition of the authoritativeness)

is not merely the qualification of the qualifier in the substratum of the qualifier; but rather, it is the particularity of the qualifierness of the qualifier, i.e. the silverness. And such a particularity of the qualfierness appears only in the first knowledge but not in the second or after - knowledge. For, mind has no independence outside the first sense-perception. However, this objection is not correct. Since the particularity of the qualifierness, like the qualifier and the qualificand, is referred by first knowledge, the same too becomes the object of second - after - knowledge. Further, it should be noted that a distinct particularity of the qualifierness is going to be refuted.

From this refutation, the following objection too gets refuted : "That the authoritativeness is not ascertained intrinsically in the case of the non-self illumination or non-self consciousness of after-knowledge; for, when the substratum of the qualifier is not ascertained, even the qualifier, i.e. the authoritativeness of the knowledge cannot be ascertained. Also, even in the case of the authoritativeness of first knowledge, like the word and the odour, being ascertained intrinsically by the competency of the causes of the knowledge itself, the cognition that "Knowlege is authoritative' would not be tenable. Also even in the case of the self-illumination of after knowledge, the causes of after knowlege that witness, i.e. ascertain merely the knowledge, do not have the competency for ascertaining the property of authoritativeness of first knowledge. Also, suppose the causes of after knowledge have the competency in ascertaining the authoritativeness of first knowledge, then they would need to ascertain even the non-authoritativeness of first - knowledge. In the case of the extraneous consciousness or illumination of inferential knowledge, inferential knowledge, being produced by the probans or mind, cannot ascertain the authoritativeness as excluded from illusion; for, there would arise the deviation of the probans. Also it is not correct to hold that the property, i.e. the validity or authoritativeness, that exists in knowledge, needs to be ascertained intrinsically by the causes of knowledge. For, in that case, even the invalidity or non-authoritativeness that exists in knowledge would be required to be ascertained intrinsically by the causes of knowledge. Also, after knowledge or inference is not produced from the objects of first knowledge."

Explanation :

The Naiyāyikas now raise an objection that the state being the substratum of the qualifier (*tadvattva*) that constitutes the authoritativeness needs to be admitted as the particualarity of the qualifierness (*viśeṣaṇatā viśeṣa*) of the qualifier; and not merely the qualification of the qualifier in the substratum of the qualifier (*dharma dharmi vaiśiṣṭya mātra*). According to them, such a particularity of the qualifierness appears only in first knowledge

(*vyavasāya*) and not in second after-knowledge (*anu vyavasāya*) as mind has no independence outside first sense perception. However, the Mīmāmsakas refute the objection. According to them, even the particularity of the qualifierness, can be the object of second or after-knowledge (*anuvyavasāya viṣaya*), as the same is to be referred by the first knowledge (*vyavasāyopanīta*). Further, the Mīmāmsakas opine that since the particularity of the qualifierness is to be refuted, it does not matter even if the same does not appear in after knowledge.

Further the Mīmāmsakas state that the refutation of the above objection effectively answers the following objection of Some Naiyāyikas as well : "That the authoritativeness of first knowledge (*prāmāṇya*) is not ascertained intrinsically by the causes of second knowledge (*svataḥ*) in the case of the non-self consciousness of second or after-knowledge (*asvaprakāśa*), as the property of the authoritativeness (*dharma*) cannot be ascertained in the non-grasping of the substratum (*dharmy agraha*). Also even in the case of the self-consciousness of second or after-knowledge (*svaprakāśe*), the totality of causes of after–knowledge, ascertaining merely the knowledge (*svamātra sākṣin*), does not ascertain the property of the authoritativeness (*svadharma*); also if it ascertains the property, then it would ascertain even the property of non-authoritativeness (*aprāmāṇya*). Also in the case of the extraneous illumination of the knowledge (*paraprakāśe*), the inferential knowledge, produced from the probans or mind, cannot ascertain the authoritativeness due to the deviation of the probans (*vyabhicāra*). Also it is not possible to admit that the property of authoritativeness that exists in the knowledge (*yatra yad asti*) needs to be ascertained intrinsically by the causes of the knowledge; for, in that case even the property of non-authoritativeness, that exists in the knowledge, would be required to be ascertained intrinsically by the totality of causes of knowledge (*svataḥ*)" only. According to the Mīmāmsakas, the particularity of the qualifierness (*viśeṣaṇatā viśeṣa*) can be the object of the after knowledge, and hence the authoritativeness of the knowledge too can be the object of the after knowledge.

Conclusion of the Mīmāmsakas' Primafacie view

I. ii. 7. The Mīmāmsakas now conclude their prima facie view. That the validity or authoritativeness of first knowledge is of the form of either the state of being the knowledge referring to the property as the qualifier in the substratum of the property or the state of being the knowledge referring to the qualification of the qualifier in the substratum of the qualifier. For, the validity or authoritativeness of first knowledge is to be ascertained either intrinsically by the totality of causes of first knowledge or by the totality of

causes of after-knowledge or by the totality of causes of inference (in the case of the Gurus, the Mishras and the Bhāṭṭas respectively). Also the state of being the knowledge, referring to the authoritativeness as its object or the state of being the knowledge, referring to the authoritativeness as its qualifier, is to be ascertained by the totality of causes producing the knowledge.

Suppose the authoritativeness of knowledge is to be ascertained extraneously by something else, then there would arise the infinite regression both ways from the causes and from the effect, as the same authoritativeness needs to be ascertained extraneously by something else in the knowledge of authoritativeness as well as in the knowledges of probans, subject and invariable concomitance producing the inference of the authoritativeness for ascertaining their objects. Also, as a result, the authoritativeness of knowledge would not be known at all. Thus, it gets established, even by exclusive specification, that the authoritativeness of knowledge is to be ascertained intrinsically by the totality of causes itself.

This constitutes the *prima facie* view of the Mīmāmsakas.

Explanation :

The Mīmāmsakas conclude their prima facie view now. According to them, the validity or authoritativeness (*prāmāṇya*) of first knowledge (*vyavasāya*) is established to be either the state of being the knowledge that referse to the property as the qualifier (*tat prakāraka jñānatva*) in the substratum of the qualifier (*tadvati*) or the state of being the knowledge that refers to the qualification of the qualifier (*tad vaiśiṣṭya jñāntva*) in the substratum of the qualifier. Therefore, the same validity or authoritativeness is ascertained intrinsically either by the totality of causes of first knowledge (*svena*) in the case of Gurus, or by the totality of causes of after-knowledge (*anuvyavasāya*) in the case of the Mishras or by the totality of causes of inference (*anumiti*) in the case of the Bhāṭṭas. For, the state of being the knowledge referring to the authoritativeness as its object (*tadviṣayatva*) or the state of being the knowledge referring to the property as its qualifier (*tat prakārakatva*) is to be ascertained by the totality of causes producing the knowledge (*jñāna grāhaka sāmagrī*).

Also according to the Mīmāmsakas, suppose the validity or authoritativeness of knowledge is to be known extraneously by something else, then there would arise the infinite regress or add-infinitum (*anavasthā*) both ways from the causes and from the effects; for, the same authoritativeness in the knowledge of the authoritativeness (*prāmāṇya jñāna*) and that of the probans etc producing the inference of the authoritativeness (*tadanumāpaka liṅga jñāna*) would be required to be ascertained by yet something else (*parataḥ*). Thus, the authoritativeness of knowledge would become untenable to be ascertained. Therefore, it gets established by exclusive specification

(*pariśeṣa*) that the authoritativeness of knowledge is ascertained intrinsically by the totality of causes of the knowledge (*svataḥ*) itself. The end of the Pūrvapakṣa.

Naiyāyikas' Conclusive view that the Validity or Authoritativeness is ascertained extrahneously

I. ii. 8. The conclusive view of the Naiyāyikas is as follows : That in the case that the validity or authoritativeness of knowledge is ascertained intrinsically by the totality of causes of knowledge itself, the doubt regarding the validity or authoritativeness would become untenable in the event of the knowledge produced at the time of non-repetition, i.e. at the time of the knowledge not produced from the observasion of particularity. For, the authoritativeness of knowledge becomes automatically ascertained in the ascertainment of the knowledge itself. Also the authoritativeness of knowledge becomes untenable to be ascertained intrinsically by the totality ofcauses of knowledge itself in the non-ascertainment of the knowledge. Further, doubt regarding the authoritativeness would become untenable in the non-ascertainment of first knowledge due to the absence of the knowledge of the substratum of the authoritativeness.

It may be argued now as follows : That since first knowledge is destroyed at the moment prior to the doubt due to the recollection of (contradictory) sides of arguement, mental doubt regarding the validity or authoritativeness, that has the first knowledge as the qualificand, need not be produced. However, this argument is not correct. The doubt regarding the validity or authoritativeness is certainly necessary with regard to the first knowledge that is established by the knowledge.

Explanation :

Now Gangeśa presents the conclusive view *(siddhānta)* of the Naiyāyikas. According to them, the validity or authoritativeness of knowledge (*prāmāṇya*) needs to be ascertained only extraneously by something else (*parataḥ*), as when it is ascertained intrinsically by the totality of causes of knowledge itself (*svataḥ*), the doubt regarding the authoritativeness would become untenable in the knowledge produced at the time of the non-repetition, i.e. at the time of knowledge not produced from the observasion of particularity (*anabhyāsa daśotpanna jñāne*). For, the authoritativeness of the knowledges too becomes ascertained automatically when the knowledge is ascertained *(jñāna graha)*. Also according to the Naiyāyikas, the ascertainment of the authoritativeness (*prāmāṇya graha*) would become untenable intrinsically by the totality of causes of the knowledge itself in the non-ascertainment of the knowledge

(aniścaya). Further, according to them, doubt regarding the authoritativeness (*samśaya*) would become untenable in the non-ascertainment of the knowledge (*jñānāgraha*) due to the absence of the knowledge of the substratum (*dharmi jñāna*) of the authoritativeness.

The Naiyāyikas refute the argument of the Mīmāmsakas that the mental doubt (*mānasa samśaya*) regarding the validity or authoritativeness such as '*vyavasāyaḥ pramāṇam na vā*' is not necessary, as the first knowledge (*vyavasāya*) is destroyed prior to the doubt due to the recollection of the two sides of the argument (*koṭi smaraṇa*). According to the Naiyāyikas, the doubt is quite necessary in the first knowledge which is established by the knowledge (*jñānopanīta*). Thus, the Naiyāyikas establish their conclusive view that the validity or authoritativeness of knowledge (*prāmāṇya*) needs to be ascertained only extraneously (*parataḥ*).

Prāmāṇyasaṁśaya is untenable

I. ii. 9. It may be argued now as follows : That knowledge of the substratum of the property is not really the cause of doubt regarding the property. The apprehension of the first knowledge, which is of the form of only doubt regarding the validity or authoritativeness of knowledge is produced due to the knowledge of two contradictory sides of an argument, non-observasion of any particularity and the mere contact of the substratum with the sense organ. However, this argument is not correct. In the view that knowledge is transcendental, mental doubt regarding the validity or authoritativeness, that has the first knowledge as its substratum, becomes untenable without the knowledge of the substratum, i.e. the first knowledge. Further, the means, in the case of inference proving the authoritativeness, cannot produce the doubt regarding the validity or authoritativeness (Cf. T.C. I. ii. 3), as the same is only the cause of the ascertainment of the validity or authoritativeness. Also, in the view that the first knowledge is merely mental perception, even the totality of causes of the knowledge of the authoritativeness, like the knowledge of the authoritativeness, is only an impediment to the doubt regarding the authoritativeness; for, the same totality of causes is only the cause of the ascertainment of the authoritativeness. Otherwise, the doubt regarding the authoritativeness would become contingent even during the observation of the particular side of the argument.

Now it may be argued as follows: That only in the case when one side of the argument is recollected, the same side is imposed on the substratum at the time of the non-observation of the other particular side of the argument. Whereas in the case when both the sides of the argument are recollected, only a doubt regarding the validity or authoritativeness arises. This way, since the

totality of causes of doubt regarding the validity or authoritativeness is stronger then the totality of causes of the ascertainment of the validity or authoritativeness, only the doubt regarding the validity or autoritativeness, but not the ascertainment of the validity or authoritativeness, would arise in the case of the recollection of both sides of the argument.

However, this argument too is not correct. There occurs only an imposition of the two contrasting sides of an argument on one single substratum from the combination of two distinct totalities of causes conducive to the two mutually contradictory impositions of sides; and the same is doubt (regarding the authoritativeness); however, one totality of causes conducive to the imposition of one side of an argument does not impede the other totality of causes conducive to the imposition of another side of an argument. For, they are not mutually contradictory. Also it is not correct to argue that the totalily of causes conducive to the impositions of two mutually contradictory sides of argument impedes the totality of causes conducive to the ascertainment of one side of an argument (authoritativeness). For, the totality of causes conducive to the impositions of two sides, which is distinct from the totality of causes conducive to the imposition of one particular side (validity or authoritativeness) does not exist. Also it is not correct to argue that the two different totalities of causes produce two different effects (i.e. the impositions of two distinct sides of argument and the imposition of one particular side of argument, i.e. validity or authoritativeness) respectively. For, two different effects are quite tenable at the same time like the collective cognitions. Thus, the doubt regarding the validity or authoritativeness is not tenable, as the totality of causes conducive to the ascertainment of the validity or athoritativeness is present. Further, it must be admitted that the knowledge of the substratum, i.e. the first knowledge is the cause of doubt regarding the validity or authoritativeness. Otherwise, the rule of the necessity of (the knowledge of) the substratum and the prominance of the two contradictory sides of an argument would not be tenable in the case of doubt.

Explanation :

The Pūrvapakṣin raises the argument that knowledge of the substratum of the property (*dharmi jñāna*) is not the cause of doubt regarding the validity or authoritativeness (*samśaya hetu*); and hence not necessary. According to him, the apprehension of the first knowledge (*jñāna graha*), having the form of the doubt regarding the validity or authoritativeness (*saṁśaya rūpa*), can be produced from the knowledge of two contradictory sides (*koṭi jñāna*), non observation of any particularity (*viśeṣādarśana*) and the contact of the organs with the substratum(*dharmīndriya' sannikarṣa*). However, the Naiyāyikas refute the argument. According to them, in the view that knowledge is transcendental

(*atīndriya*), mental doubt regarding the validity or authoritativeness, having the first knowledge as the substratum (*taddharmika mānasa saṁśaya*), is untenable without the knowledge of the substratum, i.e. the first knowledge. Also the probans (*liṅga*) never produces the doubt, as it is the cause of ascertainment (*niścāyaka*). Further, the Naiyāyikas state that in the view that the knowledge is mental (*mānasa*), the totality of causes of the knowledge of the validity or authoritativeness (*prāmāṇya jñāna sāmagrī*) is an impediment to the doubt, as the same is only the cause of ascertainment. Thus, the knowledge of the substratum is necessary for the doubt regarding the validity or authoritativeness. Now the Pūrvapakṣin again raises the argument that the imposition of one side of the argument (*koṭyāropa*) is possible on the substratum when only one side of the argument is recollected and the other particular side is not observed (*viśeṣādarśana*); whereas the doubt regarding the validity or authoritativeness is possible when both the sides of the argument (*koṭi dvaya*) are recollected. Thus, according to the Pūrvapakṣin, the totality of causes of doubt (*saṁśaya sāmagrī*) is stronger than that of the ascertainment (*niścaya sāmagrī*); and therefore, only a doubt regarding the validity or authoritativeness is produced at the recollection of the two mutually contradictory sides of argument (*koṭi dvaya smaraṇa*).

However, the Naiyāyikas refute even such an argument : According to them, doubt of the form of imposition of the two contradictory sides of the argument (*ubhayāropa*) on the single substratum arises from the combination of two totalities of causes of two sides (*sāmagrī dvaya samāja*); however, one totality of causes of a side of an argument does not impede the other totality of causes of another side of an argument due to non-contradiction. Also the Naiyāyikas refute the argument that the totality of causes of the impositions of both the sides of an argument (*ubhayāropa sāmagrī*) impedes the totality of causes of the ascertainment of one side of an argument (*eka niścaya sāmagrī*). According to them, there exists no totality of causes that is distinct from the totality of causes of one particular side (*pratyekāropa sāmagrī*). Therefore, it must be admitted that the doubt regarding the validity or authoritativeness of first knowledge (*prāmāṇya saṁśaya*) would become untenable in the Mīmāmsakas' theory of the ascertainment of the validity or authoritativenesss intrinsically by the totalities of causes of the knowledge itself (*svataḥ*), as the totality of causes of the ascertainment of the authoritativeness (*prāmāṇya niścaya*) exists at the time of the knowledge of the substratum (*dharmi jñāna*)

Refutation of argument that Prāmāṇya saṁśaya is tenable

I. ii. 10. It may be argued now as follows : That the illusions like 'This conch is yellow' and 'The face exists in the mirror' may arise from the other

defects (bile or yellowness in the eye etc.), dispite the observation of the particular property; in the same way, the doubt regarding the authoritativeness of knowledge may arise from some other defects in the causes of knowledge, dispite the ascertainment of the validity or authoritativeness of knowledge. However, this argument is not correct. In the same way, the activity towards the object would have an occasion to arise in the case of doubt like in the case of illusion. The perceptual ascertainment of the particular true property is an impediment to the perceptual illusion. However, the perceptual ascertainment of the particular true property does not arise in the case of the illusion of the quarter of the sky. The perceptual ascertainment of the particular true property (such as 'The conch is not yellow') does not arise due to the impediment from the bile in the eye etc. Nothing is a defect in general.

Further it may be argued as follows : That the doubt regarding the validity or authoritativeness of knowledge arises from the doubt regarding the validity or authoritativeness in the knowledge of the validity or authoritativeness; and it is like the doubt regarding the validity or authoritativeness of object of first knowledge arising from the doubt regarding the validity or authoritativeness of knowledge. However, this argument too is not correct. The doubt regarding the authoritativeness of knowledge would not be tenable provided that the authoritativeness is not ascertained intrinsically by the totality of the causes of the knowledge itself in the case of the knowledge of the authoritativeness.

Explanation :

The Pūrvapakṣin, i.e. the Mīmāmsaka raises the argument that the doubt regarding the validity or authoritativeness of knowledge (*prāmāṇya saṁśaya*) is tenable from the other defects in the causes of knowledge dispite the ascertainment of the validity or authoritativeness (*prāmāṇya niścaya*); and this instance is similar to the instance of the production of illusion (*bhrama*) such as 'This conch is yellow' (*pītaḥ śaṅkhaḥ*) from the other defects (bile or yellowness in the eye) (*doṣāntara*) dispite the observasion of the particular property (*viśeṣa darśana*). Therefore, the position of the Naiyāyikas that the doubt regarding the validity or authoritativeness of knowledge becomes untenable is not correct. However, the Naiyāyikas refute the argument : According to them, in such a case, the undesired occasion of the activity (*pravṛtti prasaṅga*) would arise in the case of the doubt regarding the validity or authoritativeness of knowledge, like the undesired occasion for the activity would arise in the case of the illusion of the yellowness that 'This conch is yellow' (*pītaḥ śaṅkhaḥ*). Further, the perceptual ascertainment of the particular true property (*sākṣātkāri viśeṣa darśaṇa*) impedes the perceptual illusion (*sākṣātkāri bhrama*). However, the perceptual ascertainment of the particular true property like '*śaṅkho na pītaḥ*' does not arise due to the impediment such

as bile in the eye etc (*pittādi*). And nothing is a defect in general, i.e. defects should be impediments in their particular forms. Thus, second or after-knowledge or recognition need not ascertain the validity or authoritativeness of first knowledge.

The Pūrvapakṣin, i.e. the Mīmāmsaka raises the argument that the doubt regarding the validity or authoritativeness of knowledge (*prāmāṇya samśaya*) may arise from the doubt regarding the validity or authoritativeness in the knowledge of the validity or authoritativeness (*prāmāṇya jñāne*) like '*ghaṭavad bhūtalam*' ; and therefore, the doubt regarding the validity or authoritativeness of knowledge need not be untenable. However, the Naiyāyikas refute the argument. According to them, the doubt regarding the authoritativeness of knowledge (*prāmāṇya saṁśaya*) would not be tenable in the knowledge of the authoritativeness (*prāmśṇya jñāne*) like '*ghaṭavad bhūtalam*' when the validity or authoritativeness is not ascertained intrinsically by the totality of causes of knowledge itself (*svataḥ*) in the knowledge of the authoritativeness (*prāmāṇya jñāne*).

Refutation of further arguments: Prāmāṇyasamśaya is not tenable

I. ii. 11. It may be argued by the Mīmāmsaka as follows : That knowledge in general cannot remove the contradictory knowledge. For, contradictory knowledge arises even after the illusory knowledge. Rather, therefore it must be admitted that only the non-redundant knowledge, i.e. the knowledge not grasped to be illusory, removes the contradictory knowledge. That is why, i.e. since the knowledge of object is possible even without the (knowledge of) object in the non-substratum, the doubt regarding the object arises, due to being the object of knowledge in general, by disregarding the ascertainment of the object which is apprehended to be redundant or illusory. In the same way, the doubt regarding the validity or authoritativeness of knowledge arises by disregarding the ascertainment of the validity or authoritativeness in the knowledge of the validity or authoritativeness due to the apprehension of redundancy or illusoryness.

Now it may be objected as follows : That since the first knowledge of pot is an object of an after–knowledge or recognition, the doubt regarding the first knowledge being the knowledge and referring to the pot as the object does not arise. In the same way, the doubt regarding the authoritativeness of first knowledge does not arise, as the after-knowledge or recognition is ruled to be valid or authoritative. However, this objection is not correct. After-knowledge or recognition is ruled not to be referring to the state of being the knowledge in the case of non-knowledge and the state of being the object in the case of non-object. This way, since the state of being the after-knowledge or recognition referring to the pot as the object and the state of being the after-knowledge or recognition referring to the non-redundant or non-illusory

validity or authoritativeness of first knowledge are quite tenable in the after-knowledge that is devoid of the validity or authoritativeness, the doubt regarding the validity or authoritativeness of first knowledge can certainly arise there.

No, this argument of the Mīmāmsaka is not correct. The state of being the illusion means the state of being the redundant knowledge. Thus, the final conclusive view is that the doubt regarding the validity or authoritativeness arises in the object of first knowledge on account of the doubt regarding the illusoryness in the knowledge of the validity or authoritativeness (of first knowledge). For, it has been stated that the doubt regarding the illusoryness (in the validity or authoritativeness of after-knowledge) does not arise from the ascertainment and the non-ascertainment of the validity or authoritativeness of the after-knowledge. In the same way, in the other cases too, the doubt regarding the validity or authoritativeness does not arise in the object due to the doubt regarding the illusoryness of first knowledge. For, the doubt regarding the illusoryness of first knowledge is not possible in the view that the validity or authoritativeness of first knowledge is ascertained intrinsically by the totality of causes of the knowledge itself.

Explanation :

Now, the Pūrvapakṣin, i.e. the Mīmāmsaka raises the argument that the doubt regarding the validity or authoritativeness, in the first knowledge (*prāmāṇya saṁśaya*), is tenable due to the doubt regarding the state of being the illusion itself (*bhramatva saṁśaya*); and hence the theory that the validity or authoritativeness of first knowledge is ascertained intrinsically by the totality of causes of first knowledge itself (*svataḥ prāmāṇya*) is tenable. According to him, knowledge in general (*jñāna mātra*), which includes even illusion, cannot remove the contradictory knowledge (*virodhi buddhi*), as the contradictory knowledge (*bādhaka jñāna*) can arise after illusion. Therefore, only the non-redundant or non-illusory knowledge (*ananyathā siddha*) needs to remove the contradictory knowledge. And since the ascertainment of the validity or authoritativeness (*prāmāṇya niścaya*) in the knowledge of the authoritativeness (*prāmāṇya*) may involve the apprehension of the redundancy or illusoryness (*anyathāsiddhi śaṅkā*), the doubt regarding the validity or authoritativeness of first knowledge (*prāmāṇya saṁśaya*) is quite tenable by disregarding the ascertainment of the validity or authoritativeness.

The Mīmāmsaka further refutes the objection of the Naiyāyikas that the doubt regarding the authoritativeness (*prāmāṇya saṁśaya*) of the first knowledge (*vyavasāya*) cannot arise due to the fact that the after-knowledge (*anu vyavasāya*), which refers to the first knowledge as its object, is ruled to be only valid or authoritative (*pramātva niyama*). According to him, the after-knowledge (*anuvyāvasāya*) does not refer to the state of being the knowledge

of the first knowledge (*jñānatva*) and the state of being the object of the pot (*viṣayatva*) provided that first knowledge is a non-knowledge (*ajñāna*) and does not refer to the pot as the object (*aviṣaya*). And therefore, the doubt regarding the authoritativeness of first knowledge (*saṁśaya*) is tenable, as the state of being the after–knowledge referring to the non-redundant or non-illusory (*ananyathā siddha*) authoritativeness of first knowledge (*prāmāṇya viṣayatva*) is possible even without the authoritativeness.

However, the Naiyāyikas refute the Mīmāmāsaka's argument. According to them, the state of being the illusion (*bhramatva*) means the state of being the-redundant knowledge (*anyathā siddhatva*). And therefore, the doubt regarding the authoritativeness (*prāmāṇya saṁśaya*) can arise in the object of first knowledge (*viṣaye*) only through the doubt regarding the illusoryness (*bhramatva saṁśaya*) in the ascertainment of the authoritativeness of first knowledge (*prāmāṇya niścaya*). For, the doubt regarding the illusoryness (*bhramatva saṁśaya*) in the authoritativeness of after-knowledge is not possible from the ascertainment and the non-ascertainment of the authoritativeness of after-knowledge. Thus, in the same way, the doubt regarding the authoritativeness does not arise in the object of first knowledge from the doubt regarding the illusoryness of first knowledge (*bhramatva saṁśaya*). For, the doubt regarding the illusoryness of first knowledge (*bhramatva saṁśaya*) is not possible in the theory that the authoritativeness of first knowledge is ascertained intrinsically by the totality of causes of knowledge.

Viṣayasaṁśaya results from prāmāṇya saṁśaya

I. ii. 12. It may again be argued as follows : The position that the doubt regarding the object of knowledge arises from the doubt regarding the validity or authoritativeness of first knowledge is not tenable; for, there exists no proof to prove such a position. Also the doubt regarding the object constitutes the object of knowledge. Further, the same doubt regarding the object is tenable due to the doubt referring to the common property of objects only. Also it need not be argued that this way when the doubt regarding the objects arises, the ascertainment of the objects would become impossible in all cases.This difficulty is equally applicable in the theory of the Naiyāyikas that the doubt regarding the object arises from the doubt regarding the validity or authoritativeness of first knowledge. However, this is not correct. The doubt regarding the validity or authoritativeness of first knowledge is not universal in all cases. Also, the non-origination of the doubt regarding the validity or authoritativeness of the object, which is ascertained without any doubt regarding the illusoryness, is experienced by all.

It may again be argued as follows : That the validity or authoritativeness of knowledge is the state of being the knowledge that refers to the qualifying property as the qualifier in the substratum of the qualifier. And since such a state, i.e. the authoritativeness is already ascertained by the totality of causes of first knowledge, the doubt regarding the authoritativeness of first knowledge is not tenable. Also it is not correct to argue that since the doubt regarding the authoritativeness persists dispite the ascertainment of such a state (of being the knowledge referring to the qualifier in the substratum of the qualifier), the same state of being the knowledge referring the qualifier in the substratum of the qualifier cannot constitute the authoritativeness of first knowledge. For, the unwaving activity of humans arises only from the ascertainment of such a state of knowledge referring to the qualifier in the substratum.

However, we, the Naiyāyikas, shall reply as follows : Alright; let the same state constitute the validity or authoritativeness of knowledge. However, since the doubt regarding the authoritativeness of first knowledge and the doubt regarding the state of having such an authoritativeness of the object are established to arise after the production of after-knowledge, by experience, the state of having the authoritativeness of object cannot be the object of after-knowledge.

Explanation :

The Mīmāmsaka again raises the argument to the Naiyāyikas' position that the doubt regarding the object of knowledge (*viṣaya saṁśaya*) results from the doubt regarding the validity or authoritativeness of first knowledge (*prāmāṇya saṁśaya*). According to him, the doubt regarding the object of knowledge can be explained merely from the doubt referring to the common property of objects only (*samāna dharma*). Also the Mīmāmsaka refutes the argument that the ascertainment of the object (*tanniścaya*) becomes untenable when only the doubt regarding the object (*viṣaya saṁśaya*) is produced from the doubt referring to the common property of objects. According to him, such a difficulty is equally applicable even in the Naiyāyikas' theory that the doubt regarding the object is produced from the doubt regarding the validity or authoritativeness of knowledge (*prāmāṇya saṁśaya*). However, the Naiyāyikas refute the argument. According to them, such a difficulty of the doubt regarding the object is avoided due to the non-universality (*asārvatrikatva*) of the doubt regarding the authoritativeness of first knowledge (*prāmāṇya saṁśaya*). Also since the doubt regarding the object (*viṣaya saṁśaya*) is not produced without the doubt regarding the illusoryness of knowledge (*bhramatva saṁśaya*), the ascertainment of the object (*viṣaya niścaya*) need not become untenable.

The Mīmāmsaka further raises the argument that the doubt regarding the authoritativeness of knowledge (*prāmāṇya saṁśaya*) itself becomes untenable in the Naiyāyikas' theory that the authoritativeness of knowledge is the state of being the knowledge that refers to the qualifying property (*tat prakāraka jñānatva*) in the substratum of the qualifying property (*tadvati*), as the same state is already ascertained by the totality of causes of the knowledge (*jñāna grāhaka*). Also the Mīmāmsaka refutes the argument that since the doubt regarding the authoritativeness persists despite the ascertainment of such a state of being the knowledge that refers to the qualifier in the substratum of the qualifier *(tadvati tatprakārakatva),* the same state cannot constitute the authoritativeness. According to him, the unwavering activity (*niṣkampa vyavahāra*) can be explained by the ascertainment of only such a state; and therefore, only such a state constitutes the authoritativeness.

However, the Naiyāyikas refute even such an argument. According to them, such a state may constitute the authoritativeness of knowledge; however, the doubt regarding the authoritativeness of first knowledge (*vyavasāyasya prāmāṇye*) and the state of having of such an authoritativeness of the object (*arthasya tadvatta*) are experienced even after the production of after-knowledge; and therefore the state of having of the authoritativeness of first knowledge cannot constitute the object of after knowledge *(anuvyavasāya viṣaya).*

Udayanācārya's Refutation of Mīmāmsakas' (Mishras') positon

I. ii. 13. The Mīmāmsakas (Mishras) now propose as follows: That only the after - knowledge or recognition is the proof of the fact that the first knowledge refers to 'this', object in front, i.e. the substratum qualified by the qualifying properties such as. the thisness and the silverness. Thus, the substratum, as qualified by all the qualifiers, which are referred by the first knowledge, is recognized in the after- knowledge. Otherwise, suppose the after-knowledge is an indeterminate knowledge with respect to the object of first knowledge, then the form of the after-knowledge would not be that 'I know that this object in front is the silver'. Thus, the after-knowledge ascertains the qualification of both the thisness and the silverness in the substratum 'this'. Therefore, the knowledge, i.e. the ascertainment of the authoritativeness intrinsically by the totality of causes of after-knowledge becomes unavoidable with respect to the qualification of the silverness like the ascertainment of the validity or authoritativeness intrinsically by the totality of causes of after-knowledge is unavoidable with respect to the subsratum. That is why, the doubt regarding the authoritativeness is never tenable with respect to the substratum 'this'.

No this position of the Mīmāmsakas (Mishras) is not correct. The form of the after-knowledge is not that 'I know this object in front and also the silver'. For, the mind, i.e. the instrument of the after - knowledge, has no independence with respect to the after-knowledge referring to the outside substratum 'this object in front' etc. Rather, therefore, the form of the after-knowledge is only that 'I know this object infront both as being this and as being silver'. And in such an after - knowledge (*idam idantvena rajatatvena jānāmi*), the thisness and the silverness apear as being the qualfiers; whereas the state of possessing such an after-knowledge referring to such qualifiers appears in the soul. Otherwise, the meanings of instrumental cases (viz. *idantvena* and *rajatatvena*) that express the qualifierness would become untenable semantically to construe in the case of the after-knowledge. Suppose the qualification of the silverness is the meaning of the instrumental case in the case of the after-knowledge, then the same meaning of the instrumental case would be requiered to be described or referred even in the case of first knowledge. Thus, only the after-knowledge is the proof of the fact that the after-knowledge refers to the first - knowledge in turn referring to the thisness and the silverness as the qualifiers in the substratum 'this'; and also it is the proof that the soul is the possessor of such an after - knowledge. Therefore, the same after - knowledge cannot be an indeterminate knowledge with respect to the objects of first knowledge. However, since the qualifications such as the thisness and the silverness in the object in front, i.e. the substratum, 'this', are not the objects of the after - knowledge, the validity or authoritativeness of the first knowledge cannot be ascertained intrinsically by the totality of causes of after- knowledge. Therefore, the validity or authoritativeness of the first knowledge, which is devoid of the condition of repetitiveness, is, like the invalidity or non-authoritativeness, ascertained extraneously by others; for, the same pertains to the doubt (existing at the third moment of origin). This is the position of the followers of Udayanācārya.

Explanation :

The Mīmāmsakas (Mishras) propose that only the after - knowledge (*anu vyavasāya*) is the proof that the first knowledge (*vyavasāya*) refers to the substratum 'this', as qualified by both the thisness and the silverness, as the object (*idamtva rajatatva viśiṣṭedam viṣayatva*); and therefore, the substratum (*dharmin*), as qualified by all the qualifiers described by the first knowledge (*vyavasāyollikhita*), is cognized in the after-knowledge. According to them, it is necessary that the after - knowledge, which has the form of '*idam rajatam jānāmi*' is a determinate knowledge (*savikalpaka*) referring to the object of first knowledge (*viṣayāṁśe*). And since the after - knowledge ascertains the qualification of both the thisness and the silverness with respect to the

substratum, i.e. 'this', the ascertainment of the validity or authoritativeness, intrinsically by the totality of causes of after - knowledge (*svataḥ prāmāṇya*), becomes necessary even with respect to the qualification of the silverness (*rajatatva vaiśiṣṭye*) like it is necessary with respect to the substratum, i.e. 'this'. Thus, the doubt regarding the authoritativeness is never tenable in the substratum; and so the untenability of the doubt cannot be a fault in the Mīmāmsakas' theory.

However the followers of Udayanācārya refute the position of the Mīmāmsakas (Mishras). Accoding to them, the form of the after - knowlege is only that 'I know this object in front as being the object in front and also as being silver' (*idam idantvena rajatatvena jānāmi*); however, the form is not that 'I know this object in front and also the silver' (*idam rajatatañ ca jānāmi*), as the internal instrument of mind is not independent in producing the knowledge referring to the outside substratum, i.e. 'this' (*bahir viśeṣyaka*). It should be noted that in the after - knowledge , i.e. '*idam idantvena rajatatvena jānāmi*', both the thisness and the silverness are cognized to be the qualifiers; whereas the after - knowledge having such qualifiers is cognized to exist in the soul. Thus, they maintain that only the after - knowledge is the proof that the same after - knowledge refers to the first knowledge referring to the thisness and the silverness as the qualifiers in the substratum as its object (*idantva rajatatva prakāraka jñāna viṣayatve*) and that the soul is the possessor of such an after - knowledge (*tādṛśa jñānavattve*). Therefore, the after - knowledge cannot be an indeterminate knowledge (*nirvikalpaka*) with respect to the object of first knowledge (*viṣaya*). However, since only the first knowledge, but not the qualifications such as the thisness and the silverness (*idantva rajatatva vaiśiṣṭya*) in the substratum i.e. 'this', are the objects of the after - knowledge, the validity or authoritativeness of first knowledge cannot be ascertained intrinsically by the totality of causes of after - knowledge itself. Rather therefore, the validity or authoritativeness of first knowledge, having the condition of non-repetition (*anabhyāsa daśāpanna*), needs to be ascertained only extraneously by some other means (*parataḥ*), as it pertains to the doubt (*sāṁśayikatva*).

Avoidance of Siddhasādhana in Ācārya's position :

I. ii. 14. It may be objected by the Mīmāmsakas as follows : That though the validity or authoritativeness of first knowledge is to be ascertained by the totality of causes of the knowledge itself, the same is to be ascertained extraneously by some other means at times; and also even the (totality of causes of the) first knowledge is only 'other' as compared to (that of) the other, i.e. (that of) after - knowledge. Moreover, the authoritativeness of first knowledge is to be ascertained by some other means, i.e. the totality of causes of inference in the theory of the Bhāṭṭas in any case. Consequantly, there arises the fault of the establishment of the already established in the theory of the followers of Udayanācārya that the validity or authoritativeness is to be ascertained extraneously by some other means.

It should not be argued, however, that the totality of causes of after - knowledge, that ascertains the validity or authoritativeness of first knowledge, has the extraneousness or otherness as compared to the totality of causes of first knowledge having the authoritativeness to be ascertained. The knowledge of the causes, that ascertains the authoritativeness of the first knowledge, too has only the authoritativeness that is to be ascertained; and therefore, the totality of causes of after-knowledge cannot have the otherness as compared to the totality of causes of first knowledge. Also suppose the totality of causes of the knowledge that ascertains the authoritativeness has the otherness as compared to the totality of causes that does not ascertain the authoritativeness of knowledge, then the contingency of the non-authoritativeness would become contingent in knowledge.

Here, we the Naiyāyikas state our reply. The validity authoritativeness of first knowledge, that has the condition of non-repetitiveness, is not to be ascertained by its substratum, i.e. by the totality of causes of first knowledge (as held by the Gurus); also the same validity or authoritativeness of first knowledge is not to be ascertained by what is other than its substratum, i.e. the totality of causes of after - knowledge and by the totality of causes of inference (as held by the Mishras and the Bhaṭṭas respectively). For, dispite the presence of the substratum of the authoritativeness, i.e. the first knowledge, the same authoritativeness becomes only the object of the doubt arising at the third moment from the production of first knowledge; also the same does not become the object of doubt not arising from the doubt regarding the authoritativeness; like the non-authoritativeness. When the object is ascertained, the doubt regarding the same object does not arise at the third moment from the ascertainment of the object; also the same doubt regarding the object does not arise without the doubt regarding the authoritativeness. Thus, the deviation of probans does not arise in the inferenece proving the authoritativeness of first knowledge extraneously.

Further the point of debate, between the Mīmāmsakas and the Naiyāyikas, i.e. the validity or authoritativeness of first knowledge is not to be ascertained by the totality of causes of knowledge that produces the substratum of the authoritativeness, i.e. the first knowledge; for, the same validity or authoritativeness, even while its own substratum, i.e. the first knowledge is ascertained, is being doubted, like the invalidity or non-authoritativeness, even without the doubt regarding the non-authoritativeness

at the third moment from the ascertainment of the first knowledge. Also, the authoritativeness of first knowledge, having the condition of non-repetitiveness, is not the object of the ascertainment of the knowledge of the authoritativeness that arises prior to the doubt regarding the authoritativeness of the knowledge; for, the same authoritativeness is being doubted even after the ascertainment of the knowledge of the authoritativeness like the non-authoritativeness.

It should not be argued that the fallacy of contradiction arises, as the term 'itself' (*sva*) is intended to convey merely the validity or authoritativeness; and the authoritativeness needs to be ascertained by the substratum of the authoritativeness, i.e. the first knowledge. Since the term 'itself' (*sva*) is intended to convey the relational subjunct, the same can convey even the contextually relavant substratum of the authoritativeness, i.e. (the totality of causes of) first knowledge. Otherwise, since 'itself' can be 'other' and 'other' can be 'itself', and also since the state of being (the totality of causes of) knowledge itself and the state of being other than (the totality of the causes of knowledge are common to 'knowledge itself' and 'other than knowledge itself', the doubt as to whether the authoritativeness of the first knowledge is ascertained intrinsically by the totality of causes of the knowledge itself or extraneously by something else would not be tenable.

Some maintain, however, that since the contradiction arises in the theory that the validity or authoritativeness of knowledge is ascertained by the totality of causes of knowledge itself, 'the state of being what is to be ascertained extraneously by some other means' is the state of being what is ascertained otherwise by exclusive specification.

Explanation :

The Pūrvapakṣins, i.e. the Mīmāmsakas raise the objection that the inference of the followers of Udayanācārya, viz. "*prāmāṇyam parato jñāyate, sāṁśayikatvāt*" (C.f. I. ii. 13) involves the fault of establishment of the already established (*siddha sādhana*). According to them, the validity or authoritativeness of knowledge (*prāmāṇya*) is to be ascertained extraneously by some other means (*parataḥ*) at times; and also the same is to be ascertained only extraneously by other means, i.e. totality of causes of inference in the theory of the Bhāṭṭa Mīmāmsakas. Thus, the authoritativeness of first knowledge need not be established to be ascertained extraneously by some other means again in the theory of the followers of Udayanācārya by inference.

Also the Pūrvapakṣins refute the argument of the followers of Ācārya that the totality of causes of after-knowledge that ascertains the validity or authoritativeness of first knowledge (*grāhaka prāmāṇya*) has the otherness (*paratva*) as compared to the totality of causes of first knowledge having the authoritativeness to be ascertained (*grāhya prāmāṇya*). According to them, even the knowledge of the causes that ascertains (*ghāhaka*) needs to have the authoritativeness to be ascertained (*grāhya prāmāṇya*) at times; and hence the totality of causes of after-knowledge that ascertains the authoritativeness cannot have the otherness as compered to the totality of causes of first knowledge (*tadapekṣayā*). Also the Pūrvapakṣin refutes the argument that the totality of causes of the knowledge that ascertains can have the otherness as compared to the totality of causes of knowledge that does not ascertain the authoritativeness (*svāgrāhya prāmāṇya*). According to him, such an option would involve the contingency of the non-authoritativeness (*aprāmāṇya prasaṅga*) in the knowledge.

However, the Naiyāyikas refute the objection of the Mīmāmsakas. According to them, the validity or authoritativeness of first knowledge cannot be ascertained intrinsically by itself. And the same is proved by the inference that 'The authoritativeness of knowledge, having the condition of non-repetitiveness (*anabhyāsa daśāpanna jñāna prāmāṇyam*) is not to be ascertained by either the substratum of the authoritativeness, i.e. the totality of causes of the first knowledge (*svāśraya grāhyam*), as held by the Gurus, or by what is other than the substratum of the authoritativeness, i.e. by the totality of causes of after - knowledge or by the totality of causes of inference as held by the Mishras and that the Bhāṭṭas (*svāśraya vyatirikta grāhyam*); for, it is only the object of doubt arising at the third moment from the production of the first knowledge (*taduttara tṛtīya kṣaṇa vṛtti samśaya viṣayatvāt*). And since no doubt arises after the third moment of the ascertainment of the first knowledge of objects (*tanniścayānantara tṛtīyakṣane*), no deviation of the probans of inference (*vyabhicāra*) arises in the case of objects.

Also the Naiyāyikas establish that the validity or authoritativeness of knowledge is what is to be ascertained extraneously by the merits in the causes of knowledge by refuting the objection of the Mīmāmsakas. According to them, the inference could be that 'The point of debate, i.e. the authoritativeness of first knowledge (*vivāda padam*) is not to be ascertained by the totality of causes of first knowledge producing the substratum of the authoritativeness, i.e. the first knowledge (*na yāvat svāśraya grāhaka grāhyam*); for, it is being doubted even without the doubt regarding the non-authoritativeness at the third moment from the ascertainment of the first knowledge (*taduttara tṛtīyakṣane sandihyamānatvāt*), like the non-authoritativeness (*aprāmāṇyavat*)'. Also since the term 'itself' (*sva* in *svataḥ*) is meant to convey the relational subjunct (*sambandhi - paratvena*), the same can convey even the substratum of the authoritativeness (*samabhivyāhṛta*); and thus there arises no contradiction

(*bādha*) on account of not conveying the substratum of the validity or authoritativeness (*tadāśraya*). And the position that the term 'itself' (*sva*) is intended to convey relational subjunct is necessary, as otherwise the doubt as to whether the authoritativeness of first knowledge is ascertained intrinsically by the totality of causes of the knowledge itself (*svataḥ*) or extraneously by something else (*parataḥ*) would become untenable.

It should be noted that Some scholars, however, suggest that the validity or authoritativeness of first knowledge (*prāmāṇya*) needs to be ascertained only extraneously by some other means (*parataḥ*), as there would arise contradiction in the view that the authoritativeness of first knowledge is ascertained intrinsically by the totality of causes of first knowledge itself (*svataḥ*).

Sampradāyavādin's view : Prāmāṇya jñāna is produced from Anumāna

I. ii. 15. The Traditionalists (Sampradāya vādins) hold here as follows : That the first knowledge of the validity or authoritativeness is produced from the inference of negative invariable concomitance (That 'This knowledge of fire is not delimited by the property not existing in the fire; for, it produces the activity towards the fire competent of burning').

It may be objected now that how could the negative inference produce the knowledge of the validity or authoritativeness, as the negative invariable concomitance of probans cannot be ascertained with the probandum without the establishment or exampledness of the authoritativeness first. However, the Traditionalists suggest that at first valid knowledge and its object such as fire get established on account of the fear of falacy of contradiction otherwise; and thereafter the state of being the object of valid knowledge can be inferred in the fire by means of the knowability through such an example. Thus, the fault of non-establishment or non-exampledness of the probandum of the authoritativeness of the knowledge of fire does not arise when the same is established in general as exampled. Also since the probandum of the inference is not ascertained in particular, the faults of non-commonality of probans and the exclusive positive character of probans can be avoided.

It may be argued now that the validity or authoritativeness of first knowledge is not common or consecutive to all the knowledges; but rather, it is distinct in each and every knowledge, as the object and the qualifier differ. Thus, only the state of not being delimited by the qualifier, not existing in the fire, of the knowledge of fire etc., needs to be the probandum of the negative inference. Since such a probandum is not established or exampled, the fault of unexampledness persists. However, this argument is not correct. The state of not being delimited by the qualifier, not existing in the qualificand of fire, of the knowledge of fire etc., which is being inferred, culminates into being the authoritativeness of the knowledge referring to the fire as its object on the strength of the property of the subject of inference.

It may again be objected as follows: That in that case, none can have the inference of the validity or authoritativeness of knowledge for oneself at first; for, contradiction to the authoritativeness, which is of the form of the negation of the authoritativeness of knowledge, is absent at that time. And the negation of the authoritativeness of knowledge by oneself, on the other hand, needs to be preceded by the knowledge of the authoritativeness at first (and hence is untenable). Since the authoritativeness of knowledge is negated by others without first knowing the authoritativeness, even the others' contradiction to the authoritativeness cannot be known. Although the diversity or distinction of the knowledge of the probans of the inference of the authoritativeness of first knowledge is possible to infer from the conformity to the activity to wards fire and the non-confority to the lack of activity towards fire, the subject of the inference of the authoritativeness of first knowledge, in the said form of authoritativeness, cannot be known.

Here we, the Traditionalists, reply. That merely the validity or authoritativeness of first knowledge, of the form of being the knowledge that refers to the qualifier in the substratum of the qualifier or being the knowledge that does not refer to the non-qualifier not existing in the substratum of the qualifier, is recollected from the impression arison earlier. The same authoritativeness of first knowledge, which is being inferred in the knowledge of fire etc., culminates into being the knowledge of fire, that does not refer to the fireness not existing in the substratum of the qualifier, on the strength of the use of the pronoun and on the strength of being the property (smoke) of the subject of inference. The necessity of the earliar knowledge of the validity or authoritativeness cannot be explained in any other way in the case of the negation of the validity or authoritativeness by oneself. This is the theory of the Traditionalists.

Explanation :

Gangeśa now explains the view of the Traditionalists (Sampradāyavids) among the Naiyāyikas. Accoding to them, the validity or authoritativeness of first knowledge (*prāmāṇya*) is to be ascertained extraneously by some other means (*parataḥ*); and the first knowledge of authoritativeness (*prathamam prāmāṇya jñānam*) needs to be produced from the inference of negative invariable concomitance (*vyatirekin*). such as '*vahniviśeṣyaka jñānamidam vahny avṛtti prakārānavacchiunam, dāhasamartha viśeṣyaka pravṛtti janakatvāt*'.

However, an objection is raised by the Pūrvapakṣin that the inference of negative concomitance (*anumāna*) becomes untenable due to the impossibility of the ascertainment of negative concomitance (*vyatireka vyāpti*) without the exampledness of the authoritativeness (*prāmāṇya prasiddhi*) first. However, the Traditionalists suggest that the authoritative knowledge and its object of fire (*pramā tadviṣaya*) get established due to the fear of fallacy of contradition (*vyāghāta daṇḍa bhaya*); and therefore the state of being the object of valid knowledge can be inferred in the fire. Consequently, the inference of the authoritativeness of first knowledge can be tenable, as the unexampledness of the probandum (*sādhyāprasiddhi*) is avoided due to ascertainment of concomitance between the probans and the probandum in general. Also since the probandum of inference is not ascertained in particular, the fault of non-commonality of probans (*asādhāraṇya*) can be avoided.

Also the Traditionalists refute the argument that the validity authoritativeness is not consecutive (*anugata*) to all the first knowledges; rather the same differs in each knowledge, as the object and the qualifier differ (*viṣaya prakāra - bheda*); and therefore, the probandum, i.e. the state of not being delimited by the qualifier not existing in the fire (*vahnyavṛtti prakārānavacchinnatva*) cannot be exampled in the knowledge of fire. According to them, such a state of not being delimited by the qualifier, not existing in the qualificand, which is being inferred, amounts to the authoritativeness of the knowledge of fire (*vahni viṣayaka pramātva*); and hence the probandum need not become unexampled (*aprasiddha*).

The Pūrvapakṣin again raises the objection that the inference of the authoritativeness of first knowledge for oneself (*svārtha prāmāṇyānumāna*) would become untenable. According to him, others' contradiction to the authoritativeness *(parakīya vyāghāta)*, of the form of the negation of the authoritativeness, is impossible for any one at first due to the absence of the knowledge of the authoritativeness (*prāmāṇya jñāna*). Also according to him, though the distinction of the knowledge of probans of the inference of the validity or authoritativeness (*taddhetu vaicitrya*) can be known by the conformity to the activity towards fire and non-conformity to the lack of activity towards fire (*pravṛtti samvāda visamvāda*), the subject of the inference of the said authoritativeness (*yathokta rūpa prāmāṇya*) cannot be known. Thus, the inference of the authoritativeness of first knowledge is untenable.

However, the Traditionalists (Sampradāya vādins) refute the objection. According to them, mere validity or authoritativeness (*prāmāṇya mātra*) of first knowledge, of the form of the state of being the knowledge that refers to the qualifying property in the substratum of the qualifier (*tadvati

tatprakārakatva*) can be recollected from the impression arison earlier (*prāgbhavīya samskāra*); and the same, being established in the knowledge of fire (*vahni jñāna*), culminates into the state of being the knowledge that does not refer to the qualifying property not existing in the substratum (*viśeṣyāvṛtty aprakārakatva*) of the knowledge of fire. Thus, the knowledge of the exampledness of the authoritativeness (*prāthamika prāmāṇya jñāna*) at first can be obtained; and therefore, the infernece of the validity or authoritativeness with negative concomitance need not be untenable.

Navyanaiyāyikas' Position

I. ii. 16. Here we, the Navyanaiyāyikas, reply as follows: That the validity or authoritativeness of first knowledge, of the form of the absence of non-authoritativeness of knowledge, is to be inferred by the inference with the negative concomitance. For, the unwavering human activity can be tenable from such an authoritativeness of knowledge only. Or, alternatively, it can be held that the same authoritativeness of knowledge, while being established, becomes established as the state of being the knowledge that refers to the property as the qualifier in the substratum of the qualifying property on the strength of being the property of the subject of inference; or the same becomes established afterwards by implication.

The inference of negative concomitance (that establishes the validity or authoritativeness of first knowledge) may be illustrated as follows : "That this knowledge of fire as being fire does not refer to the fireness as the qualifier in the substratum of the absence of the fireness; it does not refer to the qualifier existing in the non-fire; it does not refer to the qualifier not existing in the substratum; it, while being what refers to the fireness as the qualifier, does not refer to the fire as the non-substratum; it is not delimited by the qualifier not sharing the community of locus with the fireness; or it does not refer to the qualifier not existing in the fire; for, it is the determinate knowledge of fire referring to the fireness as the qualifier while producing the human activity towards what is competent of burning; or for, it is the determinate knowledge referring to the fireness as the qualifier while having the what is competent of burning (i.e. fire) as the substratum; and whatever knowledge is not so, is not so like the invalid or non-authoritative knowledge of fire".

Explanation :

The Navyanaiyāyikas, maintaining their distinct opinion, explain as to how the validity or authoritativeness of first knowledge is ascertained. According to them, first only the authoritativeness of first knowledge of the form of the absence of non-authoritativeness (*aprāmāṇyā bhāva*) is

ascertained by the inference with negative concomitance (*vyatirekin*), as only such an authoritativeness is the cause of unwavering human activity (*niṣkampa pravṛtti*). Or, the same authoritativeness of first knowledge being inferred, i.e. ascertained, becomes inferred, i.e. ascertained as referring to the state of being the knowledge that refers to the qualifying property in the substratum of the qualifier (*tadvati tatprakārakatva*) on account of the state of being the property of the subject of inference (*pakṣa dharmatā*). Thus, the authoritativeness of first knowledge (*prāmāṇya*) can be ascertained extraneously by inference (*parataḥ*).

The Navyanaiyāyikas further illustrate the inference with negative concomitance (*vyatirekin*) that ascertains the validity or authoritativeness of first knowledge as follows : 'That this knowledge of fire as being fire (*ayam vahnitvena anubhavaḥ*) does not refer to the fireness as the qualifier in the substratum of the absence of the fireness (*vahnyabhāvavti vahnitva prakārako na*); or it does not refer to the qualifier not existing in the fire (*vahnyavṛtti prakārako na vā*); for, it is a determinate knowledge of fire referring to the fireness as the qualifier while having what is competent of burning as the substratum (*dāhasamartha viśeṣyaka vahnitva prakāraka niścayatvāt*)".

It should be noted that this way, according to the Naiyāyikas, the authoritativeness of first knowledge (*prāmāṇya*) is to be ascertained extraneously (*parataḥ*) by the inference with negative concomitance (*vyatirekin*); but not intrinsically by the totality of causes of first knowledge (*svataḥ*) by the totality of causes of knowledge.

Ascertainment of non-authoritativeness

I.ii. 17. It is established, i.e. admitted by one and all that in the case of invalid or non authoritative knowledge, the invalidity or non–authoritativeness of the form of being the knowledge that 'I had the knowledge of fire as being fire in the substratum of the absence of the fireness' is ascertained by mind or by some other means when the illusion is recollected subsequant to the contradiction.

Also this way, in the case of the invalid or non-authoritative knowledge of fire, first the invariable concomitance is ascertained between the probans such as the absence, and the probandum such as the state of being the knowledge producing the activity towards the fire, competent of burning, which is identical with the state of being the knowledge referring to the fireness as the qualifier in the substratum of the absence of the fireness etc; and consequently the probandum of the form of the absence of the invalidity or non–authoritativeness becomes inferred or ascertained from the probans of the form of the absence of the absence of probans, pervading the non-

authoritativeness of knowledge. The Probans establishes the absence of the entity, i.e. the absence of the probandum, as pervading which the absence of the probans is ascertained. However, in the case where the absence of the probans is ascertained to have the state of being the pervader of the absence of the probandum, the exampledness of the probandum is the associate cause of inference; for, the inferential knowledge of the absence of the probandum is untenable without the exampledness of the probandum, i.e. the counter positive.

However, in the case where the absence of the probans has the state of being what pervades the presence (of the form of the absence of probandum), the exampledness of the probandum need not be the associate cause of inference; for, the negative concomitance can be ascertained even without the exampledness of the probandum. Therefore (in the case of the inference, such as 'Sky is different from non-sky; for, it has the skyness'), the mutual absence of non-skyness, though it is not exampled to be the sky, can be inferred, as the absence of the skyness is ascertained to be pervading the non-sky. Now it may be questioned as to how is it that the inference of the first knowledge, as qualified by the authoritativeness, is possible without the knowledge of the qualifier, i.e. the authoritativeness first? However, we shall reply that such an inference (of the first knowledge as qualified by the authoritativeness) is not possible in any way (without the knowledge of the qualifier) first. Rather, only after the inference that the validity or authoritativeness exists in the first knowledge, the inference of the first knowledge, as qualified by the validity or authoritativeness, is produced in the same case of knowledge by the same probans. And this instance is similar to the instance of the qualificative knowledge such as 'The ground is the substratum of the absence of the pot which is produced after the knowledge of the qualifier that the absence of the pot is the qualifier in the ground. Thus, the absence of the state of being the knowledge referring to the qualifier (fireness) in the substratum of the absence of the qualifier (fireness) becomes inferred; however, this is possible only by taking into consideration the state of being the knowledge referring to the qualifier (fireness) in the substratum of the qualifier (fireness) after the doubt as to whether "This knowledge, referring to the fireness as the qualifier, refers to the qualifier in the substratum of the qualifier or refers to the qualifier in the substratum of the absence of the qualifier". Since there exists no third alternative way, the probandum cannot be conclusively inferred without knowing such a state of being the knowledge referring to the qualifier in the substratum of the qualifier. And this instance is like the instance of the eternality of knowledge.

Explanation :

The Navyanaiyāyikas now establish that the invalidity or non-authoritativeness of knowledge (*aprāmāṇya*), like the authoritativeness of knowledge (*prāmāṇya*), is ascertained extraneosly (*parataḥ*) by mind or inference. According to them, the non-authoritativeness of knowledge, has the form that 'I had the knowledge of fire as being fire in the substatum of the absence of the fireness' *(vahnitvābhāvavati vahnitvena mama jñānam vṛttam)*; and the same is ascertained extraneously in both the Bhaṭṭa Mīmāmsakas' and the Naiyāyikas' theories. Further, the Navyanaiyāyikas establish that the probandum (*sādhya*), i.e. the authoritativeness of knowledge of the form of the absence of non-authoritativeness of knowledge (*aprāmāṇyābhāva rūpa*) can be inferred by the probans of the form of the absence of the absence of the probans (*hetvabhāvābhāva*) pervading the non-authoritativeness (*aprāmāṇya vyāpaka*) after the ascertainment of the concomitance (*vyāpti graha*) between such a probans and the state of being the knowledge producing the activity towards the fire, competent of burning (*samartha pravṛtti janakatva*). The Navyanaiyāyikas now reply to the anticipated objection that dispite the ascertainment of the non-authoritativeness of knowledge, the absence of the non-authoritativeness is not ascertained; and hence the invariable concomitance cannot be ascertained in the infererence. According to them, the general rule in the Nyāya is that the probans establishes the absence of the probandum (*tadabhāva*), as pervading which the absence of the probans is ascertained (*yad vyāpakatayā hetvabhāvaḥ gṛhītaḥ*). However, in the case where the absence of probans (*hetvabhāva*) is ascertained to pervade the absence of the probandum, the exampledness of the probandum (*sādhya prasiddhi*) is necessary, as the inference of the absence of the probandum is impossible without the counter positive.

However, the Navyanaiyāyikas state that in the case where the absence of brobans (*hetvabhāva*) pervades the presence of the probandum (*bhāva vyāpaka*), the exampledness of the probandum (*tat prasiddhi*) is not necessary, as the negative concomitance can be ascertained even without the exampledness of the probandum. For instance, the mutual absence of non-skyness (*itarānyo'nyābhāva*) can be inferred even without the exampledness of the skyness, as the absence of the skyness pervades non-sky. Further, the Naiyāyikas state that the inference of the first knowledge as what is qualified by the validity or authoritativeness (*prāmāṇya viśiṣṭānumiti*) cannot be produced without the knowledge of the qualifier, i.e. the validity or authoritativeness (*viśeṣaṇa jñāna*); and hence the same inference needs to be produced only after the knowledge that the validity or authoritativeness exists in the first knowledge (*jñāna prāmāṇyam*). Finally, the Naiyāyikas explain the inference of the probandum (*sādhya siddhi*). According to them, the absence

of the state of being the knowledge referring to the qualifier (*tatprakāratva vyatireka*) in the substratum of the absence of the qualifier (*tadabhāva vati*) becomes inferred by taking into consideration the state of being the knowledge referring to the qualifier (*tatprakārakatva*) in the substratum of the qualifier (*tadvati*) after the doubt as to whether the knowledge of fire, referring to the fireness as the qualifier (*vahnitva prakāraka jñāna*), refers to the fire in the substratum of the fire or in the substratum of the absence of the fire. Thus, both the validity or authoritativeness and the invalidity or non-authoritativeness of knowledges are to be ascertained only extraneously (*parataḥ*) by inference.

Alternative form of inference :

I. ii. 18. Or alternatively, the validity or authoritativeness of first knowledge may be ascertained by another inference with negative concomitance. And the form of the inference is that "This knowledge of fire, referring to the fireness as the qualifier, has the substratum of the fireness as the object; for, it is a knowledge referring to an object, while not referring to the substratum of the absence of the fireness as the object. And whatever knowledge is not so, does not constitute the knowledge of the validity or authoritativeness like the invalid or non-authoritative knowledge of fire".

However, in the view that the objectness (existing in the qualificand) is a distinct entity, the form of the probandum of the inference would be as follows : "That this knowledge of fire, as being fire, does not refer to the fireness existing in the non-fire as the qualifier; it does not refer to the fireness not sharing the community of locus with the fireness; or it does not refer to the fireness, not existing in the substratum of the objectness, as the qualifier". Subsequently, the positive form of the probandum, i.e. the state of being the knowledge referring to the fireness, existing in the fire, as the qualifier or the same the state of being the knowledge referring to the fireness, existing in the substratum of the objectness, as the qualifier, gets established by implication. However, the positive form of the probandum does not get established first all by itself; for, the probandum is unexampled. In the case of the illusion of fire, the fire is not the substratum of the objectness; for, the objectness exists only in the qualificand. Thus, the fault of the establishment of the already established does not arise in the inference.

Explanation :

Anticipating the objection that the inference 'This knowledge of fire as being fire...' '*ayam vahnitvena anubhāvaḥ....*' (cf. I. ii. 16) is possible even when the first knowledge of fire does not refer to the fireness as the qualifier (*vahnitva prakārakatva*), in the substratum of the fireness (*vahnitvati*), the

Naiyāyikas present an alternative form of the inference. According to them, the form of the inference could be that 'This knowledge of fire referring to the fireness as the qualifier (*vahnitva prakāraka jñānam*) refers to the substratum of the fireness as its object (*vahnitvavat viṣayakam*); for, it is a knowledge referring to the object (*saviṣayakatvāt*) while not referring to the substratum of the absence of the fireness as the object (*vahnitvābhāvavat aviṣayakatve sati*)'.

Also the Naiyāyikas, present an alternative form of the probandum in the view that the objectness (existing in the qualificand) is a distinct entity (*atirikta viṣayatā*). According to them, the form of the probandum could be that 'This knowledge of fire, as being fire (*vahnitvena anubhavaḥ*), does not refer to the fireness existing in the non-fire as the qualifier (*avahnivṛtti vahnitva prakāraka viṣayatāko na*)' ; therefore, the positive form of the probandum, i.e. the state of being the knowledge referring to the fireness existing in the fire as the qualifier (*vahnivṛtti vahnitva prakāraka viṣayatākatvam*) gets established indirectly by implication (*arthāt*). However, it should be noted that in the case of the illusion of fire (*vahnibhrama*), the fire is not the substratum of the objectness (*viṣayatāśraya*), as only the qualificand is the substratum; and hence the establishment of the already established (*siddha sādhana*) does not arise in the inference.

Explanation of Authoritativeness in the View that objectness is distinct

I. ii. 19. However, Others hold as follows : That in the case of the illusion of fire, the objectness existing in the qualifier is not distinct from the objectness existing in the qualificand; and therefore, the same objectness is not non-delimited by the property not having the community of locus with the fireness. Thus, consequently, there arises no fault of the establishment of the already established in the inference. It may be argued now that in the case of the inference of the authoritativeness of the knowledge of the gem, the state of being the knowledge, referring to the gemness as the qualifier and producing the activity for the obtainment of the gem, constitutes an inconclusive or discrepant deviating probans, when the person, who has understaken the activity with the illusion of the gem, obtains the gem in the light of the gem. However, this argument is not correct. For, the knowledge, referring to the light of gem as the object, does not produce the activity for the obtainment of the gem, as it refers to a different entity as its object from the knowledge referring to the gem as its object. And the obtainment of the gem is merely due to the untenability of the gem otherwise. Though the knowledge of the gem and the activity for obtaining it occur at two different times, the cause and effect relationship can be ascertained between them through the mind like between the knowledge and the recollection. Thus, the fault of unexampledness or non-establishment of the probans does not arise in the inference. Also in the case of the inference having the absence of non-authoritativeness as the probandum, the fault of peculiarity of the probans does not arise due to the fact that the indeterminate knowledge is not ascertained to be co-subject of inference first. Also the negative inference can be described as follows : "That the knowledge 'This is earth' does not refer to the earthness, in the substratum of the absence of the earthness, as the qualifier; it does not refer to the property, existing in the non earth, as the qualifier; it does not refer to the property, not existing in the qualificand of the earthness, as the qualifier; it does not refer to the earth as the non-qualificand while referring to the earthness, as the qualifier; it is not delimited by the qualifier not sharing the community of locus with the earthness; or it does not refer to the property, not existing in the earth, as the qualifier; for, it is a determinate knowledge referring to the earthness as the qualifier and the substratum of the odour as the qualificand."

Since the illusion of the earthness refers to the earthness, in the substratum of the absence of the earthness, as the qualifier, no fault of the establishment of what is already established arises in the inference by being the illusion. Also there arises no fault of the deviaton of the probans in the inference, as the same does not refer to the substratum of the odour as the qualificand. However, the affirmative or positive ascertainment of the state of referring to the earthness, in the substratum of the earthness, as the qualifier etc. gets established (ascertained) indirectly through implication. In the view that only the knowledge referring to distinct objectness is a qualificative cognition, the form of the probandum in the inference may be described as follows : "That this knowledge of earth as being the earth does not refer to the earthness, existing in the earth, as the qualifier; it does not refer to the earthness, not existing in the earth, as the qualifier; it does not refer to the earthness, not sharing the community of locus with the earthness, as the qualifier; or it does not refer to the earthness, not existing in the substratum of the objectness, as the qualifier." And the affirmative or positive ascertainment of the state of refering to the earthness, sharing the community of locus with the earthness, as the qualifier etc. gets established (obtained) indirectly through implication.

Explanation :

Now the Others (*anye*) explain the absence of the fault of the establishment of already established (*siddha sādhana*) in the negative inference '*ayam vahnitvena anubhavo vahnitvāsamānādhikaraṇa vahnitva prakāraka viṣayatāko na*' (Cf. I. ii. 18). According to them, the objectness existing in the qualifier (*viśeṣaṇa vṛtti viṣayatā*) is identical with the objectness existing in

the qualificand (*viśeṣya vṛtti viṣayatā*); and hence the fault is avoided as the objectness cannot be delimited by the property not having the community of locus with the fireness (*vahnitvāsamānādhikaraṇa dharma*). The Others refute the argument that the state of being the determinate knowledge, having the gemness as the qualifier (*maṇitva prakāraka niścayatva*), is the inconclusive or discrepant probans (*anaikāntika*) in the inference of the authoritativeness (*prāmāṇyānumāna*) of the knowledge of the gem. According to them, such a determinate knowledge of the light of the gem does not produce the activity for the gem as the same is distinct from the knowledge referring to the light of the gem as its object (*maṇi viṣaya*). Also the Others avoid the fault of unexampledness or non-establishment (*asiddhi*) in the inference of the authoritativeness on the ground that the cause and effect relationship (*kāryakāraṇa bhāva*) between the activity for obtaining the gem (*maṇi prāpti prayatna*) and the knowledge of gem (*maṇi jñāna*) can be obtained mentally. Also they avoid the peculiarity of probans (*asādhāraṇya*) in the inference, having the absence of non-authoritativeness as the probandum (*abhāva sādhyaka*), on the ground that indeterminate knowledge (*nirvikalpaka*) is not ascertained to be co-subject of inference (*sapakṣa*) first. The Others explain that the negative inference (*vyatirekin*) that "The knowledge 'This is earth' (*ayam pṛthivī*) does not refer to the earthness as the qualifier (*pṛthivītva prakārako na*) in the substratum of the absence of the earthness (*pṛthivītvābhāvavati*); for, it is a determinate knowledge referring to the earthness as the qualifier (*pṛthivītva prakāraka*) and referring to the substratum of the odour as the qualificand (*gandhavad viśeṣyaka*)."

Further according to them, the fault of the establishment of what is already established (*siddha sādhana*) does not arise in the negative inference, as the illusion of the earthness (*pṛthivītva bhrama*) refers to the earthness as the qualifier in only the substratum of the absence of the earthness; and the fault of deviation of probans (*vyabhicāra*) does not arise, as the probans (i.e. *pṛthivītva prakāraka niścaya*) does not refer to the substratum of the odour as the qualificand (*gandhavad viśeṣyaka*). Here the probandum, i.e. *pṛthivītvavati pṛthivītva prakārakatva* gets established through implication (*arthāt*) only. Finally the Others state that in the view that knowledge referring to distinct objectness (*viṣayatā*) is the qualificative cognition, 'This is a knowledge of earth as being the earth (*pṛthivītvena anubhavaḥ*) does not refer to the earthness, not existing in the substratum of the objectness (*viṣayatāśraya vṛtti*), as the qualifier' constitutes the probandum. However, the positive ascertainment of the state of referring to the earthness, sharing the community of locus with the earthness (*pṛthivītva samānādhikaraṇa pṛthivītva prakāraka viṣaya tākatva*), gets established through implication.

Position of Yet Others :

I. ii. 20. Yet Others state as follows : That the absence of the state of being the knowledge referring to what is delimited by the qualifier, not sharing the community of locas with the earthness, is the probandum; for, the knowledge 'This is earth' has the objectness, not being the qualifier of what does not share the community of locus with the odour and being the qualifier of what shares the community of locus with the odour, as the counter positive. Therefore, the doubt becomes excluded from being the probandum. Or, only the state of being the determinate knowledge (ascertainment) is intended to be the probandum.

Also the erroneous knowledge 'The earth is cold' is only valid knowledge while referring to the earth. And the fault of deviation of probans does not arise in the case of the collective cognition having the form of both illusion and valid knowledge. For, even such collective cognition is valid while referring to a particular aspect. Also, the objectness differs as the qualificand differs. However, it cannot be admitted that the objectness differs as the qualifier differs. For, no proof exists in support of such a theory.

Explanation :

Yet Others propose that in a negative inference 'This is a knowledge of earth as being the earth' (*pṛthivītvena anubhavaḥ*), only the absence of the state of being the knowledge (*viṣayatākatvābhāva*) referring to what is delimited by the qualifier (*prakārāvacchinna*), and not sharing the community of locus with the earthness (*pṛthivītvāsamānādhikaraṇa*), can be established as the probandum. According to them, the knowledge of earth has the objectness, not being the qualifier of what does not have the community of locus with the odour and being the qualifier of what shares the community of locus with the odour, as the counter positive (*gandhāsamānādhikaraṇāprakāraka gandhasamānādhikaraṇa prakāraka*). And since the knowledge is qualified as having the objectness not being the qualifier of what does not share the community of locus with the odour, doubt is excluded, and only the determinate knowledge can be intended to be the probandum.

Also the Others propose that even the erroneous knowledge 'The earth is cold' (*śītā pṛthivī*) can be valid knowledge (*pramā*) while referring to the earthness in earth. And the probans need not deviate in the collective cognition (*samūhālambana*), as the same too is valid knowledge while referring to either of the two aspects of collective cognition. Further, the Others state the rule that the objectness (*viṣayatā*) differs as the qualificand differs (*viśeṣya bheda*); but it does not differ as the qualifier differs (*prakāra bheda*).

Form of positive inference : Position of Yattu :

I. ii. 21. Yet Others state as follows : That the knowledge 'This is earth' is a knowledge that has the objectness resident in the earth, as delimited by the property sharing the community of locus with the earthness; or it is a knowledge that has the objectness resident in the earth, as not delimited by the property not sharing the community of locus with the earthness; or it is a knowledge that has the objectness resident in the earth, as not delimited by the property not existing in the earth; for, it is a knowledge of the counterpositive of the objectness that has the property not sharing the community of locus with the odour as the qualifier; or it is a knowledge that has the objectness qualified by the property of the earthness not existing in the non-substratum of the odour; or it is a knowledge of the counterpositive of the objectness as sharing the community of locus with the odour. However, this position is not correct. For, in such a position, the probandum would become unexampled or unestablished in the inference. Rather, therefore, it should be admitted that the probandum gets established in such a negative inference only by implication. Also, this way, only the state of being what produces the activity towards the odour, the unctuousness and the competent fire, found in the hand and the foot, are known to be pervaded by the particular qualifier. Therefore, only the state of being the knowledge, referring to the qualifier in the substratum of the qualifier, is the probans that establishes the validity or authoritativeness of knowledge.

Explanation :

Yet Others state now that the inference establishing the authoritativeness of knowledge could be universal positive (*anvayin*). And the inference 'This is earth' (*iyam pṛthivī*) is a knowledge that refers to the objectness resident in the earth (*pṛthivī vṛtti viṣayatāka*), as not delimited by the property not existing in the earth (*pṛthivyavṛtti dharmānavacchinna*). For, it is a knowledge of the counterpositive of the objectness (*viṣayatā pratiyogi jñāna*) sharing the community of locus with the odour (*gandha samānādhi karaṇa*). However, the Naiyāyiikas refute the position. According to them, the probandum cannot be established or is unexampled (*aprasiddha*) in such an inference. Therefore, the inference establishing the authoritativeness of knowledge needs to be only negative in character (*vyatirekin*); and the positive probandum, i.e. the validity or authoritativeness gets established indirectly through implication. And only the state of being the knowledge that refers to the property as the qualifier in the substratum of the property (*tadvati tatprakāraka jñānatva*) is the probans establishing the authoritativeness of knowledge.

Objection :

I. ii. 22. It may be objected now as follows : That the objectness, of the fire competent of burning, which is described by the knowledge of the fire, cannot be ascertained by the first knowledge like "This (fire) is competent of burning". For, the knowledge and its objectness are not the objects of the first knowledge. Also the same objectness of the fire cannot be ascertained by the after–knowledge (recognition) of the competent fire. For, the competency of burning of the fire in front is not the object of the after–knowledge (recognition). The after–knowledge (recognition) has no competency for referring to (grasping) the competency of burning of fire which is referred to by the first knowledge. Otherwise, suppose the fireness, existing in the fire in front and referred to by the first knowledge, is the object of the after–knowledge (recognition), then there would arise the cogntingency of the ascertainment of the validity or authoritativeness intrinsically by itself. This way, even the ascertainment that the knowledges of the earth and the water refer to the substrata of the odour and the unctuousness becomes untenable. Here we reply : When the after–knowledge (recognition) of the fire, having the fireness as the qualifier, is produced, the competency of burning is grasped in the object, i.e. the fire. Consequently, the state of having the objectness of the competency for burning, referred by the recollection, is grasped in the first knowledge of fire, referred by the recollection. In the same way, the first knowledges of the water and the earth, which are referred by the recollection, are distinctly ascertained by mind, too have the state of referring to the substrata of the unctuousness and the odour referred by the knowledges. For, in such cases, one experiences, after the distinctive ascertainment of the state of being the substrata of the odour etc., that 'I experienec the earthness etc. only in the substratum of the odour etc.' And such an instance of distinctive ascertainment is similar to the instance of the distinctive ascertainment of the invariable concomitance in the smoke referred by the recollection and the distinctive knowledge of the fragrance in the sandlewood produced by the eye etc.

Now it may be argued as follows: That in that case, the qualificative cognition of the earthness is produced in the substratum of the odour by the eye like the state of having the substratum of the odour as the qualificand is produced in the cognition of the earthness. Afterwards, when the knowledge of the earth such as 'This is earth', referring to the earthness as the qualifier, is produced, the knowledge of the state of referring to the earthness as the qualifier is produced in the substratum of the earthness. Also in the same way, the validity or authoritativeness, of the form of the state of having the absence of the qualifier not existing in the earth or the state of having the absence of

the qualifier not existing in the qualificand, like the absence of the state of referring to the potness as the qualifier in the knowledge of the earth, is distinctly ascertained by the mind only. Thus, the authoritativeness can be ascertained in the knowledge intrinsically by the totality of causes of knowledge itself. However, this argument is not correct. The extraneousness cannot be removed in the ascertainment of the authoritativeness existing in the first knowledge produced to be recollected from some other first knowledge.

Explanation :

Here the Pūrvapakṣin raises the objection that the objectness, of the fire competent of burning (*dāhasamartha viṣayatva*), admitted in the knowledge of the fire (*vahni jñāna*), cannot be ascertained properly. According to him, the first knowledge 'This (fire) is competent of burning.' (*dāhasamartho' yam*) does not ascertain such an objectness, as the same does not refer to the knowledge and its objectness (*jñāna viṣayatā*). Also such an objectness cannot be ascertained by the after–knowledge or recognition (*anuvyasāya*), as the competency of burning of the fire existing in front (*purovarti dāha sāmarthya*) is not the object of the after–knowledge; and the after–knowledge is not competent to refer to the competency of burning referred by the first knowledge. The Pūrvapakṣin notes that when the fireness, (*vahnitva*), existing in the fire in front (*purovartin*), becomes the object of the after–knowledge (*anuvyavasāya viṣaya*), the ascertainment of the validity or authoritativeness of knowledge (*prāmāṇy graha*) intrinsically by itself (*svataḥ*) becomes contingent. However, the Naiyāyikas reply that the state of having the objectness of the competency to burn (*dāha sāmarthya viṣayakatva*), referred by the recollection (*smṛty upanīta*), can be cognized in the first knowledge of the fire (*vahni vyavasāya*) after the competency to burn is grasped in the object, i.e. the fire from the recognition of the fire having the fireness as the qualifier (*vahnitva prakārakānuvyavasāya*). Also they state that the state of referring to the substratums of the unctuousness and the odour (*sneha gandha viṣayakatva*), referred by the first knowledge (*jñānopanīta*), can be distinctly ascertained by mind in the knowledges of the water and the earth (*jala pṛthivī jñāna*), as the experience of the earthness in the substrata of the odour etc. is possible only after the ascertainment of the state of being the substrata of the odour etc.

Some Mīmāmsakas argue here that the validity or authoritativeness of knowledge (*prāmāṇya*) needs to be ascertained intrinsically by the totality of causes of knowledge itself (*svataḥ*). According to them, the authoritativeness of the knowledge of the form of the state of referring to the earthness, as the

qualifier (*pṛthivī tva prakārakatva*) in the substratum of the earthness (*pṛthivītva vati*) can be ascertained when the knowledge of the earth "This is earth" (*iyam pṛthivī*) referring to the earthness as the qualifier is ascertained. Also, the authoritativeness of the knowledge of the form of the state of having the absence of the qualifier (*prakārābhāva vattva*) not existing in the qualificand (*viśeṣyāvṛtti*) can be ascertained by the mind only. However, the Naiyāyikas refute the argument. According to them, the extraneousness (*paratastva*) of the ascertainment of the authoritativeness (*prāmāṇya graha*) of the first knowledge cannot be avoided as the same is caused to be recollected from another knowledge (*jñānāntaropasthāpita*).

Nature of svatastva and paratastva :

I. ii. 23. The intrinsicality of the ascertainment of the validity or authoritativeness of knowledge is either the state of being what is ascertained by the totality of causes of first the knowledges, or the state of being ascertained by what ascertains all the substrata of the authoritativeness, or the state of being ascertained by the produced knowledge, not produced in turn by the produced knowledge referring to the same authoritativeness. And the extraneousness of the ascertainment of the authoritativeness of knowledge is the state of being what is ascertained without the totality of causes. Now this way, when the ascertainment of the authoritativeness of knowledge is admitted by mind, the extraneousness of the authoritativeness of the knowledge is not lost or harmed, as the authoritativeness is to be ascertained by the produced knowledge in turn produced by the knowledge referring to the knowledge of the authoritativeness.

The authoritativeness of knowledge can be inferred by the universally positive inference after the negative inference, as the positive inference belongs to the same class of inference as that of negative inference. For instance, (the authoritativeness of knowledge is inferred by the inference such as) 'The knowledge of body is valid or authoritative; for, it is a knowledge of the body with respect to the substratum of hand and foot, like the knowledge of ones own body'. Also there arises no deviation of probans in the case of the knowledge referring to the state of being the substratum of certain hand and foot with respect to what is the substratum of another hand and foot; for, the same is valid knowledge with respect to the body.

Explanation :

The Naiyāyikas explain the intrinsicality (*svatastva*) and the extraneousness (*paratastva*) of the ascertainment of the validity or authoritativeness of knowledge. According to them, the state of being what is ascertained by the

totality of causes of the first knowledges (*yāvajñāna grāhaka sāmagrī grāhyatva*) is the intrinsicality of the ascertainment. Whereas the state of being what is ascertained without the totality of causes (*tad anyathā grāhyatva*) is the extraneousness of the ascertainment. And since the authoritativeness of knowledge is to be ascertained by the produced knowledge in turn produced by the knowledge (*janya jñāna janya jñāna grāhya*), referring to the knowledge of the authoritativeness, the extraneousness of the ascertainment is not harmed.

It should be noted that the authoritativeness of knowledge (*prāmāṇya*) can be inferred by the universally positive inference (*anvayin*) that belongs to the same class of inference as that of negative inference (*vyatirekin*). And the form of such an inference could be that 'The knowledge of body (*śarīrajñānam*) is valid or authoritative (*pramā*); for, it is a knowledge of the body (*śarīra jñānatvāt*) with respect to the substratum of hand and foot (*kara caraṇa vati*); Now since probans is not deviating, in the case of the knowledge referring to the state of being the subtratum of certain hand and foot (*kara caraṇā ntaravattva*), with respect to what is the substratum of another hand and foot (*kara caraṇāntara vati*), the extraneousness of the ascertainment of the authoritativeness of knowledge is quite tenable.

Refutation of objection that probans is untenable:

I. ii. 24. From this, the following objection too gets refuted : "That the state of being the substratum of hand and foot is not an adventitious qualifier of the probans in the case of the inference 'The knowledge of body is valid; for, it is a knowledge of the body with respect to the substratum of hand and foot'; for, there exists no adventitious qualificand that needs to be excluded. Also the same state need not be the qualifier of the knowledge of body, i.e. the probans, even by way of being the object; for, the state of being the knowledge of body, referring to the state of being the substratum of hand and foot, as the qualifier, is deviating or non-exclusive. Also such a state is not exampled in the case of the knowledge 'This is a body'. Also suppose the same state is held to be the qualifier of the object of knowledge, i.e. the body, then the probans 'The state being the knowledge of the body referring to the substratum of hand and foot' deviates; for, even the illusion of the body refers to the substratum of hand and foot in actuality. Also, it is not possible that "while being what is other than the knowledge of body as being that of the body with respect to what is devoid of hand and foot etc." is intended to be the qualifier of the probans. For, 'the state of referring to' is the meaning of the locative in the case of 'in what is devoid of' (*śūnye*); and therefore, the qualified phrase of probans would mean that "for the state of being the knowledge of the body which is other than the knowledge referring to what is devoid of hand and foot etc." Thus, the unexampledness arises, as the knowledge of body is ruled to refer to the state of being the body devoid of hand and foot etc. Also it is not possible that "which does not function as the knowledge of body as being the body with respect to what is devoid of hand and foot etc." is intended to be the qualifier of the probans. For, the said fault of unexampledness would remain the same, as 'the state of referring to' is the meaning of the instrumental as well. And no other qualifier of the probans is tenable."

"The state of being the knowledge of the body, referring to the bodyness as the qualifier and referring to the substratum of hand and foot as the qualificand" is the probans. And the body possessing hand and foot is the qualifier in the illusion of body. Also in the view that even the objectness describes both the qualifierness and the qualificandness, "The state of being the knowledge of the body, while being (the knowledge) devoid of the counter positiveness of the objectness, and describing the bodyness existing in what is devoid of hand and foot etc., as the qualifier" is the probans of the inference.

Explanation :

The Pūrvapakṣin raises the objection that the inference of the Naiyāyikas, viz. '*idam śarīra jñānam pramā; karacaraṇavati śarīra jñānatvāt*' is untenable. According to him, 'the state of being the substratum of hand and foot' (*kara caraṇa vattva*) cannot be an adventitious qualifier (*upalakṣaṇa*) of the probans, as the adventitious qualificand that needs to be excluded (*vyāvṛttopalakṣya*) is absent. Also the Pūrvapakṣin objects that the same state cannot qualify the knowledge of the body (*jñāna*), i.e. the probans, even as being the object (*viṣayatayā*), as the state of being the knowledge of the body (*śarīra jñānatva*), referring to the state of being the substratum of hand and foot as the qualifier, (*kara caraṇa vattva prakāraka*) is deviating. Also he objects that the same state cannot be held to be the qualifier of the object of the knowledge, i.e. body (*viṣaya viśeṣaṇa*), as then the probans would deviate due to the illusion of body (*śarīra bhrama*) referring to the substratum of hand etc. Also the Pūrvapakṣin objects that "while being what is other than the knowledge of body as being that of the body" (*yaccharīratvena jñānam tadanyatve sati*) cannot be the qualifier of the probans. According to him, then such a qualified probans becomes unexampled (*apprasiddha*), as the knowledge of body (*śarīra jñāna*) is ruled to refer to the state of being the body devoid of hand and foot etc. (*tacchūnya śarīratvādi viṣayaka*). Also the Pūrvapakṣin objects that "which does not function as the knowledge of body with respect to what is devoid to hand and foot etc." (*kara caraṇādi śūnye yaccharīratvena jñana*) too cannot be the qualifier of the probans. According to him, the fault of unexampledness

(*apprasiddhi*) would remain in the same way, as the qualified probans is untenable.

However, the Naiyāyikas refute the objection. According to them, only the state of being the knowledge of the body (*śarīra jñāna*), referring to the bodyness as the qualifier and referring to the substratum of hand and foot as the qualificand (*kara caraṇa vad viśeṣyaka śarīratva prakāraka*), is the probans of the inference; and the same is not deviating, as the body possessing hand and foot is the qualifier in the illusion of body (*śarīra bhrama*). Also according to the Naiyāyikas, in the view that the objectness describes both the qualifierness and the qualificandness (*viṣayatā pakṣe*), only the probans, viz. the state of being the knowledge of the body (*śarīra jñānatva*), qualified as being devoid of the counter positiveness of the objectness (*viṣayatā pratiyogitva śūnyatve sati*), and describing the bodyness existing in what is devoid of hand and foot etc. as the qualifier (*kara caraṇādi śūnya niṣtha śarīratva prakāraka*), can establish the validity or authoritativeness of knowledge.

Refutation of Prābhākaras' position that Infinite regress becomes contingent :

I. ii. 25. It may be held now by the Pūrvapakṣins (Prābhākaras or Gurus) as follows : That the knowledge, whose validity or authoritativeness is already ascertained by another, cannot be held to be of the form of what determines or ascertains the authoritativeness of the other knowledge; for, then there would arise infinite regress. Also the knowledge, whose authoritativeness is now being ascertained, cannot be held to be so; for, then there would arise the contingency of the ascertainment of the authoritativeness of knowledge intrinsically by the totality of causes of knowledge itself. Therefore, only the knowledge, whose authoritativeness is not ascertained, must be admitted to be of the form of what determines or ascertains the authoritativeness of the other knowledge. Thus, let it be admitted that only the first knowledge, whose authoritativeness is not yet ascertained, ascertains its own object; and so what is the need for the ascertainment of the authoritativeness of the first knowledge by another knowledge for the sake of the ascertainment of the objects of the first knowlede?

However, the Naiyāyikas state here as follows : That since the first knowledge is observed to have even the invalidity or non-authoritativeness at times, the objects of the first knowledge cannot be ascertained merely by the totality of causes of first knowledge itself. You (the Pūrvapakṣins) may argue that since even the first inference of the authoritativeness is observed to have the non–authoritativeness, the ascertainement of the authoritativeness of the first knowledge is not possible even from such an inference. However, this

argument is not correct. We, the Naiyāyikas, are not saying that the ascertainment of the objects of the first knowledge is produced from the ascertainment of the authoritativeness of the first knowledge only. Rather, we are saying only that in the case of the knowledge of the Emblic Myrobalan etc. placed on the palm of a hand, where the doubt regarding the non–authoritativeness does not arise, the ascertainment of the objects is possible by the first knowledge only; and the unwavering activity (*pravṛtti*) too is produced by only such an ascertainment of the objects. It is established in every ones experience that in the case where the doubt regarding the objects arises, by removing the ascertainment of the objects, due to the doubt regarding the non-authoritativeness of knowledge at the time of non-repetition, one acts unwaveringly only by ascertaining the objects from the knowledge dependant only on the ascertainment of the authoritativeness of knowledge; and one does not act in any other way. That is why, it must be admitted that only the knowledge (inference), whose authoritativeness is not ascertained, ascertains the authoritativeness of the other knowledges; for, there exists no spot, i.e. fault of the doubt regarding the non- authoritativeness. However, in the case of knowledge of the authoritativeness, where the doubt regarding the authoritativeness arises due to the doubt regarding the non-authoritativeness, the ascertainment of the authoritativeness arises in the knowledge of the authoritativeness due to the ascertainment of the authoritativeness. This way, the ascertainment of the objects arises only from the ascertainment of the authoritativeness of the knowledge of objects so long as the doubt regarding the authoritativeness of knowledge persists.

Explanation :

The Pūrvapakṣins, i.e. the prābhākaras or Gurus, propose that only the knowledge (*jñāna*), whose validity or authoritativeness is not ascertained (*agṛhīta prāmāṇyam*), determines or ascertains the authoritativeness of the other knowledge (*para prāmāṇya*); and therefore, the first knowledge (*vyavasāya*), whose authoritativeness is not ascertained, too can ascertain its own objects. According to them, the knowledge whose authoritativeness is ascertained by another (*gṛhīta prāmāṇya*), cannot be admitted to be ascertaining the authoritativeness of the other knowledge (*paraprāmāṇya*) due to the infinite regress (*anavasthāna*). Also according to them, the knowledge, whose authoritativeness is now being ascertained (*jñāyamāna prāmāṇya*) too cannot be admitted to be ascertaining the authoritativeness of the other knowledge due to the contingency of the ascertainment of the authoritativeness of knowledge intrinsically by the totality of causes of knowledge itself. (*svataḥ prāmāṇya*).

However, the Naiyāyikas refute the Prābhākaras' position. According to them, since the first knowledge (*vyavasāya*) is observed to have even the non-authoritativeness (*aprāmāṇya*), merely the same cannot be admitted to be ascertaining the objects of itself (*artha niścaya*). And though the inference of the authoritativeness (*prāmāṇyānumiti*) too may fail at times to ascertain the authoritativeness of first knowledge, the knowledge including first knowledge (*vyavasāya*) such as the knowledge of the Emblic Myrobalan on the palm (*karatalāmalaka*), may ascertain its objects provided that the doubt regarding the non-authoritativeness of the first knowledge is absent. Thus, only the ascertainment of the authoritativeness of the first knowledge (*jñāna prāmāṇya niścaya*) need not produce the ascertainment of the objects of knowledge. And the unwavering activity (*pravṛtti*) too can be explained from such an ascertainment of objects only. It should be noted here that in the case where the doubt regarding the objects (*artha saṁśaya*) arises due to the doubt regarding the non-authoritativeness of knowledge (*aprāmāṇya saṁśaya*), activity is possible from the ascertainment of the objects due to the knowledge dependant on the ascertainment of the authoritativeness (*pramāṇya niścayādhīna jñāna*); and hence it must be admitted that only the knowledge whose authoritativeness is not ascertained by itself (*agṛhīta prāmāṇya*), ascertains the authoritativeness of the other (first) knowledge (*paraprāmāṇya*). Further, in the case of doubt regarding the authoritativeness (*prāmāṇya saṁśaya*) in the knowledge of the authoritativeness, the ascertainment of the authoritativeness (*prāmāṇya niścaya*) is produced in the knowledge of the authoritativeness (*prāmāṇya jñāna*), from the ascertainment of the authoritativeness only. Thus, the ascertainment of the objects (*tanniścaya*) is produced only from the ascertainment of the authoritativeness of knowledge (*prāmāṇya niścaya*).

Avoidance of infinite regress (anavasthā):

I. ii. 26. Also this way, infinite regress does not arise. The doubt regarding the validity or authoritativeness of knowledge is not necessary, as the knowledge of the authoritativeness of the last knowledge is absent; also as the recollection of the alternative side of the doubt is absent; and also as the distinct object of knowledge is included i.e. obtained. Otherwise, on the contrary, there would arise the fault of infinite regress in the theory of the Bhāṭṭas, as the authoritativeness of knowledge is to be ascertained by the inference of such a knowledge. However, in the theory of the Guru Mīmāmsakas, the authoritativeness of knowledge is not to be ascertained by the totality of causes of knowledge itself, as the same is excluded from both the intrinsic nature of knowledge and the authoritativeness of knowledge.

Rather, therefore, the same state needs to be ascertained either by the inference of exclusive specification or by some other means of valid knowledge, as the infinite regress would arise if the same is to be ascertained by yet other means like word. Thus, this way, since the authoritativeness of such a knowledge too is to be ascertained by some other means, only infinite regress would becomes contingent.

Some scholars state here as follows : That since activity is tenable from the ascertainment of the authoritativeness of mere first knowledge, the ascertainment of the validity or authoritativeness of such an ascertainment in turn is not necessary. Thus, there arises no infinite regress. Also, it is not correct to argue that the doubt regarding the (authoritativeness of) objects of knowledge is devoid of the appropriateness due to the doubt regarding the authoritativeness of first knowledge is contingent. Doubt regarding the authoritativeness of first knowledge is not tenable once the authoritativeness is ascertained. Otherwise, the fault of infinite regress becomes contingent even in the case of the ascertainment of the authoritativeness of the first knowledge intrinsically by the totality of causes of itself when the doubt regarding the authoritativeness of first knowledge is experienced. However, this above position is not correct. Suppose the doubt regarding the (authoritativeness of the) objects of knowledge does not arise from the doubt regarding the authoritativeness of the first knowledge as the objects are already ascertained, then the ascertainment of the authoritativeness of knowledge becomes useless (or unnecessary) for the ascertainment of (the authoritativeness of) the objects. For, unwavering activity is tenable merely from the initial ascertainment of (the authoritativeness of) the objects of knowledge. It has been never stated (admitted) that the ascertainment of the authoritativeness of knowledge, by disregarding the doubt regarding the objects, is the cause of the human activity. Suppose you aspire to know as to how the doubt arises even with respect to the already ascertained objects from the doubt regarding the authoritativeness of the first knowledge, then you should ask the experience. Only the experience admits the doubt regarding the authoritativeness and the non-authoritativeness of knowledge to be the cause of the doubt regarding (the authoritativeness of) the objects as evidenced by itself. Even the state of being the objects of knowledge produces the doubt regarding (the authoritativeness of) the objects by assuming the form of the doubt regarding the authoritativeness of knowledge.

Explanation :

The Naiyāyikas explain that the infinite regress (*anavasthā*) does not arise in the theory that the ascertainment of the validity or authoritativeness of objects (*tanniścaya*) depends on the ascertainment of the authoritativeness of the knowledge of objects (*tajjñāna prāmāṇya niścaya*). According to them,

the doubt regarding the authoritativeness of knowledge (*prāmāṇya samśaya*) is not necessary as the recollection of the alternative side of the doubt (*koṭi smaraṇa*) is absent, and the distinct object of knowledge (*viṣayañtara*) is included. Also according to them, when the ascertainment of the authoritativeness of knowledge is required for the ascertainment of the authoritativeness of objects, the infinite regress would become contingent in the Bhāṭṭas' theory that the authoritativeness of knowledge (*prāmāṇya*) needs to be ascertained by the inference of knowledge (*jñānānumiti*). Also in the theory of the Guru Mīmāmsakas, the authoritativeness of knowledge (*prāmāṇya*) is not to be ascertained by the totality of causes of knowledge itself (*svagrāhya*); rather it is to be ascertained by yet another means of valid knowledge (*pramāṇāntara*); and thus the infinite regress (*anavasthā*) becomes contingent, as the authoritativeness of such a knowledge of means needs to be ascertained by some thing else.

Some scholars (*yattu*) propose to solve the infinite regress by holding that the activity (*pravṛtti*) is possible merely by the ascertainment of the validity or authoritativeness (*prāmāṇya niścaya*) of first knowledge; and hence the ascertainment of the authoritativeness of such an ascertainment (*prāmāṇyānusaraṇa*) is not necessary. According to them, it is not correct to state that the doubt regarding the authoritativeness of objects (*viṣaya samśaya*) is devoid of the appropriateness of first knowledge (*aucityā varjita*), as the doubt regarding the authoritativeness of first knowledge does not arise when the authoritativeness is ascertained. However, the Naiyāyikas refute the position of Some. According to them, if the doubt regarding the authoritativeness of objects (*viṣaya samśaya*) is not admitted from the doubt regarding the authoritativeness of the first knowledge (*prāmāṇya samśaya*), then the ascertainment of the authoritativeness of first knowledge would become unnecessary for the ascertainment of the authoritativeness of objects (*viṣaya niścaya*), as the unwavering activity (*niṣkampa pravṛtti*) is tenable even from the initial ascertainment of the authoritativeness of the objects of knowledge (*prāthamika viṣaya niścaya*). The doubt regarding the authoritativeness of the already ascertained objects (*anyatra niścita*) is produced from the doubt regarding the authoritativeness of first knowledge (*anya saṁśaya*) due to experience. The experience establishes the doubt regarding the authoritativeness and the non - authoritativeness of first knowledge (*prāmāṇyā prāmāṇya saṁśaya*) to be the cause of the doubt regarding the authoritativeness of objects (*viṣaya saṁśaya*). Thus, even the state of being the objects of knowledge (*jñāna viṣayatva*) produces the doubt regarding the authoritativeness of objects by assuming the form of doubt regarding the authoritativeness of knowledge.

Naiyāyikas' reply to the objection :

I. ii. 27. Some Mīmāmsakas object now as follows: That infinite regress arises in the case of the ascertainment of the validity or authoritativeness of the knowledges of the probans, subject and invariable concomitance of inference etc; and non-exampledness of the probans arises in the case of the non - ascertainment of the authoritativeness of the same. You, the the Naiyāyikas, may argue that the knowledge of the (authoritativeness of) probans etc. does not require the knowledge i.e. the ascertainment of the authoritativeness of knowledge itself for the ascertainment of the objects of itself; for, in that case, inference in general would be lost. For, the determination or ascertainment of the authoritativeness of the probans etc., is established in everyones theory to be dependant intrinsically on its own cause. However, this argument is not correct. The doubt regarding the probans arises from the doubt regarding the authoritativeness of knowledge of probans. The doubt regarding the authoritativeness (of the knowledge of probans) does not arise in the absence of the knowledge of probans; for, there exists no contradiction.

Here we, the Naiyāyikas, reply : In the absence of the spot of doubt regarding the validity or authoritativeness of knowledge, only the knowledge of probans is the cause of the ascertainment of the authoritativeness of objects. However, in the presence of the spot of doubt, regarding the authoritativeness, only the said means, i.e. the inference is the cause of the ascertainment of the authoritativeness of objects. Some Naiyāyikas, however, state as followes: That even you, the Mīmāmsakas' need to admit that the doubt regarding the non-authoritativeness of the first knowledge arises at times; and does not arise at other times. This way, the knowledge that the sacrifice is the means of heaven to be accomplished with much expenditure of money and exertion, which (knowledge) is ascertained to have the authoritativeness, is not the cause of activity; for, the same knowledge is destroyed even before the inference of the authortativeness. Rather, therefore, only the distinct second knowledge, which is devoid of the doubt regarding the non-authoritativeness of the knowledge and is referring to the same object as that of the first knowledge, is the cause of activity. It may be argued now that the knowledge, i.e. the ascertainment of the authoritativeness of first knowledge is fruitless in the case of the unwavering activity towards the sacrifice that is to be accomplished with much expenditure of money and effort; and therefore, what is the point in pursuing the means (inference) of the ascertainment of the authoritativeness of first knowledge of sacrifice. However, this is not correct. Once the authoritativeness of the first knowledge that the sacrifice is the means of heaven is ascertained, the doubt regarding the non-authoritativeness does

not arise with respect to the the second distinct knowledge that refers to the same object of sacrifice as that of the first knowledge. Consequently, the distinct second knowledge (referring to the same objects as that of the first knowledge), which is of the form of the ascertainment of its own objects, though not ascertained to have the authoritativeness, produces the unwavering activity. Thus, the knowledge, i.e. the ascertainment of the authoritativeness of first knowledge is not fruitless, as the same is useful in the unwavering activity through the prevention of the doubt regarding the non-authoritativeness.

Explanation :

The Pūrvapakṣin, the Mīmāmsaka, raises the objection that when the distinct knowledges of the probans, subject and invariable concomitance of inference (*liṅga pakṣa vyāpti jñāna*) need to be ascertained to have the validity or authoritativeness by some other knowledge, infinite regress (*anavasthā*) arises; and when the same are not ascertained to have the authoritativeness (*anavadhāraṇa*) by some other knowledge, unexampledness of the probans (*hetv asiddhi*) arises; and therefore, the authoritativeness of first knowledge cannot be admitted to be ascertained extraneously by inference; i.e. first knowledge needs to be authoritative intrinsically by itself. Also the Mīmāmsaka refutes the argument of the Naiyāyikas that the knowledge of probans etc. (*liṅgādi jñāna*) does not require the ascertainment of the authoritativeness (*prāmāṇya jñāna*) of itself for ascertaining the authoritativeness of its objects (*svaviṣayāvadhāraṇa*); and the knowledge of (the authoritativeness of) probans is admitted, in everyone's theory, to be dependent intrinsically on its own cause (*svakāraṇādhīna*). According to him, the doubt regarding the probans (*liṅga sandeha*) arises from the doubt regarding the authoritativeness of the knowledge of probans (*prāmāṇya saṁśaya*). And the doubt regarding the authoritativeness does not arise in the absence of the knowledge of probans etc. Thus, the authoritativeness of knowledge need not be ascertained extraneously through inference.

The Naiyāyikas, however, reply that when the spot of doubt regarding the invalidity or non-authoritativeness (*aprāmāṇya śaṅkā kalaṅka*) is absent, only the knowledge of probans etc. (*liṅgādi jñāna*) produces the ascertainment of the authoritativeness of objects (*arthaniścāyaka*); and therefore the inference etc. need not be the cause of the ascertainment of the authoritativeness of the objects in the absence of the spot of doubt regarding the authoritativeness. Thus, there arises no infinite regress. Also some Naiyāyikas state that even the Mīmāmsakas must admit that the doubt regarding the non-authoritativeness (*aprāmāṇya śaṅkā*) arises in the first knowledge only at times; and hence inference proving the authoritativeness

is not always necessary. Also this way, since the knowledge that the sacrifice is the means of heaven, which is ascertained to have the authoritativeness, is destroyed even before the inference of the authoritativeness (*prāmāṇyānumiti*), only the distinct second knowledge (*jñānāntara*) which is devoid of the doubt regarding the non-authoritativeness (*aprāmāṇya śaṅkā śūnya*) and refers to the same objects as that of the first knowledge (*tajjñāna samāna viṣayaka*), is the cause of activity. Also the Naiyāyikas refute the argument that since the knowledge, i.e. the ascertainment of the authoritativeness of first knowledge (*prāmāṇya jñāna*) is not fruitful in the case of the unwavering activity (*niṣkampa pravṛtti*), following of the means (inference) ascertaining the authoritativeness of first knowledge (*tadanusaraṇa*) is pointless. According to them, once the authoritativeness of first knowledge that the sacrifice is the means of heaven (*svarga sādhanam yāgaḥ*) is ascertained, the distinct second knowledge (*jñānāntara*), which refers to the same object, would not have any doubt regarding the non-authoritativeness (*aprāmāṇya śaṅkā*). Thus, the distinct second knowledge, though not ascertained to have the authoritativeness (*agṛhīta prāmāṇya*), produces the unwavering activity towards the sacrifice. Therefore, the ascertainment of the authoritativeness of the first knowledge is not fruitless due to preventing the doubt regarding the non-authoritativeness.

Naiyāyikas' Conclusion : Inference is Intrinsically Authoritative but Repetitive After Knowledge is not Intrinsically Authoritative :

I. ii. 28. Some Naiyāyikas (Vācaspati etc.) have stated that inference, that is devoid of the doubt regarding any illusion of the invalidity non authoritativenss, is ascertained to have the validity or authoritativeness intrinsically by the totality of causes itself. And such a statement means that the inference needs to be ascertained, by the second or after knoweldge, to have the state of being the knowledge of fire in the locus of smoke, and the same is invariably connected with the authoritativeness. Therefore, the doubt regarding the non-authoritativeness does not arise there in the inference due to the perception of distinction. Thus, since the doubt regarding the non-authoritativeness does not arise in the inference due to the ascertainment of the authoritativeness in the inference intrinsically by itself, the unwavering activity occurs merely from the ascertainment of the objects. As a matter of fact, in the view that the authoritativeness of knowledge is ascertained extraneously, the knowledge, the i.e. ascertainment of the authoritativeness of first knowledge is never the cause of the activity. Also this way, since the after-knowledge or recognition is invariably connected with the authoritativness, the doubt regarding the authoritativeness never arises. None, while not having the knowledge, perceives that 'I know pot'. Nor one, while

having the first knowledge of pot, recognizes that 'I know that this is clothing'. Also in the case of illusion, the after knowledge or recognition, mentions, i.e. refers to the silverness etc. as being the qualifier of the first knowledge; and the same silverness is only the qualifier of the first knowledge. However, Some hold that since the most efficacious unwavering activity is observed at the time of the repetitive after - knowledge such as 'This is the body', the authoritativeness of repetitive after- knowledge is ascertained only intrinsically by itself; whereas the same is ascertained extraneously by other means at the time of non-repetive knowlege.

However, this position is not correct. The authoritativenes of knowledge, such as the state of being what is not delimited by the qualifier that is the counter positive of the constant absence existing in the qualificand, cannot be ascertained intrinsically by itself; and therefore the same needs to be ascertained extraneously by some other means. And immediate or instant activity is produced only from the first knowledge, which is devoid of the doubt regarding the non-authoritativeness on account of the grasping of the particularity such as the state of being the first knowledge of body in the substratum of hand and foot etc. by after -knowledge or recognition. Thus, it has been stated that the ascertainment of the authoritativeness of first knowledge is not directly the cause of activity. The instant presence of the totality of causes of the inference of the authoritativeness is dependant on the presence of the totality of causes of the first knowledge itself. The people desirous of drink or thirsty never have the most urgent and efficacious activity towards the water instantly. The competency of the water for quenching the thirst is only perceptible. Thus ends the theory of ascertainment in the theory of validity or authoritativeness of knowledge in the perception of the Tattva cintāmaṇi composed by śrīmad Gangeśopādhyāya.

Explanation :

Gangeśa now concludes his theory of ascertainment (*jñaptivāda*) in the theory of the validity or authoritativeness of knowledge (*prāmāṇyavāda*). While the authoritativeness of first knowledge (*vyavasāya*) is held to be ascertained extraneously through inference (*parataḥ*), the same authoritativeness of inference etc., which is devoid of any illusion of non-authoritativeness (*vibhramāśaṅkā*), is held to be ascertained intrinsically by itself. According to Vācaspati etc., the inference is ascertained, by the second or after–knowledge or recognition (*anuvyavasāya*), to have the state of being the knowledge of fire (*vahnijñānatva*) in the locus of smoke (*dhūmavati*) which is invariably connected with the authoritativeness. Therefore the unwavering activity (*niṣkampa vyavahāra*) is produced from the ascertainment of the authoritativeness of objects, as the doubt regarding the non-authoritativeness (*aprāmāṇya śaṅkā*) is avoided in the inference due to the ascertainment of the authoritativeness (*prāmāṇya niścaya*) in the inference intrinsically by itself. It should be noted that in the view that the authoritativeness of knowledge (*prāmāṇya*) is ascertained extraneously through other means (*parataḥ*), the ascertainment of the authoritativeness (*prāmāṇya graha*) is not the cause of the activity. Also, the after–knowledge or recognition (*anuvyava sāya*) is invariably connected with the authoritativeness (*prāmāṇya niyata*); and no doubt regarding the authroritativeness arises. Further, in the case of illusion, (*bhrama*), the after–knowledge refers to the silverness etc. as the qualifier which is the qualifier in the first knowledge as well.

Finally Gangeśa refutes the position of the Mīmāmsakas that at the time of the repetitive knowledge (*abhyāsa daśāyām*) such as 'This is body' (*idam śarīram*), the unwavering activity is observed; and hence the authoritativeness of repetitive after–knowledge (*abhyāsa*) is ascertained intrinsically by itself (*svataḥ*); whereas at the time of non-repetitive knowledge, the authoritativeness of the knowledge may be ascertained extraneously by some other means (*parataḥ*). According to him, the authoritativeness of knowledge (*prāmāṇya*) such as the state of being what is not delimited by the qualifier (*prakārānavacchinnatva*), that is the counter positive of the constant absence resident in the qualificand (*viśeṣya niṣṭhātyantābhāva pratiyogi*), cannot be ascertained intrinsically by itself (*svataḥ*); and hence needs to be ascertained only extraneously by other means (*parataḥ*). Nevertheless, Gangesa makes an abservasion that the instant activity (*jhaṭiti pravṛtti*) is produced only from the first knowledge (*vyavasāya*) devoid of the doubt regarding the non-authoritativeness (*aprāmāṇya śaṅkā*) due to the ascertainment of the particularity such as the state of being the first knowledge of body (*śarīra jñānatva*) in the substratum of hand and foot etc. (*kara caraṇādimati*); and hence the ascertainment of the authoritativeness of first knowledge (*prāmāṇya jñāna*) is not the cause of activity (*pravartaka*). And the instant presence of the totality of causes of the inference of the authoritativeness (*prāmāṇyānumiti samavadhāna*) is dependent on the presence of the totality of the causes of the first knowledge (*svakāraṇādhīna*).

The end of the Jñaptivāda in the Prāmāṇyavāda of the Pratyakṣakhaṇḍa.

B.

Theory of Constitution or Production of Validity (Utpattivādaḥ)

Naiyāyikas' position that Validity is constituted Extraneously

I. ii. 29. Also the validity or authoritativeness of first knowledge is constituted or produced only extraneously by other means; however, it is not constituted or produced intrinsically by the totality of causes of knowledge itself. For, then even invalid or non-authoritative knowledge, being constitited or produced by the totality of causes of such knowledge, would become only valid or authoritative knowledge. Otherwise, even valid or authoritative knowledge would not become valid knowledge. Suppose, you argue that invalid or non-authoritative knowledge arises due to the incorporation of defect in the totality of causes of knowledge, then invalid or non-authoritative knowledge would become, like particular valid or authoritative knowledge, only a particular valid or authoritative knowledge, as the same too is to be proproduced only by the totality of causes of the knowledge. Therefore, it must be admitted that since valid and invalid, i.e. authoritative and non-authoritative knowledges differ, they are produced by the merits and demerits or defects in the totality of causes of knowledges respectively.

Now it may be argued as follows: That in the case where valid and invalid, i.e. authoritative and non-authoritative knowledges are absent due to the absence of merit and defect, the totality of causes of knowledge itself would be required to be absent; for, when the same totality of causes is present, knowledge in general (exclusive of valid and invalid knowledges) would be required to be produced. However, this is not correct. Effect (knowledge) in general (exclusive of valid and invalid knowledges), which is devoid of the distinction such as the authoritativeness and the non-authoritativeness, is absent. The totality of causes of knowledge in general is constituted only by incorporating the totality of causes of knowledges in particular, i.e. valid and invalid knowledges. And the totality of causes of knowledge in general, which is excluded from the totality of causes of the knowledge in particular, does not exist at all. Otherwise, the particular (totality of) causes would be lost, i.e. would not be required in the production of the particular effect (knowledge).

Explanation :

Gangeśa begins his 'Theory of production' (Utpattivāda) in the ' Theory of Validity or Authoritativeness' (Prāmāṇya vāda) by stating the Naiyāyikas' position regarding the constitution or production of the validity or authoritativeness of first knowledge. According to the Naiyāyikas, the validity or authoritativeness of first knowledge (*prāmāṇya*) arises only extraneously (*parataḥ*) by merits in the totality of causes of knowledge; but it does not arise intrinsically (*svataḥ*) by the totality of causes of knowledge (*prāmāṇya sāmagrī*). When the validity or authoritativeness arises intrinsically by the totality of causes of knowledge itself, even the invalid knowledge (*apramā*) would become only valid knowledge (*pramā*) by being produced by the same totality of causes of knowledge. Also according to them, it is not correct to argue that the invalid knowledge (*apramā*) arises by incorporating the defect (*doṣānupraveśa*) in the totality of causes of knowledge; for, then particular invalid knowledge (*apramā*) would need to become only particular valid knowledge (*pramā viśeṣa*) due to being produced by the totality of causes of knowledge (*jñāna sāmagrī*) itself. Thus, the Naiyāyikas propose that the validity and the invalidity of knowledges are produced by the merits and defects (*guṇa doṣa*) in the totality of causes of knowledge.

The Pūrvapakṣin now argues that the totality of causes of knowlegde (*jñāna sāmagrī*) needs to be absent in the case where valid and invalid knowledges are absent due to the absence of merit and defect (*guṇa doṣau*). According to him, when the totality of causes of knowledge is admitted to be present, knowledge in general (*jñāna mātra*), which excludes both valid and invalid knowledges, needs to be produced. However, the Naiyāyikas refute the argument. According to them, effect in general (*sāmānya kārya*), which excludes particulars, i.e. authoritative and non-authoritative knowledges (*viśeṣa vinākṛta*) cannot be admitted. Also according to them, the totality of causes of knowledge in general (*sāmānya sāmagrī*), which is excluded from the totality of causes of the knowledges in particular (*viśeṣa sāmāgrī*), does not exist, as the particular cause (*kāraṇa viśeṣa*) is required for the production of the particular effect (*kārya viśeṣa*).

Objection of the Mīmāmsakas : Inference stated by Kusumāñjalīkāra is not correct. :

I. ii. 30. It may be objected now as follows : That valid and invalid knowledges have the mutual differences and the distinct natures dispite being produced by the totality of causes of the same class; and it is like two pots and twins having differences and the distinct natures dispite being produced by the totality of causes of the same class. It should not be argued, however,

that since the validity or the authoritativeness of knowledge is consecutive due to the consecutive activity, a consecutive cause must be admitted in the case of valid knowledge in general; for, consecutive effect (knowledge) cannot be produced from a non-consecutive cause. Since the validity or the authoritativeness of knowledge is a condition, the same cannot be proved to be the delimitor of the effectness (of the knowledge). Also the state of being the property existing in the effect in general deviates from the particulars, i.e. the blue potness and the state of being the knowledge of the pot etc.

It may be argued by the Kusumāñjalīkāra that valid knowledge is to be produced from the causes of knowledge in particular which is distinct from that of the knowledge in general; for, it is a knowledge to be produced like invalid knowledge. However, this is not correct. Since valid knowledge constitutes knowledge in general, the same valid knowledge needs to be produced from the causes of the knowledge in general; and therefore, such a state is contradictory to the probandum, i.e. the probandum becomes absent in the subject of inference. Also contradiction to the probandum becomes contingent in the theory that valid knowldge has the state of being produced from the cause not conducive to the knowledge in general. Also such a state is not established in the example of invalid knowledge. Also since the probandum consists of useless qualifier, the probandum cannot be established to be exclusive. Also when valid knowledge is inferred to be produced from the cause distinct from that of some knowledge or when it is inferred to be produced from the cause distinct from the causes of all the knowledges, the fault of the establishment of the already established becomes contingent. Also, (the state of being) the valid knowledge to be produced from the totality of causes, different from the totality of causes of knowledge in general, cannot be the probandum; for, then there would arise the fault of the establishment of the already established and the fault of contradiction as in the earliar case.

It should not be argued that the valid knowledge in general and the valid knowledge in particular have two distinct totalities of causes of knowledge. The valid knowledge in general would have the contingency of being different from the valid knowledge in particular. Otherwise, the difference between the two totalities of causes (of general and particular knowledges) could not be established. For, such a difference is to be assumed due to the difference between the effects, i.e. general and particular knowledges.

From this refutation, even the position that knowledge (in particular) to be produced from the cause that is different from the cause of knowledge in general, is the probandum becomes refuted. Also when all the knowledges are intended to be the probandum, the fault of establishment of the already

established arises on account of the sense organs etc. Also when the state of being the knowledge in general is intended to be the probandum, the fault of non-establishment of the probans becomes contingent.

Explanation :

Now the Mīmāmsakas raise their objection. According to them, valid and invalid knowledges (*pramāprame*), can be established to have mutual difference (*bheda*) and distinct natures (*vaidharmya*), dispite the same being produced from the totality of causes of the same class, like the two pots and twins (*yamaja*) have difference and distinct natures dispite being produced from the totality of causes of the same class (*ekajātīya sāmagrī*). The Pūrvapakṣin (Naiyāyika) raises the argument here as follows : That a consecutive cause (*anugata hetu*) needs to be admitted in the case of valid knowledge in general (*pramā mātre*), as the consecutive validity is produced in the knowledge from the consecutive activity (*anugata vyava hāra*). However, the Mīmāmsakas refute the argument. According to them, the validity of knowledge (*pramātva*) is a condition (*upādhi*); and hence the same cannot be the delimitor of the effectness of the effect (*kāryatāvacchedaka*) produced from any cause.

The Pūrvapakṣin (Kusumāñjalīkāra) again raises the argument as follows : That valid knowledge (*pramā*) can be inferred to be produced from a cause distinct from that of the knowledge in general (*jñājna hetvatirikta hetujanyā*) due to its being a knowledge to be produced (*janya jñānatva*). However, the Mīmāmsakas refute the argument. According to them, the state of being produced from the cause distinct from that of the knowledge in general (*jñāna hetvatirikta hetujanyatva)* becomes contradictory, to the probandum, as the valid knowledge, being the knowledge in general, needs to be produced from the causes of the knowledge in general (*taddhetu janya*). Also when the valid knowledge is held to be produced from the cause that does not produce the knowledge (*jñānājanaka janya*), the fault of contradiction (*virodha*) to the probandum becomes contingent, as such a state of *jñānā janaka janyatva* is unestablished in the valid knowledge. The Mīmāmsakas state that the valid knowledge cannot be inferred to be produced either from the cause that is different from the cause of some knowledge (*yatkiñcid jñāna hetu*) or from the cause that is different from the cause of all the knowledges (*sarva taddhī hetu*), as then the fault of the establishment of the already established (*siddha sādhana*) arises. Also they state that the state of being the valid knowledge to be produced from the totality of causes, which is distinct from the totality of causes of knowledge in general (*jñāna sāmānya sāmagryatirikta sāmagrī janyatva*) cannot be the probandum due to the contradiction (*virodha*).

It should be noted that the valid knowledge in general and the valid knowledge in particular (*sāmānya viśeṣayoḥ*) cannot be admitted to be produced from the two distinct totalities of causes (*sāmagrī dvaya*). For, then the valid knowledge in general (*pramā*) would need to be different from the valid knowledge in particular (*jñāna bhinna*). Otherwise, the difference between the two totalities of causes (*sāmāgrī bheda*) cannot be established due to being dependent on the difference between the two effects (*kārya bheda*).

Also the Mīmāsakas state that from the above refutation of the Pūrvapakṣin's position, even the position that the valid knowledge in particular is to be produced from the cause that is different from the cause of the valid knowledge in general (*jñāna sāmānya hetu*) gets refuted. According to them, the fault of the establishment of the already established arises when all the knowldges are the probandum; and the fault of the non establishment of the probans (*hetva siddhi*) arises when knowledge in general is the probandum.

Refutation of Other inferences

I. ii. 31. Also (the state of being) the knowledge to be produced from the cause, that has the effectness different from the effectness of the knowledges-ness-delimited as its relational adjunct, cannot be the probandum. Since the knowledgeness exists in the eternal substance, the same cannot function as the delimitor of the effectness.

It may be argued now as follows: That the rule is that the property, the existence of the non-existing substratum of which property is dependent on the cause, is the delimitor of the effectness. And the property of knowledgeness is so (i.e. the delimitor of the effectness). Also the qualifier 'non-existing' is not extra or redundant. For, the existence in general, which is common to even the eternal sky etc., cannot be controlled by the cause. However, this argument is not correct. Only that property, whose nature associated with the non-existing substratum is dependant on the cause, is the delimitor of the effectness due to the brevity. And the knowledgeness does not qualify to be such a property. Also when the state of being the valid knowledge of only non-eternal substance is restrictively admitted to be the probandum, the fault of the establishment of the already established arises due to the sense organ etc. causing knowledge in their own way. For, the sense organs are not the causes of knowledge in general individually.

From this, the following parallel view too gets refuted : "That the validity of knowledge is the delimitor of the effectness, which has the causeness different from the causeness described by the effectness of the knowledgeness-delimited as its relational adjunct; for, it is the property pervaded directly by the knowledgeness in general like the invalid knowledge (ness)". For, the validity of knowledge exists only in the eternal substance. Even the inference that "The knowledgeness of the non-eternal substance is so, i.e. the delimitor of the effectness; for, it is the property existing in the effect in general" has a deviating probans. For, the blue potness etc. exist in the effect in general.

Now it may again be argued as follows : That the valid knowledge of non-eternal substance is the effect to be produced from the cause that is different from the cause of both valid and invalid knowledges; for, it is an effect to be produced like the invalid knowledge. However, this is not correct. Since the bodily humour such as the bile is the cause of the valid knowledge referring to itself, the probandum becomes unestablished in the case of the invalid knowledge. Also suppose the inference is held to have the pot as the example, then the inference would involve the deviation by the invalid knowledge only. Even the invalid knowledge such as 'The conch is yellow' is valid with respect to the conch. Further, the inference would involve the fault of the establishment of the already established, as the valid knowledge of the non-eternal substance is the effect to be produced from the knowledge of difference of individual cause.

Explanation :

The Mīmāmsakas refute the argument of the Pūrvapakṣin that the state of being the valid knowledge to be produced from the cause (*kāraṇa janyā*), that has the effectness different from the effectness of the knowledgeness-delimited as its relational adjunct (*jñānatvāvacchinna kāryatvānya kāryatva pratiyogika*), is the probandum. According to them, the knowledgeness (*jñānatva*) exists in the eternal substance (*nitya vṛtti*); and hence cannot be the delimitor of the effectness of the effect to be produced (*kāryatāvacchedaka*).

The Pūrvapaksin again argues that the rule is that the property, the existence of the non-existing substratum of which property (*yaddharmāśrayasya*) is dependent on the cause, is the delimitor of the effectness (*kāryatāvacchedaka*); and therefore, the knowledge (*jñānatva*) can be the delimitor of the effectness. However, the Mīmāmsakas refute the argument on the ground that only that property, whose nature associated with the non-existing substratum (*yadāliṅgitasya svarūpam*) is dependent on the cause (*hetvadhīna*), is the delimitor of the effectness; and therefore, the knowledgeness (*jñānatva*) cannot be the delimitor of the effectness. Also the Mīmāmsakas state that when the state of being the knowledge of the non-eternal substance (*anitya jñānatva*) is admitted to be the probandum, the fault of the establishment of the already established arises due to the sense organ etc. (*indriyādibhiḥ*).

This refutation automatically cancells even the parallel inference that "The validity of knowledge (*pramātva*) is the delimitor of the effectness (*kāryatāvacchedaka*), which has the causeness different from the causeness (*kāraṇatābhinna kāraṇatā*) described by the effectness of the knowledgeness-delimited (*jñānatvāvacchinna kāryatā nirūpita*) as its relational adjunct (*pratiyogika*); for, it is the property pervaded directly by the knowledgeness in general (*jñānatva sākṣād vyāpya dharmatvāt*)", as the validity of knowledge, being the property of the eternal substance (*nitya vṛtti dharma*), cannot be the delimitor of the effectness. Also the inference that "The validity of knowledge of the non-eternal substance (*anitya pramātva*) is the delimitor of the effectness (*kāryatāvacchedaka*); for, it is the property existing in the effect in general (*kārya mātra vṛtti dharmatvāt*)" too is of deviating probans and hence useless.

Further, the Mīmāmsakas refute the inference that "The valid knowledge of eternal substance (*anitya pramā*) is produced from the cause different from the cause of both the valid and the invalid knowledges (*pramā pramobhaya hetubhinna hetujanyā*); for, it is an effect to be produced (*janyatvāt*)". According to them, then the probandum becomes unestablished (*aprasiddha*) in the case of the invalid knowledge, as the bile etc. (*pitta*) is the cause of the valid knowledge referring to itself (*svaviṣaya pramā hetu*). Also the invalid knowledge such as 'This conch is yellow' (*pītaḥ śaṅkhaḥ*) too is valid with respect to the conch; and hence such a probandum needs to be established in the example. Thus, the Mīmāmsakas insist that the valid knowledge (*pramā*) cannot be held to be produced from inference.

Conclusion of Prima facie view

I. ii. 32. It may be argued now as follows : That the valid knowledge is to be produced from the cause, that describes the effectness delimited by the property excluded from the invalid knowedge; for, it is an effect different from the class of invalid knowledge like the pot. And suppose the valid knowledge is not to be produced from the cause, that has the effectness, described by the property not sharing the community of locus with the invalidity of knowledge, as its relational adjunct, then it would become invalid knowledge. However, this argument is not correct. There arises the fault of the establishment of the already established in the inference as the sense-contact has the effectness delimited by the property excluded from the invalid knowledge; and the sense organ etc. are the causes that have such a sense-contact as the relational adjunct; and the valid knowledge is to be produced from such sense organs. And even the logic that the state of being produced from the individual item common to the invalid knowledge is conducive to only the identity of knowledge with the invalid knowledge is useless.

It may be argued again as follows : That the non-eternal knowledge is to be produced from the (lack of) impediment hindering either valid knowledge or invalid knowledge; for, it constitutes either valid knowledge or invalid knowledge like invalid knowledge. Also the valid perceptual knowledge is to be produced from the cause not producing the illusive perceptual knowledge; for, it constitutes the non-eternal valid knowledge like the valid knowledge of taste produced from tongue. However, this is not correct. The fault of the establishment of the already established arises in the inference. For, the non-consecutive particular individual sense–organ–contact, which produces the valid knowledge, does not impede the invalid knowledge; and also the same sense–organ–contact does not produce the illusory perceptual knowledge.

From this the following position too gets refuted: "That the valid knowledge is to be produced from the impediment hindering the knowledge contradictory to itself; for, it is the non-eternal knowledge like the invalid knowledge. Despite the fact that a person may be known to be a post from a distance, the sense organ contact again and again with the limbs of the person is experienced to be impeding the contradictory knowledge of the post and also producing the valid knowledge of the person when he comes nearby. Whereas in the case of the invalid knowledge, the bodily humour like bile and the illusion of the probans are experienced to be producing the invalid knowledge."

Since the particular sense-contact, producing the valid knowledge, is both the producer of the valid knowledge and the impediment hindering the invalid knowledge, the fault of the establishment of the already established ensues. Therefore, the additional quality of the effectness (described by the causality of the cause of another knowledge) does not get established in the valid knowledge. Moreover, in the case of valid perceptual knowledge etc., the distinct category, which is a quality, common to all the valid knowledges, is absent. Also, the causes such as the sense organ-contact etc. are non-consecutive. The merit and the demerit (or fault) are not the causes merely by (possessing) the common generic property of the causeness. The meritness and the demeritness, as the state of being what produces valid knowledge and as the state of being what produces invalid knowledge respectively are over pervassive. Further, the state of being what produces merely the valid knowledge or that of the invalid knowledge are unestablished.

Thus ends the Prima facie view of the theory of production of validity in the theory of the validity or authoritativeness on perception in the Tattvacintāmaṇi composed by Śri Gaṅgeśopādhyāya.

Explanation :

The Mīmāmsakas now conclude their prima facie view. According to them, the logic of the Naiyāyikas that if the valid knowledge (*pramā*) is not to be produced from the cause (*kāraṇa janyā*) that has the effectness, described by the property not sharing the community of locus with the invalidity of knowledge, as its relational adjunct (*apramātvāsamānādhikaraṇa rūpanirūpita kāryatva pratiyogikā*), then it would become invalid knowledge (*apramā*) is untenable; and therefore, the inference "The valid knowledge (*pramā*) is to be produced from the cause (*kāraṇa janyā*), that describes the effectness delimited by the property excluded from the invalid knowledge (*apramāvyāvṛtta dharmāvacchinna kāryatva pratiyogik*); for, it is an effect different from the class of invalid knowledge (*apramā vijātīya kāryatvāt*)" is incorrect. For, the fault of the establishment of the already established (*siddha sādhana*) arises in the inference, as the sense–organ–contact (*samyoga*) has the effectness delimited by the property excluded from the invalid knowledge (*apramā vyāvṛtta dharmāvacchinna kāryatva*); and the sense organ etc. (*indriyādi*) are the causes that have such a sense-contact as the relational adjunct (*tatpratiyogika kāraṇa*).

Also the Mīmāmsakas refute the logic of the Naiyāyikas that the non-eternal knowledge (*anitya pramā*) is to be produced from the (lack of) impediment hindering either valid knowledge or invalid knowledge (*pramāpramāṇyatara pratibandhaka janyā*); for, it is either the valid knowledge or invalid knowledge (*pramāpramāṇyataratvāt*) is not tenable. According to them, the fault of the establishment of the already established (*siddhasādhana*) arises in the inference, as the non-consecutive particular individual sense-contact (*asādhāraṇa vyaktibheda*), that produces the valid knowledge, does not impede the invalid knowledge.

It should be noted that since the above inference is refuted as untenable, even the inference that the valid knowledge (*pramā*) is produced from the impediment hindering the knowledge contrdictory to itself (*svavirodh-yanubhava pratibandhaka janyā*); for, it is the non-eternal knowledge (*anit-yānubhavatvāt*) too becomes refuted.

Further, it should be noted that since the particular sense-contact (*vyakti viśeṣa*), producing the valid knowledge, is both the producer of the valid knowledge (*pramā janaka*) and the impediment hindering the invalid knowledge (*apramā pratibandhaka*), the fault of the establishment of the already established arises in the inference; and therefore, the valid knowledge cannot be established to have a distinct quality (*atirikta guṇa*) of being the effect in general. Also the valid perceptual knowledge (*pratyakṣa pramā*) etc

cannot be admitted to have a distinct quality common to all the valid knowledges. And even the causes such as sense organ-contact (*indriya sannikarṣa*) are not consicutive. For, the merit and demerit (*guṇa doṣau*) cannot be the causes of valid and invalid knowledges by merely possessing the generic property of the causeness (*jātyā*). Thus, the Naiyāyikas contention that (the validity or authoritativeness of) knowledge is produced from a distinct cause (*parataḥ*) is untenable.

Siddhānta or Conclusive view that Prāmāṇya is produced from Guṇa

I. ii. 33. Here we, the Naiyāyikas reply as follows : This way, in the Mīmāmsakas' theory, even the invalid knowledge would be required to be produced only intrinsically by the totality of cause of invalid knowledge itself and not extraneously from a distinct cause. For, when invalid knowledge, like valid knowledge, is to be produced from the non-consecutive or peculiar cause (of knowledge) only, the distinct demerit or fault cannot be the cause in the production of invalid knowledge.

It may be argued now as follows : That despite the presense of the totality of causes of knowledge, the demerit or fault is the cause in the production of invalid knowledge in conformity with the non-perception of distinction and bile etc. However, then we shall reply as follows : That valid knowledge, referring to the same objects as that of invalid knowledge, is produced from the perception of distinction and the absense of bile etc.; however, the same is not produced merely from the absense of such defects. Also, since the incidental cause is definitely required for the production of valid knowledge, how can the state of being produced extraneously from the distinct cause be not applicable in the case of valid knowledge? Moreover, the cause and-effect relationship is based on the rule or regulation; however; the rule or regulation is not based on the relationship of individuals due to the deviation and the over pervasion etc. Therefore, the cause- and - effect- relationship, which describes the rule or regularion, must be admitted to be both conforming and consecutive to the production of effect. Thus, consecutive cause, which is excluded from the deviating effect, must be admitted in the case of production of the valid knowledge like in the case of production of the invalid knoweldge.

Moreover, the effect such as clothing, which belongs to a different class of effect from the effect concerned such as pot, is produced from the cause that belongs to a different class of cause, from the cause concerned. For instance, the clothing, which belongs to a different class of effect from the pot, is produced from the cause that belongs to a different class of cause from the cause of pot. Otherwise, the distinction between different effects would become merely incidental. And since the effect, which belongs to the class of

the knowledge of the pot, is to be produced from the sense organ-contact with the pot, which belongs to a different class of cause producing the effect different from the knowledge of pot, deviation of cause does not arise. Therefore, the non-eternal valid knowledge is to be produced from the cause belonging to the different class of cause from the cause of the invalid knowledge; for, it is an effect belonging to the different class of effect from the invalid knowledge, like the pot. This way, (Cf. I. ii. 32) when the consecutive cause is held to be the cause of valid knoweldge in general, the fault of the establishment of the already established does not arise in the inference such as "The valid knowledge is to be produced from the cause belonging to the class of the impediment hindering the knowledge contradictory to itself; for, it is a knowledge to be produced, like the invalid knowledge."

Explanation :

Gangeśa now begins the section on conclusion (*siddhānta*) with the Naiyāyikas' reply. According to the Naiyāyikas, when valid knowledge (*pramā*) is held to be produced intrinsically by the totality of causes of knowledge itself (*svataḥ*), even invalid knowledge (*apramā*) would be required to be produced intrinsically by itself (*svataḥ*) and not extraneously from the distinct cause such as demerit (*parataḥ*). They state that when invalid knoweldge can be produced from the peculiar cause of knowledge (*asādhāraṇa kāraṇa*) only, distinct demerit or fault (*doṣa*) need not be the cause of invalid knowledge. Thus, the Mīmāsakas' theory that while valid knowledge is produced intrinsically by the totality of causes of knowledge itself (*svataḥ*), invalid knowledge is produced extraneously from the demerit (*parataḥ*) is untenable.

The Naiyāyikas refute the argument of the Mīmāmsakas that dispite the presence of the totality of causes of knowledge (*jñāna sāmagrī*), the defect (*doṣa*) is the cause of the production of invalid knowledge (*apramā*) in conformity with the defect such as the bile (*pittāder anuvidhānād*). According to the Naiyāyikas, valid knowledge, referring to the same objects as those of invalid knowledge, is produced from the perception of distinction (*viśeṣa darśana*) and the absence of bile (*pittādyabhāva*); however, the same is not produced merely from the absence of such defects; and therefore, the state of being produced extraneously from the distinct cause must be admitted in the case of valid knowledge. It should be noted that the cause- and-effect relationship (*kārya kāraṇa bhāva*) is based on the rule or regulation (*niyama garbha*). However, the rule is not based on the relationship of individuals due to deviation. Therefore, the cause - and effect - relationship which describes the rule (*niyama nirūpaka*) must be admitted to be conforming to the

production of effect (*anuguṇa*). Thus, the Naiyāyikas establish the theory that the consecutive cause (*anugata kāraṇa*) must be admitted in the case of valid knowledge like in the case of invalid knowledge.

The Naiyāyikas state that the effect (*kārya*) such as clothing (*paṭa*), which belongs to a different class of effect from the effect concerned (*kārya vijātīya*) such as pot (*ghaṭa*), is produced from the cause (*kāraṇa*) such as yārn (*tantu*), which belongs to a different class of cause from the cause concerned (*vijātīya kāraṇa*). This is necessary to explain the difference between the effects (*kārya vaijātya*). Now since the effect, belonging to the class of the knowledge of pot (*ghaṭa jñāna jātīya*), is produced from the sense organ-contact with the pot (*ghaṭendriya sannikarṣa*), belonging to a different class of cause producing the effect different from the knowledge of pot (*tadvijātīya kārya kāraṇa*), no deviation arises in the cause and effect - relationship. Thus, the Naiyāyikas hold that the inference that "The non-eternal valid knowledge (*anitya pramā*) is to be produced from the cause that belongs to a different class of cause (*vijātīya kāraṇa*) from the cause of the invalid knowledge (*apramā kāraṇa*); for, it is an effect that belongs to a different class of effect (*vijātīya kāryatvāt*) from the invalid knowledge" (Cf. T.C. I. ii. 32) establishes the effectness of knowledge. Also they state that no fault of establishment of the already established (*siddha sādhana*) arises in the inference that "The valid knowledge (*pramā*) is to be produced from the cause belonging to the class of the impediment hindering the knowledge (*anubhavapratibandhaka jātīya*) contradictory to itself (*svavirodhi*); for, it is a knowledge to be produced (*tajjanyānubhavatvāt*)", as the consecutive cause (*anugata*) is the cause of valid knowledge.

Illustration and Justification of Other inferences

I. ii. 34. Moreover, the state of being the non-eternal valid knowledge is the delimitor of the effectness; for, it is a property existing in all the effects without any impediment, like the state of being the invalid knowledge. However, the blue potness, which is a qualified property, is not the delimitor of the effectness; for, the qualified property can be a property constituted from the two conducive factors which are common or consecutive to two individuals (blue colour and pot). Thus, the same qualified property is merely a combination of two individual objects. Also there exists an impediment hindering the delimitorship (of the effectness) in the case of the state of being the knowledge of pot etc.

Alright; let it be admitted that the common or consecutive merit of the waiter at the table is the cause even in the case of blue pot. Otherwise, transcendental merit would not be the cause of the effects in general. Also

the state of being the valid knowledge is the delimitor of the effectness, that does not describe the causality distinct from the causality, describing the effectness of what is delimited by the state of being the non-eternal knowledge as the relational adjunct; for, it is the property delimiting the effectness pervaded by the state of being the non-eternal knowledge like the state of being the invalid knowledge. Therefore, a consecutive cause, excluded from the cause of the invalid knowledge, becomes established in the production of the non-eternal valid knowlege. Otherwise, the consecutive (knowledge of) effect would become untenable. Also the state of being the non-eternal valid knowledge is the delimitor of the effectness, that describes the causality delimited by the form not delimiting the causality described by the invalid knowledge; for, it is the delimitor of the effectness not existing in the illusory knowledge like the potness. The state of being the visual valid knowledge is the delimitor of the effectness, that describes the causality delimited by the form not delimiting the causality described by the visual invalid knowledge, for, it is the delimitor of the effectness not existing in the visual illusory knowledge like the potness. Also the state of being the non-eternal valid knowledge of the silver is the delimitor of the effectness that describes the causality not delimited by the form delimiting the causality described by the invalid knowledge of the silver; for, it is the delimitor of the effectness not existing in the illusory knowledge of the silver, like the potness. Otherwise, the rule that the visual knowledge of the silver etc. describes the silverness existing in some silver as its qualifier; but it does not describe the non-silverness not existing in the silver as its qualifier would become untenable without some regulating factor. For, the totality of causes is equal or similar in both the cases.

Explanation :

The Naiyāyikas now illustrate and justify other inferences. According to them, the state of being non-eternal valid knowledge (*anitya pramātva*) is the delimitor of the effectness (*kāryatāvacchedaka*), as it is a property existing in all the effects (*kāryamātra vṛtti dharma*) without any impediment; and hence valid knowledge, like invalid knowledge, needs to be admitted as the effect to be produced extraneously from the other cause such as merit. However, the Naiyāyikas maintain that a qualified property (*viśiṣta*) such as the blue potness (*nīla ghaṭa tva*) is not the delimitor of the effectness. According to them, the qualified property is a combination of the two individual objects (*ārthaḥ samājaḥ*), as the same can be constituted from the two factors common or consecutive to the two individuals objects (*pratyekānugata prayojaka dvaya*) such as the blue colourand the pot.

Now as an alternative, the Naiyāyikas propose that in the case of the blue pot, the common or consecutive transcedental merit of the waiter at the table (*anugata bhojakādṛṣṭa*) can be admitted to be the cause (*hetu*), as otherwise the general rule of the transcendental merit being the cause of the effect in general (*kārya mātra*) would become violated. Also they state that the common or consecutive cause excluded from the invalid knowledge (*apramā vyāvṛttānugata hetu*) can be admitted in the production of the non-eternal valid knowledge (*anitya pramā*). According to them, the state of being the non-etrnal valid knowledge (*anitya pramātva*) is the delimitor of the effectness (*kāryatāvacchedaka*) that describes the causality, different from the cauality, describing the effectness of what is delimited by the state of being the non-eternal knowledge as the relational adjunct (*anitya jñānatvāvacchicchinna kāryatā pratiyogika*); for, it is the property delimiting the effectness pervaded by the state of being the non-eternal knowledge (*anitya jñānatvāvacchinna kāryatā vacchedaka dharma*). This is necessary for maintaining consecutive effect (*anugata kārya*). Also the Naiyāyikas state that the state of being the non-eternal valid knowledge (*anitya pramātva*) can be the delimitor of the effectness (*kāryatāvacchedaka*), describing the causality delimited by the form not delimiting the causality described by the invalid knowledge (*apramā kāraṇatānavacchedaka rūpāvacchinna kāraṇatā*), as the same is the delimitor of the effectness not existing in the illusory knowledge (*bhramāvṛtti kāryatāvacchedaka*). Thus, the valid knowledge, like the pot, is an effect that is produced extraneously from a distinct cause or means (*parataḥ*). Further, the Naiyāyikas state that the state of being the visual valid knowledge (*cākṣuṣa pramātva*) is the delimitor of the effectness (*kāryatāvacchedaka*), that describes the causality delimited by the form not delimiting the causality described by the visual invalid knowledge (*cākṣuṣāpramā kāraṇatānavacchedaka rūpāvacchinna kāraṇatā*), as the same is the delimitor of the effectness not existing in the visual illusory knowledge. (*cākṣuṣa bhramāvṛtti kāryatāvacchedaka*). Thus, the visual valid knowledge, like the pot, is an effect that is produced extraneously from a distinct cause or means (*parataḥ*). Again the Naiyāyikas state that the state of being the non-eternal valid knowledge of the silver (*anitya rajata pramātva*) is the delimitor of the effectness, that describes the causality not delimited by the form delimiting the causality described by the invalid knowledge of silver (*rajatāpramā kāraṇatā*), as the same is the delimitor of the effectness not existing in illusory knowledge of silver (*rajata bhramāvṛtti kāryatāvacchedaka*). According to them, this is necessary to explain the rule that the visual knowledge of silver describes the silverness existing in the silver but it does not describe the non-silverness not existing in the silver as the qualifier. Thus, in both ways, valid knowlegde is to be produced extraneously from a distinct cause (*parataḥ*).

Refutation of Condition and Establishment of Merit and Demerit as the Causes of Valid and Invalid knowledges:

I. ii. 35. The Mīmāmsakas object here as follows : That the state of being what is other than the valid knowledge is the deviating condition in the establishment or inference of the probandum, viz. the state of being produced from a distinct cause or means (from that of the invalid knowledge) (Cf. I. ii. 33.). Also it is not correct to argue that the state of being what is other than the subject of inference constitutes the deviating condition. You; the Naiyāyikas, consider the knowledge of the Lord to be only the valid knowledge; and the subject of inference is what is to be excluded from the non-subject. It should be noted that the state of being what excludes the non-subject of inference. admitted by both the parties, is the key; however, what is to be excluded from the non-subject cannot be established to be the key in both the parties due to the heaviness. The uncommonality or peculiarity in the negative probans is the root cause of the state of being what is other than the subject in not being the deviating condition. However, such a state of being what is other than the subject does not exist in the present case, as the knowledge of the lord, as admitted by you, is only the co-subject.

However, this objection of the Mīmāmsakas is not correct. Since the probans is pervaded by the probandum on account of the impediment to the contradictory position, the so called condition cannot be the pervader of the probandum.

It may be objected again by the Mīmāmsakas that the absence of the defect such as bile is the cause of valid knowledge; and hence the state of being produced intrinsically by itself of the form of the state of being produced by the totality of causes of knowledge is unharmed as compared to the incidental or non-illusory states. The followers of Miśra may argue that the absence of defect is not the cause; but rather it is merely the indicator of the difference in the totality of causes of valid knowledge by being the delimitor of the causeness like the staffness. However, this argument is not correct. The valid knowledge of white form is not produced in the presence of the China rose; however, the valid knowledge of white form is produced in the absence of the rose on the crystal. Therefore, even the absence of defect needs to be the cause of valid knowledge by being non-redundant.

No, the above objection is not correct. The valid knowledge is produced in the collective presence of all the merits such as the complete sense-oragan-contact with most parts and the observation of peculiarity; whereas the invalid knowledge is produced in the absence of such merits. Therefore, why should it not be admitted that only the presence of the merit is the cause of the valid knowledge and the absence of the merit is the cause of the invalid knowledge?

Explanation :

The Mīmāmsakas now raise the objection that the state of being what is other than the valid knowledge (*pramāṇyatva*) is the deviating condition (*upādhi*) in the establishment or inference of the probandum, viz. the state of being produced from a distinct cause from that of invalid knowledge (*asādhāraṇa kāraṇa janyatva*). (Cf. I. ii. 33.). According to them, the fault of deviating condition cannot be avoided by stating that the state of being what is other than the subject of inference (*pakṣetara*) as the deviating condition, as the Naiyāyikas have admitted the knowledge of the lord (*Iśvara jñāna*) to be only the valid knowledge. It should be noted that the state of being what is other than the subject of inference (*pakṣetara tva*) does not constitute the deviating condition (*upādhi*) as the subject viz. the valid knowledge, cannot be excluded from the non-subject, viz, the invalid knowledge. Also, it should be noted that the state of being what is other than the subject does not constitute the deviating condition as the uncommonality or peculiarity in the negative probans is the root-couse of the state of being what is other then the subject (*pakṣetaratva*) in not constituting the deviating condition in the Naiyāyikas' inference.

However, the Naiyāyikas refute the objection. Accroding to them, the probans (*hetu*) such as the state of being the effect belonging to a different class of effect (*vijātīya kāryatva*) is pervaded by the probandum (*sādhya*) such as the state of being produced from the cause that belongs to a different class (*vijātīya kāraṇa janyatva*); and hence the so called deviating condition (*upadhi*) cannot pervade the probandum, i.e. cannot make probans deviating.

The Mīmāmsakas again raise the objection that only absence of fault or defect (*doṣā bhāva*), and not the positive presence of merit (*guṇa*), can be admitted to be the cause of the valid knowledge (*pramā*); and hence the valid knowledge can be admitted to have the state of being produced intrinsically by itself (*svatastva*). However, they refute the argument of the Miśras that the absence of the defect (*dośābhāva*) may not be the cause of the valid knowledge (*pramā kāraṇa*); but rather it is merely an indicator of the difference in the totality of causes of the valid knowledge (*sāmagrī bhedopalakṣaka*) by being the delimitor of the causeness (*kāraṇatāvacchedaka*). Accroding to the Mīmāmsakas, the absence of defect needs to be admitted as the cause of valid knowledge on the ground that the absence of the China rose is the cause of the knowledge of white form on crystal, whereas the presence of the China rose is the impediment.

However, the Naiyāyikas refute even such an objection. According to them, valid knowledge (*pramā*) is produced in the collective presence of the

sense-organ-contact (*avayavendriya sannikarṣa*) and invalid knowledge (*apramā*) is produced in the absence of the sense organ-contact etc. (*tadabhāva*); and therefore, it is necessary to admit that the presence of the merit (*guṇa*) is the cause of the valid knowledge and the absence of the merit (*tadabhāva*) is the cause of the invalid knowledge.

Guṇābhāva is not the Cause

I. ii. 36. That the absence of the cause (merit), producing the valid knowledge referring to the existing objects, is not conducive to the invalid knowledge referring to the non-existing objects. Since the epistemological rule stipulates that the knowledge refers to only the existing objects, the absence of the cause (merit), producing the valid knowledge, cannot be conducive to the invalid knowledge. It may be argued that the absence of cause (demerit), producing the invalid knowledge referring to the non-existing objects, can be the cause of valid knowledge referring to the existing objects; for, unlike the valid knowledge referring to only the existing objects, the invalid knowledge cannot be admitted to be referring to only the non-existing objects. However, then we shall reply that in that case, the invalid knowledge would not be the knowledge referring to any existing objects. For, there exists no ground to admit such a rule. It may again be argued that the absence of the cause (demerit) producing the invalid knowledge referring to the non-existing objects, is the cause of the valid knowledge referring to merely the existing objects. However, then we shall counter argue that in that case, let it be admitted that only the merit (sense organ-contact) is the cause of the valid knowledge (referring to the existing objects) and the absence of such a merit is the cause of the invalid knowledge referring to the non-existing objects.

It may be argued now that since the absence of merit is common to, i.e. controlled by a particular object, one and the same knowledge cannot be both valid and invalid. For, the merit and the absence of merit cannot exist in the same locus. However, this argument is not correct. This difficulty is equally applicable even in the Mīmāmsakas' theory that the absence of demerit is the cause of valid knowledge. And the logic that some defect is the cause of some invalid knowledge is equal to the logic that some merit is the cause of some valid knowledge.

Now it may again be argued that the invalid knowledge, referring to the non-existing objects in general, would be necessary from the absence of the merit (sense - organ - contact etc.). However, this is not correct. The invalid knowledge, referring to the non-existing objects in general, would be necessary even from the demerit as well. And the argument that the demerit need not produce (the invalid knowledge of) all sorts of objects, is equal to the argument

that the absence of merit need not produce (the invalid knowledge of) all sorts of objects.

Explanation :

The Naiyāyikas now refute the suggestion of the Mīmāmsakas that the absence of the cause (*hetvabhāva*) such as the merit, producing the valid knowledge referring to the existing objects (*sadartha viṣayaka*), can be conducive to the invalid knowledge, referring to the non-existing objects (*asadartha viṣayaka*). According to them, the epistemological rule stipulates that the knowledge in general (*jñāna*) refers to only the existing objects (*sadartha viṣaya*); and therefore, the absence of the cause (merit), producing the valid knowledge, cannot be the cause (demerit) producing the invalid knowledge referring to the non-existing objects.

Also the Naiyāyikas refute the argument that the absence of the cause (*kāraṇābhāva*), producing the invalid knowledge referring to the non-existing objects (*asadartha viṣayaka*), can be the cause (*hetu*) of the valid knowledge referring to the existing objects (*sadartha viṣayaka*), as the invalid knowledge (*apramā*) does not refer to only the non-existing objects (*asadartha mātra viṣayaka*), unlike the valid knowledge (*pramā*) which refers to only the existing objects (*sadartha mātra viṣayaka*). According to them, then the invalid knowledge (*apramā*) cannot refer to any existing objects (*sadartha viṣaya*), as no ground exists to support such a theory. Further, the Nayāyikas state the counter argument that instead of admitting the absence of the cause (*hetv abhāva*) of the invalid knowledge referring to the non -existing object (*asadartha viṣaya*) as the cause of the valid knowledge referring to merely the existing objects (*sadartha mātra viṣaya*), only the merit (*guṇa*) such as the sense organ-contact can be admitted to be the cause of the valid knowledge and the absence of such a merit can be admitted to be the cause of the invalid knowledge referring to the non-existing objects.

Also the Naiyāyikas further refute the argument that since the absence of the merit (*guṇābhāva*) such as the sense-organ-contact is common to, i.e. controlled by a particular object (*viṣaya viśeṣa niyantrita*), the same knowledge cannot be both valid and invalid (*satyam asatyam*), as merit and its absence cannot exist in the same locus. According to them, the difficulty is equally applicable even in the Mīmāmsakas' theory that the absence of demerit (*doṣābhāva*) is the cause of valid knowledge. And the logic that some demerit (*doṣa*) is the cause of some invalid knowledge is equal to the Naiyāyikas' logic that some merit (*guṇa*) is the cause of some valid knowledge.

Finally, the Naiyāyikas refute the argument that in the Naiyāyikas' theory, the invalid knowledge (*jñāna*), which refers to the non-existing objects in

general (*asanmāntra viṣayaka*), would become necessary from even the absence of merit (*guṇā bhāva*). According to them, in the Mīmāmsakas' theory too, the invalid knowledge, which refers to the non-existing objects in general, would become necessary from the demerit (*doṣa*). And if the demerit need not produce the invalid knowledge of all sorts of objects, then the absence of merit too need not produce the invalid knowledge of all sorts of objects.

Refutation of Objection that Merit is not Cause :

I. ii. 37. It may again be objected now as follows : That the merit such as the observasion of the particularity and the absence of such a merit are non-consecutive; and hence the same cannot be the causes of the valid and invalid knowledges respectively. Rather, therefore, only the demerit or defect such as bile and the absence of such a demerit or defect are the causes of the invalid and the valid knowledges respectively. However, then we shall reply that the defect such as bile and the absence of such a demerit or defect too are non-consecutive; and hence the same too cannot be the causes of the invalid and the vaild knowledges respectively. Further, the absence of the defect such as bile is deviating from the production of the valid knowledge of the bile itself (as the bile produces the valid knowledge upon its destruction).

It may be argued now as follows : That the demerithess or defectness cannot be single, i.e. generalized. The defectness cannot be the state of being the cause of particular illusory (invalid) knowledges. For, such a state pertains to oneself etc. and is non-consecutive. Nor the demeritness or defectness can be the state of being the cause of illusory (invalid) knowledge in general. Since the bile etc. are non-consecutive, the defectness does not have such a state and is impossible. Nor the demeritness or defectness can be the state of being the counter positive of the absence of the cause of valid knowledge. For, then the fault of mutual dependence arises and also the defects such as bile are the causes of the valid knowledge of themselves. Nor the demeritness or defectness can be the state of being the impediment hindering the valid knowledge different from the valid knowledge of the defect itself. For, this way, the consideration of the correct probans, which hinders the perception, becomes the defect; and therefore, inference would not be valid knowledge; rather on the contrary, it would need to become invalid knowledge. Thus, suppose you state that something functions as defect in only in some cases, then we shall counter state that this fact (of something functioning as defect in only some cases) is same even in the case of merit.

Explanation :

The Naiyāyikas now establish their theory that the merit (*guṇa*) is the cause of valid knowledge by refuting the Mīmāmsakas' objection that the absence of demerit or defect (*doṣābhāva*) is the cause. According to them, the position that the demerit or defect and the absence of demerit or defect (*doṣa-tadabhāva*) are the causes of the invalid and the valid knowledges (*pramā prama hetu*) is untenable, as the defect such as bile and the absence of bile are non-consecutive (*ananugata*) and deviating (*vyabhicāra*).

Further, the Naiyāyikas state that the demeritness or defectness (*doṣastva*) cannot be defined properly. According to them, it cannot be the state of being the cause of the particular illusory (invalid) knowledge (*tattad bhrama hetu tva*), as the same is not consecutive. It cannot be the state of being the cause of the illusory (invalid) knowledge in general (*bhramamātra hetu tva*), as the same is impossible, due to bile etc., being non-consecutive (*ananugata*). Also the demeritness or defectness cannot be the state of being the counter-positive of the absence of the cause of valid knowledge (*pramā hetvabhāva pratiyogitva*), as the defect such as bile is only the cause of valid knowledge of bile (*svapramā hetu*). Further, the demeritness or defectness cannot be the state of being the impediment hindering the valid knowledge different from the valid knowledge of the defect itself (*svapramā bhinna pramā pratibandhakatva*), as then the inference would become only illusory (invalid) and not valid (*pramā*) due to the defectness of consideration of correct probans (*salliṅga parāmarśa*). Therefore, the merit (*guṇa*), like the defect (*doṣa*), needs to be the cause in only particular cases.

Objection of the Mīmāmsakas that Absence of defect is Cause :

I. ii. 38. It might be so. However, in the presence of the totality of causes of knowledge producing neither valid knowledge nor invalid knowledge, the illusory (invalid) knowledge of the cane as serpent is produced on account of the defect of the ointment of frog-marrow; and the valid knowledge of the cane as cane is produced on account of the absence of the defect. Now, since the absence of the defect is the cause of valid knowledge of cane there, the same absence of the defect should be admitted to be the cause of valid knowledge even elsewhere due to being already assumed. The frog-marrow is the defect only in the case of eye, but it is not so in the case of skin; and since the defect is absent in the skin, the skin produces only the valid knowledge of cane.

It may be argued now that dispite the presence of the impression of the defect, causing the illusion of non-difference (identity) that 'I am, white', the valid knowledge of difference (non-identity) that 'This is my body' is produced from the merit. However, this is not correct. Only the absence of the observation of particularity, and not the impression of defect, is the cause of the illusion of non-difference, as the illusion is not produced in the absence of the observasion of particularity.

It may again be argued that dispite the contact of eye with hair etc. at a long distance, the valid knowledge of hair etc. is produced only in the case of the eye- contact with another hair of the same class and not otherwise in the absence eye-contact. And, since the merit of the form of the eye-contact is the cause of the valid knowledge of hair etc., the same merit must be admitted to be the cause of the valid knowledge in other cases as well; thus, the valid knowledge needs to be produced from the merit only. However, this arugument too is not correct. Such a contact of eye with the hair of the same class is the cause of only the valid perception of the hair existing in such a long distant area, as the same perception is not produced without such a contact. Even you, the Naiyāyikas, must admit that the merit such as the contact of eye is the cause of only the valid knowledge of the hair existing at a long distance, as the valid knowledge of the hair, existing in the near by area, is produced even without the contact of eye with the hair of the same class. Also, the absence of the defect need to be assumed as the cause of valid knowledge even in such a case of hair existing at a long distance, as when the knowledge of hair is produced from the defect in the eye, the knowledge of hair would need to become invalid.

It may again be argued that the merit such as the observasion of particularity is the cause of valid knowledge; for, when the absence of the observasion of particularity is the defect, the absence of such an absence, i.e. the merit needs to be the cause of valid knowledge. However, then we shall reply that the observation of particularity is the cause of valid knowledge only as being the absence of defect, but not as being the merit or as being the action.

Explanation :

Now the Mīmāmsakas raise the objection that the absence of demerit or defect (*doṣābhāva*), and not the merit (*guṇa*), is the cause of valid knowledge (*pramā*). According to them, the defect of the ointment of frog-marrow (*maṇḍūka vasāñjana*) produces the illusory (invalid) knowledge of cane as serpent (*vamśoraga vibhrama*) and the absence of such a defect (*doṣābhāva*) produces the valid knowledge of cane as cane; and therefore, only the absence of defect needs to be the cause of valid knowledge every where. Also the Mīmāmsakas state that frog-marrow is the defect only in the case of eye (*nayane*) and not in the case of skin (*tvaci*); and therefore, the skin produces only the valid knowledge of cane due to the absence of any defect in the skin.

The Mīmāmsakas refute the argument of the Naiyāyikas that the valid knowledge of difference (*bheda pramā*) such as 'This is my body' (*mama śarīram*) is produced dispite the presence of the impression of the defect (*doṣa samskāra*) producing the illusory (invalid) knowledge of non-difference (*abheda bhrama*) such as 'I am white' (*gauro' ham*); and hence absence of defect need not be the cause of valid knowledge. According to them, only the non-observasion of particularity (*viśeṣādarśana*), and not the impression of defect (*doṣa samskāra*), is the cause of the illusory (invalid) knowledge of non-difference; and hence the absence of defect can be admitted to be the cause of valid knowledge.

Further, the Mīmāmsakas refute the argument of the Naiyāyikas that the valid knowledge of hair etc. (*pramā*) is produced only in the case of the eye-contact with the hair of the same class (*sajātīya samyoga*) and not otherwise in the absence of eye-contact (*tadabhāva*); and therefore, only the merit of the form of the eye-contact (*samyogarūpa guṇa*) must be admitted to be the cause of the valid knowledge (*pramā hetu*) everywhere. According to them, the merit of eye-contact with the hair of the same class (*sajātīya samyoga rūpa guṇa*) is the cause of the valid knowledge of only the hair existing at a long distance (*tāvaddeśa varti keśa pramā*) and not of the valid knowledge of the hair existing nearby (*sannikṛṣṭa keśa pramā*); and thus only the absence of defect (*doṣābhāva*) and not the merit (*guṇa*) needs to be the cause of valid knowledge.

Also the Mīmāmsakas refute the argument of the Naiyāyikas that since the observasion of particularity (*viśeṣa darśana*) is the cause of valid knowledge, the non-observasion of particularity (*viśeṣādarśana*) becomes the defect (*doṣa*) and the absence of such a non-observation (*tadabhāva*), which is nothing but merit (*guṇa*), naturally becomes the cause of valid knowledge. According to them, the absence of non-observasion of such a particularity (*tadabhāva*) is the cause of the valid knowlege only being the absence of defect and not as being the merit.

Mīmāmsakas' Theory that Doṣābhāva is conducive to yāthārthya :

I. ii. 39. Moreover, only bile etc., that hinder the observasion of particularity, are the defects due to necessity; however, the non-observasion of particularity etc. are not the defects. Also, it should not be argued that the defects such as the bile etc. are non-common or non-consecutive; and need to be generalized only as being the impediments hindering the observasion of particularity etc.; and therefore, only the non-observasion of particularity must be admitted to be the cause of invalid knowledge due to brevity. Generalization of the defects such as the bile is certainly possible by admitting that certain defect is the cause of certain invalid knowledge. Otherwise, the invalid knowledge would not be tenable even from the defect such as the bile due to

the non-generalization. Further, there arises no fault (in the cause-and-effect - relationship) even in the non-generalization of defects or impediments that hinder the production like the magical gem. For, only the collection of the absences of defects is the cause of valid knowledge.

It may be argued that only the non-observasion of particularity is the cause in all cases of the invalid knowledge; and since the individual defects such as bile are non-consecutive, they lose the status of being the cause of invalid knowledge. However, this is not correct. The excellence or intensity of illusory (invalid) knowledge is produced only from the excellence or intensity of defect such as the bile. Supposing the bile etc. are not the defects, then why should not only the valid knowledge of particularity be produced everywhere? Also supposing such a contingency can be avoided on the ground that one particularity does not have another particularity, then only infinite regress would arise. Moreover, the observation of particularity, can be the cause of neither the valid knowledge in general nor the valid knowledge in particular due to the deviation. Also suppose the observation of particularity is the cause of the valid knowledge of particularity itself, then the infinite regress would arise.

Now, it may again be argued that the merit such as sense-organ-contact is the cause in the case of the production of the valid visual knowledge; whereas the demerit or defect is the cause of the production of the invalid knowledge, as the sense-organ-contact is absent due to the absence of the object in the case of invalid knowledge. Also the same defect cannot be the cause of even the valid knowledge, as then the defect would have the undesired occasion of being non-defect; and also as then the valid knowledge would have the undesired occasion of being the invalid knowledge. Further, the perceptibility would be necessary in the invalid knowledge, as it is produced from the sense-organ-contact. However, this argument is not correct. The aspect of the form of object in the valid knowledge is not to be produced from either the sense organ or the defect in it. Further, since the sense-organ-contact is absent in the aspect (case) of invalid knowledge, the perceptibility would become untenable in the invalid knowledge. Also suppose the defect is the cause of the perceptibility of invalid knowledge, then the overpervasion and the non-consecutiveness would arise (in invalid and valid inferences). Also, it is not correct to argue that the merit, conducive to the validity, exists in both valid knowledge and the valid knowledge of knowledge, like the defect (conducive to the invalidity); exists in the invalid knowledge. For, the absence of defect (conducive to the validity) indeed exists in the valid knowledge.

Explanation :

The Mīmāmsakas now establish their theory that only absence of defect (*doṣābhāva*) is the cause conducive to the validity (*yāthārthya*) of knowledge. According to them, only bile (*pitta*) etc., hindering the observasion of particularity (*viśeṣa darśana*), and not the non-observation of particularity (*viśeṣādarśana*), is the defect (*doṣa*). They refute the argument that since bile etc. are non common or non-consecutive (*ananugata*), only the non-observasion of particularity (*viśeṣādarśana*) needs to be the cause of invalid knowledge (*apramā*). According to them, the generalization of defects (*doṣa*) is certainly possible by admitting that certain defect such as bile is the cause of certain invalid knowledge. Further, non-generalization of defects need not be a fault, as otherwise invalid knowledge (*apramā*) would not be tenable from even the defects like bile etc. and also as only the collection of the absences of defects (*tadabhāva kūṭa*) is the cause of valid knowledge. (*hetu*).

Also the Mīmāmsakas refute the argument that only the non-observasion of particularity (*viśeṣādarśana*), and not the defect (*doṣa*), should be the cause in all cases of invalid knowledge (*apramā*), as the defects such as the bile, being non-consecutive, lose the causeness (*upakṣaya*). According to them, the excellence or intensity of the illusory (invalid) knowledge (*bhramotkarṣa*) is produced from the excellence or intensity of the defect such as the bile (*pittady utkarṣa*); and hence only the defect (*doṣa*) is the cause of invalid knowledge. Further, the observasion of particularity is neither the cause of valid knowledge in general (*pramā mātra*) nor the cause of valid visual knowledge in particular (*pratyakṣa pramā*) due to the deviation.

The Mīmāmsakas refute further the argument of the Naiyāyikas that the merit (*guṇa*) such as the sense-organ-contact (*indriya - sannikarṣa*) is the cause of valid visual perception (*pratyakṣa*), whereas the defect (*doṣa*) is the cause of invalid knowledge (*apramā*) due to the absence of sense-organ-contact in such a case with objects; further, the defect cannot be the cause of the valid knowledge, as then the defect would become the merit and the valid knowledge would become invalid knowledge. According to the Mīmāmsakas, the aspect of the form of the object (*viṣaya rūpāmśa*) in the knowledge is not to be produced from the sense-organ-contact; and if the defect (*doṣa*) is the cause of the perceptibility of invalid knowledge (*sākṣātkāritva*), then the over pervasion would arise in the case of invalid inference. Also according to the Mīmāmsakas, the merit (*guṇa*) cannot be argued to exist in both valid knowledge (*pramā*) and valid knowledge of valid knowledge (*pramā pramā*), as it is unnecessary and the absence of defect (*doṣā bhāva*) can only exist in the valid knowledge.

Naiyāyikas' reply : Merit is peculiar and not consecutive;

I. ii. 40. Here, we, the Naiyāyikas, state our reply. There does not exist any single merit that is consecutive or common to all types of valid knowledge : Rather, only the peculiar or particular merits such as the sense-organ- contact with most of the parts of objects, valid knowledge of (concomitance of) probans, similarity and the knowledge of sentence-meanings are found to be conducive to the perception, inference, analogy and verbal cognition respectively due to positive and negative concomitance. Just as the bile and the illusion of probans etc. are the defects in the case of particular invalid knowledges, i.e. invalid perception and invalid inference, in the same way, the observasion of particularity too is the merit in the case of perception, as the same conforms to perception.

The Mīmāmsakas propose here as follows : Let it be admitted that only the cause of the observsion of particularity is the cause of the valid knowledge (perception), as the absence of valid knowledge (perception) is tenable from the absence of the cause of the observation of particularity only. Otherwise, why should not only the observasion of particularity be produced in such a case there? You may argue that the infinite regress would become contingent in the position that the observasion of particularity is required even for the production of observasion of particularity. However, then we shall state that this way, when the pervading perception is ruled to refer to the pervaded object, the doubt regarding the authoritativeness would become untenable in the case of perception of person like in the case of inference. The state of being the person is ascertained in the person possessing the hand etc. by the after-cognition or recognition. You (the Naiyāyikas) may argue that how is the perception of the pervader possible without the observasion of the particularity even in your theory. However, this is not correct. The observasion of the particularity is the cause of only the valid knowledge of individuals arising after the doubt and the invalid knowledge. In our theory too, the cause of the observasion of the particularity is the cause of only the valid knowledge of individuals arising after the doubt and invalid knowledge.

However, this proposal too is not correct. Since the particular such as hand, foot and chin are the particularities of the persons individully, the causes of the observasions of such particularities too are not common or non-consecutive; and hence they cannot be the causes of the valid knowledges of individuals arising subsequent to the doubt and invalid knowledge. And the state of being the pervaded valid knowledge, which is consecutive, does indeed exist in the case of the observasion of the particularity.

Explanation :

The Naiyāyikas reply that no merit (*guṇa*), which is consecutive, i.e. common to the valid knoweldge in general (*pramāmātra*), can be found to exist; rather, only the peculiar mertis (*pratyeka*) such as the sense-organ-contact with most parts of objects (*bhūyo'vayavendriya sannikarṣa*), valid knowledge of probans (*yathārtha linga*), similarity (*sādṛśya*) and knowledge of sentence-meaning (*vākyārtha jñāna*) are found to be causes conducive to perception, inference, analogy and verbal cognition respectively. Also according to the Naiyāyikas, the observation of particularity (*viśeṣa darśana*) such as the hand etc. is the merit (*guṇa*), like the bile (*pitta*) etc. are the defects (*doṣa*), due to the conformity to the perception. (*anuvidhāna*).

The Mīmāmsakas propose here that only the cause of the observasion of particularity (*viśeṣa darśana hetu*) can be the cause of the valid visual knowledge (*taddhetu*), as the absence of valid knowledge can be produced from the absence of the cause of observasion of particularity (*tadvyatireka*). The Mīmāmsakas refute the argument that the infinite regress (*anavasthāna*) would arise in the position that the observasion of particularity is required even for the production of observation of particularity. According to them, when the pervading perception (*vyāpaka pratyakṣa*) is ruled to refer to the pervaded object (*vyāpya viṣayaka*), the doubt regarding the authoritativeness (*prāmāṇya samśaya*) would become untenable with respect to the perception of a person (*puruṣa pratyakṣa*), as the recognition (*anuvyavasāya*) ascertains the state of being a person in the possessor of hand etc. (*karādimat*). The Mīmāmsakas further refute the argument that the perception of the pervader (*vyāpaka pratyakṣa*) is untenable without the observasion of particularity (*viśeṣa darśana*). According to them, the observasion of particularity is the cause of only the valid knowledge (*pramā*) arising after the doubt and invalid knowledge (*samśaya viparyayottara*).

However, the Naiyāyikas refute the proposal of the Mīmāmsakas. According to them, the hand, the foot and the chin etc. are particularities of persons individually (*pratyekam viśeṣa*); and therefore, the causes of the observasion of such particularities, being non-consecutive, cannot be the causes of the valid visual knowledge arising after the doubt etc. (*ahetu*). And the observasion of the particularity indeed pervades valid knowledge (*vyāpya darśana*); thus the valid knowledge needs to be produced only from a distinct cause such as the observasion of particularity.

Conclusion that Merit is cause and Explanation of Merit in the case of Inference etc.

I. ii. 41. It may be argued now that this way, in the presence of the knowledge of the pervaded probans after the doubt, only an inference and not a perception, would be produced, as the totality of causes of inference is stronger than that of perception. However, this is not correct. Though the totality of causes of inference is stronger elsewhere, the totality of causes of perception is stronger here in the present use. And this is so because, in such a case, the recognition such as 'I perceive a person here, is produced. That is why, the knowledge, known to be produced from the observasion of particularity, is the contradictory impediment. And the knowledge produced from the observasion of particularity is to be contradicted (impeded). Otherwise, the–rule of the contraditory and–contradicted–relationship would become untenable.

Also it cannot be argued that only the valid knowledge is the contradictory impediment. For, even the illusory invalid knowledge of person, produced from the illusion of hand, is the impediment that contradicts the knowledge of post. Also, only the valid knowledge cannot be held to be the impediment by contradicting the opposite invalid knowledge. For, the valid knowledge (produced by illusion) is equal to the invalid knowedge to be contradicted. Also it cannot be argued that only the non-redundant valid knowledge is the contradictory impediment. For, only the valid knowledge produced from the valid observasion of particularity is meant to be the contradictory impediment.

It is not correct to argue that in the case of the illusion such as 'The conch is yellow', the valid knowledge of white colour of conch is not produced dispite the observasion of particularity; and therefore, the same observasion cannot be the cause of valid knowledge of white colour. The existence of only that observasion of particularity, which is contradictory to the illusory invalid knowledge, is the cause of the valid knowledge; and the observasion of particularity of the perceptible person is contradictory to the illusory invalid perception of post; for, such a rule of contradiction is experienced in the case of illusory knowledge of direction and in the case of illusory knowledge such as 'I am white'. However, such an observasion of particularity is absent in the case of the valid knowledge of post produced after the doubt due to the presence of defect. Moreover, since inference, analogy and verbal cognition are not produced merely from the absence of defects such as illusions of probans, similarity and sentence-meaning respectively, the merits such as the true consideration etc. become established as causes. This way, since the valid

knowledge is to be produced from the merit, the valid knowledge with regard to the Vedas too is to be produced from the merit such as the valid knowledge of sentence-meaning; and thus, the lord Īśvara, the substratum of the Vedas, becomes established.

Explanation :

The Naiyāyikas refute the argument that when the merit such as the observasion of particularity (*viśeṣa darśana*) is considered to be the cause of the valid knowledge after the doubt (*samśayottara pramā*), only an inference, (*anumiti*), and not the perception (*pratyakṣa*), would become necessary in the presence of the knowledge of the pervaded probans (*vyāpya jñāna*), as the totality of causes of inference (*anumiti sāmagrī*) is stronger than that of perception. According to them, the totality of causes of perception (*pratyakṣa sāmagrī*), is stronger than that of inference in the persent case of preception due to the absence of desire to establish inference (*siṣādhayiṣā viraha*); and also due to the recognition such as 'I perceive a person' (*puruṣam paśyāmi*) produced. Also according to the Naiyāyikas, the knowledge (*jñāna*) known to be produced from the observasion of particularity (*viśeṣa darśana*), is the contradictory impediment (*bādhaka*); whereas the knowledge produced from such an observasion (*taddarśana janya*) is the contradicted (*bādhya*) in accordance with the rule of contradictory and contradicted - relationship (*bādhya bādhaka bhāva*).

The Naiyāyikas refute the argument that only the valid knowledge (*pramā*) is the contradictory impediment (*bādhaka*) on the ground that even the invalid knowledge of the person (*puruṣa jñāna*), produced from the illusion of the hand, contradicts (impedes) the knowledge of the post (*sthāṇu jñāna*). Also only the valid knowledge cannot be admitted to be the contradictory impediment (*bādhaka*) by contradicting the opposite invalid knowledge (*viparīta bādhakatvena*) as the valid knowledge (produced by illusion) is equal to the invalid knowledge to be contradicted (*bādhyatulya*). Also, only the non-redundant valid knowledge (*ananyathā siddha*) cannot be admitted to be the contradictory impediment, as only the knowledge produced from the observasion of particularity is meant to be the contradictory impediment (*tadartha*).

The Naiyāyikas refute the argument that in the case of the illusion '*pītaḥ śaṅkhaḥ*', the valid knowledge of the white colour (*śvaitya pramā*) is not produced dispite the observasion of particularity; and therefore, the observasion of particularity is not the cause of the valid knowledge. According to them, the existence of only the obsevasion of particularity (*tadbhāva*), which is contradictory to the illusion (*bhrama virodhī*), is the cause of valid knowledge

(*pramā hetu*). Therefore, the observasion of the particularity of the person (*pratyakṣa viśeṣa darśana*), which is contradictory to the illusory perception (*pratyakṣa bhrama*), is the cause of valid knowledge; whereas the same observasion is absent in the case of the valid knowledge produced after the doubt; and therefore, the same is not the cause of such a knowledge. Also, the inference etc. are not produced merely from the absences of the defects such as the illusions of probans (*liṅga bhrama doṣābhāva*); and therefore the merits such as the true consideration (*satya parāmarśa*) etc. too need to be the causes. This way, since the valid verbal knowledge too is produced from the merit such as valid knowledge of sentence-meaning (*vākyārtha yathārtha jñāna*), the merit gets established as the cause of valid Vedic knowledge.

Bhramābhāva is not cause :

I. ii. 42. It may be objected that the valid knowledge may have the state of being produced from the merit in the case of the perception etc; however, the group of four such as absences of illusions constitutes the causes of valid knowledge in the case of the Vedas (Cf. I. ii. 41). For, the valid knowledge is produced in the case of ordinary words only in the absence of illusion etc.

However, this objection is not correct. The valid knowledge of sentence-meaning is the cause only in the case of ordinary word due to brevity; and therefore, the absences of illusion etc. become redundant. Moreover, the trustworthy person does not construe such a sentence without the valid knowledge of sentence-meaning merely from the absence of the illusion etc. Otherwise, even you, the Mīmāmsakas, cannot explain the inference of the valid knowledge of speaker in the case of ordinary words; for, the same is never the cause.

Alright; let it be admitted, as an alternative, that both (the absence of defect and the merit) are the causes of preception due to the absence of determinating factor. However, even then, only the merit gets established as the cause of valid knowledge in the case of the Vedas. Also, it should not be argued that when the validity or the authoritativeness is tenable in the Vedas from merely the known qualities such as the eternal defectlessness only, the assumption of the omnicient person having the unseen eternal knowledge etc. as the cause is not tenable due to the heaviness. Only the heaviness in the assumption leading to the desired fruit, and established by the authoritative proof, does not amount to the fault. Also, since the fruit is absent at the time of the grasping of the causality, the heaviness in the assumption is unknown. Also, the eternality is absent in the case of ordinary words (and hence the absence of eternal defectlessness is untenable).

It may be argued now that the non-recollection of the agent etc. is the impediment that contradicts the causality of the merit such as the knowledge of sentence–meaning; and therefore, (both in the Vedas as well as) in the ordinary words, only the absence of defect, as being the defectlessness, is the cause of the valid knowledge. However, in the Vedas, dispite the absence of the speaker, the defectlessness is ascertained due to the eternality only. However, this is not correct. The contradictory impediment is to be mostly refuted. Moreover, the same absence of defect as being the defectlessness is absent in the case of the sentences of the illusioned and the deceiver, in the case of the sentence such as 'The clothing exists' which is uttered instead of 'The pot exists' and is produced from the defect, and also in the sentence of parrot which is valid by conformity. Moreover, the sentences uttered by chance such as 'One should salute the Buddhist hall of worship', and the sentences of parrot and child etc. too would become valid this way, as the defect of the speaker is absent and also as the same sentences are equal to the Vedas by not being dependent on any other proof such as inference.

Explanation :

The Naiyāyikas refute the objection of the Mīmāmsakas that only the group of four absences of illusion, mistake, deceit and lack of sharpness of means (*bhramādyabhāva catuṣṭaya*) constitutes the cause of the valid knowledge (*pramā hetu*) in the case of the Vedas, dispite the merit producing the perception, as the valid knowledge is produced only in the absence of defect in the ordinary words. According to them, the absence of illusion etc. are redundant (*anyathā siddha*) in producing valid knowledge, as only the valid knowledge of sentence-meaning (*vākyārtha yathārtha jñāna*) is the cause due to bravity. Also the trustworthy (*āpta*) does not construe any sentence (*vākya*) merely from the absence of illusion, without the knowledge of sentence-meaning (*vākyārtha jñāna*). Otherwise, even the Mīmāmsakas cannot explain the inference of speaker's valid knowledge (*vaktṛ jñānānumā*), as the same cannot be the cause of valid verbal cognition.

The Naiyāyikas admit, as an alternative, that both the absence of defect (*doṣābhāva*) and the merit (*guṇa*) can be the causes of valid knowledge in general. However, they insist that only the merit (*guṇa*) is the cause of valid knowledge in the case of the Vedas. According to them, the position that when the validity or authoritativeness is tenable from only the seen defectlessness (*nirdoṣatva*), the unseen merit such as the eternal knowledge etc. (*aparidṛṣṭa nityajñānādi*) need not be the cause due to the heaveness is incorrect. For, the heaviness leading to the fruit (*phalamukha gaurava*) is not a fault; and the heaviness is not grasped at the time of the grasping of the causality (*kāraṇatā graha*).

Also the Naiyāyikas refute the argument that since the non-recollection of the agent (*kartrasmaraṇa*) etc. is the impediment (*bādhaka*) contradicting the causality of the merit such as the knowledge of sentence-meaning, only the absence of defect as the defectlessness (*nirdoṣatva*) needs to be the cause of valid knowledge. According to the Naiyāyikas, the contradictory impediment can be refuted; and the absence of defect is untenable in the case of the sentence of the parot etc. that are valid by conformity (*samvādāt pramāṇa*). Further, the invalid sentences such as '*caityam vandeta*' would need to be valid sentences, as the same are devoid of the defect of speaker (*vaktr doṣābhāva*). Thus, only the merit, and not the absence of defect, needs to be the cause.

Objection that speech of Parrot etc. is not Valid or Authoritative :

I. ii. 43. It may be objected now as follows: How is it that the sentences of the illusioned, those of the deceiver, and also those of parrot etc. are authoritative in your Naiyāyikas' theory, as they are not produced from the merits? Also it is not correct to counter argue that those sentences of illusioned etc. are only non-authoritative, as the same are neither produced from the merit nor the objects of the speaker's intention. For, there arises contradiction in the inference (of the probandum of the non-authoritativeness) due to the conformity of those sentences with authoritative sentences.

Some propose here that the semantic competency is lacking in the case of the sentences of the illusioned and those of the deceiver. etc. For, the semantic competency means only the non-contradiction to the sentence-meaning known to the speaker; and that which is the object of illusion is contradicted. However, this proposal is not correct. The sentence such as 'The pot does not exist in the locus of pot' is not the cause of the illusion. by referring to quite a distinct object. Also, on the contrary, semantic competency must be admitted to be non-contradiction to the sentence-meaning due to brevity in assumption; and the sentence-meaning is quite non-contradictory in such cases of sentences of illusioned and those of parrot etc.

Also it may be argued that the cognition of sentence-meaning is not produced from the sentences of childern and parrot etc.; rather, merely an awareness of the kind that this one (boy or parrot) speaks this way is created. However, this is not correct. When syntactic expectancy and semantic competency etc., which constitute the totality of causes of verbal cognition, are present, the experience of verbal cognition cannot be denied. Also, the validity of cognition of such sentences can be experienced by conformity to the validity of experience. This way, the inference of even fire in the locus of fire from the illusion of smoke would not become valid; for, the same inference is not produced from the valid knowledge of probans (smoke). Also, it cannot be argued that only a distinct probandum of fire is the object of such an inference (produced from the illusion of smoke); for, the recognition refers to the identity of the fire. Moreover, the state of having a distinct probandum is absent in the case of the inference of the single individual property (substanceness) from the cowness. Also it cannot be argued that in the case of the inference of the substanceness from the single individual property of cowness, the identity of a distinct substancesness is imposed; for, the invariable concomitance of the cowness is cognized with the same substanceness by the imposition of the relation (of inherence); and dispite the illusoryness in the case of the charateristics of the probans (such as the cowness), the validity is unharmed in the case of the probandum (of the substanceness). Thus, the inference must be valid.

Explanation :

The Mīmāmsakas raise the objection that the sentence of the illusioned and those of parrot etc. (*śukādi bhrānta vākya*) cannot be valid or authoritative (*pramāṇa*), as the same are not produced from the merit (valid knowledge of sentence-meaning) (*guṇājanya*). According to them, it is not possible to argue that such sentences of the illusioned etc. need not be authoritative due to not being produced from the merit, or due to not being the object of speaker's intention (*vaktṛ tātparyāviṣaya*). For, the non-authoritativeness (*apramāṇatva*) cannot be inferred in those sentences due to their conformity with the valid sentences (*samvādāt*).

Also the Mīmāmsakas refute the position of Some (*yattu*) that such sentences of the illusioned etc. do not have the semantic compitency (*yogyatā*), as the competency means the non-contradiction to the sentence-meaning known to the speaker (*vaktr jñāna vākyārthābādha*); and hence they need not be valid or authoritative. According to them, the illusion such as 'The pot does not exist in the locus of pot' (*ghaṭavati ghaṭo nāsti*), by referring to a distinct object (*bhinna viṣaya*), cannot produce such a sentence of the illusioned. Also, on the contrary, the semantic competency of the form of non-contradiction to the sentence-meaning (*vākyārthābādha*), is quite tenable there.

Also the Mīmāmsakas refute the argument that the cognition of the sentence-meaning (*artha bodha*) is not produced from the sentences of children and parrot etc; rather, merely an awareness of what one says etc. (*pratīti*) is created. According to them, the experience of cognition of sentence-meaning (*anubhava*) cannot be denied from such sentences provided that the syntactic expectancy and semantic competency etc., constituting the totality of causes, are present. Validity of cognition (*yathārthatva*) of such sentences

can be experienced by conformity to the validity of experience produced from the trustworthy's sentence. Further the Mīmāmsakas state that in this way the inference of fire (*vahny anumiti*) in the locus of fire (*vahni mati*) too would not be valid when produced from the illusion of smoke (*dhūma bhrama*), as the same is not produced from valid knowledge of probans (*yathārtha liṅga jñāna*) such as smoke. Also the Mīmāmsakas refute the argument that only a distinct fire (*vahny antara*) is the object of such an inference, as the recognition (*pratyabhijñāna*) refers to the same fire. Also, a distinct probandum such as the substanceness is untenable in the case of the inference of the substanceness from the single individual property such as the cowness (*gotvādyeka vyaktika*); and the identity of another substanceness (*anya tādātmya*) cannot be imposed on the substanceness in such an inference, as the invariable concomitance of the cowness (probans) is cognized with the same substanceness by the imposition of the relation of inherence (*samsargāropa*). The inference must be admitted to be valid, as the aspect of probandum (*sādhyāṁśa*) is valid, dispite the aspect of characteristics of probans (*liṅgopadhānāṁśa*) is illusory.

Reply of Sampradāyavids :

I. ii. 44. Here we, the Samapradāyāvids, reply : Only the valid knoweldge of sentence-meaning of the lord Īśvara is the cause in the case of the sentences of the illusioned and the deceiver and also the sentence of the parrot, as the same, like the Vedas, are uttered by the trustworthy to be the authoritative words. And the valid knowledge of sentence-meaning is the cause of the effect of sentence–meaning in general. And even the Mīmāmsakas, who advocate the causality of the absence of the defect, must admit the sentences of the parrot etc. to be equal to the Vedas.

It may be argued now that this way the category of fallacious words would be lost, as even the fallacious words are uttered (spoken off) by the lord Īśvara only. However, this argument is not corret. Since the sentence-meaning of fallacious words does not exist, the same cannot be the object of the knowledge of the lord Īśvara. This way, it should be noted that even in the case of the valid inferential knowledge, produced from the fallacious probans, only the valid knowledge of the existence of the probans (smoke), pervaded by the probandum of fire, is the cause of inference of the lord Īśvara. This is the position of the Sampradāyavids.

Explanation :

The Sampradāyavids state their reply to the objection of the Mīmāmsakas that the merit (*guṇa*) cannot be the cause of the sentences of the illusioned etc. (*brāntādi vākya*). According to them, the valid knowledge of the sentence-meaning (*yathārtha vākyārtha jñāna*) of the lord Īśvara is the cause of the usage of the sentences of illusioned and those of parrot etc. (*bhrānta śukādi vākya*), as the same are uttered, like the Vedas, by the trustworthy (*aptoktatva*) to be the authoritative words. It should be noted that even the Mīmāmsakas, advocating the causality of the absence of defect (*doṣā bhāva vādin*), need to admit that the sentences of parrot etc. are equal to the Vedas as far as producing the valid knowledge is concerned.

Further, the Sampradāyavids refute the argument that this way the category of fallocious or illusory words (*śabdābhāsa*) would be lost, as the same too are only uttered by the lord Īśvara (*Īśvara vaktṛka*). According to them, the sentence-meaning of fallacious or illusory words (*tad vākyārtha*) is non-existing; and hence need not be the object of the knowledge of the lord Īśvara (*bhagavad jñānā gocara*). Thus, the Sampradāyavids establish the position that like the valid knowledge of sentence-meaning is the cause of the valid knowledge of the sentence of the illusioned etc., the valid knowledge of the existence of the probans (smoke) pervaded by the probandum of fire (*vahni vyāpya vattājñāna*) is the cause of the valid inferential knowledge (*pramā*) produced from the knowledge of fallacious probans (*liṅgābhāsa janya*).

Naiyāyikas' Reply : Yogyatā and Yathārthatajjñāna are causes of Validity

I. ii. 45. Here we, the Naiyāyikas, state our reply : The valid knowledge of sentence-meaning of the speaker is not the merit (cause) of the valid verbal knowledge in the case of ordinary words. Rather, the semantic competency etc. or the valid knowledge of the same competency is the merit (cause) due to the brevity and the necessity. The valid knowledge of semantic competency does not exist in the case of the non conforming sentence produced from the illusion, mistake and deceit; for, the sentence-meaning is contradicted in such cases. This way, sometimes, the merit (cause) such as the knowledge of the semantic competency etc. does not exist in the case of the non-conforming sentence, expressing something else than what is to be expressed, produced from the lack of sharpness of the instrument (ear). However, the sentence, only when coforming to the speach of the trustworthy, is valid or authoritative (and hence the knowledge of competency does necessarily exist there).

It may be argued now as follows : That this way, the sentence involving polysemous words such as 'Hari exists' (*harir asti*) would become valid or authoritative in the sense of even the lion; for, when the illusion of the speaker's intention to convey lion exists in the case of the polysemous word *'hari'* intended to convey the lord Viṣṇu, or when even without the illusion of the speaker's intention, the valid knowledge of semantic competency etc. exists, the knowledge of the expressed meaning, referring to the conforming meaning of lion, too is valid. However, this argument is not correct. Such a contingency

of the validity or authoritativeness of the sentence is only desired. Neverthless, such a sentence is not conventionally used or admitted to be authoritative, as the same does not produce the valid knowledge referring to the object of speaker's intention. Also this way, even in the Vedic words, only the valid knowledge of the semantic competency is the merit, i.e. the cause of valid knowledge of Vedic sentence–meaning; and therefore, the lord Īśvara need not be established (as the cause of valid knowledge of the Vedic words).

Explanation :

The Naiyāyikas state the reply that only the semantic competency etc. (*yogyatādi*) or the valid knowledge of the competency (*yathārtha tajjñāna*), but not the valid knowledge of the sentence-meaning (*yathārtha vākyārtha jñāna*), is the merit (*guṇa*), i.e. the cause of the valid knowledge (*pramā*) in the case of ordinary words, as it is necessary. However, according to them, the same valid knowledge of semantic competency (*yogatādi jñāna*) is not the merit, i.e. the cause of valid knowledge in the case of the non-conforming sentence (*visamvādin*) produced from illusion etc., as the sentence-meaning is contradictory there (*bādhita*). Also, the same knowledge of semantic competency is not the merit, i.e. the cause of valid knowledge in the case of the non-conforming sentence expressing something else (*anyābhidhāna*) than what is intended to be expressed, as the same sentence is not an authoritative means (*pramāṇa*).

Also the Naiyāyikas refute the argument that the sentence '*Hari* exists' (*harir asti*) would become valid or authoritative (*pramāṇa*) in the sense of lion, as when the illusion of the speaker's intention (*tātparya bhrama*) exists in the polysemous word '*harir*' intended to convey the lord Viṣṇu, or when the valid knowledge of semantic competency (*yathārtha yogyatā jñāna*) exists, even the knowledge of the expressed meaning of lion (*śakya jñāna*), referring to the conforming meaning of lion (*samvādya para*), is valid. According to them, such a contingency of the authoritativeness of the sentence is only desired (*iṣṭa*). However, the sentence 'Hari exists' is not conventionally used to be valid or authoritative (*pramāṇa*) because the same does not produce the valid knowledge (*pramā janaka*) referring to the object of speaker's intention. Thus, the Naiyāyikas establish the theory that only the valid knowledge of the semantic competency etc. is the merit, i.e. the cause of valid knowledge of sentence–meaning in the case of both Vedic and non-Vedic words.

Vaktur Vākyārtha jñāna is not Merit in the Veda

I. ii. 46. It might be so. However, even the valid knowledge of sentence-meaning of speaker needs to be the merit, i.e. the cause of the usage of word in the case of the Vedas; for, such a valid knowledge is already admitted to be the cause of (the usage of) the authoritative word in the case of ordinary speech. That is why, you, the Naiyāyikas, need to infer the valid knowledge of (the sentence-meaning of) the speaker to be the cause (of the valid knowledge) of sentence–meaning. Thus the lord Īśvara can be established as the speaker from the inference that 'The Veda is composed by the independent authority possessing the valid knowledge referring to the sentence-meaning; for, it is an authoritative word, like the sentence 'Bring the cow'. However, no; this objection is not correct. It has already been established that the state of being the authoritative word is possible even without the earlier existence of the valid knowledge of sentence-meaning; for, the semantic competency etc., that are necessary, exist; and also the valid knowledge of semantic competency etc. exist. Therefore, the establishment of the lord Īśvara as the speaker is useless.

It may again be objected that the knowledge of sentence-meaning is grasped to be the cause of the usage of authoritative sentence in the case of ordinary speech; and therefore how can the use of the authoritative-sentence be possible without the knowledge of sentence-meaning even in the case of the Vedas? However, this is also not correct. The speaker employs the sentence with the intention that the knowledge of sentence is necessary for the activity of the prompted agent; and the prompted agent would come to know the sentence-meaning from these words. Thus, the knowledge of the sentence-meaning of the speaker is rendered redundant at first. Therefore, the same knowledge of sentence-meaning of speaker is not the cause of the usage of the series of such words constituting sentence. The employment of the collection of words, i.e. sentence is tenable from only the causes of individual words like those of the words of parrot.

Explanation :

The Pūrvapaksin raises the objection that the valid knowledge of sentence-meaning of speaker (*vaktur yathārtha vākyārtha jñāna*) needs to be the merit or cause (*guṇa*) of the usage of word in the case of the Vedas, as the same knowledge is the cause (*hetu*) of the usage of word in the ordinary speech (*loke*). According to him, when valid knowledge (of sentence-meaning) of speaker is the cause of word - usage in both Vedic and ordinary speech, the lord Īśvara gets established as the speaker from the inference such as 'The Veda is composed by the indipendant authority possessing valid knowledge; for, it is an authoritative word' (*vedo yathārtha jñānavat svatantra praṇītaḥ pramāṇa śabdatvāt*). However, the Naiyāyikas refute the objection. According to them, the state of being the authoritative word (*pramāṇa śabdatva*) is not dependent on the valid knowledge of sentence-meaning of speaker (*vākyārtha yathārtha jñāna*) (it is actually dependent on the knowledge of semantic

competency); and hence the same knowledge of sentence-meaning is useless; and therefore, even the establishment of the lord Īśvara as the speaker is unnecessary.

The Pūrvapakṣin again raises the objection that the valid knowledge of sentence-meaning (*vākyārtha jñāna*) is admitted to be the cause of the use of authoritative sentence (*pramāṇa vākya*) in the ordinary speech; and therefore the same needs to be the cause of the use in the Vedic speech as well. However, the Naiyāyikas refute the objection. According to them, the knowledge of sentence-meaning of the speaker is rendered redundant on the ground that the use of sentence (*vākya prayoga*) by the speaker is meant to convey only the sentence-meaning to the prompted agent (*prayojya*) for his activity; but the knowledge of sentence-meaning is not the cause of the use of the series of words constituting sentence(*padāvali*). Thus, only the knowledge of semantic competency (*yogyatā jñāna*) etc. are the merits or causes of the use of word.

Tātparya is not the Merit

I. ii. 47. It may be proposed now that the Vedas are valid or authoritative means with respect to only the objects of speaker's intention; and speaker's intention is the speaker's utterence of words with the intention of conveying the particular objects. And ordinary people like us do not posses any transcendental knowledge referring to the meanings of the Vedas without the utterence of the Vedas by the lord, Īśvara, which would have made the utterence of the Vedas by the ordinary people possible with the intention of conveying the meanings of the Vedas. Also, the knowledge of the meanings of the Vedas is not tenable from the Vedas only in the Vedic usages; for, then, the mutual dependence would become contingent. Therefore, only those Vedas are valid or authoritative words (means), which are uttered by the lord Īśvara, knowing all the meanings of the Vedas, with the intention of conveying all the meanings of the Vedas; and thus, only such an intention of the lord Īśvara is the merit, i.e. the cause, and the valid knowledge of the meanings of the Vedas is produced from such an intention. Thus only the knowledge of the indepedent authoritative person, such as the lord Īśvara, i.e. the substratum of the valid knowledge of the meanings of the Vedas, gets established to be the merit or cause.

No, this proposal is not correct. The teacher, possessing the knowledge of the Vedic sentence-meanings, due to the association with all limbs such as the ritualistic investigation, utters the Vedas with the intention of conveying the meanings; and therefore, the teacher, who has the valid knowledge of the meanings of the Vedas, does necessarily have the intention in the particular

meanings of the Vedas. This way, the latter and the latter teachers understand the meanings of the Vedas by understanding the state of convaying the intented meanings of the Vedas of the form of the state of being the words uttered with the intention of conveying the particular meanings by the earlier and the earlier teachers; and thus there is an eternal tradition of speaker's intentions. Thus, what is the use of admitting the lord Īśvara?

It may be argued now that then the Vedas, which are uttered by the earliar teachers, not knowing the meanings of the Vedas, cannot be uttered by the latter teachers with the intention of conveying the particular meanings; and therefore, the same Vedas can neither be the valid (authoritative) words due to the absence of eternal speaker's intention, nor be conducive to the ascertainment of the meanings from them. However, this argument is not correct. In this eternal cycle of birth and rebirth, some teacher, who has the knowledge of the meanings of the Vedas dependent on the six limbs such as the ritualistic investigation, has necessarily uttered the Vedas sometimes with the intention of conveying such meanings of the Vedas; and hence the state of being the words uttered with the intention of conveying such meanings is tenable by merely such utterance.

Explanation :

The Pūrvapakṣin now states that the Vedas need to be valid or authoritative means (*pramāṇa*) with respect to only the objects of speaker's intention (*tātparya viṣaya*); and the speaker's intention (*tātparya*) means the speaker's utterence of words with the intention of conveying the particular meanings or objects (*tatpratītichayā uccaritatva*). Also he states that ordinary people like us cannot have the transcendental knowledge of the meanings of the Vedas (*atīndriya vedārtha jñāna*) without the Vedas being uttered by the Ī śvara; and hence even the utterence of the Vedas with the intention of conveying the same meanings (*tatpratīticchayā uccāraṇa*) is untenable. Further, the knowledge of such meanings cannot be held to be tenable from only the Vedas due to the contingency of mutual dependence. Thus, only the Vedas, uttered by the independent authority, such as Īśvara, knowing all the meanings of the Vedas (*sakala vedārtha darśin*), with the intention of conveying the particular meanings of the same Vedas, are the valid or authoritative means (*pramāṇa);* and therefore, only such a desire to convey the meanings (*tādṛśecchā*) is the merit or cause (*guṇa*); and hence the knowledge of the independent authority, such as Īśvara (*svatantra puruṣa dhī*) gets established as the cause.

However, the Naiyāyikas refute the proposal. According to them, the teacher (*adhyāpaka*), possessing the knowledge of the sentence-meaning of

the Vedas (*veda vākyārtha jñānavat*) utters the Vedas with the intention of conveying the particular meanings (*tattadartha pratīticchā*); and hence the teacher knowing the valid Vedic meaning (*vedārtha yathārtha vid*) does have speaker's intention. Also according to them, this way, since the latter and the latter teachers understand the Vedic meanings (*vedārtha pratyaya*) by understanding the state of being uttered by the earliar and the earliar teachers with the intention of conveying the Vedic meanings (*tatpratīticchayā uccaritattva*), tradition of eternal speaker's intension (*anādi tātparya paramparā*) becomes established without the lord Īśvara.

Further, the Naiyāyikas refute the argument that the Vedas, uttered by the earlier teachers, not understanding the meanings of the Vedas (*vedārthā nabhijñāpaka*), cannot be uttered by the latter teachers with the intention of conveying the meanings of the Vedas; and therefore, the same, not having the eternal speaker's intension, cannot be the valid or authoritative words (*pramāṇa*). According to them, in this eternal cycle of birth and rebirth (*samsāra*) some teacher, having the knowledge of Vedic meanings (*vedārtha jñānavat*), has necessarily uttered the Vedas with the intention of conveying the meanings of the Vedas; hence the state of being uttered with the intention of conveying such meanings (*tatparatva*) is unharmed in the Vedas; and the same can be the merit or cause.

Prābhākaras' position : Validity is known and produced intrinsically by itself

I. ii. 48. The Prābhākara Mīmāmsakas hold that the validity or authoritativeness of knowledge is produced and known intrinsically by (the totality causes of knowledges) itself. It can be explained as follows : That only the validity or authoritativeness of knowledge, which is common to both experience and recollection and is the subsidiary cause of the unwavering acitivity (undertaking), is the validity or authoritativeness of the means of knowledge. And such an authoritativeness, is produced from the totality of causes of knowledge in general; and does not expect either the merit or the absence of defect as its cause. And also no deviation arises in the cause-and-effect-relationship, as all the knowledges are only valid. And only the activity is invalid, as the same is to be contradicted. The knowledge is never contradicted, as the same is equal to the knowledge which is meant to contradict (other). The designation of invalidity in the knowledge is merely conditioned by the production of the opposite activity.

It may be objected now as follows : That suppose the validity or authoritativeness of knowledge constitutes the authoritativeness of the means of knowledge, how can then the knowledge of silver be invalid in the shell; also how can the invalidity or non–authoritativeness be produced extraneously from the causes which are other than those of the knowledge? However, this is not correct. The invalidity or non-authoritativeness of knowledge does not constitute the non-authoritativeness, as all the knowledges are only valid. Rather, the same non-authoritativeness means the being the cause of opposite activity. And such a non-authoritativeness, which is of the form of non-grasping of the non-relation between the property and its substratum, and accompanied by non-grasping of the non-relation of the oneness, is produced extraneously either from the inclusion of extra defect in the totality of causes of knowledge, or from the non-grasping of non-relation caused by defect, or from the association with defect after the knowledge is produced. However, the non-authoritativeness is not produced intrinsically from the totality of causes of the knowledge itself. For, then deviation would arise in the case of invalid knowledge. Also the state of being the cause of the opposite activity is facilitated from the contradiction. For, the invalidity or non-authoritativeness of knowledge cannot be grasped intrinsically either from the (totality of causes of) knowledge or the recognition of the same. The defect and its absence are not the causes in regard to the very nature of knowledge due to the deviation. Although the invalidity or non-authoritativeness is a property of the knowledge, the validity or authoritativeness of knowledge is produced intrinsically from the totality of causes of knowledge itself; however, it is not produced either from the merit or from the absence of defect. Even the contradictory knowledge etc. are valid with respect to the substratum (of invalidity). The state of being the knowledge referring to the non-existing objects is caused by the defect. The sense-organs do not have the competency for perceiving the non-existing objects that are not connected.

Explanation :

The Prābhākara Mīmāmsakas propose the theory that the validity or authoritativeness of knowledge (*prāmāṇya*) is both produced and known intrinsically from the totality of causes of knowledge itself (*svataḥ*). According to them, only the validity ar authoritativeness of knowledge (*yāthārtha*), common to both experiece and recognition (*smṛtyanubhava sādhāraṇa*) causing activity, is the authoritativeness of means of knowledge; and the same is to be produced only from the totality of the causes of the knowledge (*jñāna mātra sāmagrī*), and not extraneously from the merit (*guṇa*) or the absence of defect (*doṣā bhāva*). Also there is no danger of deviation (*vyabhicāra*) when the validity or authoritativeness is produced intrinsically by the totality of causes of knowledge itself (*svataḥ*), as all the knowledges are only valid (*yathārtha*). It should be noted that only the activity (*vyavahāra*), and not the knowledge

(*jñāna*), is to be contradicted (*bādhya*). And the designation of 'invalidity' (*ayathārthatva*) in the knowledge is merely conditioned by the production of opposite activity (*viparīta vyavahāra*).

The Prābhākaras refute the objection that when the validity or authoritativeness of knowledge (*yathārthatva*) is the authoritativeness of the means of knowledge (*prāmāṇya*), the knowledge of silver (*rajata jñāna*) cannot be invalid in the case of shell; and also the invalidity or non-authoritativeness of knowledge (*aprāmāṇya*) cannot be produced extraneously from the defect (*parataḥ*). According to them, the invalidity or non-authoritativeness of knowledge (*ayathārthatva*) does not constitute the non-authoritativeness (*aprāmāṇya*), as all knowledges are only valid; rather, the non authoritative-ness means the being the cause of opposite activity (*viparīta vyavahāra pravartakatva*). The non-authoritativeness of knowledge, of the form of non-grasping of non-relation between property and its substratum, is produced extraneously (*parataḥ*) from the association of defect (*doṣa sahakāra*), and not intrinsically by the totality of causes of knowledge itself (*jñāna sāmagrī*). Also the state of being the cause of opposite activity (*viparīta vyavahāra janakatva*), i.e. the non-authoritativeness, of knowledge is facilitated from the contradiction (*bādhaka*), as the sense cannot be grasped intrinsically from the totality of causes of the knowledge or its recognition (*tadanuvyavasāya*). It should be noted that defect and its absence are not the causes in regard to the very nature of knowledge (*jñāna svarūpe*) due to the deviation. Also, the validity or the authoritativeness of knowledge (*yathārthatva*) is to be produced only intrinsically from the totality of causes of knowledge (*jñāna sāmagrī*) and not from the merit or absence of defect. However, the state of being the knowledge referring to the non-existing objects or the non-authoritativeness (*asadartha viṣayatā*) is produced extraneously from the defect as the sense-organs are not competent there.

Yathārthatva is known svataḥ

I. ii. 49. It may be argued now as follows : That merely the defect cannot be the cause of the invalidity or non-authoritativeness; rather, the totality of causes of the knowledge, dependent on the defect, is the cause. Therefore conversly, the totality of causes of knowledge, dependent on the absence of defect, is the cause of the validity or authoritativeness. However, this is not correct. One and the same totality of causes of knowledge may be dependent on the defect with respect to the non-existing objects; and therefore, the knowledge is invalid or non-authoritative with respect to the non-existing objects; whereas the totality of causes may be independent of defect with respect to the existing objects; and therefore the knowledge is valid or authoritative with respect to the existing objects. However, one and the same totality of causes of knowledge cannot be dependent on both the defect and the absence of defect (or merit) with respect to the same knowledge (which may be valid or invalid) due to contradiction. The defect and the absence of defect are redundant in producing the validity or authoritativeness and the invalidity or non-authoritativeness of knowledge respectively.

The validity or authoritativeness of knowledge means the state of referring to the object which has its qualifier described by the knowledge or the state of being the knowledge having the same qualifier as that of the object. The knowledge such as 'This is silver', by being self-conscious, is of the nature of the ascertainment of its own object by delimiting, i.e. referring, to the validity or authoritativeness of the form of the truness of knowledge, which is either the silverness of the object or the state of referring to the substratum of the silverness as the object. And the validity or authoritativeness of knowledge, as distinguished from such a truness of knowledge, does not exist, due to lack of evidence.

Explanation :

The Prābhākaras refute the argument that since the totality of causes of knowledge (*jñāna sāmagrī*) dependent on the defect (*doṣāpekṣā*) is the cause of activity, the totality of causes of knowledge, dependent on the absence of defect (*doṣā bhāva sāpekṣā*), is the cause of the validity or the authoritativeness of knowledge. (*yathārthatva*). According to them, the knowledge (*jñāna*) is non-authoritative (*ayathārtha*) with respect to the non-existing objects (*asadartha*); whereas the same is authoritative (*yathārtha*) with respect to the existing objects (*sadartha*), as one and the same totality of causes of knowledge (*sāmagrī*) is dependent on the defect (*doṣa sāpekṣā*) with respect to the non-existing objects; and is independent of the defect (*doṣa nirapekṣā*) with respect to the existing objects. Thus, defect and its absence (*doṣa tadabhāvau*) are redundant (*nāntarīyakau*) with respect to the non-authoritativeness and the authoritativeness (*ayathārtha yathārtha tve*).

The Prābhākaras now explain that the validity or authoritativeness of knowledge (*yāthārthatva*) means the state of referring to the object (*arthasya*) which has its qualier described by the knowledge (*jñānollikhita prakāravattva*) or the state of being the knowledge (*jñāna*) having the same qualifier as that of the object (*tatprakāraka*). According to them, the knowledge such as 'This is silver' (*idam rajatam*), by being self conscious, delimits or refers to the validity or authoritativeness (*pramāṇya*) of the form of the truness of knowledge (*yathārthatva rūpa*), which is the silverness of the object or the state of referring to the substratum of the silverness of as the object; and hence the same knowledge is only the ascertainment of its object (*svārtha niścaya*).

Alternative position of the Prābhākaras

I. ii. 50. Or let it be that the validity or authoritativeness of knowledge is known intrinsically by the totality of causes of knowledge itself, or is known extraneously from the absence of defect or not known at all. However, what is the point in describing, i.e. explaining it (the authoritativeness of knowledge) as the same is useless in promoting activity. Since one undertakes the acitivity by ascertaining the object, the activity is tenable due to the necessary ascertainment of the object itself. It may be argued that it is true that the activity is produced from the ascertainment of the object only; however, the ascertainment of object such as 'This object is of this form' is dependent on the knowledge of the validity or authoritativeness of knowledge. However, this is not correct. The knowledge of object, in general, having the form such as 'This object is of the form of silver', is produced in the form of the ascertainment of its object; and therefore, how can the activity have the dependence on the extraneous knowledge of the validity or authoritativeness of knowledge? Now, since the validity or authoritativeness of the objects of knowledge is delimited intrinsically by itself, the validity or authoritativeness of knowledge is known intrinsically by the totality of causes of knowledge itself.

Also the Prābhākaras state that suppose the first knowledge of objects, independent of the ascertainment of the validity or authoritativeness, is not of the form of the ascertainment of the object, then even the knowledge of the authoritativeness of the first knowledge cannot be of the form of the ascertainment the authoritativeness. Also the other, i.e. second knowledge, dependent on the ascertainment of the authoritativeness of first knowledge, cannot be of the form of the ascertainment of its objects. Therefore, the description of the authoritativeness is useless as far as the ascertainment of the objects is concerned. Also infinite regress would become contingent in admitting the position that another, i.e. second knowledge of authoritativeness is required for the ascertainment of the objects even in the case of the first knowledge of the authoritativeness. Moreover, in the view that the authoritativeness of knowledge is known or produced extraneously from the merit or the absence of defect, infinite regress would become contingent in admitting that only the other, i.e. second knowledge of already known authoritativeness produces the ascertainment of the authoritativeness of one, i.e. first knowledge. Therefore it must be admitted that only one knowledge of unknown authoritativeness has the form of producing the ascertainment of the authoritativeness of another knowledge.

Also, when a desire to know the validity or authoritativeness of one, i.e. first knowledge arises, then too, only the other, i.e. second knowledge of unknown validity or authoritativeness ascertains the validity or

authoritativeness of one i.e. first knowledge. Thus, there ensues no, infinite regress. In the same way, even the knowledge of objects of unknown authoritativeness has the form of producing the ascertainment of the other objects due to non-distinction. When the knowledge is already produced, the doubt regarding the objects as to whether it is this way or it is not this way does not arise.

It may again be argued that how can the knowledge of the form of the knowledge of objects, ascertain the validity or authoritativeness of knowledge itself, without ascertaining knowledge itself?. However, then, we, the Prābhākaras, shall state that the dispute is only regarding the intrinsic illumination of the validity or authoritativeness of knowledge. And even you, the Naiyāyikas, have admitted that the authoritativeness of knowledge of the form of authoritativeness of the obects is to be known intrinsically by the totality of causes of knowledge itself.

Explanation :

As an alternative, the Prābhākaras propose that the validity or authoritativeness of knowledge need not be known either intrinsically by itself, or extraneously, as the same is useless in promoting the activity (*pravṛttau anupayogāt*). According to them, activity is tenable from the ascertainment of the objects only, as one undertakes the activity after ascertaining the objects. However, they refute the objection that the ascertainment of object such as 'This object is of this form' (*evam rūpo' yamarthaḥ*) is dependent on the knowledge of the authoritativeness of knowledge; and hence the same is necessary. According to them, the knowledge of object is of the form such as 'This object is of the form of silver' (*rajatarūpo' yamarthaḥ*) etc.; and hence it is not dependent on the extraneous knowledge of authoritativeness of knowledge (*parāpekṣā*). Thus the Prabhākaras establish that the authoritativeness of knowledge is known and produced intrinsically by the totality of causes of knowledge itself (*svataḥ*), as the validity of the objects (*artha tattātva*) is delimited intrinsically by itself.

The Prābhākaras state that since the first knowledge of the objects independent of the ascertainment of the validity or authoritativeness (*taj jñāna*), is not of the form of the ascertainment of the objects (*svārtha niścaya rūpa*), even the knowledge of the authoritativeness of first knowledge (*prāmāṇya jñāna*) is not of the form of the ascertainment of the authoritativeness (*prāmāṇya niścaya rūpa*). According to them, even the other, i.e. second knowledge (*jñānā ntara*) dependent on the ascertainment of the authoritativeness of first knowledge (*tadadhīna*) cannot be of the form of the ascertainment of the objects (*svārtha niścaya rūpa*). Thus, the description of

the authoritativeness of knowledge (*prāmāṇya nirūpaṇa*) is useless as far as the ascertainment of the objects is concerned.

Also the Prābhākaras state that if the validity or authoritativeness of knowlede (*prāmāṇya*) is to be known extraneously from the merit (*parataḥ*), then infinite regress (*anavasthā*) would become contingent when the other, i.e. second knowledge of already grasped authoritativeness (*gṛhīta prāmāṇya*) produces the ascertainment of the authoritativeness of one, i.e. first knowledge (*prāmāṇya niścāyaka*). According to them, therefore it must be admitted that only the other, i.e. second knowledge of unknown authoritativeness (*agṛhīta prāmāṇya*) has the form of producing the ascertainment of the authoritativeness of one, i.e. first knowledge (*paraprāmāṇya niścaya rūpa*); and only the same other knowledge of unknown authoritativeness ascertains the authoritativeness of one, i.e. first knowledge. And in the same way, even the knowlede of objects (*artha jñāna*) of unknown authoritativeness (*aniścita prāmāṇya*) has the form of producing the ascertainment of objects (*artha niścaya rūpa*). Further, the Prābhākaras reply that the knowledge of the objects (*artha jñāna*) can ascertain the authoritativeness of knowledge itself (*svaprāmāṇya*) without ascertaining knowledge itself (*svam agṛhṇat*), as the dispute is only about the intrinsic illumination of the authoritativeness of knowledge (*svaprakāśatve*); further even the Naiyāyikas have admitted that the authoritativeness of knowledge of the form of the authoritativeness of the objects can be known intrinsically by itself (*svataḥ*).

Conclusion of the Prābhākaras :

I. ii. 51. It may be objected now as follows : In the view of the Prābhākaras that the validity or authoritativeness of knowledge is to be known intrinsically by the totality of causes of knowledge itself (*svataḥ prāmāṇya grahe*), the doubt regarding the knowledge of the condition of being non-repetition as to whether this knowledge is valid or not would become untenable. For, the doubt cannot arise with respect to the authoritativeness that is already ascertained intrinsically. Therefore, the doubt regarding the object as to whether this is this way or other way can arise due to the doubt regarding the invalidity or non-authoritativeness of the object. Consequently, the ascertainment of the validity or authoritativeness of the object cannot arise with respect to the Emblic Myrobalan at the palm of hand merely from the knowledge of object; for, there arises deviation.

However, this is not correct. The doubt regarding the trueness and untrueness does not arise here in the case of the repetitive knowledge; for, all kinds of knowledge are only true. Rather, only the doubt as to whether the knowledge is authoritative or not arises here. And the doubt is of the form that whether knowledge is one without grasping the distinctive sides or two with the grasping of distinctve sides. The doubt regarding the authoritativeness of knowledge is produced from the doubt regarding the defect of causes; and the same disappears from the certain knowledge of only one side.

Again it may be objected as follows : That the state of being the valid or authoritative knowledge is the state of being the experience; and the same is the state of being the knowledge that is other than the recollection. And the state of being the recollection is the state of being the effect that has impression as the extra ordinary cause. Therefore, the same recollection cannot be known intrinsically by the totality of causes of recollection, as the impression etc. cannot be known intrinsically. That is why even the valid kowledge is not produced intrinsically by the totality of causes of knowledge itself as the same is similar to the recollection.

However, this is not correct. The validity or authoritativeness of knoweldge, useful or conducive to the activity, is the state of being the ascertainment of the validity or the authoritativeness of the objects. And the same is known and produced only intrinsically from the totality of causes of knowledge itself; and not as possessing the state of being the experience due to the heaviness. Even you, the Naiyāyikas, infer the validity or authoritativeness of knowledge to be only the validity or authoritativeness of objects, as the activity is produced from the conformity of knowledge with the objects. And the same is not inferred to be the experienceness due to the deviation in the case of the recollection. The designations such as valid knowledge and invalid knowledge, by the followers of the scientific literature, for the experience and the recollection are caused by their non-dependence and the dependence on the impression respectively. For, they have stated that the valid experience is desired to be the valid means due to being non-expectant of or non-dependent on the impression.

Explanation :

The Pūrvapakṣin raises the objection that the doubt (*samśaya*) as to whether this knowledge of the condition of non-repetition (*anabhyāsa daśāpanna*) is valid or not (*pramā na vā*) would not be tenable when the validity or authoritativeness of knowledge is admitted to be known intrinsically by the totality of causes of knowledge itself (*svataḥ prāmāṇya*). According to him, doubt regarding the object as to whether this is this way or other way (*kim evam anevam*) too arises from the doubt regarding the authoritativeness of the object (*pramātva śaṅkā*); and therefore, the ascertainment of the validity or authoritativeness of the object (*artha niścaya*) is not possible with respect

to even the Emlic Myrobalan at hand (*karatalāmalaka*) merely from the knowledge of object (*jñāna mātra*).

However, the Prābhākaras refute the objection to conclude their view. According to them, the doubt regarding the truenes and the untrueness (*satyā–satyatva*) of knowledge does not arise in the case of repetitive knowledge, as all kinds of knowledge are only true. Rather, only the doubt regarding the authoritativeness of knowledge as to whether the knowledge is authoritative or not arises. And such a knowledge is either two with the grasping of distinctive sides or one without grasping of distinctive sides. And the doubt is produced extraneously from the doubt of defect of the causes of knowledge (*kāraṇa doṣa samśaya*), and destroyed from the certain knowledge of oneside (*jñānā ntara*).

The Pūrvapakṣin again raises the objection that the state of being the valid or authoritative knowledge (*pramātva*) is the state of being the experience (*anubhūtitva*) which is distinct from the recollection (*smṛtyanya*). Now, here since the state of being the recollection (*smṛtitva*) has the impression as the extraordinary cause (*samskārāsādhāraṇa kāraṇaka*), the same recollection is not known intrinsically by the totality of causes of recollection itself. And therefore, even the valid or authoritative knowledge cannot be produced intrinsically by the totality of causes of knowledge (*svataḥ*) like the recollection.

However, the Prābhākaras finally refute even such an objection. According to them, the validity or authoritativeness of knowledge, by merely being of the form of being the ascertainment of the validity or authoritativeness of objects (*artha tathātva niścayatva*), is conducive to the activity (*pravṛtty aupayika*); and the same is known and produced intrinsically from the totality of causes of knowledge itself (*svataḥ*); and thus the same need not be grasped as possessing the state of being the experience (*anubhūtitva*). Also according to the Prūbhākaras, even the Naiyāyikas must admit that since the activity is possible even from the conformity of knowledge with the objects (*saṁvāda*), the validity or authoritativeness of knowledge is inferred to be only the validity or authoritativeness of objects (*yathārthatva*) and not the experienceness (*anubhūti tva*) due to the deviation in the recollection. It should be noted that the designations such as invalid and valid knowledges (*apramā-pramā vyapadeśa*) for the recollection and the experience (*smṛty anubhava*) are caused by their dependence on the impression and the non-dependence on the impression (*sāpekṣatva nirapekṣatva*) respectively.

Refutation of Prābhākaras' View

I. ii. 52. Here we, the Mīmāmsakaikadeṣins state the refutation of the Prabhākaras' view as follows : That it is established by experience that only the ascertainment of the validity or authoritativeness of knowledge, and not the doubt regarding the same, is the cause of the unwavering activity; and even you, the Naiyāyikas, have admitted the same. And such a validity or authoritativeness of knowledge is not of the form of the validity or authoritativeness of the objects. Though the knowledge, having the condition of non-repetiveness, can be known to have the state of being the ascertainment of the validity of the objects from either the self illumination or from the recognition, the unwavering activity is not produced from it; and also only doubt about the authoritativeness of knowledge arises. All the knowledges are ruled to be invariably valid; and therefore, the state of being the ascertainment of the validity or authoritativeness of objects is common to even the illusion of the form of the two contradictory knowledges of unknown distinctions both ways in nature and in objects. Therefore the unwavering activity does not arise from the knowledge such as 'This is silver', which has the same form as that of the illusion; rather, it arises from the knowledge which has the form exclusive of such an illusion.

It may be objected now that in such cases, the doubt regarding the validity or authoritativeness of knowledge does not arise; for, the validity or authoritativeness of the form of the validity or authoritativeness of the objects is ascertained. Rather, only the doubt regarding the nature of knowledge as to whether it is the two knowledges of unknown distinctions or the qualificative knowledge arises. And the same doubt is an impediment to the unwavering activity; and therefore the unwavering activity is produced after the same doubt is removed from another (opposite) qualificative knowledge. However, then we shall reply that the pervasion, i.e. rule is that the ascertainment of that entity whose doubt and the ascertainment of absence are impediments, is the cause of the activity; and therefore, only the ascertainment of the state of being the qualificative knowledge, excluded from the illusion, is the cause of the activity. However, the ascertainment of the validity or authoritativeness of objects is not so, i.e. the cause; for, the same is common to even the illusion. Also, the activity is not produced, at times, in the presence of the ascertainment of the validity or authoritativeness of objects. Further, the heaviness arises in the assumption that the ascertainment of the validity of the objects, as associated with the absence of the doubt regarding the objects, is the cause of the activity.

Explanation :

The Mīmāmsakaikadeṣins, now, state the refutation of the Prābhākaras' view. According to them, only the ascertainment of the validity or authoritativeness of knowledge (*prāmāṇya niścaya*), and not the doubt

regarding the same (*tatsamśaya*), is the cause of the unwavering activity (*niṣkampa pravṛttihetu*). And the validity or authoritativeness of knowledge is never of the form of the ascertainment of the valdity or authoritativeness of the objects (*artha tathātva niścaya*). For, the unwavering activity (*niṣkampa pravṛtti*) is not produced even when the knowledge having the condition of non-repetiveness (*anabhyāsa daśāpanna jñāna*) is known to have the state of being the ascertainment of the validity of the objects (*artha tathātva niścaya*) from recognition (*anu vyavasāya*). Also since all the knowledges are ruled to be only valid (*yathārtha*), the state of being the ascertainment of the validity or authoritativeness of the objects (*artha tathātva niśayatva*) is common to even the illusion (*bhrama*), which is of the form of two contradictory knowledges of unknown distiction (*agṛhīta bheda jñāna dvaya*). Therefore, the unwavering activity is produced only from the knowledge, exclusive of the form of illusion such as 'This is silver' (*idam rajatam*), and not from the knowledge which is of the same form as illusion (*bhrama samānākāra*).

The Pūrvapakṣin now objects that in such cases, the doubt regarding the validity or authoritativeness of knowledge (*prāmāṇya*) does not arise, as the same validity or authoritativeness of the form of being the ascertainment of the validity of the objects (*arthatathātva*) is ascertained. Rather, only the doubt regarding the nature of knowledge as to whether it is the two knowledges (*jñāna dvaya*) of unknown distinctions or qualificative knowledge (*viśiṣṭa jñāna*) arises; and the same doubt impedes the unwavering activity, but the activity is produced when such a doubt is removed by another (opposite) qualificative knowledge (*jñānāntara*). However, the Mīmāsakaikadeśins refute the objection on the ground that only the ascertainment of the state of being the qualificative knowledge (*viśiṣṭa jñānatva*), excluded from the illusion, and not that of the validity of the objects (*artha tathātva*), which is common to illusion, is the cause of the activity. According to them, the assumption that the ascertainment of the validity of the objects, associated with the absence of doubt regarding the objects (*samśayābhāva sahita*), is the cause of the activity is heavy.

Conclusion of Mīmāmsakaikadeśins :

I. ii. 53. Moreover, only the qualificative knowledge that destroyes, i.e. contradicts the knowledge causing the activity is the impediment in the case of qualificative knowledge. However, such is not the case in the present case of illusion. For, the activity arises even when the doubt regarding the objects persists.

Further, the validity or authoritativeness of knowledge is only the state of being the qualificative knowledge, as the same is excluded from illusion.

However, it is not the state of being the ascertainment of the validity of objects, as the same is common to even illusion. Since the ordinary non-Vedic scholars recognize the authoritativeness in the knowledge excluded from illusion, the authoritativeness of knowledge would become mere convention in transgressing such a recognition. Therefore, the validity or authoritativeness of knowledge is only the state of being the qualificative knowledge as the same is excluded from the illusion,; and the same is the cause of the unwavering activity and is the remover of the doubt regarding the authoritativeness of knowledge.

It may be argued now that let the validity or authoritativeness of knowledge be that way; however, the same is known intrinsically from the totality of causes of knowledge itself. However, this is not correct. The authoritativeness of knowledge is the state of being the qualificative knowledge, which is the state of being the knowledge referring to the property and the substratum of the non-grasped non-relation and excluded from the illusion. Hence the same cannot be known intrinsically from the totality of causes of knowledge. The non-grasped non-relation etc. are not recollected earliar, in the qualificative knowledge, as the totality of causes of the same is non-existent. The self-illumination of knowledge is reference to the objects of knowledge merely; otherwise, the doubt regarding the authoritativeness of knowledge would become untenable, as the same authoritativeness would be known intrinsically even in the case of the knowledge having the condition of non-repetitiveness. That is why, the authoritativeness of knowledge is not produced merely from the totality of causes of knowledge, as then even the authoritativeness of illusion would become contingent from the totality of causes of illusion itself.

Explanation :

The Mīmāmsakaikadeśins now conclude their view. According to them, only the qualificative knowledge (*jñāna*), which destroys, i.e. contradicts the knowledge causing the activity (*pravṛtti hetu*), is the impediment in the case of qualificative knowledge; whereas, the doubt regarding the object (*samśaya*) is not the impediment, as the activity arises even when the doubt persists.

Further the Mīmāmsakaikadeśins propose that the validity or authoritative-ness of knowledge (*prāmāṇya*) is the state of being the qualificative knowledge (*viśiṣṭa jñānatva*), as it is excluded from illusion; but it is not the state of being the ascertainment or the validity of objects (*artha tathātvaniścayatva*), as it is common to illusion (*bhrama sādhāraṇa*). According to the Mīmāmsakaikadeśins, the ordinary non-Vedic examiners recognize the authoritativeness only in the knowledge excluded from the

illusion (*bhrama-vyāvṛtta*); as otherwise it would be mere convertional (*pāribhāṣika*). Therefore, the validity or authoritativeness of knowledge must be only the state of being the qualificative knowledge, as it is excluded from illusion and is the cause of unwavering activity (*niṣkampa pravṛttihetu*).

Also the Mīmāmsakaikadeśins refute the argument that dispite the validity or authoritativeness being the ascertainment of qualificative knowledge, the same can be known intrinsically from the totality of causes of knowledge itself (*svataḥ*). According them, the state of being the qualificative knowledge (*viśiṣṭa jñānatva*), being excluded from the illusion and referring to the property and the substratum of non-grasped non-relation (*agṛhītā samsarga*), cannot be known intrinsically from the totality of causes of knowledge itself (*svataḥ*) due to the absence of the totality of causes of non-relation. Further, since the self-illumination of knowledge (*svaprakāśatā*) is reference merely to the objects of knowledge (*svamātra sākṣiṇī*) (i.e. it does not refer to the authoritativeness in it), the authoritativeness of knowledge (*jñāna prāmāṇya*) cannot be admitted to be produced intrinsically from the totality of causes of knowledge itself, as then even the authoritativeness of illusion (*bhrama*) would be required to be produced intrinsically from the totality of causes of illusion only.

Navya Prābhākaras' Theory

I. ii. 54. The Navya Prābhākara Mīmāmsakas state here as follows : That the validity or authoritativeness of knowledge is the non-grasping of the non-existing difference. And the non-grasping is the constant absence, as the same is never known. Since the authoritativeness is of the form of the constant absence, it is established intrinsically; and therefore, it is stated to be known intrinsically from the totality of causes of knowledge.

The invalidity or non-authoritativeness of knowledge is the non-grasping of existing difference. And such a non-grasping is the antecedent absence, as the difference is known in future from other proofs. When the grasping of the existing difference is contingent, the same grasping is not produced due to the defect. Since the continuation of the non-grasping of existing difference, which is of the form of contact with the future, is to be produced from the defect, the non-authoritativeness of knowledge is produced extraneously from defect. And the distinct conforming and non-conforming activities or usages too are caused by distinct causes such as the non-grasping of non-existing and grasping of existing differences respectively. The validity or authoritativeness of knowledge, which is conducive to the activity or usage, is only the validity or authoritativeness of objects; and the same is produced intrinsically from the totality of the causes of knowledge merely. However, the invalidity or non-authoritativeness of knowledge is produced extraneously from the defect. The doubt regarding the authoritativeness of the knowledge, having the condition of non-repetitiveness, too is dependent on the two sides of non-grasping of non-existing and grasping of existing differences. And the same doubt is the impediment to the unwavering activity.

Explanation :

The Navya Prābhākara Mīmāmsakas propose that the validity or authoritativeness of knowledge (*prāmāṇya*) is the non-grasping of the non-existing difference (*avidyamāna bheda*). According to them, such a non-grasping of non-existing difference is the constant absence (*atyantābhāva*), as the same can never be known. And since the authoritativeness, being of the form of constant absence (*atyantābhāva rūpa*), is established intrinsically (*svataḥ siddha*), the same authoritativeness of knowledge (*prāmāṇya*) is stated to be produced intrinsically from the totality of causes of knowledge itself (*svataḥ*).

Further the Navya Mīmāmsakas propose that the invalidity or non-authoritativeness of knowledge (*aprāmāṇya*) is the non-grasping (*agraha*) of existing difference (*vidyamāna bheda*). According to them, such a non-grasping is the antecedent absence (*prāgabhāva*), as the same will be known infuture. It should be noted that when the grasping of the difference (*bheda graha*) is contingent, the same is never produced due to the defect (*doṣa*); and since the continuation of the non-grasping of existing difference (*tatparipālana*) of the form of contact with the future (*uttara kāla saṁsarga*) is to be produced from the defect (*doṣa*), the non-authoritativeness of knowledge is produced extraneously from the defect (*parataḥ*). Also, the distinct conforming and non-conforming activities or usages (*vicitra vyavahāra*) too are caused by the distinct causes such as the non-grasping of non-existing and grasping of existing differences (*vidyamānāvidyamāna bhedāgraha*). Also the validity or authoritativeness of knowledge, which is conducive to the activity (*vyava hāropayukta*), is merely the validity or authoritativeness of objects (*yathārthatva*); and the same is produced intrinsically from the totality of causes of knowledge itself (*svataḥ*). Whereas, the invalidity or non-authoritativeness of knowledge (*aprāmāṇya*) is produced extraneously from the defect (*doṣa*). And the doubt regarding the authoritativeness (*prāmāṇya saṁśaya*) in the knowledge having the condition of non-repetitiveness (*anabhyāsa daśāpanna*) is the impediment of unwavering activity (*niṣkampa pravṛtti*), as the same depends on the two sides (*koṭidvaya*) of non-grasping of non-existing and grasping of existing differences.

Conclusion of Gaṅgeśa :

I. ii. 55. No, this position of the Navya Prābhākara Mīmāmsakas is not correct. Only that which causes the unwavering activity must be admitted to be the validity or authoritativeness of knowledge; and nothing else can be admitted to be so, as something else is useless. And suppose such a validity or authoritativeness, of knowledge has the form of being the non-grasping of non-existing difference, then it cannot be known intrinsically from the totality of causes of knowledge itself. For, the grasping of the non-existing difference, i.e. the counter positive of such a non-grasping, is absent; and also it is not recollected earliar. Also, actually the doubt arises with respect to the non-grasping of non-existing difference dispite that the knowledge is known at the time of non-repetition.

From this above stated position, even the following alternative position that "The validity or authoritativeness of knowledge is only the grasping of the relation in general; and the invalidity or non-authoritativeness is the non-grasping of the relation" becomes refuted. For, the state of being the grasping of the relation cannot be known intrinsically from the totality of causes of knowledge itself. And suppose such a state is possible to be known, then the doubt regarding the authoritativeness of knowledge would not be tenable, as the state of being the grasping of the relation is possible even at the time of non- repetition.

Therefore, it must be admitted that the validity or authoritativeness of knowledge, which is excluded from illusion and is the cause of unwavering activity, is the state of being the qualificative knowledge of the form of being the single knowledge referring to the substratum of the property of the non-grasped non-existing relation of property. Or, it may be either the state of being the knowledge of relation or the state of being the non-grasping of non-existing difference; however, the same cannot be known intrinsically from the totality of causes of knowledge itself. Rather, therefore, the authoritativeness of knowledge is ascertained extraneously from the knowledge produced from the perception of distinction or difference. Therefore, the extraneousness of authoritativeness of knowledge becomes cemented. Thus ends the theory of production of the authoritativeness of knowledge.

Thus ends the theory of production in the theory of validity or authoritativeness of knowledge in Perception in the Tattvacintāmaṇi composed by Śri Gangeśopādhyāya.

Explanation :

Gangeśa concludes the theory of production of validity (Utpatti Vāda) by refuting the Navya Prābhākara Mīmāmsakas' position. According to him,

the validity or authoritativeness of knowledge must be admitted to be only that which produces the unwavering activity (*niṣkampa pravṛtti hetu*); and nothing else, as only such an authoritativeness is useful in prompting activity. And such a validity or authoritativeness, which has the form of the non-grasping of non-existing difference (*avidyamāna bhedāgraha*), cannot be known intrinsically from the totality of causes of knowledge itself (*svataḥ*), as the counter positive, viz. the grasping of non-existing difference (*avidyamāna bheda graha*) is absent; and therefore the totality of causes is also absent. It should be noted that only a doubt arises with respect to the non-grasping of the non-existing difference (*avitdyamāna bheda*), though the knowledge may be known at the time of non-repetition (*anabhyāsa daśā*).

Now since the validity or authoritativeness of knowledge cannot be of the form of non-grasping of the existing difference (*vidyamāna bhedāgraha*), it cannot be of the form of the grasping of the relation in general (*autsargika samsarga graha*) either; for, in such a case too, the validity or authoritativeness, i.e. the state of being the grasping of the relation (*samsarga grahatva*), cannot be known intrinsically from the totality of causes of itself. And if it is possible, then the same can be known even at the time of the non-repetition (*anabhyāsa daśā*); and hence the doubt regarding the validity or authoritativeness would never be possible.

Therefore, Gangeśa concludes that the validity or authoritativeness of knowledge (*prāmāṇya*), which is excluded from illusion (*bhrama vyāvṛtta*) and is the cause of unwavering activity (*niṣkampapravṛtti hetu*), is the state of being the qualificative knowledge (*viśiṣṭa jñānatva*) of the form of being a single knowledge (*eka jñānatva*) referring to the substratum of the property of the non-grasped non-existing relation of property (*agṛhītāsamsarga dharma dharmi*). Further the authoritativeness can be the state of being the knowledge of the relation (*samsarga jñānatva*) or the state of non-grasping of the non-existing difference (*avidyamāna bhedāgrahatva*); however, the same cannot be known intrinsically from the totality of causes of knowledge (*svataḥ*); rather it is known extraneously (*parataḥ*) from the knowledge produced from the observasion of particularity (*viśeṣa darśanādi janya jñāna*).

The end of the Utpatti vāda. The end of the Prāmāṇyavāda in the Pratyakṣakhaṇḍa.

I. III.

Theory of Definition of Valid Knowledge (Pramālakṣaṇam)

Pramālakṣaṇa pūrvapakṣaḥ Prāmāṇya is not Jāti

I. iii. 1. Now what is this validity or authoritativeness of knowledge, i.e. the delimitor of the effectness of valid knowledge? It cannot be generic property. For, then doubt regarding the validity of knowledge would become untenable with respect to the perceptuality of knowledge by way of existing in the competent individual, i.e. perception. Also the validity of knowledge cannot be generic property; for, the same validity of knowledge is to be inferred (in the case of the collective knowledge of doubt).

Also, cross-connection of the validity of knowledge with the directness of perceptual knowledge is an undesired contingency (in the view that validity of knowledge is a generic property). Further, cross-connection is a fault even in the view that the validity of knowledge is cross-connected with other property only in a quality due to the similarity of causes or sources. Also suppose (the validity of knowledge is a generic property dispite cross-connection, like) the highness (and the lowness) of sounds etc. are ruled to be the generic properties (dispite cross-connection with the *ka* -ness and the *ga*-ness of sounds) due to their inherent forms of increase (and decrease) in pitch, then the generic property would need to be various due to the lack of any other alternative. And the fault of the lack of consecutiveness arises in the case of the variousness of the validity of knowledge.

Explanation :

After the exposition of the 'Theory of the validity or authoritativeness of knowledge' (Prāmāṇya vāda), Gangeśa begins the exposition of the *Prima facie* view of the 'Theory of definition of valid knowledge' (Pramālakṣana Pūrvapakṣa). According to him, the validity of knowledge (*prāmāṇya* or rather *pramātva*), constituting the delimitor of the effectness of the valid knowledge (*kāryatāvacchedaka*), cannot be a generic property (*jāti*), as then the doubt regarding the validity of knowledge (*samśaya*) would become untenable in the case of perceptuality of knowledge (*pratyakṣatve*), due to the presence of the validity of knowledge itself in the competent individual (*yogya vyakti*), i.e.

in the qualificative perception. Further, according to Gangeśa, in the case of the collective knowledge of doubt '*idam jñānam pramā na vā, ayam ca ghaṭaḥ*' , the validity of knowledge needs to be inferred afther the doubt (*anumeya*); and hence, the same cannot be a generic property.

Also Gangeśa points out that the validity of knowledge is cross–connected with the directness of knowledge (*sākṣātva*) in the case of direct valid knowledge (*sākṣātkāri pramā*); and the same cross-connection sets aside the claim that the validity of knowledge is a generic property. Further, cross-connection (*saṅkara*) constitutes a fault (*doṣa*) even in the theory that the validity of knowledge is cross-connected with another property only in a quality, as the causes are same (*bīja sāmya*). Gangeśa replies that suppose the validity of knowledge (*pramātva*), like the highness and the lowness of sounds etc. (*utkarṣādi*), is viewed to be a generic property (*jāti*), dispite cross-connection, then the same validity of knowledge would become various like the highness and the lowness etc.; and thus, the fault of non-consecutiveness (*ananugama*) becomes contingent due to the variousness of the validity of knowledge.

Invalid knowledge (apramā) is Valid in a particular aspect (amśe)

I. iii. 2. Moreover, this way (when the validity of knowledge is a generic property), invalid knowledge could not have the validity in the particular aspect of thisness; for, the generic property is ruled to be of pervassive occurrence in all aspects. And such a contingency cannot be termed to be a desired contingency either. Since in the case of the collective knowledge, which is conforming and not conforming to particular aspects (viz. 'This belongs to both silver and shell and this is silver'), both the validity and the invalidity are being experienced (with respect to particular aspects, viz. the thisness and the silverness), the single option (of the validity and the invalidity pervading both the aspects) cannot be admitted.

It may be argued now that the contradictory, i.e. invalid knowledge cannot have the validity with respect to any particular aspect; rather, the same needs to have the validity with respect to both the aspects, like the recollection. However, then it is necessary that only the state of being the valid experience needs to be the validity of knowledge. However, we shall state later on (C.f. I. iii. 6.) as to how even the state of being the valid experience cannot be the validity of knowledge.

Explanation :

Gangeśa states that the validity of knowledge (*pramātva*) cannot be admitted to be a generic property (*jāti*), as then invalid knowledge (*apramā*) cannot have the validity even in the particular aspect of thisness (*idam aṁśe*).

According to him, the invalid knowledge such as '*idam rajatam*', has the the validity in the thisness aspect (*idam amśe*) and the invalidity in the silverness aspect (*rajatatvāmśe*); however, since the generic property is of pervassive occurrance (*vyāpya vṛtti*), the invalid knowledge cannot have the validity in merely the thisness-aspect. Further, Gangeśa states that such a contingency cannot be termed as a desired contingency (*iṣṭāpatti*), as both the validity and the invalidity (*pramātvāpramātve*) are being experienced with respect to the thisness-aspect and the silverness-aspect in the case of the collective knowledge (*samūhālambane*) such as '*raṅga rajatayor idam, idam ca rajatam*', which are conforming and non-conforming to different aspects (*samvādini visamvādini*).

Gangeśa refutes the argument that the contradictory, i.e. invalid knowledge (*viparyaya*) cannot have the validity with respect to any one aspect; rather the same needs to have the validity with respect to both the aspects (*yathārthatva*) like recollection. According to him, if the contradictory knowledge too has the validity, then the validity of knowledge (*prāmāṇya or pramātva*) could be defined to be the state of being the valid experience (*yathārthānubhavatva*). However, the same is untenable, as is to be shown later (c.f. I. iii. 6.)

Validity and its Absence cannot be of non-pervassive occurance

I. iii. 3. It may be argued now as follows : That contact and its absence have been admitted to be of non-pervassive occurrance on the basis of non-contradictory experience, by refuting the rule that presence and absence are not of non-pervassive occurence. In the same way, let the validity of knowledge and its absence too be admitted to be of non-pervassive occurrence on the basis of experience, by refuting the rule that the generic property is of only pervassive occurrence.

It should not be objected that the rule is only that what is of non-pervassive occurrence is not of pervassive occurrence; and what is of pervassive occurrence is not of non-pervassive occurence; and therefore, the validity of knowledge (and its absence) cannot have double nature of being pervassive and non-pervassive–occurences. For, such a rule is deviating in the case of the constant obsence of contact. Also it is not correct to object that such a rule refers to only two absences. For, such an objection cannot be justified. Also, on the contrary, it is possible to explain the rule otherwise that an antity is of non-pervassive occurence in the presence of both merit and defect; and an entity is of pervassive occurrence in the presence of only merit in the place. Otherwise, suppose the above explanation of the rule is not admitted, then the validity of knowledge, though being a mere condition (instead of a generic property), cannot have the community of locus with its costant absence in a collective knowledge due to its generic, i.e. positive nature. And further, it could not have double nature of being both of pervassive and non-pervassive occurrences.

No, this argument is not correct. Two mutually contradictory entities, viz. contact and its absence or the validity and its absence, cannot occur together; and therefore, the same cannot appear together in one place, viz. in tree or knowledge without the difference between the dilimitors of substrata such as the bottom or top of a tree or without the difference between the two aspects of a knowledge, viz. this' (shell) and 'silver'. Also it is not tenable that only the objects, i.e. the 'this (shell)' and the 'silver' having the form of the aspects, constitute the delimitors of the substratum in the occurrence of the validity of knowledge. For, the state of having the silver as the object is common to even the illusion such as 'This (shell) is silver'.

Explanation :

The Pūrvapakṣin now raises the argument that the validity of knowledge and its absence (*pramātva tadabhāvau*) can be admitted to be of non-pervassive occurrence (*avyāpya vṛtti*) by refuting the rule that the generic property (*jāti*) is of pervassive occurrence (*vyāpya vṛtti*); and this instance is similar to the instance of admitting contact and its absence (*samyoga tadabhāva*) as being of non-pervassive occurrence (*avyāpya vṛtti*) by refuting the rule that presence and absence (*bhāvā bhāvau*) are not of non-pervassive occurrence.

The Pūrvapakṣin refutes the objection that the rule (*vyāpti*) is that whatever is of non-pervassive occurrence (*avyāpya vṛtti*) is not of pervassive occurrence (*vyāpya vṛtti*) and whatever is of pervassive occurrence is not of non-pervassive occurrence; and therefore the validity of knowledge (and its absence) cannot be of double nature of being pervassive and non-pervassive occurrences (*ubhaya rūpa*). According to him, such a rule is invalid due to the deviation in the case of constant absence of contact (*samyogātyantābhāva*). Also the Pūrvapakṣin refutes the objection that such a rule refers to only two absences (*abhāva dvaya*). According to him, it is possible to explain the rule otherwise that an entity is of non-pervassive occurrance in the presence of both merit and defect in the same place and an entity is of pervassive occurrence in the presence of only merit. This above explanation of the rule is necessary, as otherwise the validity of knowledge, dispite being a condition (*upādhi*), cannot have the community of locus with its absence (*atyantābhāva sāmānādhikaraṇya*) due to its positive nature (*sāmānyatva*); and thus cannot have double nature (*ubhaya- rūpa*) of being of pervassive and non-pervassive occurences.

However, Gangeśa refutes the argument. According to him, two mutually contradictory entities (*viruddhayoḥ*) such as contact and its absence or the validity of knowledge and its absence cannot occur and appear together in one place such as tree or knowledge without the difference between the delimitors of substrata (*avacchedaka bheda*) such as different points, viz. the bottom and top of a tree or the two aspects of a knowledge such as 'this' (shell) and 'silver'. Also only the objects(*viṣayaḥ*) such as 'this' and 'silver', having the form of the aspects (*amśa rūpaḥ*), cannot be the delimitors of the substratum in the occurrence of the validity of knowledge (*pramātva vṛtti*). For, the state of having the silver as the object (*tadviṣayatva*) is quite common to even the illusion such as '*idam rajatam*'.

Viśeṣyāvṛtty aprakārakatva cannot be the Avacchedaka :

I. iii. 4. Now it may be argued as follows : That the state of not having the property, not existing in the substratum, as the qualifier, and the state of having the property, not existing in the substratum, as the qualifier, respectively, can be the delimitors (of the substrata) in the occurence of the validity of knowledge and in the occurrence of the absence of validity of knowledge respectively.

However, we shall reply as follows : Let only those states be considered as the producers of the usages of valid knowledge and invalid knowledge respectively, as they are necessary and also as they are referred to first. Thus, what is the necessity of admitting (the validity of knowledge as a) generic property. However, we shall state later on that even such states cannot be the delimitors (of the substrata) in the occurrence of the validity and in the occurrence of its absence.

Explanation :

The Pūrvapakṣin now raises the argument that the state of not having the property, not existing in the substratum, as the qualifier, (*viśeṣyāvṛtty aprakārakatva*) and the state of having the property, not existing in the substratum, as the qualifier (*viśeṣyāvṛtti prakārakatva*) respectively can be considered to be the delimitors of the substrata in the occurrence (*vṛtitāvacchedakau*) of the validity of knowledge and in the occurrence of the absence of validity of knowledge (*pramātvāpramatvayoḥ*).

However, Gangeśa refutes the argument on the ground that when such states are delimitors of occurrence, the same can be considered to be the causes of the uses of the valid knowledge and the invalid knowledge (*pramāpramā vyavahāra janakau*); and therefore, the validity and the invlidity need not be considered to be the generic properties at all. Nevertheless, he notes that such states cannot be the delimitors of substrata in the occurrences of the validity and the invalidity.

Refutation of Prābhākaras' theory :

I. iii. 5. Also the Prābhākaras' theory that the state of being the valid knowledge, grasping what is not already grasped, or the state of being the valid knowledge as established by ordinary experience is the validity of knowledge is not tenable. For, such a state would not apply to (i.e. exist in) the continuous series of knowledges (viz. 'This is a pole' produced after 'This is a pole').

It may be argued by the Prābhākaras now as follows: Since perceptual knowledge has the state of grasping the objects existing at present, the state of being the valid knowledge grasping what is not already grasped, by way of grasping the pole etc, as qualified by the present moment of time; i.e. the substratum of the knowledge, is quite established in perceptual knowledge by the ordinary experience; otherwise, the contingency of simultaneity of two knowledges in one moment would arise. However, this argument too is not correct. Moments of time are beyond the (perception through) sence organs (and hence cannot qualify the valid knowledge); and the presentness of moments of time is grasped by taking into account the gross conditions (aspects) of time such as hour etc. Also since knowledges are produced in successive moments of time present in their own forms, the continuous series of knowledges is not tenable.

Also quality and action are not produced in the pole etc. at every moment so that the state of being the knowledge grasping what is not already grasped could have been possible by taking into account such a production of quality etc. Further, such a state does not apply to (i.e. exist in) the continuous series of knowledges, referring to the meanings of the Vedas, which are produced in a serial order from the Vedas only.

Explanation :

Gangeśa now refutes the theory of the Prābhākaras who do not admit the indeterminate knowledge. According to him, the state of being the valid knowledge grasping what is not already grasped (*yathārthāgṛhīta grāhitva*) or the state of being the valid knowledge established by the ordinary experience (*loka siddha pramātva*) cannot be the validity of knowledge; as the same does not apply to (i.e. exist in) the continuous series of knowledges (*dhārāvāhika buddhi*) such as '*ayam stambhaḥ*' produced after '*ayam stambhaḥ*'.

Gangeśa refutes the argument of the Prābhākaras that perceptual knowledge (*pratyakṣa*) grasps only the objects existing at present (*vartamānārtha grāhin*); and therefore, the perceptual knowledge can be established to have the state of being the valid knowledge grasping what is not already grasped (*agṛhīta grāhitva*), by way of grasping the pole etc. as

qualified by the present moment of time, i.e. the substratum of knowledge (*svāśrayakṣaṇa viṣiṣṭa stambhādi grāhakatvena*). According to him, moments of time (*kṣaṇa*) are beyond the perception through sense-organs (*atīndriya*); and the presentness of moments of time (*varta māvatva*) etc. are grasped by considering the grasping of the gross conditions of time such as hour etc. (*sthūlopādhi*). Further, since knowledges are produced in successive moments of time (*kramika kṣaṇotpattika*), the state of not applying to the continuous series of knowledge is not a fault.

Also Gangeśa refutes the argument that the state of grasping what is not already grasped (*agṛhītagrāhitva*) can be experienced in the valid knowledge by considering the production of quality etc. at every moment (*pratikṣaṇam*) on the ground that quality etc. are not produced in pole etc. at every moment. Further, the state of grasping what is not already grasped does not apply to the continuous series of knowledges (*dhārāvāhika buddhi*), referring to the meanings of the Vedas (*vedārtha gocara*), which are produced from the Vedas only.

Yathārthānubhavatva etc. cannot be Pramātva :

I. iii. 6. Also the state of being the experience conforming to the objects cannot be the validity of knowledge. For, the conformity (with the object), constituting the meaning of the term 'as it is' (*yathā*), is absent, i.e. is not tenable in the knowledge by way of referring to the particular properties such as the potness etc. And mere similarity or conformity (with the object) is common to even illusion or invalid knowledge.

Also the state of being the experience produced from the merit, or the state of being the experience produced from the absence of defect cannot be the validity of knowledge. For, they are not common or consecutive. Also, they need to be described by valid and invalid knowledges (and hence is involve mutual dependence).

Also the state of being the non-contradictory experience cannot be the validity of knowledge. For, the contradiction (involved in the definition) constitutes the opposite of valid - knowledge is (and hence is useless).

Also the state of being the conforming experience cannot be the validity of knowledge. For, the state of being the conforming experience,, i.e. the state of referring to the object referred by another knowledge, is common to even illusion.

Also the state of being the experience producing the competent activity cannot be the validity of knowledge. For, such a definition does not apply to the knowledge of indifference (not producing competent activity), as the

competency, i.e. the nature of such a knowledge of indifference is to be described by valid knowledge only.

Also the state of being the experience of the reality of object cannot be the validity of knowledge. For, unreal object does not appear; or even suppose the unreal object appears, then too, the experience of the same would be common to even illusion.

Explanation :

Gangeśa now refutes the definitions of various scholars such as Jayanta (Nyāymān. i. 1.) regarding the validity of knowledge (*pramātva*) as untenable. According to him, the state of being the experience conforming to the objects (*yathārthānubhavatva*) cannot be the validity of knowledge, as the similarity or the conformity with the object (*sādṛśya*), constituting the meaning of the word '*yathā*', cannot be tenable in the knowledge by way of referring to the potness etc.; and mere conformity is common to even illusion.

According to Gangeśa, the state of being the experience produced from the merit (*guṇa janyānubhavatva*) or the state of being the experience produced from the absence of the defect (*doṣābhāvānubhavatva*) cannot be the validity of knowedge, as the same states are to be described by valid knowledge and invalid knowledge (*pramā apramā nirūpya*), and hence involve mutual dependence.

Also according to Gangeśa, the state of being the non-contradictory experience (*abādhitānubhavatva*) cannot be the validity of knowledge, as the contradiction (*bādha*), involved in the definition, constitutes the opposite of valid knowledge (*viparīta pramā*), and hence is useless.

Also according to Gangeśa, the state of being the conforming experience (*samvādy anubhavatva*), cannot be the validity of knowledge, as the state of being the conforming knowledge (*samvādyatva*), which is nothing but the state of referring to the objects referred by another knowledge (*jñānāntareṇa tathollikhyamānatva*), is common to even illusion.

Also according to him, the state of being the experience producing competent activity (*samartha pravṛtti janakānubhavatva*) cannot be the validity of knowledge,; for, the same definition does not apply to the knowledge of indifference (*upekṣā*), as the competency, i.e. the nature (*yogyatā*) needs to be described by valid knowledge.

Finally Gangeśa states that the state of being the experience of reality of object (*tattvānubhavatva*) as proposed by Mishra etc. cannot be the validity of knowledge. According to him, unreal object (*avastu*) never shines or appears; and even if it shines, the knowledge of such an unreal object becomes

equal to an illusion. Thus, valid knowledge need not be distinguished from such an illusion and defined as the experience of reality of object.

Veśeṣyaniṣṭhātyantābhāva..... is not Pramātva

I. iii. 7. Also the state of being the experience, having the property, not constituting the counterpositive of the constant absence existing in the qualificand, as the qualifier, cannot be the validity of knowledge. For, such a definition does not apply to the valid knowledge of contact etc. Also suppose the constant absence is qualified to have the state of having pervassive occurrence (to exclude the valid knowledge of contact etc.), then the same state would over extend or apply to the illusion of contact, as the constant absence of the illusion of contact is one, i.e. of pervassive occurrence.

Also the state of being the experience having the property, constituting the delimitor of the counterpositiveness described by the mutual absence existing in the qualificand, as the non-qualifier, cannot be the validity of knowledge. For, the same definition cannot apply to the valid knowledge of contact of non-pervassive occurrence. On account of the non-contradictory experience such as 'The tree has the absence of monkey-contact at the bottom, but not on the top', the mutual absence of contact, like the contact, is of non-pervassive occurrence. Suppose you argue that this way, tree would need to be possessing mutual absence of one having contact as well as its absence, then we shall reply that you kindly take cognizance of the experience on account of which even the mutual absence, like the constant absence, needs to be (admitted as) of non-pervassive occurrence due to the difference between the delimiting spaces (of tree). That is why, the knowledge such as 'This (pot) is not black now', is not contradictory with respect to backed pot due to the difference between times; and the same knowledge depends on the mutual absence of the pot possessing the black colour in the pot possessing black colour.

Explanation :

Gangeśa now refutes the two definitions of the validity of knowledge (*pramātva*) based on the constant and mutual absences (*atyantānyonyā-bhāvau*) respectively. According to him, the state of being the experience, having the property, not constituting the counter-positive of the constant absence existing in the qualificand, as the qualifier (*viśeṣya niṣṭhātyantābhāvā pratiyogi dharma prakārakānubhavatva*) cannot be the validity of knowledge, as the same does not apply to the valid knowledge of contact etc. (*saṁyogādi pramā*) which refers to the constant absence of contact of non-pervassive occurrence. Also supposing the qualification of 'the state of having pervassive

occurrence' (*vyāpyavṛttitva*) is included in the absence, then the definition would apply to the illusion of contact such as '*guṇaḥ saṁyogavān*', as the constant absence of the possessor of contact (*tadatyantābhāva*) is of pervassive occurrence.

Also according to Gangeśa, the state of being the experience, having the property, constituting the delimitor of the counterpositiveness described by the mutual absence existing in the qualificand, as the non-qualifier (*viśeṣya vṛttyanyo'nyābhāva pratiyogitāvacchedaka dharmā prakrānubhavatva*), cannot be the validity of knowledge, as the same does not apply to the valid knowledge of contact which is of non-pervassive occurrence (*avyāpya vṛtti pramā*). Gangeśa notes that mutual absence (*anyonyābhāva*), like contact (*saṁyoga*), is of non-pervassive occurrence (*avyāpya vṛtti*) due to the non-contradictory experience such as '*mūle vṛkṣaḥ kapisaṁyogābhāvavān nāgre*'. Also he rejects the argument that this way tree would need to have both mutual absence of one having contact and its absence (*bhedā bheda*) on the ground that mutual absence is of non-pervassive occurrence (*avyāpya vṛtti*) due to the difference of delimiting spaces (*avaccheda bhedena*). Therefore, the knowledge such as 'This (pot) is not black now' (*idānīm na śyāmaḥ*) is not contradictory in the case of baked pot, as it depends on the mutual absence of the pot possessing black colour at different times.

Viṣayatā is a Viśeṣaṇatāviśeṣa

I. iii. 8. Also the state of being the experience, having the property not existing in the qualificand as the non -qualifier, cannot be the validity of knowledge. For, such a definition would not apply to the collective knowledge, having many properties not existing in one single qualificand, as the qualifiers.

It should not be argued that since any given qualifier (among many qualifiers not existing in one single qualificand) exists atleast in one of the qualificands in a collective knowledge, the same qualifier need not have the state of being the property not existing in the qualificand. For, then the definition would over extend or apply to even the collective knowledge of the form of both valid and invalid knowledges. Also, it should not be argued that the state of not existing in all of the qualificands is expected in the qualifier. Since the qualifier existing in one of the qualificands, cannot exist in all of the qualificands, the given defintion would not apply to the collective knowledge. For, all the objects, i.e. the qualifiers cannot exist in one single qualificand.

It may be held now as follows : That the qualificand of knowledge is the substratum of the objectness, and the knowledge is the describer of the

objectness. In the case of illusion (such as 'This (shell) is silver'), the objectness existing in the shell is delimited by the contradictory (i.e. not existing in the locus) silverness; whereas the objectness existing in the silver is delimited by the conforming (i.e. existing in the locus) silverness. The objectness existing in the object is not intended to be of the form of the knownness described by the knowledge; for, it cannot be established due to contradiction with the established conclusion . Also such a knownness is absent in the objects of both past and future knowledges. Rather, therefore, the objectness is a particular qualifierness, i.e. self-linking relation of the knowledge with the object.

The person, who recognizes the knowledge of the other as being the knowledge in general and the object of such a knowledge as being the pot in particular, does necessarily have a doubt as to 'Whether this person knows the pot or not'. Therefore, a particular qualifierness, i.e. self-linking relation of knowledge which is distinct form the substratum of the knowledge and the absence, but which is of the nature of the knowledge and that of the object must be admitted. Otherwise, the meaning of the instrumental, i.e. the particular qualifierness or self - linking relation in the case of the statement 'This object is known as being the pot' would become untenable. And further even the qualifierness is only the self-linking relation of the object with the knowledge; however, it is not mere objectness due to the overapplication or over extension.

Explanation :

Gangeśa refutes the position that the state of being the experience, having the property not existing in the qualificand as the non- qualifier (*viśeṣyāvṛtty aprakārakānubhavatva*) can be the validity of knowledge (*pramātva*). According to him, such a defition would not apply to the collective knowledge (*samūhālambana*) which has many properties such as the potness and the clothingness not existing in one single qualificand, i.e. the pot, as the qualifiers (*ekaikaviśeṣyāvṛtti nānā prakāraka*).

Also Gangeśa refutes the argument that since any qualifier (*prakāra*) among many qualifiers not existing in one single qualificand, exists atleast in one of the qualificands of the collective knowledge (*ekaviśeṣya vṛttitayā*), the qualifier need have the state of being the property not existing in the qualificand (*viśeṣyāvṛttitva*). According to him, then such a definition would over extend or apply to even the collective knowledge of the form of valid and invalid knowledges (*pramāpramā rūpa samūhālambana*). Also he refutes the argument that only the state of not existing in any of the qualificands (*yāvad viśeṣyāvṛtti tva*) is expected in the qualifiers in such cases. According to him, the qualifier, existing in one of the qualificands (*ekaikaviśeṣya vṛtti*), cannot

exist in all of the qualificands (*yāvad viśeṣyā vṛtti tvena*); and hence the definition would not apply to collective knowledge.

Gangeśa now makes an important statement on the Navya nyāya theory of epistemology for introducing next definition (cf. I. iii. 9). According to him, the qualificand of the knowledge (*viśeṣya*) is the substratum of the objectness (*viṣayatāyāḥ āśrayaḥ*) and the knowledge (*jñāna*) is the describer of the objectness (*tatpratiyogin*). And in the case of illusion 'This (shell) is silver' (*idam rajatam*), the objectness existing in the shell (*śuktivṛttir viṣayatā*) is delimited by the contradictory (i.e. not existing in the locus) silverness (*vyadhi karaṇena rajatatvena*); whereas the objectness existing in the silver (*rajatavṛtti*) is delimited by the conforming (i.e. existing in the locus) silverness (*samānādhikaraṇena rajatatvena*). Also it should be noted that the objectness existing in the object is not intended to be of the form of knownness (*jñātatā rūpā*) described by the knowledge (*jñānāhitā*), as it would be contradictory to the established conclusion (*apa siddhānta*) and also as it is absent in both past and future knowledges. Rather therefore, the same objectness is a particular qualifierness, i.e. self-linking relation (*viśeṣaṇatā viśeṣa*) of the knowledge with the object (*jñānasya viṣaye*).

Gangeśa notes that the person, who recognizes the knowledge of the other (*parajñāna*) as being the knowledge in general (*jñānatvena*) and the object of the knowledge in particular (*tadviṣaya*) as being the pot (*ghaṭatvena*), has the doubt as to whether this person knows the pot or not' (*ghaṭam ayam jānāti na vā*); and therefore, a particular qualifierness, i.e. the self-linking relation (*viśeṣaṇatāviśeṣa*), which is distinct from the substratum of the knowledge and the absence of the knowledge (*svāśrayasvābhāvādi*), but which is of the nature of the knowledge and its object (*viṣaya jñāna svarūpa*), must be admitted. This is neccessary, as otherwise the meaning of the instrumental, i.e. the self-linking relation in the expression '*ghaṭatvena jñāto' yam arthaḥ*' would become untenable to be cognized. Further, Gangeśa notes that even the qualifiernes (*prakāratva*) is a type of self-linking relation (*viśeṣanatā viśeṣa*) of the object with the knowledge and not the mere objectness (*viṣayatva*).

Viṣayatāsamānādhikaraṇa prakārakānubhava is not Pramā:

I. iii. 9. This way it may be proposed as follows : That the experience, which has the property, having the community of locus with the objectness, as the qualifier, is valid knowledge; or that the experience, which describes the objectness, having the property having the community of locus with the qualifierness, is valid knowledge; or that the experience, which describes the objectness delimited by the property having the community of locus with itself is valid knowledge. However, this is not correct. Such definitions would not

apply to the indeterminate knowledge (such as 'This is something'). Also even the illusion such as 'This (shell) is silver', which has a reference to the thisness, having community of locus with the objectness as the qualifier, would have an undesired occasion of becoming valid knowledge. Also suppose you argue that the illusion is only valid with respect to thisness, then we shall reply that merely the state of being the experience can be the validity of knowledge; and all additional qualifications are useless.

Also, it should not be argued that even the experience is valid with respect to certain aspect and invalid with respect to certain other aspect (and the state of being the experience cannot exclude such an aspect of illusion). However, this argument is not correct. The exclusion of such an aspect of illusion cannot be obtained from even other stated definitions.

Explanation :

Gaṅgeśa now refutes the proposal that the experience, which has the property having the community of locus with the objectness, as the qualifier (*viṣayatā samānādhikaraṇa prakārānubhava*), or the experience, which describes the objectness, having the property having the community of locus with itself, as the qualifier (*sva samānādhikaraṇa dharma prakaraka viṣayatā pratiyogy anubhava*), or the experience, which describes the objectness delimited by the property having the community locus with itself (*sva samānā-dhikaraṇa dharmāvacchinna viṣayatā pratiyogy anubhava*), can the valid knowledge (*pramā*). According to him, such definitions are faulty, as they do not apply to the indeterminate knowledge '*idam kiñcit*', which does not have any property as the qualifier or describe any objectness. Also according to him, such definitions are faulty, as they apply to even the illusion '*idam rajatam*', which has a reference to the thisness, having the community of locus with the objectness, as the qualifier (*viṣayatā samānādhikaraṇedantva prakāraka*). Also Gaṅgeśa refutes the argument of the Mīmāmsakas that even the illusion '*idam rajatam*' is valid with respect to the thisness (*tatrāmśe*); and hence the application of the same is not a fault. According to him, then merely the state of being the experience (*anubhavtva*) could be the definition of the validity of knowledge (*pramātva*), as it applies to both types of knowledge.

Further, Gaṅgeśa refutes the argument that the experience can be valid (*pramā*) with respect to certain aspect such as the thisness (*idamtva*) and invalid (*apramā*) with respect to certain other aspect such as the silverness (*rajatatva*); and therefore, the state of being the experience cannot exclude such an aspect of illusion. According to him, even the earliar definitions of valid knowledge (*ukta lakṣaṇa*) cannot exclude such an aspect of illusion.

Svavyadhikaraṇadharmāvacchinna viṣayatāpratiyogyanubhava is not Pramā :

I. iii. 10. It may be proposed now as follows : That the experience, which describes the objectness, not delimited by the property not having the community of locus with the objectness itself, is valid knowledge. In the case of collective knowledge, the objectness differs in accordance with each qualificand; and therefore, the objectness existing in one qualificand is not delimited by the property existing in another qualificand; thus the fault of non-pervasion or non-application does not become contingent. However, this is not correct. Such a definition does not apply to the valid knowledge (such as 'This silver is both silver and shell) involving a reference to the illusory aspect, i.e. the shellness. It is not possible to admit that the objectness, which is delimited by a contradictory property, is not delimited by the same contradictory property. For, there would arise contradiction.

However, the experience, which does not describe the objectness, not having the community of locus with the qualifier, cannot be valid knowledge. For, the state of not describing the objectness is absent in the valid knoweldge, which describes the objectness not having the community of locus with the qualifier; and therefore, the definition would not apply to the valid knowledge involving a reference to the illusory aspect, i.e. the shellness.

Also the experience, which does not describe the objectness, which is delimited by the property not having the community of locus with the objectness itself, or the experience which describes the objectness, not having the property not existing in the locus of the objectness itself, as the qualifier, cannot be held to be the valid knowledge for the same reason of non-application. In the case of the illusion (such as 'This (shell) is silver'), the objectness is only delimited by the qualifying property, which does not have the community of locus with the objectness itself, or the objectness has only the property, not existing in the locus of the objectness itself, as the qualifier.

Further the experience, which describes the objectness, not delimited by the propery delimiting the counterpositiveness described by the mutual absence, having the community of locus with the objectness itself, cannot be the vaild knowledge. For, such a definition does not apply to the valid knowledge involving a reference to the illusory aspect, i.e. the shellness. Further, since the mutual absence is of non-pervassive occurrence, the definition does not apply to the valid knowledge involving a reference to the mutual absence of non-pervassive occurrence.

Explanation :

The Pūrapakṣin now proposes various definitions of valid knowledge which apply to indeterminate knowledge (*nirvikalpaka*) and collective knowledge (*samūhālambana*). According to him, the experience, which describes the objectness not delimited by the property not having the community of locus with the objectness itself (*svavyadhikaraṇa dharmānavacchinna viṣayatāpratiyogy anubhava*), can be the valid knowledge (*pramā*). And since the objectness differs in accordance with each qualificand (*prativiśeṣyam*) in a collective knoweldge, the objectness existing in one qualificand (*ekavṛtti*) such as pot is not delimited by the property existing in another qualificand (*aparavṛtti*) such as clothing; and therefore, the definition can apply to the collective knowledge.

However, Gangeśa refutes the definition on the ground that the same does not apply to the valid knowledge such as *'idam rajatam raṅgam ca'* involving a reference to the illusory aspect (*bhramāṁśa pramā*) such as the shellness. According to him, the objectness (*viṣayatā*), which is delimited by the contradictory property of the shellness (*rajatatvena*), cannot be non-delimited by the same property (*tadanavacchinnā*). Also Gangeśa refutes the definition that the experience, which does not describe the objectness not having the community of locus with the qualifying property (*prakāra vyadhikaraṇa viṣayatvāpratiyogy anubhava*), is the valid knowledge. According to him, the definition does not apply to the valid knowledge involving a reference to the illusory aspect (*bhramāṁśa pramā*) such as the shellness, as the state of not describing the objectness (*tadapratiyogitva*) is absent in the valid knowledge which describes the objectness not having the community of locus with the qualifying property (*prakāra vyadhikaraṇa viṣayatva pratiyogin*).

Also Gangeśa refutes the definitions that the experience which does not describe the objectness delimited by the property not having the community of locus with the objectness itself (*svavyadhikaraṇa dharmāvacchinna viṣayatvāpratiyogy anubhava*) or the experience which describes the objectness, that does not have the property not existing in the locus of the objectness itself, as the qualifier (*svādhikaraṇāvṛttyaprakāraka viṣayatāpratiyogy anubhava*), is the valid knoweldge. According to him, both the definitions do not apply to the valid knowledge involving a reference to the illusory aspect of the shellness. And it should be noted that in the case of an illusion referring to the valid aspect (*pramāṁśa bhrame*), the objectness (*viṣayatā*) is only delimited by the property which does not have the community of locus with the objectness itself (*svavyadhikaraṇa prakārāvacchinna*) or it has only the property, not existing in the locus of the objectness itself, as the qualifier (*svādhikaraṇāvṛtti prakāraka*).

Further Gangeśa refutes the definition that the experience, which describes the objectness not delimited by the property delimiting the counter positiveness described by the mutual absence, having the community of locus with the objectness itself (*svasamānādhikaraṇānyonyābhāava pratiyogitāvacchedaka dharmānavacchinna viṣayatā pratiyogy anubhava*), can be valid knowledge. According to him, the definition again does not apply to the valid knowledge involving a reference to the illusory aspect, i.e. the shellness (*bhramāṁśa pramā*). Also since mutual absence (*anyonyābhāva*) is of non-pervassive occurrence (*avyāpya vṛtti*), the definition cannot apply to the valid knowledge referring to the non-pervassive mutual absence (*avyāpya vṛtti pramā*).

Avoidance of Non-pervassion or Non-application

I. iii. 11. Some hold here as follows : That since the validity and the invalidity are mutually contradictory, illusion cannot be valid knowledge. However, this position is triffle. By taking into account the difference between the illusory and the non-illusory aspects, both the validity and the invalidity are experienced in illusion. Otherwise, illusion would have the contingency of exclusion from both valid and invalid knowledes.

From this even the following position gets refuted: "That the knowledge, having the property not having the community of locus with the objectness itself, as the qualifier, is illusion; and the experience, which is distinct from such a knowledge, is valid knowledge. And illusion is not valid with respect to the substratum-aspect."

Further, the experience, which describes the objectness, having the property not existing in the substratum of the qualifier, as the non-qualifier, or the experience, which describes the objectness not existing in the non-substratum of the qualifier, cannot be the valid knowledge. For, the non-substratum of the qualifier cannot be exampled in the case of the valid knowledge (involving reference to the unnegatable) such as 'This is knowable'. Moreover, since the objectness, having the silverness as the qualifier, is ruled to be existing in the silver, the objectness existing in the silver is only delimited by the silverness in the case of the illusion of silver (viz. 'This (shell) is silver'). Thus, even the illusion of the (shell as the) silver would be required to be valid knowledge with respect to the silver.

Explanation :

With a view to avoid non-pervasion or non-application (*avyāpti*) of the definition of valid knowledge (*pramā lakṣaṇa*) in the case of the valid knowledge involving a reference to the illusory aspect (*bhramāṁśa pramā*) such as *'idam raṅgam rajatam ca'*, Some scholars (*yattu*) propose that invalid

knowledge or illusion (*bhrama*) cannot be valid knowledge (*pramā*), as the validity (*pramātva*) and the invalidity (*apramātva*) are mutually contradictory; and therefore no valid knowledge involving a reference to the illusory aspect is possible. However, Gaṅgeśa refutes the position on the ground that both the validity and the invalidity are experienced in the case of illusion on the basis of difference between the illusory and non-illusory aspects (*amśa bheda*). According to him, therefore, the position that the knowledge (*jñāna*), having the property, not having the community of locus with the objectness, as the qualifier (*svavyadhikaraṇa prakāraka*), is illusion; and the experience other than such a knowledge (*tadanya*) is valid knowledge; and illusion is not valid with respect to its substratum (*dharmy amśe*) is refuted.

Also Gaṅgeśa refutes the definitions that the experience, which describes the objectness, having the property not existing in the substratum of the qualifier, as the non-qualifier (*prakārādhikaraṇāvṛtty aprakāraka viṣayatā pratiyogy anubhava*) or the experience, which describes the objectness not existing in the non-substratum of the qualifier (*prakārānadhikaraṇāvṛtti viṣayatā pratiyogy anubhava*) is valid knowledge. According to him, the non-substratum of the qualifier (*prakārānadhikaraṇa*) cannot be established in the case of the valid knowledge involving unnegatable such as '*idam prameyam*'; and hence such a knowledge cannot be applied. Also, Gaṅgeśa points out an undesired contingency that since the objectness having the silverness as the qualifier (*rajatatva prakāraka viṣayatā*) is ruled to be existing in the silver, the objectness existing in the silver (*rajata vṛtti viṣayatā*) is only delimited by the silverness (*rajatvāvacchinna*) in the case of the illusion of the shell as the silver; and therefore, the illusion referring to the silver would be required to be valid with respect to silver.

Single Viṣayatā is not tenable :

I. iii. 12. It may be proposed now as follows : That in the case of illusion, both the silver and the object in front (shell) have only one single objectness; and the same objectness is delimited by the property existing in the non-substratum of the qualifier. However, then we shall reply that in that case, the illusory knowledge of silver, i.e. 'This (shell) is silver' would not be valid even with respect to the substratum - aspect, i.e. this. For, the state of having the contradictory property as the qualifier is equal to the objectness existing in both the object in front (shell) and the silver. And suppose such an illusory knowledge of the shell as the silver is valid with respect to the substratum - aspect, i.e. this (shell), then the same could be valid with respect to the silver-aspect as well.

Now it may be proposed as follows : That such an illusory knowledge as 'This (shell) is silver' is valid with respect to the silver-aspect and also with respect to the substratum (shell) aspect; however, it is not valid with respect to the qualification-aspect (viz. superimposition of the identity of silver with shell). However, this proposal is not correct. Since the qualification does not constitute the object of the former valid knowledge, it cannot constitute the qualifier of the illusory knowledge. Also since the silverness and the object in front (viz shell) are the qualifiers in the objectness existing in the qualification (viz. the superimposition....), the illusion would be required to be both valid and invalid with respect to the shell-aspect and the silver-aspect respectively.

Explanation :

Gaṅgeśa refutes the position that in the case of illusion such as '*idam rajatam*', only one single objectness (*viṣayatā*), as delimited by the property existing in the non-substratum of the qualifier (*prakārānadhikaraṇa dharmā-vacchinnā*), is found in both the object in front (shell) and the silver (*rajata purovartinoḥ*). According to him, then the illusory knowledge would not be valid with respect to even the substratum-aspect (*dharmy amśe*), as the objectness existing in the substratum (shell) too is delimited by only the contradictory property of the silverness (*vyadhikaraṇa dharmāvacchinnā*). Also, if the illusory knowledge is valid with respect to the substratum - aspect, then it would require to be valid with respect to the silver as well for the same reason.

Further Gaṅgeśa refutes the position that the invalid knowledge '*idam rajatam*' is valid with respect to the silver aspect (*rajatāmśe*) and also with respect to the substratum-aspect (*dharmy amśe*); however, the same is invalid with respect to the qualification-aspect (*vaiśiṣṭyāmśe*), i.e. superimposition of the identity of silver with shell. According to him, since the qualification, i.e. the imposition is not the object of the earlier valid knowledge, it cannot be the qualifier of the illusory knowledge. Also according to him, since the silver and the object in front (shell) (*rajata purovartinoḥ*) are the qualifiers in the objectness existing in the qualification, i.e. the superimposition (*vaiśiṣṭya vṛtti viṣayatāyām*), the illusory knowledge would be required to be both valid and invalid (*pramā pramātva*).

Conclusion of Prima Facie View :

I. iii. 13. Also the experience, which describes the objectness, not delimited by the qualifying property existing in the non-substratum of, i.e. contradictory to the objectness itself, cannot be the valid knowledge. For, in the case of the knowledge of the unnegatable such as 'This is knowable', the non-substratum of the objectness, having the knowability as the qualifier, is unexampled; and therefore the definition cannot apply to such a valid knowledge.

It should not be argued that the absence of the objectness, having the knowability as the qualifier, as delimited by the contradictory connecetedness etc., can very well be established in the pot etc. Only the knowledge of the counter-positive, as being delimited by the delimiting property of the counter positiveness, is the cause of the absence. Moreover, the state of not being delimited by the qualifying property, contradictory to something, is common to (the objectness described by) the illusion. And the state of not being delimited by the qualifying property, contradictory to (the objectness described by) the present contextual knowledge, does not pervade the indeterminate knowledge. For, the indeterminate knowledge is devoid of any qualifying property.

Thus, ends the *Prima Facie* view on the definition of the validity of knowledge in perception in the Tattvacintāmaṇi composed by Sri Gangeśopādhyāya.

Explanation :

Gangeśa now concludes the *Prima Facie* view on the definition of the validity of knowledge (*pramālakṣaṇa pūrvapakṣa*). According to him, the experience, which describes the objectness not delimited by the qualifying property not existing in the non-substratum of, i.e. contradictory to the objectness itself (*svavyadhikaraṇa prakārānavacchinna pratiyogy anubhava*) cannot be the valid knowledge (*pramā*); for, the same cannot apply to the valid knowledge of the unnegatable such as '*idam prameyam*' due to the non-establishment of the non-substratum of the objectness having the knowability as the qualifier (*prameyatva prakāraka viṣayatānāśraya*).

Also Gangeśa refutes the argument that the absence of the objectness, having the knowability as the qualifier (*prameyatva prakāraka viṣayatā vyatireka*) as delimited by the contradictory connectedness, can be established in the pot etc. According to him, only the knowledge of the counter positive (*pratiyogi jñāna*), as delimited by the delimiting property of the counterpositiveness (*pratiyogitāvacchedakarūpavattvena*), is the cause of the absence; and the same is untenable in the case of unnegatable. Further, the state of not being delimited by the qualifying property, contradictory to something (*yatkiñcit vyadhikaraṇa prakārānavacchinnatva*), is common to even the objectness in the case of illusion (*bhrama sādhāraṇa*); and hence is useless in the case of defining validity of knowledge. Also the state of not being delimited by the qualifying property contradictory to the (objectness described by the) present contextual knowledge (*prakṛta jñāna vyadhikaraṇa prakārānavacchinnatva*) cannot apply to indeterminate knowledge (*nirvikalpaka*) which is devoid of any qualifier (*niṣprakāra*).

The End of the Pramālakṣaṇa pūrvapakṣa

Pramālakṣaṇa Siddhānta

Tadvati tatprakārakānubhava is Pramā

I. iii. 14. Here, we, the Siddhāntins state the conclusive theory. That the experience or knowledge of that object in the substratum, in which it exists, is the valid knowledge. Or as an alternative, it can be stated that the experience, or knowledge which refers to the property, in the substratum of that property, as the qualifier, is the valid knowledge.

In the same way, the experience or knowledge of that object in the non-substratum, in which it does not exist, is the invalid knowledge. Or as an alternative, it can be stated that the knowledge, which refers to the property, in the non-substratum possessing the absence of that property, as the qualifier, is the invalid knowledge.

And the state of being the experience or knowledge, while being different from the invalid knowledge, is the validity of knowledge. And the state of being the knowledge, referring to the property (in the substratum having that property), as the qualifier, is the state of being the knowledge referring to the qualification of such a qualifier or is the state of being the knowledge produced from the knowledge of such a qualifier.

Explanation :

Gangeśa, the Siddhāntin, states his conclusive view (*siddhānta*) here. According to him, the experience or knowledge of that object (*tasyānubhavaḥ*), in the substratum (*tatra*), in which it exists (*yatra yad asti*), is the valid knowledge (*pramā*); or the experience or knowledge which refers to the property in the substratum, of that property, as the qualifier (*tadvati tatprakārakānubhava*), is the valid knowledge. For instance, the experience or knowledge of the pot on the ground where it exists or the same experience referring to the pot on the ground as the qualifier is the valid knowledge.

Contrarily, the experience or knowledge of that object in the non-substratum (*tasya tatva jñānam*) in which it does not exist (*yatra yannāsti*) or the experience or knowledge referring to the property in the non-substratum possessing the absence of the property as the qualifier (*tad abhāvavati tatprakārakam jñānam*) is the invalid knowledge. For instance, the experience or knowledge of the silver in the shell in which it does not exist or the

knowledge of the silver referring the silverness in the shell possessing the absence of the silverness as the qualifier is the invalid knowledge.

Further Gangeśa states that the state of being the experience or knowledge (*anubhavatva*), while being different from the invalid knowledge (*tadanyatve sati*), is the validity of knowledge (*pramātva*). And the state of being the knowledge referring to the property in the substratum of the property, as the qualifier (*tat prakatvam*) is the state of being the knowledge referring to the qualification of such a qualifier (*tadvaiśiṣṭya viṣayakatvam*) or is the state of being the knowledge produced from the knowledge of the qualifier (*tadviśeṣaṇa jñāna janyatvam*).

Indeterminate knowledge is excluded from both Valid and Invalid knowledges :

I. iii. 15. The knowledge of the Supreme lord is the qualificative knowledge which refers to the qualificand of the qualifier; however, the same is not what refers to the property (in the substratum of the property) as the qualifier. The indeterminate knowledge (such as 'This is something') is what is only excluded from both valid and invalid knowledges, as the same is not the subsidiary cause of any activity. And even the denotation of the indeterminate knowledge by the term 'unnameble' (cf. Nyāy Sū. i. 1.4) is meant to convey only the fact that the indeterminate knowledge, which is devoid of the application of the name and the generic property, etc., constitutes perception.

The illusory knowledge, for instance 'This (shell) is silver' is valid due to being the experience which refers to the thisness in the substratum of the thisness; and it is invalid due to being the experience which refers to the property of silverness in the shell, i.e. the non-substratum possessing the absence of the silverness, as the qualifier. However, the knowledge such as 'These are pot and clothing, which is collective with respect to the particular qualificand-aspect, is not an invalid knowledge. For, the property such as the potness or the clothingness does not appear as the qualifier in the substratum of the absence of either of the qualifying properties such as the potness or the clothingness.

Explanation :

Now Gangeśa explains the knowledge (*jñāna*) of the Supreme lord (*Īśvara*). According to him, the knowledge of the Supreme lord is the qualificative knowledge referring to the qualificand of the qualifier (*tadviśiṣṭa viṣaya*); though it is not the knowledge referring to the property (in the substratum of the property) as the qualifier (*tat prakāraka*). Thus, the

knowledge of the Supreme lord is not excluded from valid and invalid knowledges. However, Gangeśa notes that indeterminate knowledge (*nirvikalpaka*) is excluded from both valid and invalid knowledges (*pramā apramā bahirbhūta*), as the same is not the cause of any activity (*vyavahārā naṅga*). The denotation of the same by the term 'unnamable' (*avyapadeśya*) in the Nyāy Sū (i. 1. 4) too indicates the mere fact that indeterminate knowledge, which is devoid of the application of the name and the generic property (*nāma jñtyādi yojanā rahita*), can be perception.

It should be noted that the illusory knowledge such as '*idam rajatam*' can be both valid and invalid. It is valid (*pramā*) due to being the experience referring to the thisness in the substratum of the thisness (*idantvavati idantvānubhavatvāt*); and it is invalid (*apramā*) due to being the experience referring to the silverness as the qualifier in the non-substratum possessing the absence of the silverness (*rajatatvābhāvavati tatprakārakatvāt*). However, the knowledge such as '*ghaṭa paṭau*', which is collective with respect to the qualificand-aspect (*amśe*) is not invalid (*apramā*), as the property such as the potness or the clothingness does not appear as the qualifier in the substratum of the absence of either of the properties such as the potness or the clothness (*ekaprakārābhāvavati*).

Explanation of Validity of the Knowledge of Avyāpyavṛtti bhāvābhāvā :

I. iii. 16. It may be objected now as follows : That this way too, both valid and invalid knowledges of (the contact of) non–occurrence-exacting–presence and–absence would become necessary at one and the same qualificand, i.e. tree, as the same refer to the contact as the qualifier at the substratum of the (presence and) absence of the contact (viz. on the top of tree). However, this is not correct. The contact and its absence exist in the tree only as delimited by different parts, i.e. the bottom and the top; however, they do not exist in the tree everywhere in its entirety; for, the same existence is contrary and is not experienced. Thus, it must be admitted that the absence of the contact does not exist in the part of the tree wherein the contact exists; or that the absence of the contact does not exist in the tree as delimited by the particular part, wherein, as delimited by the same part, the contact exists.

Even the generic property of the cowness exists in the cow only as delimited by the particular parts such as the hump. Also the knowledge such as 'This pot is black', too is only valid with respect to the pot which has become red due to baking; for, the black colour had existed there in the pot at some other, i.e.past time. However, the knowledge such as "This pot is black now' is invalid only. It should not be argued, however, that the lack of generalization arises in the present case of defining the valid knowledge (TC. I. iii. 14) with

the use of relative and correlative pronouns. For, valid knowledge is not valid in all cases; rather, it is valid only in some cases. And, since only the particular instance of knowledge is to be defined as what knowledge is valid in what case, only the composition of definition of valid knowledge with the use of relative and correlative pronous is justified.

Explanation :

Gangeśa refutes the objection that both the valid and the invalid knowledges of the contact of the non-occurrence - exacting–presence and –absence (*avyāpyavṛtti bhāvābhāvau*) would become necessary in the same tree, as the same refer to the contact as the qualifier (*tat prakāraka*) at the substratum of the (presence and) absence of the contact (*tadabhāvavati*), i.e. on the top of the tree. According to him, the contact and its absence exist in the tree only as delimited by different parts, and do not exist in the tree in its entirety (*vṛkṣamātre*); and it is admitted that the absence of contact does not exists in the part of the tree wherein the contact exists or that the absence of the contact does not exist in the tree as delimited by the part, wherein as delimited by the same part, the contact exists.

Gangeśa notes that the generic property such as the cowness (*gotva*) too exists in the cow only as delimited by the particular parts such as hump (*sāsnā vacchedena*), dispite not being non-occurrence–exacting (*avyāpya vṛtti*). Also he notes that the knowledge '*śyāmo' yam*' can be valid with respect to the pot which has become red due to baking (*pāka rakte*), as the black colour did exist in the pot before baking. However, the knowledge '*idānīm śyāmaḥ*' cannot be valid, as it refers to the pot, which has become red after baking, as black. Another interesting point to note here is that the definition of valid knowledge (T.C. I. iii. 14) with the use of relative and correlative pronouns does not cause lack of generalization (*ananugama*), as no valid knowledge is valid in all cases (*sarvatra*). And only the definition with the use of relatives and corelatives is correct, as only the particular instance of knowledge (*tattad viśeṣa*) is to be defined as valid in some case.

Position of Others :

I. iii.17. Yet Others hold as follows : That only the state of being the experience or knowledge is the validity of knowledge. For, the usage of valid knowledge is made with respect to even illusory knowledge by taking into account the valid aspect. However, the valid knowledge of silver or the invalid knowledge of silver etc. is to be defined particularly. For instance, the experience of the silverness in the substratum of the silverness is valid knowledge of silver; and the experience of the silverness in the substratum of the absence of the silverness is the invalid knowledge of silver.

It may be argued now as follows : That since the state of being the experience is common to both valid knowledge and invalid knowldge, the knowledge of the state of being the experience cannot be mere subsidiary cause of the unwavering activity. However, then we shall reply that yes, it is true. Only the valid knowledge referring to the particular qualifier such as the silverness (in the substratum of the silverness) is the cause of the activity. And in the view that the objectness delimited by the unnegatable is a distinct category from the accepted number of categories, the experience (which describes the objectness), not having the property not existing in the substratum of the objectness as the qualifier, is the valid knowledge. In the case of the objectness delimited by the unnegatable property, only the non-existing property (through the description of itself) can be established to be the non-existing property in the substratum of the objectness.

Or, as an alternative, it can be suggested as follows : That the experience or knowledge, which describes the objectness having the community of locus with the qualifying property, which in turn functions as the qualifier of the objectness, is the valid knowledge; or that the experience or knowledge, which describes the objectness having the community of locus with the qualifying property of the objectness itself, is the valid knowledge. And the knowledge, which describes the objectness not having the community of locus with the qualifying property, which in turn functions as the qualifier of the objectness, is the invalid knoweldge; or the knowledge, which describes the objectness not having the community of locus with the qualifying property of the objectness itself is the invalid knowledge. Since the objectness differs in accordance with the difference between the qualifiers in an experience, both the valid and the invalid knoweldges can have the co-mingling, i.e. co-existence in the case of the collective knowledge such as 'This (silver) is silver and shell' due to the co-application of first and second definitions of valid and invalid knowledges.

Explanation :

The Others (*anye*) propose that only the state of being the experience or knowledge (*anubhavatva*) can be the validity of knowledge. According to them, the definition need not over pervade or over apply to the illusory knowledge (*bhrama*), as the same too is what is to be defined due to the usage of valid knowledge (*pramā vyavahāra*) with respect to certain aspect. However, the valid knowledge or the invalid knowledge of silver etc. (*rajatādi pramāpramā*) needs to be defined perticularity, as the experience or knowledge of the silverness in the substratum of the silverness (*rajatatva vati tadanubhavaḥ*) as valid knowledge of silver; and the experience or knowledge of the silverness in the substratum of the absence of the silverness (*tada bhāva vati tadanubhavaḥ*) as invalid knowledge of silver.

The Others refute the argument that since the state of being the experience in general (*anubhavatva*) is common to both valid knowledge and invalid knowledge (*pramāpramā sādhāraṇyena*), the knowledge of the same state cannot be considered to be the cause of unwavering activity (*niṣkampa pravṛtti*). According to them, only the valid knowledge referring to the particular qualifier such as the silverness (*viśeṣa viṣaya pramā*) in the substratum of the silverness is the cause of the activity. And in the view that the objectness delimited by the unnegatable is a distinct category from the accepted number of categories (*atirikta viṣayatā pakṣe*), the experience not having the property not existing in the substratum of the objectness as the qualifier (*viṣayatāśrayāvṛtty aprakārakānubhava*) can be held to be the valid knowledge. And only the non-existing property (*avṛtti*) (through the description of the objectness) can be established to be the non-existing property in the substratum of the objectness (*viṣayatāśrayāvṛtti*) in the case of the objectness delimited by the unnegatable (*kevalānvayin*).

As an alternative, however, the Others suggest that the experience or knowledge, which describes the objectness having the community of locus with the qualifying property (*tatprakāra samānādhikaraṇa viṣayatākaḥ*) functioning as the qualifier of the objectness, or the experience, or knowledges, which describes the objectness having the community of locus with qualifying property of the objectness itself (*svaprakārasamānādhikaraṇa viṣayatākaḥ*) is valid knowledge. Whereas the knowledge which describes the objectness not having the community of locus with the qualifying property (*tat prakāra vyadhikaraṇa viṣayatāka*) functioning as the qualifier of the objectness, or the knowledge, which describes the objectness, not having the community of locus with the qualifying property of the objectness itself (*sva prakāra vyadhikaraṇa viṣayatāka*), is invaild knowledge. Also it should be noted that both the valid knowledge and the invalid knowledge can be said to have the co-existence (*saṅkara*) in the case of the collective knowledge '*idam rajatam raṅgam ca*' due to the co-application of first and second definitions of valid and invalid knowledges (*lakṣaṇa dvaya samāveśa*).

Alternative definitions :

I. iii. 18. Or it can be stated that valid knowledge is an experience, which describes the objectness, having the non-counter positive of the constant absence existing in the qualificand, as the qualifier; or it is an experience, which describes the objectness, not delimited by the qualifier constituting the counter positive of the constant absence existing in the qualificand; or it is an experience, which does not describe the objectness, having the counterpositive of the constant absence existing in the same locus as that of the objectness itself, as the qualifier; or it is an experience, which describes the objectness, not delimited by the qualifier constituting the counter positive of the constant absence having the community of locus with the objectness itself.

And illusion or invalid knowledge is an experience or knowledge which describes the objectness, not delimited by the qualifier having the community of locus with the objectness itself; or it is an experience or knowledge, which describes the objectness delimited by the qualifier not having the community of locus with the objectness itself.

In the case of the illusion such as 'This (shell) is silver' (which is both valid and invalid with respect to different aspects), the first definition of valid knowledge and the third definition of invalid knowledge do not have the contingencies of under–application and over–application; for, the state of being delimited by the contradictory qualifierness and the state of not being delimited by the contradictory qualifierness are not contradictory (or absent) respectively in the two objectnesses of silver and shell respectively; and the state of being what describes the objectness and the state of being what does not describe the objectness are not contradictory (or absent) in the two aspects of invalid knowledge. In the case of the collective knowledge such as 'These are pot and clothing', the definition of valid knowledge and the definition of invalid knowledge do not have the contingencies of under–application and the over-application; for, the objectness of pot and that of clothing differ mutually.

As a matter of fact, the particular objectness, as a distinct category from the accepted number of categories (cf. T.C. I. iii. 17), does not exist; for, there does not exist any means to prove the same. When the knowledge (of pot) in general is produced, the knowledge of the qualifierness or the objectness (of pot) in general may be produced on account of the fact that the same knowledge needs to describe the qualifierness, i.e. the objectness in some objects. Consequently, the doubt as to ' Whether the person knows the pot or not' remains unremoved in the same way. Therefore, dispite grasping the nature of the object pot and that of the knowledge of the pot in general, one cannot grasp the objectness of the pot described by the knowledge, which is of the form of the state of belonging to the knowledge. Consequently, the doubt regarding the objectness of the pot described by the knowledge remains unhindered. And the state of belonging to the knowledge means the state of being the nature of the relation of the pot with the knowledge without the extra relation of the pot with the knowledge. And in support this theory, Udayanāchārya has stated (in the Bauddha dhikkāra of the Ātmattattva viveka) that "The objectness of the pot described by the knowledge means the mere

nature of the object of knowledge caused by the state of belonging to the knowledge, dispite the fact that the knowledge of the pot in general exists."

Explanation :

The Others (*anye*) now present definitions of valid knowledge (*pramā*) which based on constant absence (*atyantābhāva*). According to them, valid knowledge can be the experince (*anubhava*), which describes the objectness, having the non-counterpositive of the constant absence existing in the qualificand, as the qualifier (*viśeṣya niṣṭhātyantābhāvāpratiyogi prakāraka viṣayatā pratiyogī*); or it can be the experience, which describes the objectness not delimited by the qualifier constituting the counter positive of the constant absence existing in the qualificand (*viśeṣya niṣṭhātyantābhāva pratiyogi prakārānavacchinna viṣayatā pratiyogī*); or it can be the experience, which does not describe the objectness, having the counter-positive of the constant absence existing in the same locus as that of the objectness itself, as the qualifier (*viṣayatāsamānādhikaraṇātyantābhāva pratiyogi prakāraka viṣayatā pratiyogī*); or it can be the experience, which describes the objectness not delimited by the qualifier constituting the counter-positive of the constant absence having the community of locus with the objectness (*viṣayatā samānādhikaraṇāt-yantantābhāva pratiyogi prakārānavacchinna viṣayatā pratiyogī*).

Also according to the Others, the illusion or the invalid knowledge (*bhrama*) can be the knowledge which describes the objectness not delimited by the qualifier having the community of locus with the objectness itself (*sva samānādhikaraṇa prakārānavacchinna viṣayatā pratiyogī*); or it can be the knowledge, which describes the objectness delimited by the qualifier not having the community of locus with the objectness itself (*sva vyadhikaraṇa prakārāvacchinna viṣayatā pratiyogī*).

The Others note that in the case of the illusion or invalid knowledge such as '*idam rajatam*', which is valid with respect to the this (shell)-ness and invalid with respect to the silverness, the definition of valid knowledge and that of invalid knowledge (*pramā pramā lakṣaṇe*) do not have the under–application or the over-application (*avyāpty ativyāptī*), as the two objectnesses of the silverness and the this (shell)-ness (*viṣayatā dvyaya*) have the state of being delimited by the contradictory qualifier (*vyadhikaraṇa prakārāvacchinna tva*) and the state of not being delimited by the contradictory qualifier (*tadanavacchinnatva*) respectively; and also they are so, as the invalid knowledge has the state of describing such an objectness and the state of not describing such an objectness (*viṣayatva pratiyogitva tadapratiyogitvayoḥ*). Also in the case of the collective knowledge '*imau ghaṭapaṭau*', the definitions

do not have under–application and over application due to the fact that the objectnesses of pot and clothing have difference (*viṣayatā bheda*).

It should be noted that the particular objectness (cf. T.C. I. iii. 17) cannot be admitted as a distinct category from the accepted number of categories (*viśeṣanatā viśeṣa*) as the knowledge of the objectness in general (*viśeṣaṇatā*) is produced when the knowledge of the pot in general (*sāmānyato jñāne*) is produced; and therefore the doubt as to 'Whether this one knows the pot or not' (*ghaṭam ayam jñnāti na vā*) is possible even when the knowledge of the objectness in general is produced. Therefore, the objectness of the pot described by the knowledge (*tadviṣayatva*) of the form of the state of belonging to the knowledge (*tadīyatva*) cannot be grasped even when the nature (*svarūpa*) of the pot and that of the knowledge of the pot (*ghaṭa tajñānayoḥ*) are grasped; and thus the doubt (*sandeha*) regarding the objectness of the pot cannot be avoided. And here the state of belonging to the knowledge (*tadīyatva*) means the state of being the nature of the relation of the pot with the knowledge (*tatsambandha svabhāvatva*) without the extra relation of the pot with the knowledge. Thus Udayanācārya (Bauddhadhikkāra, Ātmatattva viveka) states that '*tadīyatā mātra nibandhanaḥ svabhāva viśeṣaḥ tad viṣayatvam*'.

Sambandha is Svabhāva

I. iii. 19. It may be argued as follows : That how is it that the state of belonging to the knowledge is possible without the extra relation of the pot with the knowledge?. However, we shall reply that only the relation of the pot with the knowledge itself constitutes the nature of the knowledge. For instance, in the case of the qualifierness, i.e. the objectness, only the relation of the object with the knowledge constitutes the nature of the knowledge. Otherwise (suppose an extra relation is admitted, then), *adinfinitum* would become contingent. In other cases of such self-linking relations (viz. 'Ground has the absence of pot' and 'The pot-halves have the inherence of pot'), the same (viz. the relations of the ground possessing the absence of pot and the pot-halves possessing the inherence of pot) are the self-linking relations. Otherwise in the case of the knowledges where the substrata (such as the ground and the pot halves) are known in general to possess the absence of the pot and the inhenerece of the pot, the doubt regarding the (objectnesses of) same absence of the pot and (that of) the inherence of the pot would not be tenable. For, the natures of the substrata and the natures of the absence and the inherence are already known in general.

It may be argued now that in such cases of knowledges in general, the particular qualifierness or the objectness of the absence of the pot and that of the inherence of the pot are not known. However, this is not correct. The doubt

regarding (the objectnesses of) the absence of the pot and (that of) the inherence of the pot is necessary even in the case of the knowledges wherein the objectnesses of the absence of the pot and that of the inhenerence of the pot are grasped only in general.

Explanation :

The Pūrvapakṣin now raises the objection that the state of belonging to the knowledge (*tadīyatva*) is not possible without the extra relation of the pot with the knowledge (*sambaudham vinā*). However, the Others reply that the very relation of the pot with the knowledge (*sambandha*) itself constitutes the nature of the knowledge (*svabhāva*). And it is like the relation of the object with the knowledge constituting the nature of the knowledge in the case of the qualifierness, i.e. the objectness (*viśeṣaṇatāyām*). Further, the Others state that in the other cases of self-linking relations such as '*bhūtalam ghaṭābhāvavat*' and '*kapālam ghaṭasamavāyavat*' too, only the relation of the ground possessing the absence of the pot and the relation of the pot-halves possessing the inherence of pot constitute the self-linking relations. This is necessary because, otherwise in the case of the knowledge (*jñāna*), where the substratum such as the ground etc. (*adhikaraṇe*) is known in general (*samānyena jñāte*) to be the possessor of the absence of the pot etc., the doubt regarding (the objectness of) the absence of the pot etc. would become untenable, as the nature of the substratum *(adhikaraṇa svarūpa)* and the nature of the absence of the pot etc. (*tat svarūpa*) are known generally.

The Others refute the argument that in the case of such knowledges, doubt can be tenable, as the particular objectness (*viśeṣaṇatā viśeṣa*) of the absence of the pot etc. are not perceived in the substratum such as the ground etc. According to them, the doubt is necessary even when the objectness of the absence of the pot etc. are known only generally.

Conclusion :

I. iii. 20. Yet Some others hold as follows : That since the distinction or difference is experienced clearly between the collective knowledge (viz. 'These are the absence of the pot and the ground') and the qualificative knowledge (viz. 'The ground possesses the absence of the pot'), a distinct qualifierness or objectness (of the absence of the pot) constitutes the object of the qualificative knowledge.

However, this position is not correct. The collective knowledge such as 'These are the absence of the pot and the ground' too is possible by referring to the objectness of the absence of the pot. And the *adinfinitum* becomes contingent in admitting an additional objectness in the objectness of the object of qualificative knowledge. The distinction of the qualificative knowledge ("The ground possesses the absence of the pot") from the collective knowledge ("These are the absence of the pot and the ground") may either be produced from the cause or produced from the effect or produced from the qualifier of the qualificative knowledge.

It may be argued that the qualifier too is only the particular type of objectness; and let the same be admitted to be distinct object in the substratum such as the ground in the qualificative knowledge. However, this is not correct. The collective knowledge (that 'These are the absence of the pot and the ground') is tenable by referring to such a qualifier as an object as well.

Thus ends the conclusive theory of the definitionof valid knowledge in the Perception in the Tattvacintāmani composed by Sri Gangeśopādhyaya.

Explanation :

Gangeśa now concludes his 'Theory of definition of Valid knowledge' (Pramā lakṣaṇa Siddhānta) by refuting the position of the yet Others (yattu). According to the Others, difference is experienced clearly between the collective knowledge such as '*ime ghaṭābhāvo bhūtalam ca*' and the qualificative knowledge such as '*ghaṭābhāvavad bhūtalam*'; and therefore, a distinct objectness (*viśeṣaṇatā viśeṣa*) of the absence of the pot from the ground is the object of the qualificative knowledge (*viṣaya*).

However, Gangeśa refutes such a position. According to him, the collective knowledge '*ime ghaṭābhāvo bhūtalam ca*' too can refer to the objectness of the absence of the pot. And an additional objectness (*viśeṣaṇatāntara*) cannot be admitted in the objectness of the qualificative knowledge, as then *adinfinitum* (*anavasthā*) would become contingent.

Gangeśa notes that the distinction of the qualificative knowledge such as '*bhūtalam ghaṭābhāvavat*' from the collective knowledge such as '*ghaṭābhāvo bhūtalam ca*' is either produced from the cause (*kāraṇakṛta*) or produced from the effect (*kāryakṛta*) or produced from the qualifier (*prakārakṛta*). However, though the qualifier is a particular type of objectness (*viśeṣaṇatā viśeṣa*), the same cannot be admitted to be a distinct object in the substratum, i.e. ground (*dharmin*) in the qualificative knowledge. For, the collective knowledge '*ghaṭābhāvo bhūtalam ca*' too can refer to such a qualifier.

The End of the Pramālakṣaṇasiddhānta in the Pratyakṣakhanda.

I. IV.

Theory of Invalid Knowledge or Error (Anyathākhyāti Vādaḥ)

Objection that Invalid knowledge is untenable

I. iv. 1. It may be objected now as follows : Since all types of knowledges are only valid, and also since the object to be excluded is unexampled, the qualifying term (viz. the reference to the property in the substratum of the property as the qualifier) in the definition of valid knowledge is useless (T.c. III.iii.14); for, no authoritative proof exists in justifying invalid knowledge. It may be explained as follows : That the inference such as "The state of being the object of the activity of one desiring silver is pervaded by the state of being the object of knowledge referring to the silverness as the qualifier; for, it is the property existing merely in the object of the acitivity of one desiring silver like the property existing merely in the silver" needs be the means of knowledge establishing invalid knowledge. However, such an inference involves the fault or clincher of untimely or irregular debate. And also the state of existing merely in the silver constitutes the condition that prevents such an inference.

Also the state of existing in the silver constitutes the preventing condition in the case of the inference, viz. 'The objectness, described by the knowledge, which exists in the shell, has, i.e. refers to the silverness as the qualifier; for, it constitutes the state of being the objectness existing in the object of activity produced from the desire for the silver, like the objectness existing in the silver'. Also the state of not existing in the silver constitutes the preventing condition in the case of the inference, viz. 'The silverness is the delimitor of the objectness described by the knowledge, existing in the non-silver; for, it is the qualifier in the knowledge producing the activity towards (lit. referring to) the non-silver, like the shellness'.

Also the state of not existing in the silver constitutes the preventing condition in the case of the inference, viz. 'The objectness described by the knowledge, which has the silverness as the qualifier, either exists in the non-silver or is the non-counter positive of the absence existing in the non-silver; for, it is the objectness described by the knowledge producing the activity towards (lit. referring to) the non-silver, like the objectness existing in the shell'.

Explanation :

After establishing the theory of validity or authoritativeness of knowledge (Prāmāṇya vāda), Gangeśa begins the theory of invalid knowledge or error (Anyathā khyāti vāda). He introduces the theory of invalid knowledge with the objection of the Mīmāmsakas, who admit only non-knowledge (*akhyāti*). According to them, the qualifying term (*viśeṣaṇa*), viz. the reference to the property in the substratum of the property as the qualifier (*tadvati tatprakārakatva*, cf. T.C.I. iii. 14.) is useless, as all the knowledges are only valid (*yathārtha*) and also as the object to be excluded (*vyāvartya*) such as the invalid knowledge is unexampled. Thus, invalid knowledge (*anyathā khyāti*) need not be admitted due to the absence of proof justifying the same.

The Mīmāmsakas explain that the inference such as 'The state of being the object of activity of one desiring silver (*rajatārthi pravṛtti viṣayatva*) is pervaded by the state of being the object of knowledge referring to the silverness as the qualifier (*rajatatva prakārakānubhāva viṣayatva vyāpya*); for, it is the property existing merely in the object of the activity of one desiring silver (*rajatārthi mātra vṛtti dharmatvāt*)' needs to be the means of knowledge establishing invalid knowledge (*anyathākhyāti vyāpya*); however, the same involves the fault of the untimely or irregular debate (*aprāptakālatva*), as it needs to follow the establishment of invalid knowledge. Further, the Mīmāmsakas state that the state of existing merely in the silver (*rajata mātra vṛttitva*) constitutes the condition (*upādhi*) preventing the invariable concomitance.

Also the Mīmāmsakas state that the state of existing in the silver (*rajata vṛttitva*) constitutes the preventing condition (*upādhi*) in the case of the inference, viz. 'The objectness, described by the knowledge, which exists in the shell (*śuktivṛtti jñāna viṣayatā*), has, i.e. refers to the silverness as the qualifier (*rajatatva prakārikā*); for, it constitutes the state of being the objectness existing in the object of activity (*pravṛtti viṣaya vṛtti viṣayatātvāt*) produced from the desire for the silver'. Also, the state of not existing in the silver (*rajatāvṛttitva*) constitutes the preventing condition (*upādhi*) in the case of the inference, viz. 'The silverness (*rajatatva*) is the delimitor of the objectness described by the knowledge, existing in the non-silver (*arajatavṛtti jñāna viṣayatāvacchedaka*); for, it is the qualifier in the knowledge producing the activity towards the non-silver (*arajataviṣaya pravṛtti hetu jñāna prakāratvāt*)'.

Further the Mīmāmsakas state that the state of not-existing in the silver (*rajatāvṛtti tva*) is the preventing condition (*upādhi*) in the case of the inference, viz. 'The objectness described by the knowledge (*jñāna viṣayatā*), that has the silverness as the qualifier (*rajatatva prakārikā*), either exists in the non-silver

(*arajata vṛttiḥ*) or is the non-counter positive of the absence existing in the non-silver (*arajata niṣṭhātyantābhāvāpratiyoginī*); for, it is the objectness described by the knowledge producing the activity towards the non-silver (*arajataviṣaya pravṛtti hetu jñāna viṣayatvāt*)'. Thus, these inferences cannot prove invalid knowledge.

Fault of unexampledness in the Inference:

I. iv. 2. The objectness of silver (described by the knowledge of silver) has already been refuted. Also in the case of the inference, viz. 'The knowledge of silver (such as 'This (shell) is silver'), which is an object of debate, refers to the shell; for, it is a knowledge that produces the activity towards the shell, like the knowledge of shell', the difference from the desired silver to be known is not grasped in shell; and hence the knowledge of silver, the delimitor of the causality, cannot produce activity. Consequently the fault of unestablishedness or unexampledness arises in the inference.

The silverness constitutes the preventing condition in the case of the inference, viz. 'The shell is the substratum of the objectness described by the knowledge of silver; for, it is the object of activity of one desiring silver, like the silver'. Also the state of referring to the silver as the object constitutes the preventing condition in the case of the inference, viz. 'The activity of one desiring silver towards shell is to be accomplished from the knowledge having the silverness as the qualifier and ones activity as the substratum; for, it is the activity of one desiring silver, like the activity towards silver'. Also the meaning of the term 'one' (in ones activity) cannot be generalized.

Further, the fault of clincher of stating another (irrelavant) matter would become contingent, in the event of abandoning the term'one', on account of the recollection of silver, admitted by both, and arising from the knowledge which has the silverness as the qualifier and the activity of one desiring silver as the substratum.

Explanation :

Further, the Mīmāṃsakas state that the objectness of silver (*viṣayatā*) in the so-called invalid knowledge 'This (shell) is silver' (*idam rajatam*) stands refuted. Also they state that the fault of unexampledness (*asiddhi*) arises in the inference, viz. 'The knowledge of silver (*rajata jñāna*) such as 'This (shell) is silver' (*idam rajatam*) refers to the shell (*śukti viṣayaka*); for, it is the knowledge producing the activity towards the shell' (*śuktau pravartaka jñānatvāt*)', as, when the difference from the desired silver (*iṣṭabheda*) is not grasped in the shell (*agraha*), the knowledge of silver cannot produce the activity towards the shell (*na pravataka*).

The Mīmāṃsakas state also that the silverness (*rajatatva*) constitutes the preventing condition (*upādhi*) in the case of the inference, viz. 'The shell is the substratum of the objectness described by the knowledge of silver (*jñāna viṣayatāśraya*); for, it is the object of activity of one desiring silver (*rajata pravṛtti viṣayatvāt*)'. They state again that the state of referring to the silver as the object (*rajata viṣayatva*) constitutes the condition (*upādhi*) in the case of the inference, viz. 'The activity of one desiring silver towards shell (*śuktau rajatārthi pravṛttiḥ*) is to be accomplished from the knowledge having the silverness as the qualifier (*rajatatva prakāraka*) and ones activity as the substratum (*sva dharmika*); for, it is the activity of one desiring silver (*rajatārthi pravṛttitvāt*). Further, the Mīmāṃsakas point out that the meaning of the term 'one' in ones own activity (*svapadārtha*) cannot be generalized. And supposing the term 'one' is abandoned, then the fault of clincher of stating another or irrelavant matter (*arthāntara*) would become contingent, as the recollection of silver (*rajata smaraṇa*) is possible from the knowledge of silver. Thus, due to the impossibility of inference proving invalid knowledge, invalid knowledge cannot be established.

Establishment of Invalid Knowledge by the Naiyāyikas :

I. iv. 3. Here we, the Naiyāyikas state our reply : The inference (establishing invalid knowledge) could be that 'The activity, towards shell, produced from the desire for the silver, is to be accomplished from the qualificative knowledge referring to the desired object of activity, i.e. silver; for, it is an activity, like the activity of one desirous of shell towards shell'. Also it cannot be objected here that the state of being the activity towards the desired object constitutes a preventing condition. For, such a state constitutes the mere distinct probans, i.e. the state of being the activity. Or the inference could be that 'The knowledge (of silver) having the silverness as the qualifier, which produces the activity towards the shell and is produced from the desire for the silver, has the shell as the qualificand; for, it is the knowledge producing the activity towards the shell, like the knowledge (of shell) producing the activity of the one desiring shell towards the shell'. And dispite the delimitorship of the causality of the knowledge of silver, the fault of unexampledness does not arise in the inference due to the state of producing the activity (of the knowledge of silver). Also we shall establish the causality of the invalid knowledge of silver later on. And such an invalid knowledge, viz. 'This (shell) is (silver)' or such an invalid qualificative knowledge of silver viz. 'This (shell) is silver' has the silverness as the qualifier; for, it is the knowledge of the cause of the activity produced from the desire for the silver, like the valid knowledge of silver.

It should not be argued that when such an invalid knowledge, viz. 'This (shell) is silver' or such an invalid qualificative knowledge of silver is the subject

of inference, either the fallacy of contradiction or the fallacy of unexampledness of the subject would become contingent respectively. For, we shall admit that only the knowledge, which is admitted by both the parties to be the cause of activity towards shell, is the subject of inference. Otherwise, when either the knowledge which is yet to be proved or the knowledge which is already proved (lit. which has mutual absence from that which is yet to be proved) is considered to be the subject of inference, the very inference would become lost. Only the knowledge, which refers to the property and its substratum of non-grasped non-relation, becomes established to be the invalid qualificative knowledge in the case of one who advocates inference to be transcedental.

It should not be argued that this way, only the knowledge referring to both (the qualifierness of the silverness and the qualificandness of the shell) would become established; however, the invalid knowledge, referring to the silverness in the substratum of the absence of silverness, would not become established. For, only the knowledge, that has the contradictory property as the qualifier, is the invalid knowledge. Also it is not correct to argue that the state of not producing the non-conforming activity (towards the undesired shell) is the preventing condition of the inference. In your Mīmāmsakas theory, such a state (of not producing the non-conforming activity) does not pervade the probandum in the case of such a knowledge, viz. 'This (shell) is silver' or such a qualificative knowledge of silver. Also the state of not being produced from defect (or error) cannot constitute the preventing condition of inference. For, in the theory of the opposing Mīmāmsakas, such a state of not being produced from the defect of organs exists in all the knowledges in general. Otherwise, (suppose the invalid knowledge producing non-conforming activity is produced from defect, then), the two invalid knowledges, i.e. the simple qualificative knowledge viz. 'This (shell) is (silver)' and the knowledge viz. 'This (shell) is silver' would need to have the state of not pervading the probandum. Also, such invalid knowledges cannot be argued to have the uselessness (as far as producing the activity is concerned). The invalid qualificative knowledge, which has the desired silverness as the qualifier and the object in front (shell) as the qualificand, regularly produces the activity.

Explanation :

The Naiyāyikas, who admit 'This (shell) is silver' to be invalid knowledge, state the reply that the inference establishing invalid knowledge could be that 'The activity towards the shell (*śuktau pravṛttiḥ*), produced from the desire for the silver (*rajatārthi janyā*), is to be accomplished from the qualificative knowledge (*viśiṣṭa jñāna sādhyā*) referring to the desired object of activity, i.e. silver (*iṣṭa pravṛtti viṣayā*); for, it is an activity (*pravṛtti tvāt*)'. According to them, the state of being the activity towards the desired object (*iṣṭa viṣaya pravṛttitva*) does not constitute any preventing condition of the inference (*upādhi*); and hence the inference can certainly establish '*idam rajatam*' to be invalid knowledge. Also the Naiyāyikas, apprehending the fault of unexampledness (*asiddhi*) in the above inference, propose an alternative inference that 'The knowledge (of silver) (*jñāna*) having the silverness as the qualifier (*rajatatva prakaraka*), which produces the activity towards the shell (*śukti viṣaya pravṛtti janaka*), has the shell as the qualificand (*śukti viśesyakam*); for, it is the knowledge producing the activity towards the shell (*śukti pravṛtti prayojaka jñānatvāt*)' which can establish invalid knowledge. According to them, the inference is free from the fault of unexampledness (*asiddhi*), as the knowledge '*idam rajatam*', though possessing delimitorship of the causality of the knowledge of silver (*avacchedakavat*), produces the activity towards the shell. Further, the Naiyāyikas establish the causality of invalid knowledge towards the activity later on. It should be noted that the invalid knowledge, viz. 'This (shell) is (silver)' (*idam*) or the invalid qualificative knowledge, viz. 'This (shell) is silver' (*jñāna*) have the silverness as the qualifier (*rajatatva prakāraka*), as the same are the causes of the activity towards shell (*pravṛtti hetu*) produced from the desire for the silver (*rajatecchā janya*).

The Naiyāyikas refute the argument that when such an invalid knowledge, viz. 'This (shell) is (silver)' (idam) or such an invalid qualifictive knowledge of silver. viz. 'This (shell) is silver' (*idam rajatam*) is the subject of inference (*pakṣa*), either the fault of contradiction (*bādha*) or the fault of unexampledness (*asiddhi*) becomes contingent. According to them, only the knowledge, which is admitted by both parties (*ubhaya siddha*) to be the cause of the activity towards shell (*śukti niṣṭha pravṛtti hetu*), is the subject of inference (*pakṣa*). Otherwise, when either the knowledge to be proved (*sādhya*) or the knowledge already proved (*tadabhāva vat*) is the subject of inference, the very inference becomes lost (*anumānoccheda*). It should be noted that only the knowledge (*ekam jñānam*), which refers to the property and its substratum of non-grasped non-relation (*agṛhītāsamsargaka dharma dharmi viṣayaka*), is the invalid qualificative knowledge in the view that the inference is transcendental (*atīndriya*).

The Sidhāntins, the Naiyāyikas refute the argument that this way, only the qualificative knowledge 'This (shell) is silver', which refers to both the qualfierness of the silverness and the qualificandness of the shell (*ubhaya khyāti*), would become established, but not the invalid knowledge (*anyathā khyāti*) referring to the qualifierness in the substratum of the absence of the silverness (*tadabhāva vati tatprakāraka*) would become established. According

to them, only the knowledge which has the contradictory property as the qualifier (*vyadhikaraṇa prakāraka*) is invalid knowledge. Also they refute the argument that the state of not producing the non-conforming activity (*visamvādi pravṛty ajanakatva*) is the preventing condition (*upādhi*) of inference. According to them, such a state does not pervade the probandum (*sādhyā vyāpaka*) in the knowledge viz. 'This (shell) is '(silver)' or in the qualificative knowledge viz. 'This (shell) is silver'; and hence cannot be the condition. Also they refute the argument that the state of not being produced from defect of organ (*doṣājanyatva*) is the condition. According to them, in the theory of the Mīmāmsakas, such a state exists in all the knowledges in general (*jñāna mātra*). Also the Naiyāyikas refute the argument that the uselessness (*aprayojakatva*) occurs in the invalid knowledge. According to them, the invalid qualificative knowledge (*viśiṣṭa jñāna*), which has the desired silverness as the qualifier and the object in front (shell) as the qualificand (*iṣṭapurovartin*), is always conducive to the activity. Thus, invalid knowledge can be established through inference.

Prābhākaras' position that Iṣṭa bhedāgraha is the cause of Activity :

I. iv. 4. The Prābhākara Mīmāmsakas hold in this regard as follows : The invalid qualificative knowledge of silver is useless; for, the non-conforming activity towards shell is quite tenable merely from the non-grasping of difference between the shell and the desired silver, which is recollected independently; therefore, what is the use of admitting invalid qualificative knowledge of silver? Even the opponent, the Naiyāyika, has admitted the non-grasping of difference as necessary for the rule of imposition of invalidity.

It should not be argued that since the (vaild) qualificative knowledge of silver constitutes the cause of conforming activity towards the silver, the (invalid) qualificative knowledge of silver gets established to be the cause of the non-conforming activity towards the shell here as well. Since the invalid qualificative knowledge, having the desired silverness as the qualifier and the object in front (shell) as the qualificand, only as associated with the non-grasping of difference, is the cause of the activity in general due to brevity, the invalid qualificative knowledge of silver in general, though existing, cannot be the cause of non-conforming activity due to the heaviness.

It should not be argued that since the grasping of difference of the desired silver from the object in front (shell) cannot be established in the silver, how can the absence of such a grasping of difference constitute the cause of the activity? Either the absence of the state of being the object of knowledge, describing the counterpositiveness of the silver, in the difference present in the object in front (shell), or the absence of the state of being the object of

knowledge, describing the qualifierness of the difference of the desired silver, in the object in front (shell), constitutes the cause of activity.

It may be objected now that the knowledge of non-difference (of silver from shell) is to be obtained only from the knowledge of the object of knowledge, i.e. the knowledge that 'This (shell) is silver' and not from the non-grasping of non-difference of silver from shell; and otherwise, the knowledge of difference would become contingent from the non-grasping of non-difference. However, this is not correct. Desire and others, i.e. knowledge etc. refer merely to the non-difference of the known silver and the object in front (shell) individually. Further, the expression of non-difference is produced merely from the non-grasping of non-relation with the non-difference of the known silver. Consequently, no knowledge of any non-difference arises with respect to the unknown object (silver).

Explanation :

The Prābhākaras among the Mīmāmsakas, who admit 'This (shell) is silver' (*idam rajatam*) to be merely non-knowledge (*akhyāti*), and oppose the Naiyāyikas' theory of invalid knowledge (*anyathākhyāti*), propose that the invalid qualificative knowledge (*viśiṣṭa jñāna*) such as 'This (shell) is silver' need not be the cause of producing activity (*prayojaka*); rather, only the non-grasping of the difference between the shell and the desired silver (*iṣṭabhedā graha*) need to be the cause of producing the non-conforming activity (*pravṛtti*) towards the shell. According to them, even the opponent, i.e. the Naiyāyika, has admitted the non-grasping of difference as necessary for regulating the imposition of invalidity (*āropa niyamārtham*); and hence the admission of invalid qualificative knowledge (*viśiṣṭa jñāna*) is useless.

The Prābhākaras refute the argument that since the (valid) qualificative knowledge of silver (*viśiṣṭa jñāna*) is admitted to be the cause of the conforming activity (*pravṛtti*) towards the silver, the (invalid) qualificative knowledge of silver needs to be admitted to be the cause of the non-conforming activity towards the shell. According to them, the invalid qualficative knowledge, which refers to the desired silverness (*iṣṭa*) as the qualifier and the object in front (shell) (*purovartin*), as the qualificand, only when being assisted by the non-grasping of difference (*bhedāgraha*), produces the non-conforming activity towards shell; and therefore, the invalid qualificative knowledge need not be the cause (*tantra*) of non-conforming activity.

The Prābhākaras refute further the argument that since the grasping of difference (*bheda graha*) of desired silver from the object in front (shell) (*iṣṭa purovartin*) is unexampled, the absence of the same grasping of difference (*tadabhāva*) too cannot be exampled as the cause of activity. According to

them, the absence of the state of being the object of the knowledge (*jñāna viṣayatvābhāva*), describing the counter positiveness of silver (*rajata pratiyogitva*), in the difference present in the object in front (shell) (*purovartiniṣṭha*), or the absence of the state of being the object of the knowledge (*jñāna viṣayatvābhāva*), describing the qualifierness of the difference of the desired silver (*iṣṭabhinnatva prakāraka*), in the object in front (shell) (*purovartin*), is the cause of the activity (*hetu*).

Also the Prābhākaras refute the objection that the knowledge of non-difference (*abheda vyavahāra*), of silver from shell is to be obtained only from the knowledge of the object of knowledge (*vyavahartavyadhī sādhya*), i.e. the knowledge that 'This (shell) is silver', and not from the non-grasping of non-difference (*tadabhāvāgraha*); and thus, the knowledge of non-difference becomes untenable. According to them, desire and knowledge etc. refer merely to the non-difference of known silver and the object in front (shell) individually as unrelated (*jñāta purovarti mātra viṣaya*). Thus, knowledge of non-difference is never tenable with respect to the unknown object (silver) (*ajñāta*).

Establishment of Bhedāgraha (non-grasping of difference) as Cause :

I. iv. 5. Now it may be objected as follows : That dispite the defective knowledge of difference, viz. 'The conch is yellow, but not white', the activity of one desirous of white conch arises only from the subsequent valid inference of the non-difference from the white conch; and hence only the knowledge of non-difference, (viz. The conch is white) needs to be the cause of activity. However, this is not correct. That dispite the defective knowledge of non-difference, viz. 'The conch is yellow', one desirous of yellow object does not act towards the white conch due to the subsequent valid inference of the difference of conch from the yellow object; and hence even you, the Naiyāyikas, should admit that only the non-grasping of difference is the cause of activity.

Suppose you argue that the knowledge of non-difference, which is recognized to be illusory, is not conducive to any activity, then we shall counter argue that even the knowledge of difference, which is recognized tobe illusory, is so, i.e. is not conducive to activity.

Explanation :

The Prābhākaras refute the objection that the activity of one desirous of white conch (*śvetārthi pravṛtti*) arises from the inference of non-difference from the white conch (*śveta bhedānumiti*),; and hence only the knowledge of non-difference (*abheda dhī*), viz. 'The couch is white' (*śvetaḥ śaṅkhaḥ*) is the cause of activity (*taddhetu*). According to the Prābhākaras, the person desirous of yellow object (*pītārthin*) does not act towards the white conch due to the valid inference of the difference of conch from the yellow object (*bhedānumiti*); and hence the Naiyāyikas must admit that only the non-grasping of difference (*bhedāgraha*) is the cause of activity. Also the Prābhākaras refute the argument that the knowledge of non-difference (*abheda jñāna*), which is recognized as illusory (*bhramatvena jñāta*), is not conducive to any activity (*akiñcitkara*). According to them, in such a case, the knowledge of difference (*bheda jñāna*), which is recognized as illusory, too cannot be conducive to any activity; and hence such a fault is equal to both the Mīmāmsakas and the Naiyāyikas.

Alternative view that Iṣṭabhedā viṣayaka Jñāna is Cause :

I. iv. 6. As an alternative, it can be held as follows : That only the subsequent knowledge, not referring to the difference of the desired object (silver), is the cause of activity. And the difference of the desired object (silver) is not the object of even the inference of non-difference. Therefore, even the subsequent knowledge of non-difference of space (of west from east), produced from defect, does not refer to the difference of space (of west from east), dispite that the earliar knowledge did refer to the difference of space (of west from east). Thus, the subsequent illusion of space (of west) and the knowledge of reflection etc. do become conducive to activity.

It may be argued now that this way, the qualificative knowledge of non-difference of the silver could not be established to be the cause of activity; for, the activity towards the shell could be tenable merely from the non-grasping of difference of the silver from the shell. And the experience, i.e. after knowledge or recognition such as 'I know this (shell) as being silver' and 'This (shell) is known as being silver' is equally tenable with respect to the shell. And it is not correct to state that since the silverness is contradictory to the shell, even the after-knowledge constitutes merely the non-grasping of non-relation of silver. For, no proof or means of knowledge, that justifies the contradictory knowledge to be the qualificative knowledge of non-difference of silver, exists.

However, this argument is not correct. In the case of valid knowledge of silver, the after-knowledge or recognition of silver is not produced, as the same silver is not known earliar. However, the grasping of the qualifying property (silverness) indeed refers to the substratum (silver); for, the generic property of the silverness is grasped only as associated with the competent substratum (silver). Thus, by implication, only one single qualificative knowledge referring to the qualifying property (silverness) in the substratum (silver) gets established. There exists no cause or means which justifies the silverness to be the object of the knowledge of shell. Also, unlike the recognition or after-knowledge, the sense-organ-contact and the mental impression do

not constitute the causes or means. For, the same sense-organ-contact and the mental impression refer to the different objects.

Explanation :

The Prābhākaras answer the earliar objection (cf. I. iii. 5) with an alternative view. According to them, only the subsequent knowledge (*jñāna*), not referring to the difference of the desired object (silver) (*iṣṭabhedāviṣayaka*), can be admitted to be the cause of activity (*pravartaka*). And the inference (*anumiti*) of non-difference does not refer to the difference of the desired object (silver) (*iṣṭabheda*). Therefore, even the subsequent defective knowledge (*pratyaya*), viz. the knowledge of non-difference of space of west from east does not refer to the difference, dispite that the earliar valid knowledge refers to the difference of space of west from east (*bheda pratyaya*). Thus, the subsequent defective knowledge of non-difference can be the cause of activity.

Now the Pūrvapakṣin raises an argument that in this view, the qualificative knowledge (*viśiṣṭa jñāna*) of non-difference of silver cannot be established to be the cause of activity. According to him, the activity is quite tenable from merely the non-grasping of difference (*bhedāgraha*) of silver from shell. And the after-knowledge or recognition, viz. 'I know this (shell) as being silver' (*idam rajatatayā jānāmi*) or 'This (shell) is known as being silver' (*idam rajatatayā jñātam*) too refers to the shell. And such an after-knowledge or recognition cannot be admitted to be merely non-grasping of non-relation (*asamsargāgraha*), as no proof justifies contradictory knowledge (*bādha*) to be qualificative knowledge of non-difference of silver (*viśiṣṭa jñāna*).

However, the Prābhākaras refute the argument. According to them, in the case of the valid knowledge of silver, after-knowledge or recollection (*smṛti*) of silver is not produced, as the silver is not known or experienced earliar. And the mere grasping of the qualifying property (silverness) (*grahaṇa*) admitted by us, refers, in such a case, to the substratum (silver), as the generic property of the silverness (*rajatatva jāti*) needs to be grasped as associated with the competent substratum (*yogya dharmi*). Thus, one single knowledge, which refers to the qualifier in the substratum (*dharma dharmi viṣayaka*), gets established by implication (*arthāt*) to be the cause. Further, the Prābhākaras refute the position that any means (*hetu*) can justify the silverness (*rajatatva*) to be the object of the knowledge of shell (*śuktyanubhava viṣayatva*). According to them, the sense-organ-contact and the mental impression (*samskārendriya*), unlike recognition, donot constitute the means, as they refer to different objects (*bhinna viṣayaka*), i.e. shell and the silverness respectively.

Use of the term 'doubt' in the Absence of invalid knowledge :

I. iv. 7. The knowledge of substratum of many properties constitutes the doubt in the absence of grasping of independently recollected many mutually contradictory differences simultaneously together. However, the absence of grasping of many mutually contradictory differences, which are recollected at different times, does not constitute doubt, in which case it (doubt) would have had the form of two contradictory sides recollected at two different times. If not, even you would not have any way out for explanation of doubt.

It should not be argued that after the doubt (as to 'Whether this (post) is a post or person), knowledge of the substratum constitutes doubt in the case of non-grasping of difference between both post and person at the time of the knowledge of two contradictory sides; and the same knowledge of substratum constitutes invalid knowledge in the case of non-grasping of difference of one (post) from person. For, one, i.e. post cannot be recollected independently on the strength of defect in sense organ. Rather, the same post is recollected as the qualifier to the absence. Thus, the non-grasping of difference of the post from the person is not conducive to the doubt.

Furhter it should not be argued that after the doubt of fire (as to 'Whether the fire exists or not in the pond), the activity of one desirous of fire arises from the illusion, i.e. the non-grasping of non-relation of smoke, at times. However, the same activity does not arise without the illusion of smoke. Also it should not be argued that the non-grasping of non-relation of independently recollected fire with smoke (in the pond) is the operation, i.e. the invalid knowledge conducive to activity; for, the same non-grasping of non-relation of fire exists even earliar in accordance with the doubt. Therefore, only the inference of the fire in the pond is the operation, i.e. the invalid knowledge, conducive to activity. Since the illusion of the probans (smoke) is the impediment to the recollection of the state of not possessing the fire independently, only the independent recollection of fire regularly through concomitance is the operation, i.e. the invalid knowledge conducive to activity. Thus, both doubt and invalid knowledge of fire are not necessary for activity.

Also it should not be objected that when the subject such as mountain is perceptible and the probandum such as fire is recollected, the knowledge of fire produced from the illusion of smoke would not be distinct from the illusion of perception; and therefore the consequent knowledge would be of the form of perception that 'I perceive fire' but not of the form of inference that 'I infer fire'. Both the perception and the inference are possible respectively from the recollection and the non-recollection of the state of being the knowledge produced after the knowledge of probans.

Explanation :

The Prābhākaras now explain the usage of the term doubt (*saṁśaya*) in the absence of invalid knowledge. According to them, the knowledge of substratum of many properties (*dharmi jñāna*) constitutes the doubt in the absence of grasping of independently recollected many mutually contradictory differences (*svatantropasthita viruddhānekabhedā grahe*) simultaneously together. However, the absence of grasping of many mutually contradictory differences (*aneka bhedāgraha*), which are recollected at different times (*kramenopasthita*), does not constitute doubt, as in such a case it would be of the form of two contradictory sides recollected at two different times (*kramika viparyaya dvaya rūpa*).

The Prābhākaras refute the argument that after the doubt as to whether 'This (post) is a post or person', knowledge of substratum constitutes doubt in the event of non-grasping of difference between the post and person (*ubhaya bhedāgraha*); and the same constitutes invalid knowledge (*anyathā khyāti*) in the event of non-grasping of difference of one (post) from the person. Thus, the non-grasping of difference of one (post) from the person is not conducive to the difference.

Further, the Prābhākaras refute the argument that after the doubt as to 'Whether the fire exists or not in the pond', the activity of one desirous of fire (*vahnyarthi pravṛtti*) arises only from the illusion, i.e. the non-grasping of non-relation of smoke (*dhūma bhrama*),; but the activity does not arise without illusion. Further, the Prābhākaras refute the argument that non-grasping of non-relation (*asamsargāgraha*) of independently recollected fire with smoke (*svatantropasthita vahni*) is the operation (*dvāra*), i.e. is the invalid knowledge conducive to the activity, as the same non-grasping occurs even earliar. Therefore, only the inference of fire in the pond (*vahnyanumiti*) is the operation, i.e. is the invalid knowledge conducive to activity. According to them, illusion of smoke (*liṅga bhrama*) is the impediment to the recollection of the state of not possessing the fire independently (*svatantropasthiti pratibandhaka*); and hence only the independent recollection of fire (*svatantra vahni smṛti*) is the operation (*dvāra*), i.e. the invalid knowledge conducive to the activity. Thus, both doubt of smoke and invalid knowledge of fire are not necessary for activity.

Further the Prābhākaras refute the objection that when the subject like mountain (*parvata*) is perceived (*pratyakṣa*), and the probandum like fire (*vahni*) is recollected (*smaraṇa*), the knowledge of fire produced from the illusion of smoke would not be distinct from the illusion of perception (*pratyakṣa bhrama*); and thus the knowledge produced would be the

perception that 'I perceive fire' (*sākṣāt karomi*), but not the inference that 'I infer fire' (*anuminomi*). According to them, both knowledges, i.e. perception and inference are possible from the recollection and the non-recollection of the state of being produced from the knowledge of probans (*liṅga jñāna*).

Aniṣṭabhedāgraha is the Cause of withdrawal :

I. iv . 8. Also this way, only the non-grasping of difference of undesired object (shell), which is recollected independently, is the cause of withdrawal (from shell). Therefore, the non-grasping of difference of the undesired object (shell), which is recollected as being the counterpositive of mutual absence such as 'This is silver, but not shell', is not the cause of withdrawal (from shell). Also since the non-grasping of non-relation of the mutual absence of shell is the meaning of the negative particle, the invalid knowledge does not become contingent.

Supposing the grasping of non-difference of the undesired object is the cause of withdrawal, then one would not withdraw from the silver after making the wrong assumption with respect to the silver that 'This is not silver'. And otherwise, invalid knowledge would become contingent. Therefore, dispite the wrong knowledge with respect to the silver that 'This is not silver', neither activity nor invalid knowledge would become contingent. For, the non-relation of non-difference of the silver is not grasped.

It may be argued now that when the difference of both from each other is not grasped individually with respect to silver and shell in the case of the illusory knowledge that 'These are shell and silver', both activity towards silver and withdrawal from shell would become necessary. However, this is not correct. There exists no proof to justify such an illusory knowledge. Since the properties to be supported by the effect (means), are to be inferred in accordance with the effect, the two knowledges, which are produced in sequencial order, are wrongly thought to have the singularity or oneness due to the non-grasping of difference. Otherwise, even you would need to admit the doubt with respect to each other individually as to 'Whether this is silver' or 'Whether this is shell' due to the non-grasping of differences of both silver and shell recollected independently. Also, both activity and withdrawal would need to arise from that which is the cause of opposite qualificative knowledge; for, the rule is that the defect, which regulates, i.e. produces the opposite qualificative knowledge, produces even activity and withdrawal.

Explanation :

The Prābhākaras point out that only the non-grasping of difference of undesired object (*aniṣṭa bhedāgraha*), recollected independently

(*svatantropasthita*), is the cause of withdrawal from shell (*nivartaka*). Therefore, according to them, the non-grasping of difference of undesired object (*tad bhedāgraha*), which is recollected as the counterpositive of the mutual absence such as 'This is silver but not shell' (*idam rajatam na śudkhiḥ*), cannot be the cause of withdrawal from shell. Also therefore, the non-grasping of non-relation of mutual absence of shell (*śukty abhāvāsamsargāgraha*) is not the meaning of the negative (in....*na śuktiḥ*),; and hence invalid knowledge (*anyathā khyāti*) does not become contingent.

Also the Prābhākaras point out that if the grasping of non-difference of undesired object (*aniṣṭā bheda graha*), instead of the non-grasping of difference of undesired object (*aniṣṭa bhedāgraha),* is the cause of withdrawal (*nivartaka*), then the withdrawal from the silver would become untenable in the case of the wrong assumption regarding the silver that 'This is not silver' (*nedam rajatam*); and otherwise invalid knowledge would become contingent. Thus, since only the *aniṣṭabhedāgraha* is the cause of withdrawal, neither activity towards silver, nor the invalid knowledge (*pravṛty anyathā khyāti*) becomes contingent in the case of 'This is not silver' (*nedam rajatam*).

Also the Prābhākaras refute the argument that when the difference of both from each other is not grasped individually (*pratyekam ubhayabhedā grahe*) with respect to silver and shell in the case of the illusory knowledge that 'These are shell and silver' (*ime raṅga rajate*), both activity and withdrawal would become necessary. According to them, such an illusory knowledge of silver and shell simultaneously together cannot be justified. However, they note that the properties to be supported by the effect, i.e. means (*kāryonneya dharma*), are to be inferred in accordance with the effect (*yathā kāryam*); and therefore, the two knowledges, i.e. the grasping (*grahaṇa*) and the recollection (*smaraṇa*), are wrongly thought to be single or one due to the non-grasping of difference. And it is necessary, even in the Naiyāyikas' theory, as otherwise the doubt as to 'Whether this is silver' or 'Whether this is shell' (*raṅgam rajatam vā*) would become contingent due to the non-grasping of difference. And the activity and the withdrawal would arise only from that which is the cause of opposite knowledge (*viparyaya niyāmaka*), as the defect producing opposite knowledge produces both activity and withdrawal.

Theory of Invalid knowledge amounts to Theory of knowledge of Empty qualifier : View of the Mīmāmsakaikadeśins:

I. iv. 9. Some Mīmāmsakaikadeśins hold as follows : That the view of the Naiyāyikas that "The contradiction of the nature of the negation of wrongly imposed validity or authoritativeness is not justified in the Mīmāmsakas' theory of the absence of knowledge; and therefore, the same contradiction establishes clearly the invalid knowledge for us, the Naiyāyikas" is not tenable. For, the state of being what contradicts and the state of being what is to be contradicted cannot be established due to the non-distinction of supposedly mutually contradictory knowledges, i.e. the knowledge which contradicts and the knowledge which is contradicted. And the state of being what is produced, while referring to the opposite, is equally applicable to the knowledge which contradicts. Also it should be noted that even the earliar knowledge contradicts the latter knowledge at times. Thus, it is justified that the knowledge produced by the non-grasping of difference, becomes contradicted by the grasping of difference.

In the case of illusion of indifference not producing activity, use or employment of word (This is silver) referring to the shell as silver is contradictory. The (state of being the) knowledge referring to the particular object, i.e. the silver as the qualificand, has the nature of being the knowledge referring merely to that, i.e. the silverness as the qualifier. Therefore, how can the invalid knowledge of mere silver be the knowledge of the non-silver, i.e. the shell?, as then the very nature of the knowledge of silver would become contradicted. Also the invalid knowledge cannot be admitted to refer to both (silver and shell). Such a knowledge would have the contingency of being collective knowledge of both silver and shell. And in support of this, it has been stated as follows : That the knowledge of one (shell) as the other (silver) stands refuted by the very nature of the knowledge of silver. For, when one object, i.e. shell, is being perceived as the qualificand of silverness, the other object, i.e. silver cannot be perceived as the qualficand.

The theory that the invalid knowledge refers to the silverness as the qualifier, though devoid of the object, i.e. the silver, as the qualificand, amounts to the theory of knowledge of empty qualifier. Also when some knowledge is admitted to be invalid, unwavering activity would become untenable towards objects, due to the doubt regarding the invalidity of all the knowledges.

It is not tenable that the confidence in the valid knowledge is possible due to being not produced from the defect of sense-organ etc. (and hence it can produce activity). For, then, in the case of lack of confidence in the valid knowledge due to illusion of defect, lack of activity would become contingent. Also, it cannot be argued that activity arises due to the state being the knowledge not produced from defect. For, lack of confidence may arise even in the knowledge not produced from defect due to the state of being the knowledge in general. And, in support of this, it is stated as follows: 'That alas even the wise logicians make this great mistake of admitting invalid knowledge. For, when the knowledge refers to the deviating qualifier

(silverness), how can the confidence in the knowledge be possible from any means'.

Explanation :

Some Mīmāmsakaikadeśins refute the Naiyāyikas' view that the contradiction (*bādha*) of the form of the negation of wrongly superimposed validity (*prasajya pratiṣedhātman*) is not justified in the case of Mīmāmskas' theory of absence of knowledge (*akhyāti*); and therefore the same establishes the invalid knowledge (*anyathā khyāti*). According to them, the knowledge which contradicts (*bādhaka*) and the knowledge which is contradicted (*bādhya*) cannot be distinguished properly; and therefore, the state of being what is contradicted (*bādhyatva*) cannot be established. Thus, it must be admitted that the activity (*vyavahāra*), prompted by the non-grasping of difference (*bhedāgraha*), becomes contradicted by the grasping of difference (*bheda graha*).

Also the Mīmāmsakaikadeśins state that in the case of illusion of indiference (*upekṣā bhrama*), the use of the word '*idam rajatam*' referring to the shell as the silver is contradictory. According to them, the state of being the knowledge referring to the silver as the qualificand (*tadviṣayatva*) has the nature of being the knowledge referring to the silverness as the qualifier (*tadīya mātra svabhāvatva*); and therefore, the invalid knowledge of mere silver (*rajatīya mātra jñāna*) cannot be the knowledge of non-silver (*arajātīya*), i.e. shell. Also, they refute that the invalid knowledge can refer to both silver and shell (*ubhayīya*) on the ground that then such a knowledge would become a collective knowledge of both (*samūhālambana*). According to them, the invalid knowledge, which is the knowledge of one as other (*anyasya anyathā bhāva*) stands refuted by the very nature of knowledge (*pratīti*), as when one object such as shell (*para*) is perceived as qualificand, the other object such silver (*para*) cannot be perceived as the qualificand.

Further, the Mīmāmsakas state that the Naiyāyikas' theory of invalid knowledge, which refers to the silverness as the qualifier without the object, i.e. the silver (*viṣayam vinā*), amounts to the theory of the knowledge of empty qualifier (*sākāravāda*); also they state that the unwavering activity (*niṣkampa pravṛtti*) becomes untenable, as the doubt regarding the invalidity cannot be avoided.

Also the Mīmāmsakas refute that the confidence in the valid knowledge (*viśvāsa*) is possible due to being not produced from defect of sense organ (*doṣājanyatvena*); and hence activity too becomes tenable. According to them, lack of activity would become contingent in the case of lack of confidence for any reason. Also they refute the argument that activity arises due to the

state of being the knowledge not produced from defect (*tajjñāna*). According to them, then lack of activity would become contingent in the case of the knowledge due to the being the knowledge in general (*jñānatvena*). Thus, they state that even the wise (*dhīmān*) like the Naiyāyikas make the great mistake (*pramāda*) of admitting invalid knowledge, as the confidence in the knowledge would not be tenable when it refers to the deviating qualifier such as the sylverness (*vyabhicārin*).

Additional difficulty in the theory of Anyathākhyāti :

I. iv. 10. Also how can the invalidity of knowledge be tenable, as the illusion refers to only the existing objects. Further, there arises the contingency of admitting the Mādhyamikas' (theory of) knowledge of non-existing objects if the illusion refers to the non-existing objects.

Also, there exists no valid reason justifying invalid knowledge. The word uttered by the reliable and the faultless inferential probans cannot constitute the reasons. Also the invalid knowledge cannot be produced from the fallacy of word and the fallacy of probans. For, only valid verbal cognition and valid inference are produced from the knowledge of word as possessing semantic competency etc. and the knowledge of subject as possessing probans. In the case of fallacy of words and that of probans, invalid knowledges are not produced due to the absence of causes only. Rather, on the other hand, only two knowledges, i.e. valid knowledge and non-knowledge of non-grasped non-relations are produced. For, in such cases, sense-organ produces the knowledge of only that object with which it is connected.

Further, invalid knowledge cannot be tenable in such a case like recognition (by grasping the recollected silverness in the shell through the eye). For, this position has already been answered (as untenable due to the distinction between impression and eye). It is not tenable that, dispite non-relation, invalid knowledge is a distinct effect produced from defect in organ. For, defect in organ cannot be the producer of any effect. For instance, the defect in the Wrightia antidysenterica cannot produce barley-sprout. Also the burning sensation in the stomach is not a defect. Whereas, birth of digestive fire is not a defect, and the same is seen to have the competency for producing digestion of food consumed. The production of any essence or marrow is not possible from the food consumed, as the food consumed is already digested. And the seed of cane burnt from the forest-fire gets totally destroyed and is non-productive.

Therefore, the ash has the state of producing the root of the plantain. Thus, it is stated by the Prācyas that 'The theory of invalid knowledge is not desirable on account of the contingency of the knowledge of empty qualifier

through inherence, on account of the untenability of the knowledge of non-existing objects, on account of the contradiction to the valid knowledge, on account of the lack of any cause and also on account of the fear of non-confidence in the knowledge. Thus, knowledge needs to be only valid'.

Explanation :

The Mīmāmsakas now point out additional difficulties in the Naiyāyikas' theory of invalid knowledge (*anyathākhyati*). According to them, the invalidity of knowledge (*ayathārthatā*) is untenable, as the illusion (*bhrama*) refers to only the existing objects (*sanmātra viṣayaka*); and if the illusion refers to the non-existing objects (*asad viṣayaka*), then, the Mādhyamikas' theory of knowledge of non-existing objects (*asat khyāti*) becomes contingent.

The Mīmāmsakas state that no valid reason (*hetu*), that justifies invalid knowledge, exists. According to them, word (*śabda*) uttered by the reliable person (*āptokta*) and the probans (*liṅga*), which is faultless (*nirdoṣa*), cannot constitute the reasons, as they establish only valid knowledge. Also they state that fallacy of word and fallacy of probans (*śabdānumānābhāsa*) cannot constitute the causes of invalid knowledge, as the knowledge of word (*śabda*), as possessing cometency (*yogyatāmat*), and the knowledge of subject (*pakṣa*), as possessing the probans (*liṅga vat*), produce only valid verbal cognition and valid inference respectively. According to them, in the case of fallacy of word and that of probans (*tadābhāsa*), invalid knowldge is not produced due to the absence of causes such as the competency of word etc.; and therefore, only two knowledges, i.e. valid knowledge and non-knowledge of non-grasped non-relations (*agṛhītāsamsarga jñāna dvaya*), amounting to the absence of knowledge (*akhyāti*), are produced.

Also the Mīmāmsakas refute the position that invalid knowledge (*anyathā khyāti*) can be tenable like recognition (*pratyabhijñā*) by grasping the recollected silverness in the shell through the eye. According to them, such a position stands already refuted due to the distinction between impression and eye. Also they reject the position that invalid knowledge, dispite non-relation (*asambaddha*), is a distinct effect (*vijātīya kārya*) produced from defect in organ (*doṣavaśāt*). According to them, defect in organ is never the producer. For instance, the defect in Wrightia antidysenterica (*kuṭaja bīja*) does not produce barley-sprout (*yavāṅkura*). On the contrary, burning sensation in the stomach (*bhasmaka*), is not a defect; and the birth of digestive fire (*vahner udbhava*), which is not an effect, produces digestion. The production of marrow (*rasārjana*) is not possible from the food consumed, as the food consumed is already digested.

The Mīmāmsakas further state that ash (*bhasma*) has the capacity for producing the root of plantain (*kadalī*). Thus, they summerize that the theory of invalid knowledge (*anyathā khyāti vāda*) is not tenable due to the contingency of knowledge of empty qualifier through inhenrence (*sākāravādāt*); due to the untenability of the knowledge of non-existing objects (*asato na bhānāt*); due to the contradiction to the valid knowledge (*samvid virodhāt*); due to the lack of any cause (*hetvabhāvāt*) and due to the fear of non-confidence in the knowledge (*anāśvāsa bhayāt*).

Conclusion of Prima Facie view that Non-knowledge is justified :

I. iv. 11. Therefore, the knowledge 'This (shell) is silver', which is the object of controversy, does not have the controdictory property (silverness) as the qualifier; for, it is a knowledge like the true (valid) knowledge. Thus it is only non-knowledge. However, the counter knowledge can be established in the case of the desire for the shell having the silverness as the qualifier and produced from the non-grasping of difference (between the shell and the silver).

The knowledgeness does not become occurent in the relational adjunct (i.e. the invalid knowledge) describing the objectness delimited by the contradictory property; for, it is a property occuring in only the knowledge, like the valid knowledgeness. Also, the counter-inference, viz. 'The eye produces the knowledge, distinct from the visual valid knowledge; for, it is an organ like tongue' is not an impediment. For, such a counter inference is useless; and the state of producing the knowledge distinct from the visual knowledge functions as the preventing condition. Further, even invalid knowledge is true or valid as far as the substratum (i.e. shell) is concerned. Also the probandum consists of useless qualification (i.e. distinct from visual valid knowledge) by the law of equality (as far as producing all types of knowledges is concerned).

Thus, only the two knowledges, i.e. the valid knowledge and the knowledge, which are not grasped to have difference both ways in respect of nature and in respect of object, are the causes of non-conforming or contradictory activity. And in support of this theory, it is stated as follows: 'That even this non-knowledge, viz. 'This is silver' in shell appears as so, i.e. as producing activity, due to the non-grasping of difference (between shell and silver), like the true or valid knowledge of silver, viz. 'This is silver' in the piece of silver existing in front, appears as producing activity'. Though the activity in general is produced from the non-grasping of difference, the designations of 'valid' and 'invalid' are made with respect to the knowledges on account of the conformity and the non-conformity of the activity. That is why, the designation 'invalid' is not made with respect to the knowledge, viz. 'The water is hot'. However, the designation 'invalid' with respect to the

knowledge of disregarding is due to its competence in producing the non-conforming activity.

Thus, ends the *Prima facie* view of the theory of invalid knowledge in the Perception in the Tattvacintāmaṇi composed Śri Gangeśopādhyāya.

Explanation :

The Mīmāmsakas conclude their prima facie view now justifying non-knowledge (*akhyāti*). According to them, only the non-knowledge (*akhyāti*), of the form of non-grasping of difference (*bhedāgraha*) between shell and silver, should be admitted in the case of the knowledge (*jñāna*) 'This (shell) is silver' (*idam rajatam*). They hold that the knowledge '*idam rajatam*', which is the object of controversy (*vivādapada*), cannot have the contradictory property of silverness as the qualifier (*vyadhikaraṇa prakāraka*), as the same is a knowledge (*jñāna*) like true or valid knowledge (*satya jñāna*). However, the Mīmāmsakas admit that the counter knowledge (*pratiyogin*) can be established in the case of the desire for shell (*śuktīcchā*), which has the silverness as the qualifier (*rajatatva prakāraka*), and is produced from non-grasping of difference.

The Mīmāmsakas state that the knowledgeness (*jñānatva*) does not occur in the relational adjunct, i.e. the invalid knowledge, describing the objectness (*viṣayatā pratiyogi vṛtti*) delimited by the contradictory qualifier of the silverness (*vyadhikaraṇa prakārāvacchinna*), as it is a property occuring only in the knowledge (*jñāna mātra vṛtti*) like the valid knowledge (*pramātvavat*). Also, they state that the counter-inference, viz. 'The eye (*cakṣuḥ*) produces the knowledge, distinct from the visual valid knowledge (*cākṣuṣa satyajñānātirikta jñāna janakam*); for, it is an organ like tongue (*indriyatvāt*)' is not an impediment. According to them, such a counter inference is useless; and the state of producing the knowledge distinct from the visual knowledge (*cākṣuṣa jñānātirikta jñāna janakatva*) is a preventing or impeding condition (*upādhi*) of the counter inference. Also, according to them, even the so called invalid knowledge (*anyathākhyāti*) is true or valid (*satya*) as far as the substratum (shell) (*dharmyamśa*) is concerned.

The Mīmāmsakas conclude that the two knowledges, i.e. the valid knowledge (*sat khyāti*) and the non-knowledge (*akhyāti*), which are not grasped to have difference both ways in nature and in object, are the causes of non-conforming activity (*visamvādi pravṛtti*). And they support their theory by quoting the verse that 'The non-knowledge viz. 'This (shell) is silver' (*idam rajatam*) in the shell appears as producing activity due to the non-grasping of difference (*bhedānadhyavasāyāt*) like the valid knowledge, viz. 'This (silver) is silver' (*idam rajatam*) in the silver appears as producing activity'. According to them, dispite that the activity in general (*vyavahāra mātra*) is produced from non-grasping of difference (*bhedāgraha*), the designations 'valid' (*yathārtha*) and 'invalid' (*ayathārtha*) are applied to the knowledge, in accordance wtih the conformity (*samvāda*) and non-conformity (*visamvāda*) of activity. Thus, the designation 'invalid' is not applied to the knowledge 'Water is hot' (*uṣṇam jalam*); whereas the designation 'invalid' is applied to the knowledge of disregard (*upekṣā jñāna*).

The end of Anyathā khyāti Pūrvapakṣa in the Pratyakṣakhaṇḍa.

Conclusive view : Invalid knowledge is Qualificative

I. iv. 12. The conclusive view is as follows : That in the case of true or valid knowledge, the knowledge of the desired object (silver) in front is established to be the cause of conforming activity in general in both schools; and therefore, due to brevity, only the qualificativeness of the knowledge describing the objectness of the object in front, i.e. the shell, would be considered to be the delimitor of the causality of knowledge for avoiding the over extension in the production of activity. And the same qualificativeness can be quickly recollected, at the time of the grasping of the causality of knowledge, by being what is to be known through the comprehensional relation of knowledge. And there exists no hindrance in admitting qualificativeness of invalid knowledge.

Explanation :

Gangeśa begins here the exposition of the conclusive view of the Naiyāyikas that the admitance of invalid knowledge (*anyathā khyāti*) is necessary. According to him, in the case of true or valid knowledge (*satyasthale*), the knowledge of the desired object, i.e. silver in front (*iṣṭa purovarti jñāna*) is established to be the cause (*hetu*) of the conforming activity in general (*pravṛttimātra*) in both the schools; and therefore, only the qualificativeness of knowledge (*vaiśiṣṭya*) describing the objectness of the object in front, i.e. the shell (*viṣayatā*) needs to be the delimitor of the causality of knowledge (*kāraṇatāvacchedaka*) to avoid the over extension in the production of activity. Further, the Naiyāyikas state that the same qualificativeness can be quickly recollected (*śīghro' pasthitika*) at the time of the grasping of the causality of knowledge (*kāraṇatāgraha samaye*) due to being what is to be known through the comprehensional relation of knowledge (*jñāna vitti vedya*). Thus, there exists no hindrance in admitting the qualificativeness of invalid knowledge.

Refutation of Objection that Iṣṭabhedāgraha is Cause :

I. iv. 13. It may be objected now as follows : That the non-grasping of difference from the desired silver, which is recollected independently, needs to be the cause (of activity). Whereas, the state of being the non-grasping of such a difference (from the desired silver) is merely the delimitor of the causality due to the heaviness and also due to the state of being that whose recollection needs to be assumed additionally. Also only the non-grasping of difference in general is the cause (of both conforming and non-conforming

activities) due to the necessity of its being the cause in the case of (both valid and invalid) qualificative knowledges.

However, this is not correct. Since the causality of the non-grasping of difference in the case of (both types of) qualificative knowledges is to be assumed subsequent to the assumption or establishment of the invalid qualificative knowledge, the causality of the non-grasping of difference is not recollected at the time of the causality of the qualificative knowledge towards the activity.

Explanation :

The Pūrvapakṣin objects now that the non-grasping of difference from the desired silver (*iṣṭabhedāgraha*), which is recollected independently (*svatantropasthita*), is the cause of activity (*kāraṇa*); and hence invalid knowledge need not be the cause. According to them, the state of being the non-grasping of such a difference from the silver (*tādṛśa bhedāgrahatva*) is merely the delimitor of the causality (*kāraṇatāvacchedaka*) due to the heaviness. Also only the non-grasping of difference in general (*bhedāgraha*) is the cause of both conforming and non-coforming activities due to the necessity of it being the cause in the case of both valid and invalid qualificative knowledges. (*viśiṣṭa jñāna*).

The Naiyāyikas, however refute the objection on the ground that the causility of the non-grasping of difference (*bhedāgraha hetutva*), in the case of both types of qualificative knowledges (*viśiṣṭa jñāne*), is to be assumed subsequent to the assumption of the invaid qualificative knowledge; and therefore, the causality of the non-grasping of difference cannot be recollected at the time of the causality of the qualificative knowledge towards the activity (*pravṛtti kāraṇatā samaye*).

Visamvādi pravṛtti is produced from Viśiṣṭa jñāna :

I. iv. 14. It should not be argued that this way (in the Naiyāyikas' theory), there arises the heaviness in the assumption of the illusory, i.e. invalid knowledge as the cause of activity. Since the establishment of the heaviness gets automatically refuted by the non-establishment of the causality of non-grasping of difference, the heaviness caused by the fruit is not a fault at the time of the assumption of means or cause of producing activity. The assumption of the qualificative knowledge as the cause of activity is justified by the authoritative means.

Thus, the non-conforming activity needs to be produced from the (invalid) qualificative knowledge; for, it is an activity like the conforming activity. Since the effect (activity) is untenable without the established cause,

invalid qualificative knowledge gets established to be a non-redundant cause of activity. Thus the defective organ gets established as the cause (of invalid qualificative knowledge) on account of the causality of qualificative knowledge established by the activity. And the untenability otherwise is the strongest of all the justifications.

Explanation :

The Naiyāyikas refute the argument now that when the invalid qualificative knowledge is held to be the cause of activity, the heaviness (*gaurava*) arises in the assumption. According to them, the establishment of the heaviness (*siddhi*) gets automatically refuted by the non-establishment of the causality (*asiddhi*) of non-grasping of difference; and the heaviness caused by fruit (*phalamukha gaurava*) is not a fault. Also according to them, the assumption of invalid knowledge (*anyathā khyāti*) as the cause of activity is established by authoritative means.

Also the Naiyāyikas explain that even the non-conforming activity (*visamvādi pravṛtti*) is to be produced from the invalid qualificative knowledge (*viśiṣṭa jñāna*), as it is an activity (*pravṛtti*) like the conforming activity (*satya pravṛtti*). According to them, invalid qualificative knowledge gets established to be a non-redent cause of activity (*ananyathā siddha*), as the effect of activity is not tenable without the established means (*kḷpta kāraṇa*); consequently even the defective organ (*sadoṣam indriyam*) gets established as the cause of invalid qualificative knowledge, as the causality of the knowledge is established by the activity.

Pravṛtti is not tenable from Bhedāgraha :

I. iv. 15. Also the (non-conforming) activity is not tenable from the non-grasping of difference (from silver). For, the activity (towards shell) and withdrawal (from silver) would become contingent simultaneously together in the case of the collective knowledges of opposite four, viz. 'These are shell and silver' and 'These are silver and shell'.

Also it is not correct to argue that no proof exists in support of such collective knowledges of opposite four. Since the totalities of causes of collective illusory or invalid knowledges of both silver and shell exist simultaneously together, the production of such illusory knowledges, viz. 'These are silver and shell' is experienced like the production of such valid knowledges, viz. 'These are shell and silver'. Otherwise, in the case of the loss of collective knowledge, the numbers twoness etc. would become non-perceptible. Also, such collective invalid knowledges are possible from the knowledges of words such as 'These are shell and silver'. We, the Naiyāyikas, need not have any doubt, as the silver and the shell can be grasped to have the difference from the silver and the shell respectively by means of the power of defect in organ. However, on the contrary, you, the Mīmāsakas, need to have the doubt individually as to whether this is shell or silver; as the individual difference of both shell and silver cannot be grasped in in any one, i.e. shell or silver.

Explanation :

The Naiyāyikas refute the position that the (non-conforming) activity (*pravṛtti*) can be tenable from the non-grasping of difference (*bhedāgraha*). According to them, then, activity (towards shell) and withdrawal (from silver) (*pravṛtti nivṛtti*) would become necessary simultaneously (*yugapat*) in the case of the collective knowledges of the opposite four (*viparīta catuṣka*), viz, 'These are shell and silver' (*ime raṅga rajate*) and 'These are silver and shell' (*ime rajata raṅge*).

Also the Naiyāyikas refute the argument that no proof exists (*mānābhāva*) in support of such collective knowledges of opposite four (*viparīta catuṣka*). According to them, the totalities of causes of collective invalid knowledges of both silver and shell (*bhrama sāmagrī*) exist together; and therefore the productionof the illusory collective knowledge, viz. ' These are silver and shell' can be experienced like the production of the illusory collective knowledge, viz. 'These are shell and silver'. Further, the Naiyāyikas point out that, otherwise in the absence of collective knowledge, the experience of the twoness (*dvitva saṅkhyā*) would become untenable; and also the knowledges of words '*ime raṅga rajate*' can be admitted to produce collective knowledges. Also, while the Naiyāyikas need not have the any doubt (*samśaya*), as the silver and shell (*rajata raṅga*) can be grasped to have difference from the silver and shell due to the power of defect in organs (*doṣa mahiman*), the Mīmāmsakas need to have doubt, as the individual difference of both shell and silver (*ubhaya bheda*) cannot be grasped in anyone, i.e. shell or silver.

Refutation of the theory that Pravṛtti nivṛtti are from Tadabhedāgraha :

I. iv. 16. It may be argued that activity and withdrawal are produced from the non-grasping of difference of both silver and shell in shell and silver respectively provided that the recollections of silver and shell are produced from the knowledges of the properties of the silverness and the shellness respectively. Only the silver and the shell, and not the shell and the silver, are recollected as possessing the properties of the shell and the silver, viz. the shellness and the silverness. The activity of one desirous of Phaseolus Radiatus - pulse towards the black powder existing in the heap of Phaseolus Radiatus-pulses is produced from the non-grasping of difference of the Phaseolus Radiatus-pulse recollected from the dark colour of the black powder. And the

superimposition of the silverness experienced in the shell cannot be established (to produce both activity and withdrawal). Otherwise, even you, the Naiyāyikas, would require to have the knowledges of both shell and silver individually in each.

No, this argument is not correct. The activity and the withdrawal are not produced from the knowledge of the properties of the silverness and the shellness in the case of the recollections of the desired silver and the undesired shell from either illusory knowledge of word or perception. Also, we, the Naiyāyikas, can admit the recollections of both the silver and the shell from the knowledge of a single property, i.e. the silverness or the shellness; however, the knowledges of both the silver and the shell are not produced as qualified by the silverness and the shellness due to the defect in sense organ. Thus, the contradictory knowledges of both the silver and the shell, as qualified by the shellness and the silverness respectively, need to be established in the theories of both the schools, from the defect in the organ. Also this way, it is not tenable that activity and withdrawal are produced merely from the necessary defect in sense-organ. The defect in sense–organ is absent in the case of valid knowledges (of silver and shell) produced from defectless organ. Also it is not tenable that non-conforming activity is produced from the defect in general. The defects in sense-organ, probans, and word are not consecutive or uniform. Also defects need to vary as the generic properties, (viz. perceptuality, inferenceness and varbality) vary in accordance with the knowledges produced from perception, inference and word.

Explanation :

The Mīmāmsakas argue now that the contingency of both the activity and the withdrawal simultaneously together (*yugapat pravṛtti nivṛttī*) can be avoided. According to them, the activity and the withdrawal are produced from the non-grasping of difference of silver and shell in shell and silver (*tadbhedāgraha*), provided that the recollections of silver and shell (*yadupasthitī*) are produced from the knowledges of properties of the silverness and the shellness (*yaddharma jñāna*). Also according to them, only the silver and the shell (*rajata raṅge*), and not the shell and the silver (*raṅga rajate*), are recollected as possessing the properties, viz. the shellness and the silverness respectively (*raṅga rajata dharmeṇa*). However, both the activity and the withdrawal are not produced from the superimposition of the silverness which is experienced (*anubhūyamānāropa*). Thus, there arises no contingency of the activity and the withdrawal simulteneously together from the non-grasping of difference, as the recollections of silver and shell cannot be produced from the knowledges of properties of the silverness and the shellness.

However, the Naiyāyikas refute the argument. According to them, the activity and withdrawal cannot be held to be produced from the knowledges of the properties of the silverness and the shellness in the case where the recollections of them are produced from the erroneous or illusory knowledge of word (*śabdābhāsa*) or the perception (*pratyakṣa*). Also according to them, the knowledges of both the silver and the shell (*rajata raṅgayoḥ*) cannot be produced as qualified by the silverness and the shellness (*tattayā*) due to the defect in organ in spite of the recollection of both silver and shell from the knowledge of single property. Thus, the contradictory knowledges of both the silver and the shell as qualified by the shellness and the silverness respectively (*viparīta jñāna*) need to be admitted only from defect in both schools. Also the Naiyāyikas refute the position that activity and withdrawal (*pravṛtti nivṛttī*) are produced merely from the necessary defect in the sense organ (*āvaśyaka doṣa*). According to them, the defect in organ cannot be held to produce the activity and withdrawal in the case of valid knowledge of silver and shell (*satya jñāne*) produced from defectless organ. Also they refute that non-conforming activity (*visamvādinī*) cannot be held to be produced from the defect in general. According to them, the defects in sense–organs, probans and word cannot be generalized (*ananugata*), as the generic properties such as the perceptuality, the inferenceness and the validity vary (*jāti bheda*) in accordance with the knowledges produced from perception, inference and word.

Refutation of Navya Prābhākaras' theory that Yugapat pravṛtti nivṛttī can be avoided :

I. iv. 17. The Navya Prābhārakas hold as follows : That an intense desire to recollect the property (flashyness), known to be existing in the shell, arises in the case of silver; for, the same property is observed to have more close association with the silverness (existing in silver). However, such an intense desire to recollect the same property is absent in the case of shell; for, the same property is observed to have less close association with the shellness. Thus, the desire is non-intense there. This way, the still more intense desire to recollect the property, known to be existing in the silver, impedes the less intense desire to recollect the property (known to be existing in the shell). Thus, the withdrawal cannot arise from the shell. Also, this way the activity cannot arise towards the silver.

No, this theory is not correct. The contingency of simultaneous activity and withdrawal would arise from the illusory knowledge of words, viz. 'These are shell and silver'. When both the silverness and the shellness are recollected from the words, the desire to recollect is equal with respect to both of them. Moreover, this way, since the properties, viz. the silverness and the shellness,

are understood to have more close and less close associations, the doubt having intense and non-intense sides such as 'Whether this is shell or silver' would become necessary. Thus, no proof, justifying the assumption of intense and non-intense desires, exists. Also, the intensiveness of desire cannot be described property.

Explanation :

The Navya Prābhākaras propose now that an intense desire (*utkaṭākāṅkṣā*) to recollect the property (*dharma*) such as the flashyness, known to be existing in the shell, arises in the silver (*rajate*), as the same property is observed to have more close association (*bhūyas sahacāra*) with the silverness. However, according to them, the intense desire to recollect the same property of flashyness is absent in the case of shell, as the same property is observed to have less close association with the shellness. Further, the Prābhākaras propose that the still more intense desire to recollect the property (*ataḥ utkaṭākāṅkṣā*), known to be existing in the silver (*rajata vṛttitayā*), impedes the less intense desire (*anutkaṭākāṅkṣā*). Therefore, according to them, the withdrawal (*nivṛtti*) from the shell and the activity (*pravṛtti*) towards the silver would not become contingent simultaneously (*yugapat*).

The Naiyāyikas, however, refute the proposal. According to them, simultaneous activity towards the silver and withdrawal from the shell (*yugapat pravṛtti nivṛttī*) would become contingent from the illusory knowledges of words (*śabdābhāsa*) such as 'These are shell and silver' (*ime raṅga rajate*), as the desire to recollect the properties (the silverness and the shellness) is equal when the same properties are recollected from word (*śabdād upasthitau*). Also, the Naiyāyikas state that, on the contrary, since the properties such as the silverness and the shellness have more and less close associations (*bhūyo' lpasahacāra*), only the doubt of intense and non-intense sides (*utkaṣānutkaṭa koṭika*), viz. '*raṅgam rajatam vā*' would be necessary; and therefore the assumption of intense and non-intense desires cannot be justified.

Mīmāmsakas' objection : Aniṣṭa viṣayatva of Pravṛtti is Visamvāda*:

I. iv. 18. It might be so. However, it must be admitted that only qualificative knowledge (of silver) and the non-grasping of difference (of silver) are the causes of the varieties of effects, such as conforming and non-conforming activities respectivity; for, they are already assumed. However, the validity and the invalidity of qualificative knowledges cannot be admitted to be the causes of them; for, they are heavy and are not yet assumed. Also since the knowledge of desired silver and that of undesired shell existing in front are the causes of activity and withdrawal in general, no lack of generalization arises; however, the qualificative knowledges of the same objects are not the causes due to the heaviness.

It should not be argued that the overextension of the effect, i.e. the withdrawal from the desired silver would become necessary in the event of grasping of difference of the silver from the shell. No effect in general is produced from the cause in general without the two specific causes, viz. qualificative knowledge (of silver) and the non-grasping of difference (of silver from shell). There exists no general cause without particular characteristics. Otherwise, a blind person would need to have the perception of an object in the moon-light provided he comes in skin-contact with the object of large perceptible form. For, the cause of perception of substance in general is present. This way, it may be held that only non-conforming activity towards shell and withdrawal from silver are produced respectively from the non-grasping of difference; however, conforming activity towards silver and withdrawal from shell are not produced due to the absence of qualificative knowledges (of silver and shell).

It may be argued now as follows : That since the silver and the shell cannot be grasped to have the difference from the silver and the shell respectively, the non-conforming activity and the withdrawal would be necessary due to the presence of the totality of causes in general. And suppose you state that non-conforming activity is not tenable towards the real silver, then we shall reply that for this very reason, the non-grasping of difference is not the cause of non-conforming activity. For, the non-conforming activity is absent dispite the presence of non-grasping of difference. Also it is not correct to state that the non-conformity pertaining to the activity and withdrawal depends upon the conformity pertaining to them; and therefore, activity and withdrawal are produced from the causes that produce conformity and non-conformity, for, cause does not depend on effect.

No, this argument is not correct. The non-conforming nature means the state of being the activity referring to the undesired obect and the state of being the withdrawal referring to the desired object. Therefore, since the non-grasping of difference is the cause of both the non-conforming activity towards undesired object (shell) and the non-conforming withdrawal from the desired object (silver), how can the conforming activity towards the desired object and the conforming withdrawal from the undesired object be possible from the same non-grasping of difference? For, the non-grasping of difference does not have the competency for producing both the conforming activity and the conforming withdrawal.

Explanation :

The Mīmāṁsakas now raise the objection that the qualificative knowledge (*viśiṣṭa jñāna*) and the non-grasping of difference (*bhedāgraha*) are the causes of the varieties of effects (*vaicitrya*), viz. the conforming activity (*saṁvādi pravṛtti*) and the non-conforming activity (*visaṁvādi pravṛtti*) respectively; however, the validity of qualificative knowledge (*satyatva*) and the invalidity of qualificative knowledge (*asatyatva*) are not the causes of the same due to the heaviness. According to them, the knowledge of desired silver and that of undesired shell existing in front (*iṣṭāniṣṭa purovarti jñāna*) are the causes of activity and withdrawal in general (*pravṛtti nivṛtti mātre*); and therefore, lack of generalization (*ananugama*) does not arise in the causality. Thus, merely qualificative knowledge need not be admitted to be the cause of both activity and withdrawal.

Also, the Mīmāṁsakas refute the argument here that the overextension of the effect (*atiprasaṅga*), viz. the withdrawal from the desired silver would become necessary in the event of grasping of difference of silver from shell (*bheda graha*). According to them, no effect can be produced (*kāryānutpāda*), from the cause in general (*sāmānyahetoḥ*), without the two specific causes, (*viśeṣadvaya hetu*), viz. the qualificative knowledge (*viśiṣṭa jñāna*) and the non-grasping of difference (*bhedāgraha*). And the general cause without particular characteristies cannot exist. Thus, only the non-conforming activity towards shell and the withdrawal from silver (*visaṁvādinyau*) are produced respectively from the non-grasping of difference (*bhedāgraha*); however, the conforming activity and withdrawal (*saṁvādinyau*) are not produced due to the absence of the particular cause of qualificative knowledge (*viśiṣṭa jñāna*).

The Naiyāyikas argue here that when the silver and the shell are not grasped to have the difference from the silver and the shell respectively (*bhedā graha*), the non-conforming activity and the withdrawal (*visaṁvādinyau*) would become necessary due to the presence of the totality of causes (*sāmagrī*). According to them, since the non-conforming activity (*visaṁvādinī*) is not tenable towards the true or real silver (*satyarajate*), the non-grasping of difference (*bhedāgraha*) cannot be the cause of non-conforming activity. Also according to them, the non-conformity (*visaṁvāditva*), pertaining to the activity and the withdrawal (*pravṛtti nivṛtti gata*), cannot be admitted to be dependent on the conformity pertaining to them (*saṁvāditva*); and therefore, activity and withdrawal cannot be produced from the causes of conformity and non-conformity, as the cause cannot depend on the effect.

However, the Mīmāṁsakas refute the argument. According to them, the non-conformity (*visaṁvāda*) means the state of being the activity referring to the undesired object (*pravṛtter aniṣṭaviṣayatva*) and the state of being the withdrawal referring to the desired object (*nivṛtter iṣṭaviṣayatva*). Therefore, only the non-grasping of difference (*bhedāgraha*) is the cause of both the non-conforming activity towards the undesired object and the non-conforming withdrawal from the desired object. Thus, the conforming activity towards the desired silver (*iṣṭaviṣaya pravṛtti*) and the conforming withdrawal from the undesired shell (*aniṣṭa viṣaya nivṛtti*) cannot be produced from merely the non-grasping of difference (*bhedāgraha*) which is not competent there.

Naiyāyikas' Reply : Iṣṭa jñāna is the Cause of Activity :

I. iv. 19. Here we, the Naiyāyikas state our reply : Since knowledge produces activity towards its own object, only the same is ascertained to be the cause of both the first ever activity of a child and that of the conforming activity by one and all due to brevity and absence of impediment. Therefore, the knowledge of the shell as the desired object, which is conducive to the activity towards the shell, refers to the shell as its object; for, it is the cause of the activity towards the shell and the knowledge is not competent to produce the activity towards something which is not the object of itself.

It may be proposed now as follows : That since the non-conforming activity is tenable towards shell merely from the non-grasping of difference from silver and the necessary grasping and recollecting (of silver), we shall assume that the knowledge is the cause of activity towards even non-object, as there arises the heaviness in assuming qualificative knowledge as the cause of activity. Therefore, even the position that the knowledge of object is ascertained to be the cause of first ever activity of a child too can be abandoned.

However, this proposal is not correct. On account of the first ever employed means of knowledge, qualificative knowledge needs to be assumed to be the cause even in the case of non-conforming activity. Without impediment, assumption of a different cause, which is contrary to the original assumption of cause, cannot be made. Also the heaviness in the assumption of cause (qualificative knowledge) facilitating the fruit (non-conforming activity) is not a fault. Otherwise, the assumption of expressive power of word in what is related to the effect (action) yet to be accomplished, though already admitted by all the schollars, would be required to be abandoned due to the verbal cognition of only the accomplished object and also due to the heaviness. Thus, only the theory of the Gurus would become well established.

Explanation :

The Naiyāyikas reply here that knowledge (*jñāna*) prduces activity towards only its object (*svaviṣaya*); and therefore, only the same knowledge

needs to be assumed to be the cause of both the first ever activity of a child (*ādya pravṛtti*) and the conforming activity (*samvādi*). According to them, therefore, it must be admitted that the knowledge of the shell as the desired object (*iṣṭa jñāna*), when conducive to the activity towards shell, refers to the shell as its object (*śukti viṣayaka*), as knowledge is not competent (*asamartha*) to produce the activity towards something which is not its object (*svāviṣaya*).

The Pūrvapakṣin proposes here that non-conforming activity (*visamvādi pravṛtti*) is tenable merely from the non-grasping of difference (*bhedāgraha*); and therefore, knowledge (*jñāna*) needs to be the cause of activity towards even non-object (*svāviṣaya*), as the assumption of qualificative knowledge as the cause is heavy. Thus even the position that the knowledge is ascertained to be the cause of first ever activity of a child too can be abandoned.

However, the Naiyāyikas refute the proposal. According to them, qualificative knowledge (*viśiṣṭa jñāna*) needs to be assumed as the cause of non-conforming activity (*visamvādin*) on account of the first ever employed means of knowledge (*prathama pravṛtta pramāṇa*). Also, according to them, assumption of a different cause (*kalpanāntara*) is not tenable without the impediment (*bādhaka*). It should be noted that the heaviness in the assumption of a cause conducive to the effect (*phala mukha gaurava*) is not a fault, as otherwise even the theory that expressive power of word (*śakti*) in what is related to the effect (action) yet to be accomplished (*kāryānvita*) would become untenable due to the verbal cognition of the accomplished object (*siddhārtha*); thus, only the theory of the Gurus would become established.

Both Iṣṭa jñāna and Bhedāgraha can be causes respectively:

I. iv. 20. It may be held now as follows : It is true that knowledge produces activity towards its own object. However, merely the knowledge of the substratum, viz. 'This (shell) is (silver)', and not the knowledge of the desired object, viz. 'This (shell) is the desired object', produces the non-conforming activity towards the shell. The knowledge of the desired object, constitutes merely the delimitor of the causality existing in the non-grasping of difference (of shell) from the desired silver being known as the cause due to brevity. Thus, the same knowledge of desired object is redundant like the jarness.

This way, the state of being the object of the knowledge of the silver, which can be described as the state of being the object of knowledge which is conducive to the activity delimited by such an object, does not exist in the shell. Otherwise, the knowledge of the silver would need to refer to the shell as its object. It should be noted that the knowledge of the desired silver is the cause of the conforming activity towards the silver. For, such a knowledge of the desired silver constitutes the qualificative knowledge of silver. Since such a knowledge of the desired silver is identical with the knowledge conducive to the activity, the state of being the delimitor of the causality is absent there in the knowledge. And this is the essence of our conclusion.

Here, we, the Naiyāyikas reply : In accordance with the independent positive and nagative concomitances, the knowledge of the desired object (silver) is only the cause of the conforming activity; however it is neither the delimitor of the causality of the cause nor redundant. The positive and negative concomitances of the non-grasping of difference (of shell from silver) are not assumed with the non-conforming activity by taking into account the knowledge of the desired object (silver); and hence the same knowledge of the desired object (silver) need not be the delimitor of the causality like the staffness. Also the positive and negative concomitances of the knowledge of the desired object (silver) are not assumed with the conforming activity as inclusive of the non-grasping of the difference,; and hence the same non-grasping of difference need not be redundant like the form of a jar. Otherwise, why should it not be admitted that only the knowledge of the desired object (silver), wherein the difference (of shell from silver) is not grasped, is the cause of the activity, and the non-grasping of difference is only the delimitor of the causality. Therefore, both the knowledge of the desired object (silver) and the non-grasping of the difference (of shell from silver) can be the causes of activity due to independent positive and negative concomitances.

Moreover, in the case of the activity towards the desired object (silver), the valid knowledge of the desired object (silver) is the cause of activity in general; and hence the non-conforming activity towards the undesired shell needs to be produced from the invalid knowledge of the desired object (silver); for, no effect can be produced without the assumed cause. Also the state of being the activity towards the desired object (silver) is not the delimitor of the producedness of the activity produced from the knowledge of the desired object due to the heaviness in assumption. For, only in the absence of any impediment, the two related items in general are ruled to have the cause and effect - relationship. That is why, the same state of being the activity is not even the condition of the causality.

Explanation :

The Mīmāmsakas now propose that dispite admitting knowledge (*jñāna*) as the cause of producing activity (*pravartaka*) towards its objects (*svaviṣaya*), only the knowledge of the substratum such as 'This (shell) is (silver)' (*idam jñāna*), but not the knowledge of the desired object such as 'This (shell) is the desired object' (*iṣṭa jñāna*), must be held to be the cause of the non-conforming activity towards shell (*visamvādi pravṛtti*). According to them, the knowledge

of the desired object (silver) (*iṣṭa jñāna*) is merely the delimitor of the causality (*kāraṇatāvacchedaka*) existing in the non-grasping of difference (of shell) from silver (*iṣṭa bhedāgraha*), viz. the cause. Thus, the same knowledge of desired object is redundant like the staffness (*anyathā siddha*).

The Mīmāmsakas conclude that the state of being the object of the knowledge of silver (*rajata jñānasya tadviṣayatva*), viz. the state of being the object of knowledge which is conducive to the activity (*vyavahārānukūlatva*) delimited by such an object (*tat pratibaddha*) cannot exist in the shell; as the knowledge of silver (*rajata jñāna*) never refers to the shell. Nevertheless, the Mīmāmsakas admit that the knowledge of the desired object (silver) (*iṣṭa jñāna*) is the producer of the conforming activity (*samvādi pravṛtti*) by being the qualificative knowledge (*viśiṣṭa jñāna*). According to them, the knowledge of the desired silver is identical with the knowledge which is conducive to the activity; and hence the same is not merely the delimitor of the causality (*avacchedaka*).

The Naiyāyikas, however, refute the proposal. According to them, in accordance with the independent positive and negative concomitances (*svatantrānvaya vyatirekāt*), the knowledge of the desired object (silver) (*iṣtta jñāna*) needs to be only the cause (*hetu*) of activity, but not the delimitor of the causality (*hetutāvacchedaka*). The knowledge of the desired object (silver) cannot be the delimitor of the causality, as the positive and negative concomitances of non-grasping of difference (of shell from silver) (*bhedāgraha*) is not assumed with the non-conforming activity by taking into account the knowledge of the desired object. Further, according to the Naiyāyikas, the positive and negative concomitances of the knowledge of the desired object (silver) is not assumed with the conforming activity by including the non-grasping of difference of shell from silver; and therefore, the same non-grasping of difference need not be redundant (*anyathāsiddha*). Thus, both the knowledge of the desired object (silver) (*iṣṭa jñāna*) and the non-grasping of difference of shell from silver (*bhedāgraha*) are causes of conforming and non-conforming activities respectively due to the positive and negative concomitances.

The Naiyāyikas further maintain that while the valid knowledge of the desired object (silver) (*iṣṭa jñāna*) is the cause of activity in general (*pravṛtti mātra*), the invalid knowledge of silver (*anyathā khyāti*) needs to be the cause of the activity towards the undesired shell (*visamvādinī pravṛtti*), as no effect can be produced without cause. Also they state that the state of being the activity towards the desired object (*iṣṭa viṣaya pravṛttitva*) cannot be the delimitor of the effectness (*kāryatāvacchedala*) of the activity due to heaviness in assumption. Also it should be noted that the two related items in general

(*sāmānyayoḥ*) are ruled to have the cause and effect relationship (*kāryakāraṇa bhāva*) in the absence of impediment (*bādhaka*). Thus, invalid knowledge gets established to be the cause of non-conformity activity.

Refutation of the Position that mere Jñāna is the Cause and Reiteration of Anyathākhyāti :

I. iv. 21. It may be argued that even in the case of conforming activity, the mere knowledge of the substratum, viz. 'This (silver) is (silver)' produces the activity; and the same knowledge refers to the desired object (silver) by chance, i.e. due to the totality of causes. However, we shall reply that then the conforming activity towards the desired object too would become necessary from the mere knowledge of the substratum, viz. 'This (silver) is (silver)'. Also, the non-grasping of difference (of shell) from the desired object (silver), being known, cannot produce the activity in the case of conforming activity like in the case of non-conforming activity. From this the following position too becomes refuted : "That the valid knowledge of silver does not refer to the shell as its object; for, it does not constitute the cause of the activity delimited by shell, i.e. towards such a shell". For, the very nature of being valid knowledge would become unexampled.

It may be argued now as follows : That the pervasion, i.e. the rule that the knowledge is only valid contradicts the Naiyāyikas' theory of invalid knowledge. And that is why, the qualificative knowledge and the knowledge of the desired object (silver) are the causes of the activity in general due to brevity. And the knowledge produces the activity only towards its own object, as all the scholars have admitted the knowledge to be the cause in the case of the first ever activity (of a child). Whereas in the case of false or non-conformity activity (towards shell), even the knowledge of the desired object constitutes the cause of activity; and hence it does not merely constitute the delimitor of the causality of the cause, viz. the non-grasping of difference (of shell from silver). Thus, the establishment of the theory of invalid knowledge becomes untenable.

However, this argument is not correct. Since the inferences refuting the theory of invalid knowledge are based on the causality ascertained by the redundant positive and negative concomitances, the same inferences destroy the pervasion, i.e. the rule of valid knowledge. Since no effect is produced without the assumed cause, and also since no contradiction arises in the opposite view (of not admitting the theory of only valid knowledge), we can explain the means conducive to the unwavering activity (towards the shell) in the theory of invalid knowledge. From this refutation, even the following Mīmāmsakas' theory gets refuted: "That unlike recognition, one single

knowledge is not tenable with respect to an object, devoid of mutual relationship, either from sense organ or impression or from the knowledge of word; and hence the pervasion, i.e. the rule, that knowledge is only valid gets established." Also, dispite the non-establishment of the pervasion i.e. the rule, production of effect is necessary in the presence of the totality of causes.

Explanation :

The Naiyāyikas reiterate their theory of invalid knowledge (*anyathākhyāti vāda*) here. They hold that the argument that even in the case of conforming activity, the mere knowledge of the substratum, viz. 'This (silver) is (silver)' (*idam jñāna*) produces the activity; and the same knowledge refers to the desired object (silver) (*iṣṭa viṣayaka*) by chance is not tenable. According to them, in that case, the conforming activity would become necessary from the mere knowledge of the substratum, viz. 'This (silver) is (silver)' (*idam jñāna*) only. Also according to them, the non-grasping of difference (of shell) from silver (*bhedāgraha*) cannot produce the conforming activity (*samvādi pravṛtti*); and hence acceptance of knowledge of the desired object (silver) (*iṣṭa jñāna*) is necessary. Further, the Naiyāyikas refute the objection that the valid knowledge of silver (*rajata jñāna*) does not refer to the shell (*śukti viṣayaka*), due to not being the cause of the activity delimited by the shell (*tatpratibaddha vyavahāra*). According to them, then the very nature of being valid knowledge (*svarūpa*) would become unexampled.

The Mīmāmsakas, however, raise the argument that the pervasion, i.e. the rule, that knowledge is only valid (*jñānam yathārtham*) contradicts the Naiyāyikas' theory of invalid knowledge. According to them, the qualificative knowledge (*viśiṣṭa jñāna*) and the knowledge of the desired object (silver) (*iṣṭa jñāna*) must be admitted to be the causes of activity in general (*pravṛtti mātra*), as all admit the knowledge to be the cause of activity (*pravartaka*) towards its own object (*svaviṣaya*) in the case of first ever activity of child (*ādya pravṛtti*). Also according to them, in the case of false or non-conforming activity (*asatya sthale*), even the knowledge of desired object (silver) (*iṣṭa jñāna*) constitutes the cause of activity (*pravartaka*); and thus, Naiyāyikas' theory of invalid knowledge (*anyathā khyāti vāda*) cannot be tenable.

The Naiyāyikas, however, refute the argument on the ground that the inferences refuting the theory of invalid knowledge (*teṣām*) are based on the causality ascertained by the redundant positive and negative concomitances (*anyathā siddhānvaya vyatireka*); and therefore, the same inferences destroy the pervasion, i.e. the rule, supporting the theory of valid knowledge. According to them, since no effect is tenable without the assumed cause (*kḷpta kāraṇa*), the means conducive to the unwavering activity (*niṣkampa pravṛtti*) needs to

be explained in the form of the invalid knowledge. Further, the Naiyāyikas refute the Mīmāsakas' view that knowledge is only valid (*yathārtha*) on the ground that one single knowledge is not tenable with respect to an object either from sense-organ (*indriya*) or from the knowledge of word (*śabdābhāsa*) in the absence of mutual relationship (*sambandha viraha*).

Refutation of the View of the Ekadeśins that Anyathā khyāti is not necessary :

I. iv. 22. The Prābhākaraikadeśins state here as follows : Since the silver and the shell need not be grasped to have the difference from the silver and the shell respectively, activity and withdrawal do not become contingent simultaneously. Also therefore in that case, invalid knowledge does not become necessary, as the difference from the recollected silver and shell can be grasped in the object in front by leaving out the actual object in front due to the defect of organ. Also it should not be argued that then in that case, the recollection of the silver, as qualified by the silverness, would be required to refer to all the silvers, which are the objects of the impression of silver, as the comprehensional relation characterized by the universal is equal in its reference to all the silvers. Despite the comprehensional relation characterized by both the aspects of the thisness and the silverness, the non-reference to all the silvers is tenable due to the defect, like the hindrance to the recollection and to the direct knowledge of all the silvers is tenable due to the defect of organ. Moreover, the universal (such as the silverness) is the comprehensional relation in the case of the qualificative perception; whereas the mind is the instrument (or cause) and the impression is the comprehensional relation in the case of recollection. However, the universal is not the comprehensional relation in the case of the impression, as the same does not constitute the instrument.

No, this view of the Prābhākaraikadeśins is not correct. The over pervasion, i.e. the grasping of difference of the shell from the silver, would become contingent, after the knowledge referring to one single shell and one single silver only, in the opposite four such as recollections produced from the same knowledge referring to one single shell and one single silver or from the knowledge referring to the twin shells and twin silvers. Also, the invalid knowledge is necessary (due to the impossibility of difference of shell from shell etc.).

Explanation :

The Prābhāraikadeśins state their view that the contingency of the activity and the withdrawal simultaneously (*yugapat pravṛtti nivṛtti*) can be avoided, as the silver and the shell need not be grasped to have the difference from the silver and the shell (*rajata raṅga bheda*) respectively. Also they state that there

is no necessity of invalid knowledge (*anyathā khyāti*), as the difference from the recollected silver and shall can be grasped in the object in front by leaving out the actual object in front.

The Prābhākaraikadeśins refute the argument that in that case, the recollection of silver (*smṛti*), as qualified by the silverness (*rajatatvena*), would be required to refer to all the silvers, as the comprehensional relation characterized by the universal (*sāmānya lakṣaṇā pratyāsatti*) is equal to all the silvers in its reference. According to them, dispite the comprehensional relation characterized by both the thisness and the silverness, the recollection need not refer to all the silvers due to the defect (*doṣa*). Also, they state that the universal such as the silverness (*sāmānya*) is the comprehensional relation (*pratyāsatti*) in the case of qualificative perception (*pratyakṣa*); and the mind is the instrument (*karaṇa*) and the impression (*saṃskāra*) is the comprehensional relation in the case of recollection (*smaraṇa*). Thus, the recollection need not refer to all the silvers, dispite the qualificative knowledge referring to all the silvers.

However, the Naiyāyikas refute the Prābhākaraikadeśins' view. According to them, the overpervasion (*ati prasaṅga*), i.e. the grasping of difference of shell from silver, would become contingent in the opposite four (*viparīta catuṣka*) such as the recollections produced from the knowledge referring to one single shell and one single silver (*ekaraṅga rajata mātra jñāna*) or from the knowledge referring to the twin shells and twin silvers. Also, since the difference of shell from shell is impossible, invalid knowledge (*anyathā khyāti*) becomes necessary.

Negative knowledge of non-grasped non-relation cannot be Impediment:

I. iv. 23. Yet Others hold as follows : That the negative knowledge such as 'This is not silver' with respect to the silver, which may be either of the form of the non-grasping of the non-relation of the silverness (i.e. grasping the relation of the constant absence of the silverness), or of the form of the non-grasping of the non-relation of the difference of silver, impedes the activity towards the silver. However, this is not correct. The withdrawal from the silver would become contingent in the above position, as the non-relation of the silverness and the difference of the silver,which is known as existing elsewhere, cannot be graped to be not related in the case of shell. Also the invalid knowledge would become contingent in the event of grasping of the non-relation of both of them with the shell.

It may be argued now that the withdrawal from the silver is possible only when the non-relation of the difference of the silver is not grasped with respect to the silver. However, this is not correct. Since the non-relation of

the non-relation of the difference is of the form of the relation of the difference, there would arise the occasion of the withdrawal from the shell on account of the grasping of the non-relation of the relation of the difference of the silver. Also there would arise the contingency of invalid knowledge when the relation of the difference of the silver is grasped to be non-related.

It may again be argued now that the non-grasping of the difference with the difference of the silver is an impediment to the activity towards the silver in the case when the diffeence is recollected as occurring in the silver. And the same way, the non-grasping of the difference from the difference of the shell is an impediment to the withdrawal from the shell. However, this is not correct. Even so, simultaneous activity and withdrawal would become necessary from the knowledge derived from word. Since the differences occuring in the objects of activity and withdrawal and also the differences of shell and silver are not referred from words, the non-grasping of the differences cannot be admitted to be the impediment.

Explanation :

Yet Others (*anye*) among the Prābhākaras hold that the knowledge such as 'This is not silver' (*nedam rajatam*) with respect to the silver (*rajate*), impedes the activity towards the silver, as the same knowledge is of the form of the non-grasping of the non-relation with the silverness (*rajatatvāsaṃsargāgraha*) or of the form of the non-grasping of the non-relation of the difference of the silver (*rajatabhedāsāmsargāgraha*). However, the Naiyāyikas refute the position. According to them, the undesired occasion of the withdrawal from the silver (*nivṛtti*) would arise, as the non-relation of the silverness (*rajatatvāsaṃsarga*) and also the difference of the silver (*rajatabheda*) cannot be grasped to be non-related to the shell (*asaṃsargāgrahāt*). Also the contingency of the invalid knowledge (*anyathā khyāti*) would arise in the event of the grasping of the non-relation of both of them with the shell (*asaṃsargagrahe*).

The Others raise the argument that the withdrawal from the silver is possible only when the non-relation of the difference of the silver (*rajata bhedāsaṃsarga*) is not grasped to be related to the silver. However, the Naiyāyikas refute the argument on the ground that since the non-relation of the non-relation of the difference (*bhedāsaṃsargāsaṃsarga*) is of the form of the relation of the difference (*bheda saṃsarga*), withdrawal from the shell would become contingent in the event of the grasping of the non-relation of the relation of the difference of the silver. Also, according to them, the contingency of invalid knowledge (*anyathā khyāti*) would arise when the relation of difference (*bheda saṃsarga*) of silver is grasped to be non-related.

The Others again raise the argument that the non-grasping of difference (*bhedāgraha*) with the difference of silver (*rajata bheda*) is the impediment to the activity towards the silver (*pravṛtti pratibandhaka*) in the case when the difference is recollected as occuring in the silver (*rajatavṛtti*). Also according to them, the non-grasping of the difference from the difference of the shell is an impediment to the withdrawal from the shell. However, the Naiyāyikas refute the argument. According to them, simultaneous activity and withdrawal (*yugapat pravṛtti nivṛttī*) would become necessary from the knowledge of words (*śabdābhāsa*). The differences occuring in the objects of activity and withdrawal (*pravṛtti nivṛtti viṣaya niṣṭha bheda*) and the differences of shell and silvers (*raṅga rajata bheda*) cannot be referred to from words; and hence the non-grasping of difference cannot be the impediment..

Refutation of the View of Some Others that Iṣṭāniṣṭa pratiyogitvābhāva graha is the Cause :

I. iv. 24. Some Others hold as follows : That activity and withdrawal are produced from the grasping of the absence of the state of describing the counter positiveness of the desired and the undesired objects in the difference known to be existing in the objects in front. For instance, the difference from the silver, though existing, does not appear in the shell due to the defect of organ. Whereas the difference from something else does indeed appear in the shell. Thus, the activity towards the shell actually arises from the grasping of the absence of the state of describing the counter positiveness of the silver in the difference known to be existing in the shell. Whereas one does not withdraw from the shell, as the absence of the state of describing the counterpositiveness of the shell, though existing there, does not appear due to defect. Also one, this way, withdraws from the silver due to the grasping of the absence of the state of describing the counterpositiveness of shell in the difference, recollected as existing in the silver. Also the simultaneous activity and withdrawal do not become contingent, as the absence of the state of describing the counterpositiveness of the silver, though existing, is not grasped in the difference due to the defect.

It may be objected that since the state of being the difference existing in the shell exists even in the difference of the silver, even the difference of the silver can appear as of the form of the difference existing in the shell; for, the knowledge of objects in general refers to all the objects in particular as its objects. Thus, only invalid knowledge becomes contigent when the absence of the state of describing the counter positiveness of the shell is grasped in the difference of the silver. However, this is not correct. The difference of the silver

is not grasped to be the difference existing in the shell due to the defect even in the case of comprehensional relation.

No, this position of Some Others is not correct. It is established by experience that the qualificative knowledge such as 'This is silver' produces activity by positive and negative concomitances. Thus, such a qualificative knowledge alone is the producer of activity in the case of the valid knowledge. However, it is a matter of dispute as to whether the same qualificative knowledge alone or as to both the qualificative knowledge and the grasping of the absence of the state of describing the counterpositiveness of the desired silver are the producers of activity in the case of invalid knowledge. The view that such a qualificative knowledge is not the producer of the activity in such a case is contradicted by experience. Also it is not tenable that even the knowledge of the absence of the state of describing the counter positiveness is the cause of activity. For, such a knowledge of absence is not established to be the cause in the case of valid knowledge. Also the same knowledge of absence is heavier compared to the qualificative knowledge. The knowledge of difference etc. are absent in the case of the activity produced from the knowledge derived from word. And such difficulties must be accounted in the case of withdrawal as well.

Explanation :

Some Others among the Prābhākaras (*apare*) propose that the activity and the withdrawal (*pravṛtti nivṛttī*) are produced from the grasping of the absence of the state of describing the counterpositiveness (*pratiyogitvābhāva graha*) of the desired and the undesired objects in the difference (*bhede*) known as existing in the objects in front. According to them, the difference from the silver (*rajata bheda*), though existing, does not appear in the shell (*raṅge*) due to the defect of organ (*doṣa*). Whereas the difference from something else (*anyasmāt*) appears in the shell. Therefore the activity towards the shell (*pravṛtti*) arises from the grasping of the absence of the state of describing the counterpositiveness of the silver (*rajata pratiyogitvābhāva*) in the difference (*bhede*) existing in the shell (*raṅgavṛtti*). Whereas the withdrawal from the shell (*nivṛtti*) does not arise, as the absence of the state of describing the counter positiveness of the shell (*raṅga pratiyogitvābhāva*) is not grasped. It should be noted that one withdraws from the silver (*rajate nivṛtti*) on account of the grasping of the state of describing the counterpositiveness of the shell (*raṅga pratiyogitvābhāva*) in the difference (*bheda*) recollected as existing in the silver (*rajata nistha*). However, the simultaneous activity and withdrawal (*yugapat pravṛtti nivṛtti*) need not be contingent, as the absene of the state of describing the counterpositiveness of the silver (*rajata pratiyogitvābhāva*) is

not grasped in the difference (*bhede*).

The Others among the Prābhākaras refute the objection that the state of being the difference existing in the shell (*raṅgavṛtti bhedatva*) can exist even in the difference of the silver (*rajata bheda*); and hence the difference of the silver can appear as of the form of the difference existing in the shell as the knowledge of objects in general (*sāmānya buddhi*) refers to all the objects in particulars as its objects (*sarva viśeṣa viṣaya*); and thus, invalid knowledge (*anyathā khyāti*) becomes contingent when the absence of the state of describing the counter positiveness of shell (*tat pratiyogitvābhāva*) is grasped in the difference of silver. According to them, the difference of silver cannot be grasped as being the difference existing in shell (*raṅga vṛtti bhedatvena*) in the case of comprehensional relation (*pratyāsatti*) due to the defect of organ.

The Naiyāyikas, however, refute the position of the Others among the Prābhākaras. According to them, the qualificative knowledege such as 'This is silver' (*idam rajatam*) is established to be the cause of activity (*pravartaka*) by positive and negative concomitances (*anvaya vyatirekābhyām*). However, it is a matter of dispute (*vivāda*) as to whether the same qualificative knowledge alone or as to whether such a qualificative knowledge and the grasping of the absence of the state of describing the counter positiveness of the silver (*rajata pratiyogitvābhāva*) are the producers of activity in the case of invalid knowledge (*anyatra*). The knowledge of the absence, by leaving out the qualificative knowledge, cannot be admitted to be the cause of activity due to the non-establishment. Also the knowledge of the absence is heavier compared to the qualificative knowledge. Thus, only the qualficative knowledge needs to be the cause of activity. Further, it should be noted that similar difficulties must be accounted in explaining the cause of withdrawal in the theory of the Prābhākaras.

View of Yet Others that Dharma is the Cause of Activity :

I. iv. 25. Yet Others hold as follows : That the property which is grasped as existing in the desired object (silver), but not grasped as existing in the undesired object (shell), produces the activity towards its substratum; and such a property is the silverness in the case of the desired silver and the similarity to the silver in the case of the undesired shell. And in the same way, the property (which is grasped as existing in the undesired object, but not grasped as existing in the desired object) produces the withdrawal from its substratum. Thus, simultaneous activity and withdrawal need not become contingent.

However, this position is not correct. In this position, the activity towards the shell and the withdrawal from the silver would not be tenable from the invalid knowledge derived from words that 'These are shell and silver'. For, the property existing in the silver and the property existing in the shell cannot be recollected in the shell and the silver respectively from words. Also it is not correct to argue that the two properties are comprehended by means of perception after the use of the words such as 'silver' and 'shell'; and therefore, the words are not the causes of recollection of the properties. In accordance with the non-redundant words, activity and withdrawal are observed to be produced only from the confidence in the words of the deceiver that 'These are shell and silver' by ignoring ones own valid knowledge that 'These are silver and shell'.

Explanation :

Yet Others (*anye*) among the Prābhākaras propose that the property (*dharma*), which is grasped to be existing in the desired object such as silver (*iṣṭa vṛtti*), but not grasped to be existing in the undesired object such as shell (*aniṣṭa vṛtti*), produces activity (*pravartaka*) towards its substratum (*svāśraye*); and such a property can be the silverness (*rajatatva*) in the silver and the similariry to the silver (*rajata sādṛśya*) in the shell. Also the property, grasped to be existing in the undesired object but not grasped to be existing in the desired object, produces withdrawal (*nivartaka*) from its substratum; and hence simultaneous activity and withdrawal (*yugapat pravṛtti nivṛtti*) are not contingent.

However, the Naiyāyikas refute the position. According to them, then the activity towards the shell and the withdrawal from the silver would become untenable from the invalid knowledge of words (*śabdābhāsa*) that 'These are shell and silver' (*ime raṅga rajate*), as the property existing in the silver (*rajatavṛtti dharma*) and the property existing in the shell (*raṅga vṛtti dharma*) cannot be comprehended from the words respectively in the shell and silver. Also the Naiyāyikas refute the argument that the two properties are comprehended by means of perception (*pratyakṣataḥ*) after the use of words; and hence the words need not be the cause of the recollection of the same properties. According to them, in accordance with the non-redundant words (*śabdānuvidhānāt*), only the confidence (*viśvāsa*) in the words of the deceiver (*pratāraka vākye*) that 'These are shell and silver' (*ime raṅga rajate*) need to be admitted as the cause of activity and withdrawal.

Viśiṣṭa jñāna is the cause :

I. iv. 26. Others hold as follows : That the silverness is not grasped in the silver due to the defect in organ in the case of invalid knowledge. Therefore, one does not undertake any activity towards the silver due to the non-grasping of the difference of all the properties, recollected as existing in the silver, as

being the silver; whereas one undertake the activity towards the shell due to the non-grasping of the difference of any one property (viz. shining), recollected as existing in the shell, as being the silver. In the same way, one does not have withdrawal from the shell due to the non-grasping of the difference of all the properties, but one has the withdrawal from the silver due to the non-grasping of difference of any one property. Just as the grasping of the difference through other means is the impediment to the activity dispite the non-grasping of difference to you; in the same way, the grasping of the difference of all the properties, recollected as existing in the silver, as being the silver, is the impediment to the activity to me.

However, this is not correct. The invalid qualificative knowledge such as 'This (shell) is silver' is the cause of activity due to the brevity compared to the non-grasping of difference and also due to the positive and negative concomitances. Also it is not correct to argue that no cause of qualificative knowledge exists. Like recognition, qualificative knowledge is possible from the impression and sense-organ. Supposing recognition constitutes two distinct knowledges, then the non-difference (between the previous and the later knowledges) would be lost, as the same non-difference etc. are dependent on the recognition. Also it is not correct to argue that impression and sense-organ, having the same objects, need to co-operate mutually; for, they do not have the co-operativeness in the production of the perception of the named object, as qualified by the name, as well as in the production of the thatness. And the heaviness in assumption becomes contingent in admitting so. Also no over extension of qualificative knowledge arises dispite grasping of difference. For, even the non-grasping of difference constitutes the associate cause of qualificative knowledge.

Explanation :

The Yet Others (*itare*) among the Prābhākaras propose the view that the silverness (*rajatatva*) is not grasped in the silver due to the defect in organ (*doṣa*); and hence one does not undertake any activity towards the silver due to the non-grasping of difference (*bhedāgraha*) of all the properties (*dharma*) as being the silver (*rajatatvena*); and also one undertakes the activity towards the shell due to the non-grasping of difference of any one property as being silver. Also they propose that one does not have the withdrawal (*nivṛtti*) from the shell due to the non-grasping of difference of all the properties (*yāvaddharma*) and one has the withdrawal from the shell due to the non-grasping of anyone property (*kasyacit dharma*). Further, the Others note that like the grasping of non-existing difference (*bheda graha*) through other means (*mānāntara*) is an impediment to the activity, the grasping of the existing difference of all the properties too is an impediment to the activity.

However, the Naiyāyikas refute the view of the Others. According to them, invalid qualificative knowledge (*viśiṣṭa jñāna*) such as 'This (shell) is silver' (*idam rajatam*) has the brevity and has positive and negative concomitances (*anvaya vyatireka*) with activity; and hence the same needs to be the cause of activity. Also the Naiyāyikas refute the argument that no cause exists to produce the qualificative knowledge on the ground that impression and sense-organ can produce the qualificative knowledge. Further, the Naiyāyikas refute that the recognition constitutes two distinct knowledges (*jñāna dvaya*) on the ground that then the non-difference (*abheda*) between the previous and the later-knowledges would be lost. Also the Naiyāyikas refute the argument that impression and sense-organ need to co-operate in producing qualificative knowledge on the ground that they do not cooperate in producing the perception of the named object (*nāmi pratyakṣa*) and the thatness (*tattāṁśa*).

'Idam rajatam' is single knowledge :

I. iv. 27. It may be objected now as follows : That dispite recognition having the oneness, it does not have the perceptuality or direct knowledgeness in the thatness -aspect; for, contact with-sense-organ is lacking in the thatness; and further the thatness-aspect needs to be produced from the knowledge derived from the impression. Therefore, only the recollectionness can exist in the thatness-aspect. Also, the direct knowledgeness exists in the non-difference-(or identity-)–aspect of the object existing in front. However, the recollectionness and the direct knowledgeness are neither generic properties nor less pervading. (Thus no fault of cross-connection arises).

However, then we shall reply as follows: That even you have admitted that non-proximate object, i.e. object not connected with sense-organ, appears through mental impression. Thus, let the invalid qualificative knowledge, viz. 'This (shell) is silver' be one single knowledge like the recognition in accordance with your own theory due to the presence of the totality of causes. However, I have admitted the directness in both aspects (thatness-aspect and the silverness–aspect), as the invalid qualificative knowledge 'This (shell) is silver' is to be produced from sense–organ and also as no cross-connection between the two properties arises.

It may be argued now that the direct knowledge of the particular object is to be produced from the direct sense-organ-contant with the particular object; and the direct sense-organ-contact with the object is lacking in the silver in the case of invalid knowledge of silver. However, this is not correct. Since recognition, being produced from sense-organ-contact, is a direct knowledge, absence of the indirectness arises in the thatness and also in the name. Also the impression and the rememberance are comprehensional relations.

Also it is not correct to argue that since the inherence in the connected object is the cause by being the comprehensional relation in the case of the perception of the silverness, the perception is not tenable without such an inherence. The inherence in the connected object, being weakened due to the knowledge of qualifier (silverness), does not constitute the cause in the case of the qualificative knowledge of the silverness. When the totality of causes of qualificative knowledge is present, the qualificative knowledge cannot be delayed due to the absence of the inherence in the connected object.

Explanation :

The Mīmāmsakas raise the objection here that the recognition (*pratya bhijñā*) such as 'This one is that silver' (*so' yam rajataḥ*) does not have the perceptuality or the direct knowledgeness (*sākṣāt kāritva*) in the thatness - aspect as the contact with the sense-organ (*indriya sannikarṣa*) is lacking there. According to them, only the recollectionness (*smṛtitva*) exists in the thatness-aspect, whereas the direct knowledgeness exists in the non-difference aspect (*abhedāmśa*) existing in the object in front; and since the recollectionness and the direct knowledgeness (*anubhūtitva*) are not the generic properties, the fault of cross-connection is not contingent.

The Naiyāyikas, however, reply that the Mīmāmsakas have already admitted that the non-proximate object (*asannikṛṣṭa*) appears through mental impression (*samskāra*); and hence, like the recognition (*pratyabhijñā*), the invalid qualificative knowledge such as 'This (shell) is silver' (*idam rajatam*) can be one single knowledge (*eka*) in accordance with your own theory. Further, the Naiyāyikas state that both the aspects, i.e. the thatness (*tattā*) and the silverness (*rajatatva*), have the directness (*sākṣāttva*), as the invalid qualificative knowledge 'This (shell) is silver' is to be produced from sense-organ.

Also the Naiyāyikas refute the argument that the direct knowledge of the particular object (*yat sākṣāt kāra*) is to be produced from the direct sense-organ-contact with the particular object (*tadindriya sannikarṣa janya*), and the direct contact is lacking with the silver in the case of invalid knowledge. According to them, recognition (*pratyabhijñā*) is a direct knowledge (*sākṣātkāriṇī*) by being produced from sense-organ-contact; and therefore, the indirectness cannot be admitted in the thatness (*tattā*) and the silvernes. Also according to them, mental impression (*samskāra*) or remembrance (*smṛti*) can act as the comprehensional relation (*sannikarṣa*) proving the directness in the thatness etc.

Further, the Naiyāyikas refute the argument that the inherence in the connected object (*samyukta samavāya*) is the cause of the perception of the

silverness (*rajatatva pratyakṣa*); and therefore the same perception is not tenable without such an inherence. According to them, such an inherence does not constitute the cause of the qualificative perception of the silverness (*tadviśiṣṭa jñāna*), as it is weakened by the knowledge of the qualifier (*viśeṣaṇa jñāna*); and the qualificative knowledge is never delayed in the presence of the totality of causes (*sāmagrī*).

Bhrama is Asatya jñāna :

I. iv. 28. Moreover, knowledge of the qualifier constitutes the comprehensional relation of the qualificand; and the non-grasping of non-relation between the qualifier and the qualificand constitutes the cause of the qualificative perception. Consequently, the cause of qualificative perception, i.e. the non-grasping of non-relation, which is common to both the recognition and the valid perception, is quite possible even in the case of illusion, i.e. invalid knowledge. Despite that the eye-contact with the silver is the cause of the perception of the silver, the same constitutes the cause only as being the comprehensional relation with the qualificand in general, and not as being the relation with the silver in particular. For, the rule of comprehension is that whatever entity in general constitutes the cause of the comprehension of whatever effect in general, the particular entity belonging to the same class constitutes the cause of the comprehension of the particular effect belonging to the same class.

Since the contact with the silver in particular is rendered redundant by being intervened by another totality of causes of the perception of the qualificand in general, another totality of causes of the perception of the particular entity (silver) need not be assumed; and if assumed, it would involve the heaviness. Further, the perception of the particular qualificand or the qualificative knowledge in particular can be tenable from the comprehensional relation with the qualificand in general which is already assumed as the cause of the perception of the qualificand in general. Moreover, the assumption of the causality, as being the comprehensional relation with the qualificand, is more economical, in the case of the perception of hte silver, as compared to the causality of the non-grasping of the difference of the desired object, independently recollected, in the case of the activity.

As a matter of fact, the rule that the illusion of silver is produced from the defect in organ is established in the schools of both. However, the illusion of silver there cannot mean the absence of the grasping of non-relation; for, if the absence of the grasping of non-relation is of the form of the substratum, then the same cannot be accomplished; and if the same absence is of the from of the knowledge of the substratum, then the same, being valid knowledge in

nature, cannot be produced from the defect in organ. Also it is not correct that the valid knowledge, which is corronated, i.e. imposed in the place of illusion, needs to be produced from the defect in organ only. Since such a valid knowledge is to be produced from a distinct totality of causes of knowledge, illusion needs to be untrue, i.e. invalid knowledge. Thus, it must be admitted that even the knowledge of the object not connected with the organ arises from the defect in organ. Moreover, only the invalid qualificative knowledge is the operation in producing the activity from the defect in organ, as the causality of the defect in organ towards the non-conforming activity has already been assumed. However, the non-grasping of difference is not the cause, as the causality of the same is yet to be assumed.

Explanation :

The Naiyāyikas state that the knowledge of the qualifier (*viśeṣaṇa jñāna*) such as the silverness constitutes the comprehensional relation of the qualificand (*viśeṣya sambadha*); and the non-grasping of non-relation (*asamsargāgraha*) between the qualifier and the qualificand constitutes the cause of the qualificative perception. According to them, therefore, the cause of qualificative perception (*viśiṣṭa pratyakṣa hetu*) such as the non-grasping of non-relation, which is common to both recognition (*pratyabhijñā*) and valid perception (*satya pratyakṣa*), becomes quite possible even in the case of illusion (*bhrama*). Further, accoding to them, the eye-contact with the silver (*rajata samyoga*) is the cause of the direct perception of the silver (*rajata sākṣāt kāra*) only in the form of being the comprehensional relation with the qualificand (*viśeṣya sannikarṣatvena*) and not in the form of being the contact with the silver in particular. The rule of comprehension (*niyama*) is that whateve entity in general (*yatsāmānya*) constitutes the cause of the comprehension of whatever effect in general (*yatsāmānya*), the particular entity of the same class (*tadviśeṣa*) constitutes the cause of the comprehension of the particular effect (*tadviśeṣa*) of the same class.

It should be noted that the contact with the silver in particular (*samyoga*) is rendered redundant by the other totality of causes of the perception of the qualificand in general (*viśeṣya bhāna sāmagryantarita*); and therefore another totality of causes of the perception of the particular entity (silver) (*viśeṣya sāmagryantara*) need not be assumed. Also the qualificative knowledge of the qualificand in particular can be tenable from the relation with the qualificand (*viśeṣya sambandha*) in general itself. Moreover, the assumption of the causality (*hetutva*), as being the comprehensional relation with the qualificand (*viśeṣya sannikarṣatvena*), is much more economical compared to the causality of the non-grasping of the difference of the desired object (*iṣṭabhedāgraha tvena*).

The Naiyāyikas observe here that both the schools admit that the illusion of silver (*bhrama*) is produced from the defect in organ (*doṣa*). However, according to them, illusion of silver does not mean the absence of grasping of non-relation (*samsargāgrahābhāva*), as the absence can neither be admitted to be of the form of the substratum (*adhikaraṇa svarūpa*), nor be of the form of the knowledge of the substrarum (*tajjñāna rūpa*). Also the Naiyāyikas refute the argument that the valid knowledge (*pramā*), corronated or imposed in the place of illusion (*bhrama sthānābhiṣikta*), is produced from the defect in organ. According to them, since such a valid knowledge needs to be produced from a totally distinct totality of causes, illusion needs to be invalid knowledge only (*asatya jñāna*). Thus, they admit that only the invalid qualificative knowledge (*viśiṣṭa jñāna*), but not the non-grasping of difference (*bhedā graha*), is the operation (*vyāpāra*) in producing the activity (*pravṛtti*) from the defect in organ.

Pratyakṣa is the cause of Anyathā khyāti :

I. iv. 29. Some Others Object that since defective seed does not produce any effect, defective sense-organ too doesnot produce any invalid knowledge. However, we shall reply that no single defectiveness, which is common to both defective seed and defective organ, exists; and hence defective organ can produce invalid knowledge. Further, even perception functions as the means in establishing invalid knowledge. For, there arises no contradiction to the causality of perception. Thus, the invalid knowledge 'This (shell) is silver' is proved or established by the after -knowledge that 'I know' this (shell) as being silver'. And nothing else excepting the after-knowledge is the authoritative means in proving the objectness of the object (invalid knowledge). The non-object of the knowledge is never recognized as the object of the knowledge; also the knowledge not referring to the object is never recognized as the knowledge referring to the object. For, the after-knowledge is ruled to be only the valid knowledge referring to the existing object. Otherwise, the after-knowledge that 'I know clothing' would become necessary even in the case of the knowledge of the pot. Also it is not correct that at the time of the non-grasping of difference, the non-grasping of the non-relation of the objectness, described by the knowledge of silver, arises. In spite of the grasping of difference of silver in the case of shell, the after-knowledge that 'I have known shell as being silver', and the after-knowledge that 'I have had the knowledge of silver in the case of shell' arise.

Now it may be argued that the non-grasping of non-relation is to be contradicted by the grasping of non-relation to be established by the contradictory inference; and therefore, the same non-grasping of non-relation

persists even at the time of the grasping of difference of silver from shell without the contradictory inference. However, this argument is not correct. Since in the case of the after-knowledge that 'I know this (shell) as being the silver', the non-grasping of non-relation of the knowledge, which has the shell as the object and the silverness as the qualifier, is untenable in oneself, the invalid qualificative knowledge, i.e. 'This (shell) is silver' cannot be exampled in the Mīmāmsakas' theory. Also it cannot be argued that the form of the after-knowledge is merely 'I know this (shell) and I know silver'. Since the meaning of the instrumental, i.e. 'as being silver' is the qualifier of the silver, the same cannot be grasped in the case of the non-grasping of the qualificand (silver). Also since the (valid) qualificative knowledge refers, everywhere, to the qualificand of the qualifier, even the invalid qualificative knowledge must always refer to the qualificand of the qualifier. Further, since the qualifier such as the silverness cannot be admitted to be present in the knowledge of silver through the inherence, and also since the qualificative knowledge needs to refer to the qualificand of the qualifier, our Naiyāyikas' theory of invalid knowledge does not amount to the Sautrāntika Buddhists' theory of invalid knowledge of empty qualifier.

Explanation :

The Naiyāyikas refute the objection of the Others (*yattu*) that since the defective seed (*duṣṭa bīja*) does not produce any effect, the defective sense-organ (*duṣṭendriya*) too doesnot produce the invalid knowledge (*anyathā khyāti*). According to them, no single defectiveness (*duṣṭatva*), that is common to both seed and sense-organ, exists; and hence defective sense organ can indeed produce invalid knoweldge. Also the Naiyāyikas point out that even the perception (*pratyakṣa*) can be the means (*māna*) establishing the invalid knowledge as contradiction does not arise to the causality. According to them, the after-knowledge (*anuvyavasāya*), viz. 'I know this (shell) as being silver' (*idam rajatatayā jānāmi*) proves the invalid knowledge such as 'This (shell) is silver', as only the after knowledge proves the invalid knowledge. It should be noted that non-object of knowledge (*atad viṣaya*) is never recognized as the object of knowledge (*tad jñāna viṣaya*); and the knowledge not referring to an object (*tadaviṣayaka*) is never recognized as the knowledge referring to the object (*tadviṣayaka*), as the after-knowledge is valid knowledge by referring to the existing object (*pramā*). Otherwise the after-knowledge (*anuvyavasāya*) that 'I know clothing', (*patam jānāmi*) would become necessary even in the case of the knowledge of pot (*ghaṭa jñāna*). Further, it should be noted that the non-grasping of the non-relation (*asamsargāgraha*) of the objectness described by the knowledge of silver (*rajatajñāna viṣayatva*) cannot arise at the time of the non-grasping of difference, as the after–knowledge that 'I have known shell as being silver' (*śuktī rajatatvena mayā jñātā*) arises in spite of the grasping of difference of silver (*bheda grahe*) in the shell (*śuktau*).

The Naiyāyikas refute the argument that the non-grasping of non-relation (*asamsargāgraha*) is to be contradicted by the grasping of non-relation (*asamsarga graha*) to be established by contradictory inference (*vicārasādhya*); and therefore, the non-grasping of non-relation persists even at the time of grasping of difference of silver from shell (*bheda graha*) without contradictory inference. According to them, since in the case of the after-knowledge that 'I know this (shell) as being silver' (*idam rajatatayā jānāmi*), the non-grasping of non-relation of the knowledge, which has the shell as the object and the silverness as the qualifier (*śukti karmaka rajatatva prakāraka*), is untenable in one self, the invalid qualificative knowledge that 'This (shell) is silver' (*tādṛśa jñāna*) cannot be exampled in the Mīmāmsaksa' theory. Also the Naiyāyikas refute the argument that the form of the after-knowledge (*anuvyavasāya*) is merely 'I know this (shell) and I know silver' (*idam jānāmi rajatam jānāmi*). According to them, the meaning of the instrumental word 'as being silver'*(rajatatvena)*, is the qualifier of the silver (*prakāra*); and the same cannot be grasped in the non-grasping of the qualificand, i.e. silver (*prakārin*). Also the Naiyāyikas note that since the (valid) qualificative knowledge (*viśiṣṭa jñāna*) refers to the qualificand of the qualifier, (*viśeṣaṇa viśeṣyīya*), even the invalid qualificative knowledge (*anyathā bhāna*) must refer to the qualificand of the qualifier. Further, they state that the Naiyāyikas' theory of invalid knowledge does not amount to the Sautrāntika Buddhists' theory of invalid knowledge of empty qualifier (*sākāravāda*), as the qualifier (silverness) is never admitted to be present in the knowledge through the inherence and also as the qualificative knowledge refers necessarily to the qualificand of the qualifier.

Explanation of Law of contradictory and contradicted knowledges :

I. iv. 30. Still Others object that when knowledge is admitted to be invalid, the law of contradictory and contradicted knowledges would become untenable, as the distinction between the knowledges cannot be maintained. However, this is not correct. The knowledge, which is not rendered redundant is contradictory knowledge. It can be explained as follows : In the case, where two mutually contradictory knowledges, which are to be produced from defective and non-defective organs, but which are not mutually dependent, are to be produced, the former knowledge does not contradict the later knowledge due to the non-produced contradictoryness of the later. For, the later is not yet obtained,i.e. produced. Whereas the later knowledge, which is yet to be produced from its own cause, is produced only by destroying the

former knowledge of the contradictory form, as it cannot be produced without destroying the former knowledge due to the already produced contraditory nature of former knowledge. Otherwise, the later knowledge could not be produced at all. It is not correct to state that the later knowledge is not produced at all. For, such a view is contradictory to experience. And in support of the above view, it is stated as follows : 'That the later knowledge is comprehended to be stronger than the former knowledge in the case where two mutually contradictory knowledges, which are independent of each other, are to be produced. However, in the case where the later knowledge, which is dependent on the former knowledge, is about to be produced, the later knowledge is not produced due to the contradiction from the former knowledge, which is conducive to the later knowledge. Thus, how can the later knowledge, which is not yet produced, can contradict the former knowledge? For instance, how can the later contradictory inference, which is not yet produced, can contradict the former perception.

It may be asked now asto what aspect of illusion, i.e. invalid knowledge is contradicted? The very nature of invalid knowledge cannot be contradicted, as the same is always existent. Also the state of describing the qualifierness of the silverness and the state of describing the objectness, i.e. the qualificandness of shell cannot be contradicted, as the same cannot be removed. The invalid knowledge is produced only by referring to the shell as qualified by the silverness. Also the aspect of activity (producing invalid knowledge) cannot be contradicted, as the past activity etc. have already happened. Nor can the state of producing the future activity be contradicted, as the future activity is avoided due to the absence of the cause itself. However, we shall reply here. The very idea or aspect of illusoryness of the illusion, i.e. the invalidity of the invalid knowledge is contradicted by the contradictory knowledge.

Explanation :

The Naiyāyikas refute the objection that when knowledge is admitted to be invalid (*jñāna mithyātve*), the law of contradictory and contradicted knowledges (*bādhya bādhaka vyavasthā*) becomes untenable, as the distinction between the knowledges (*viśeṣa*) is unnecessary. According to them, the knowledge which is not rendered redundant (*ananyathā siddha*) is contradictory (*bādhaka*). For instance, in the case where two mutually contradictory knowledges (*viruddha*), which are not mutually dependent (*nirapekṣa*) and which are yet to be produced from defective and non-defective organs (*duṣṭāduṣṭendriya janya*), are to be produced, the former knowledge (*prathama*) does not contradict the later knowledge, as the later is yet to be produced and its contradictory nature is yet to be realized (*anupajāta virodhitayā*). However, the later knowledge (*uttara*), which is being produced from its own cause (*svakāraṇa*), is produced only by destroying the former knowledge, due to the already produced contradictory nature of the former knowledge (*upajāta virodhitayā*). It should be noted that the later knowledge cannot be produced unless the former knowledge is destroyed (*nānupamṛdya*); and otherwise it cannot be produced at all. This view is supported by the statement that the later knowledge is comprehended to be stronger (*balīyas*) compared to the former knowledge only in the case where the two knowledges (*dhiyām*), which are independent of each other (*anyonya nirapekṣāṇām*), are to be produced; but in the case where the later knowledge is dependent on the former knowledge (*pūvāpekṣa*), the later is not produced due to the contradiction (*virodha*) from the former knowledge which is conducive (*upajīvya pūrva*). Thus, the later knowledge, which is not yet produced (*ajāta*) such as the infernce, cannot contradict the former knowledge such as the perception.

The Mīmāmsakas now object that no aspect of illusion or invalid knowledge (*bhrama*) can be admitted to be contradicted by the Naiyāyikas. According to them, the nature of invalid knowledge (*svarūpa*) cannot be contradicted, as it always exists. Also the state of describing the qualifierness of the silverness (*rajatatva prakārakatva*) and the state of describing the qualificandness of shell (*śukti viṣayakatva*) cannot be contradicted, as the same can never be removed. Also, the aspect of producing activity (*vyavahāra*) cannot be contradicted, as the past activity is always produced from any kind of knowledge and the future activity gets removed from the absence of cause itself (*kāraṇābhāva*). However, the Naiyāyikas reply that the very idea or aspect of the illusoryness of invalid knowledge (*bhramatva buddhi*) is contradicted by the contradictory knowledge; and hence law of contradiction can be maintained.

Confidence in the validity of knowledge :

I. iv. 31. Some Others object here as follows: That how can the confidence in the validity of knowledge be possible when some knowledges are admitted by the Naiyāyikas to be invalid? However, this objection is not correct. The means to ascertain the validity or authoritativeness of knowledge has already been statėd or explained.

Also how can the confidence in the validity of knowledge be possible even in the case of the Prābhākaras' ruling of the validity or authoritativeness for all knowledges, as the knowledge of the non-grasping of non-relations of existing things, and the knowledge of non-grasped non-relation of things are observed in many cases?

It may be proposed now that the recollection of the non-grasping of non-relation of existing things is delayed; whereas the state of referring to the existing objects is quickly recollected; and therefore, the confidence in the validity or authoritativeness of knowledge arises due to the knowledge of the state of referring to the existing objects in general. Also even when the doubt regarding the validity or authoritativeness of knowledge arises at times, the removal of the same doubt is possible from the contradictory knowledge only. However, we shall reply (that this is not so). The validity or authoritativeness of knowledges is only general even for us, the Naiyāyikas; and the same can be removed only from the contradiction. Thus, the confidence in the validity or authoritativeness of knowledge can be explained from the non-occurence of contradiction. Moreover, you, the Mīmāmsakas, have no confidence (in the validity of knowledge) in (the absence of) another knowledge (reffering to the objectness of existing objects). And the confidence is equal to both of us on account of the knowledge of distinction. And the metholology as to how the non-confidence can be avoided in the validity of knowledge of distinction has already been stated in the section dealing with the validity or authoritativeness of knowledge ascertained extraneously through other means.

Explanation :

The Naiyāyikas refute the objection of Some others (*yattu*) that the confidence in the validity of knowledge (*āśvāsa*) becomes untenable in the view of the Naiyāyikas that some knowledges are invalid (*ayathārtha*). According to them , the means to ascertain the validity of knowledge has already been stated in the Prāmāṇyavāda. Also the Naiyāyikas raise the counter-objection that how can the confidence be possible in the validity of knowledge even in the Mīmāmsakas' view that all the knowledges are only valid. According to them, the knowledge of the non-grasping of non-relation of existing things (*sadasamsargāgraha*) and the knowledge of non grasped non-relations of things (*agṛhītāsamsarga*) are observed in many cases.

The Mīmāmsakas try to propose here that the recollection of the non-grasping of non-relation of existing things is delayed (*vilambita*), whereas the state of referring to the existing objects (*sadviṣayatva*) is quickly recollected (*śīghropasthita*); and hence the confidence in the validity of knowledge (*āśvāsa*) is possible due to the knowledge of the state of referring to the existing things in gerenal (*autsargika sadviṣayatva*). Also they state that in the case where doubt regarding the validity arises sometimes, the removal of the same doubt is possible from the other contradictory knowledge (*jñānāntara*). However, the Naiyāyikas refute the proposal. According to them, the validity of knowledge (*satyatva*), which is general in nature (*autsargika*), is removed by the contradiction (*bādhaka*) even for them; and hence the confidence in the validity can be explained due to the non-occurrence of contradiction (*anavatāra*) only. Further, the Naiyāyikas argue that the Mīmāmsakas cannot explain confidence in the validity of knowledge in the absence of another knowledge referring to the existing objects. And the methodology as to how the non-confidence can be avoided in the knowledge of distinction (*viśeṣa darśana*) has already been explained. Thus, the confidence in the validity of knowledge does not become untenable in the view of the Naiyāyikas.

Confidence in the Validity of Knowledge : View of Yet Others (third party):

I. iv. 32. Yet Others hold that the absence of recollected and competent contradictory property (of the shellness in the silver in front), constitutes either the substratum or its knowledge; and since such an absence can be grasped merely by perception, the confidence in the validity of knowledge is quite justified. Also when the doubt regarding the difference from the silver arises with respect to the non-competent and contradictory substratum, i.e. shell, the confidence in the validity of knowledge is possible from the other knowledge of distinction.

However, this proposal is not correct. In the theories of both the parties, i.e. the Mīmāmsakas and the Naiyāyikas, confidence in the validity of knowledge is equally possible to obtain from the other knowledge of distinction; and therefore the present discussion merely amounts to the unnecessary stupefying of students. As a matter of fact, the practice of non-difference or identity is tenable merely from the non-grasping of difference (from silver); and therefore, the state of referring to the non-difference or identity is not estblashed in any of the knowledges. Thus, how can the state of referring to the existing things be established in the knowledges by the Mīmāmsakas?

Explanation :

Yet Others, i.e. scholars of third party (*anye*) propose here that the absence of the recollection and the competent contradictory property of shellness (*smṛta yogya vaidharmyābhāva*) in the silver, constitutes the substratum (*adhikaraṇa*) or its knowledge (*tajjñāna*); and since the same can be grasped by perception (*pratyakṣataḥ*). confidence in the validity is quite tenable. Also, when the doubt regarding the difference from the silver (*bheda samśaya*) arises with respect to the non competent contradictory substratum, i.e. the shell, the confidence in the validity of knowledge is possible merely from the other knowledge of distinction (*viśeṣa darśana*).

However, the Naiyāyikas refute the view of the Yet Others. According to them, in the theories of both the parties, confidence in the validity of

knowledge (*viśvāsa*) can be obtained from the other knowledge of distinction (*jñānāntara*); and hence further discussion on this topic is nothing but stupefication of the students (*śiṣya dhandhamana*); and hence is unnecessary. Further, the Naiyāyikas note that the practice of non-difference or identity (*abheda vyavahāra*) can be tenable merely from the non-grasping of difference (*bhedāgraha*); and therefore the Mīmāmsakas' theory that the knowledge itself refers to the non-difference or identity (*abheda viṣaya*) is totally unwarranted. Thus, the Mīmāmsakas' theory that the knowledge has the state of referring to the existing things (*sadviṣayatva*) is unjustified.

Doṣa is the cause of Bhrama :

I. iv. 33. Some Others object here that the defect in sense organs cannot be the cause of invalid knowledge. However, this objection is not correct. We must admit that the defect in sense organs is the cause of invalid knowledge on account of the effect, i.e. invalid knowledge.

It may be objected now as follows : That how can the knowledge such as 'This (shell) is silver' be invalid, as both this (shell) and silver are very much existent, i.e. real? And it is not correct to argue that identity of both (the shell and the silver) is not-existent. For, only what is beyond both (shell and silver) and their identity are non-existent. Also the two things, i.e. shell and silver are existent. Suppose those two things are non-existent, then there arises the contingency of Buddist theory of knowledge of non-existent things. Further, this way, the imposition of relation cannot be non-existent.

Here we, the Naiyāyikas state our reply : That though the knowledge such as 'This (shell) is silver' refers to only existing things, i.e. shell and silver in general, the invalidity of knowledge means the state of (being the knowledge) referring to the qualifier in the substratum of the absence of the qualifier or the state of (being the knowledge) referring to the objectness contradictory to the qualifier.

Explanation :

Some Others (*yattu*) raise the objection that the defect in sense-organs (*doṣa*) cannot be the cause (*hetu*) of invalid knowledge. However, the Naiyāyikas refute the objection on the ground that the same defect gets established to be the cause of invalid knowledge on account of producing the effect (*phala balena*) such as invalid knowledge.

Again the Some scholars raise the objection that the knowledge 'This (shell) is silver' (*idam rajatam*) cannot be invalid (*ayathārtha*), as both 'this (shell) and silver (*idam rajatayoḥ*) are existent or real (*sat*). Also they refute the argument that identity (*tādātmya*) of both is non-existent (*asat*); for, only

what is beyond both (shell and silver) and their identity are non–existent. According to them, suppose those two things (shell and silver), are non-existent, then the Buddhist theory of knowledge of non-existent things (*asat khyāti*) would become contingent. Thus, they insist that invalid knowledge is untenable.

However, the Naiyāyikas refute the objection on the ground that the invalidity can be established in the knowledge 'This (shell) is silver' (*idam rajatam*) dispite the same referring to the existing things. According to them, the invalidity of knowledge (*ayathārtha tva*) means the state of being the knowledge referring to the qualifier in the substratum of the absence of the qualifier (*tadabhāvati tatprakārakatva*) or the state of being the knowledge referring to the objectness contradictory to the qualifier (*prakāra vyadhikaraṇa viṣayatākatva*); and the same is quite easy in such a knowledge.

Prāñcas' position that Anyathākhyāti is Asataḥ khyāti :

I. iv. 34. The Logicians of the earlier school, however, admit that only the identity and the other relations, which are non-existent, constitute the objects of invalid knowledge such as 'This (shell) is silver'. However, this way, the theory of invalid knoweldge need not amount to the Buddhists' theory of knowledge of non-existent objects. For, we, the Prāñcas, admit the invalid knowledge to be the knowledge of merely the non-existent objects which are adventitiously qualified by the existing qualifiers and qualificands. However, we do not admit the knowledge of non-existing objects, which is the knowledge of wholly and totally non-existing objects not adventitiously qualified by the existing qualifiers and the qualificands. For, there is no reason to admit such a theory of knowledge.

It should not be argued that the contingency of the untenability of causes of the knowledge of non-existing objects is equal for both of us, i.e. the Mīmāmsakas and the Naiyāyikas. We have shown, i.e. established here in our theory, the totality of causes of invalid qualificative knowledge. And in support of our theory, the blessed Vācaspati Mishra too has stated that "Therefore, the knowledge, which grasps the objects, existing in one way to be existing in another way, is considered to be baseless or invalid knowledge which is based on non-existing objects."

Thus ends the theory of invalid knowledge in the section on Perception in the Tattva Cintāmaṇi composed by Shri Gangeśopādhyāya.

Explanation :

Gangeśa concludes his ' Theory of invalid knowledge' (Anyathā khyātivāda) with the exposition of the position of the Prāñcas. According to

them, only the identity and the other relations (*tādātmya samsargayoḥ*), which are non-existent (*asat*), constitute the objects of invalid knowledge (*viṣayatva*) such as 'This (shell) is silver' (*idam rajatam*). However, they point out that the theory of invalid knowledge does not amount to the Buddhists' theory of knowledge of non-existent objects (Asat khyāti vāda). According to them, the invalid knowledge is the knowledge of merely the non-existent objects (*atyantāsat*) which are adventitiously qualified by the existing qualifiers and the qualificands (*saduparakta*). However, the knowledge of non-existing objects (*asat khyāti*), which is the knowledge of wholly and totally non-existing objects (*atyantāsat*), not adventitiously qualified by the existing qualifiers and qualificands (*sadanuparakta*), need not be admitted due to the absence of any cause.

Gangeśa refutes the argument that the contingence of untenability of the causes of the knowledge of non-existing objects (*tadanupapatti*) is equal for both the Mīmāmsakas and the Naiyāyikas. According to him, the totality of causes of invalid qualificative knowledge (*viśiṣṭa jñāna sāmagrī*) has been shown, i.e. established and hence the untenability is applicable only for the Mīmāmsakas. Finally Gaṅgeśa concludes his 'Theory of invalid knowledge' by citing Vācaspati Mishra that 'The knowledge, which grasps the objects existing in one way (*anyathā sat*) to be existing in another way (*anyathā*), is considered to be baseless or invalid knowledge (*tan nirālambanam jñānam*) which is based on non-existing objects (*asad ālambanam*).

The end of the Anyathākhyāti vāda in the Pratyakṣaknaṇḍa.

I. V.

A

Theory of Definition of Perception (Pratyakṣalakṣaṇavādaḥ)

Fourfold Nature of valid knowledge :

I. v. 1. Such a valid knowledge is four fold due to the distinction of perceptual knowledge, inferential knowledge, analogical knowledge and verbal knowledge (cognition). And this way, the peculiar means of such a knowledge, which constitutes the means of valid knowledge, is four fold due to the distinction as means of perception, means of inference, means of analogy and means of verbal knowledge (congnition). Other means of knowledges are included among the four means of knowledges in accordance with their own nature. And we shall elaborate later on this fact.

Explanation :

After establishing invalid knowledge (*anyathākhyāti*), Gangeśa begins his 'Theory of definition of perception' (Pratyakṣalakṣaṇavāda). However, first he devides valid knowledge (*pramā*) into four fold as perceptual knowledge, inferential knowledge, analogical knowledge and verbal knowledge. According to him, since valid knowledge is four fold as perceptual knowledge (*pratyakṣa*), inferential knowledge (*anumiti*), analogical knowledge (*upamiti*), and verbal knowledge (cognition) (*śābdī*), even the means of valid knowledge is four fold as means of perception (*pratyakṣa*), means of inference (*anumāna*), means of analogy (*upamāna*), and means of verbal knowledge (*śabda*). Also, other means of knowledges such as non-existence and presumption are to be included among the four means of knowledge only.

Indriyārtha sannikarṣotpannam jñānam cannot be the Definition of Perceptual knowledge :

I. V. 2. The Pūrvapakṣin, Jayanta, may object now as follows: That again perceptual knowledge cannot be defined as the non-deviating, i.e. valid knowledge which is produced from the comprehensional relation between sense organ and object (Cf. Nyāy Sū. i. 1.4). For, such a definition of

perceptual knowledge would involve overapplication with respect to both inference of the soul and recollection and as well as knowledge in gereral. The inference of the soul is produced from the contact, i.e. comprehensional relation, between the mind, i.e. the sense-organ, and the soul, i.e. the object. Also, such a definition would involve undeapplication with respect to the perception of the Supreme Soul. Further since the comprehensional relation is of the nature of contact etc., lack of generalization would become contingent in the relation. When the comprehensional relation, generalized as one of the relations of contact etc., is meant to be any one of non-determined relations, non-establishment by part would arise in the establishment of difference from other individual relations. Also in that case, the fault of employing useless adjective would arise in describing comprehensional relation. Further, suppose the state of being produced from either of the two, viz. sense organ and object is the defintion of perceptual knowledge, then the fault of employing useless adjective of both would arise in the definition of the Nyāyasūtra. And it is not correct to argue that the state of being produced from either of the two, viz. sense organ and object, constitutes the definition of perceptual knowledge. Since the knowledge in general is to be produced from either of the two, viz. the mind and the soul, the definition would be applicable to even the knowledge in general. Further, it should be noted that the sense-organ needs to be described, i.e. known by the perceptual knowledge.

Further it cannot be held that perceptual knowledge is true experience while not being produced from the already known peculiar means. Since the known means, i.e. inferential probans etc. are not the producers of perceptual knowledge, the definition would become overapplicable to the inferential knowledge when the unknown knowledge is held to be the peculiar means. Also it cannot be held that the perceptual knowledge is the true experience which is not produced from another knowledge. For, such a definition would involve the under application of the qualificative perceptual knowledge, as the same is to be produced from the knowledge of the qualifier. Further, the state of being the direct knowledge, while being true experience, cannot be the definition of perceptual knowledge. Since the state of being the direct knowledge cannot be grasped due to the absence of regular manifestor, the same cannot be established to be the generic property. Also suppose the regular manifestor exists, then the same manifestor could be admitted to be the definition and the cause of activity. Thus, what is the need for admitting the generic property of direct knowledgeness?

Explanation :

The Pūrvapakṣins (Jayanta) raises the objection now that the perceptual knowledge (*pratyakṣa*) cannot be defined as the non-deviating, i.e. valid knowledge (*avyabhicārin*), produced from the comprehensional relation between sense-organ and object (*indriyārtha sannikarṣotpannam*) (Cf. Nyāy Sū. i. 1. 4). According to him, such a definition would be overapplying to inference of soul and recollection (*ātmānumiti smṛti*) and also to knowledge in general (*jñāna mātra*), as the same are produced from the comprehensional relation between the mind, i.e. the sense-organ, and the soul, i.e. the object; whereas the same underapplies to the perceptual knowledge of the Supreme Soul (*īśvara pratyakṣa*), as it is not produced from such a relation. The Pūrvapakṣin points out that since the comprehensional relation is of the nature of contact etc. (*saṁyogādi rūpa*), the comprehensional relation cannot be generalized. And if the comprehensional relation is generalized as one of the relations of contact etc. (*saṁyogādyanyatama*), then non-establishment by part (*bhāgāsiddhi*) would occur in the establishment of difference from other relations (*itara bheda*). Also the Pūrvapakṣin notes that when perceptual knowledge is defined as being produced from either of the two, i.e. sense organ or object (*ekaikajanyatva*), the definition in the Nyāysūtra would involve the fault of useless adjective (*vyartha viśeṣaṇa*). And the state of being produced from either of the two (*ekaika janyatva*) cannot constitute the definition of perceptual knowledge, as it would overapply to knowledge in general (*jñāna mātra*) which is produced by either of the two. The Pūrvapakṣin further notes that sense organ (*indriya*) needs to be described, i.e. known by perceptual knowledge (*pratyakṣa nirūpya*); and hence involvement of sense-organ in the definition is contradictory.

Further the Pūrvapakṣin refutes the position that perceptual knowledge is true experience (*satyo' bhāvaḥ*) not produced from the known means (*jñātakaraṇa*). According to him, the definition would overapply to the inferential knowledge (*anumiti*), as the same is not produced from known means or is produced from unknown knowledge. Also he refutes that perceptual knowledge is true experience not produced from another knowledge (*jñānājanya*). According to him, such a definition would underapply to qualificative perception (*viśiṣṭa pratyakṣa*), as the same is produced from the knowledge of the qualifier (*viśeṣaṇa jñāna*). Further the Pūrvapakṣin refutes that the state of being the direct knowledge (*sākṣāt kāritva*) cannot be the definition of perceptual knowledge on the ground that the same state cannot be the generic property (*jāti*) due to the absence of any regular manifestor (*vyañjakābhāva*) and hence cannot be grasped. And suppose the manifestor

does exist, then the same could be admitted to be the definition of perceptual knowledge.

Sākṣātkāritva is the Definition of Pratyakṣa :

I. v. 3. We, the Prācyas, state our reply here. The state of being the direct knowledge is the definition of perceptual knowledge. The consecutive after-knowledge such as 'I directly know this' refers to such a generic property of direct knowledgeness in the absence of any impediment, in the case of the perceptual knowledge produced from eye etc. However, the state of being the knowledge produced from the sense-organ cannot be the definition of perceptual knowledge. For, in that case, the fault of mutual dependence would arise (between the state of being such a knowledge and the perceptual knowledgeness); and the sense-organ is transcendental by itself.

It should not be objected that the state of being the direct knowledge cannot be the generic property due to the absence of regular manifestor. For, the state of being the experience etc. having the eye as the means, though non-consecutive , can be the manifestors of the generic property, like the non-consecutive hump etc. are the manifestors of the generic property of the cowness etc. And the consecutive manifestor cannot be ruled to be necessary for the establishment of a generic property. The consecutive manifestor is absent in the case of (the generic properties of) knowledge, desire, effort, happiness and sorrow etc. On the contrary, generic property becomes unestablished in the presence of the regular manifestor. For, the consecutive knowledge can be produced from the regular manifestor only (even without generic property). However, the state of being the perceptual knowledge becomes established to be the generic property by the means producing the knowledge of the substrarum such as perceptual knowledge in the case of the indeterminate trascendental perception of the lord.

Explanation :

The Prācyas, influenced by the Bauddhas, state their reply here. According to them, the state of being the direct knowledge (*sākṣātkāritva*) can be the definition of perceptual knowledge (*pratyakṣa*); and the consecutive after-knowledge, viz. 'I directly know this' (*sākṣāt kāromi*) refers to the generic property of the direct knowledgeness (*jāti*) in the case of the perceptual knowledge produced from eye etc. Also the Prācyas refute the argument that the state of being the knowledge produced from the sense-organ (*indriya janyatva*) can be the definition of the perceptual knowledge. According to them, then the fault of mutual dependence (*anyonyāśvaya*) (between such a knowledgeness and the perceptual knowledgeness) would arise.

Further the Prācyas refute the objection that the state of being the direct knowledge (*sākṣāt kāritva*) cannot be the generic property (*jāti*) due to the absence of any regular manifestor (*niyata vyañjaka*). According to them, even the non-consecutive state of being the experience (*anubhavatva*), which has the eye as the means (*cakṣuḥ karaṇaka*), can be the manifestor. It should be noted that the consecutive manifestor (*anugata vyañjaka*) is not necessary for the establishment of a generic property; for, the same manifestor is absent in the case of the generic property of knowledge. On the contrary, the regular manifestor may impede the establishment of a generic property (*jāty asiddhi*), as the same manifestor can produce the consecutive knowledge. Also the Prācyas state that the state of being the perceptual knowledge (*pratyakṣatva*) can be established to be the generic property by the means producing the knowledge of the substratum(*dharmi grāhaka māna*) such as the perceptual knowledge due to the inditerminate transcendental perception of the lord.

Janyasākṣātkāratva is Janya pratyakṣa :

I. v. 4. The definition of the non-eternal, i.e. ordinary perceptual knowledge, which is not produced from the property produced from the mental concentration, not in turn produced from the determinate knowledge referring to the object of itself, and not produced from the comprehensional relation characterized by universals, can be the state of being the ordinary direct perception, which is not produced from the comprehensional relation causing the direct perception referring to the future objects.

The Other, hold that since the knowledge of universals and the comprehensional relation characterized by universals are to be included under the category of qualifierness related to the (object of knowledge produced from) sense-organ, the perceptual knowledge, produced from the same comprehensional relation characterized by universal, needs to be included in the category of perceptual knowledge only.

As an alternative, however, the Others hold that the non-eternal, i.e. ordinary perceptual knowledge can be held to be the knowledge produced from its own qualificand only as being the object of itself. In the case of the inferential knowledge, verbal knowledge (cognition) and recollection, having the Soul as the qualificand, the Soul is not the cause of them as being the qualificand; for, such knowledges can be produced even without the qualificand. Rather, therefore, the Soul is the cause only as being the inherent cause.

As yet another alternative, the Others hold that the non-etenral, i.e. ordinary perceptual knowledge can be held to be the knowledge produced from the sense-organs. For, the state of being the producer (of the sense-organs) is

intended to be delimited by the sense-organness. Thus, the sense-organs such as eye are the causes of non-etenal, i.e.ordinary perceptual knowledge in general, only as being the sense-organs. The consecutive effect, without a corresponding consecutive cause, would become accidental. The internal organ of mind is the cause of recollection and inferential knowledge etc., only as being the mind and not as being the internal organ. Otherwise, recollection (of Soul) etc. would become direct perception.

Explanation :

The Prācyas now state the definition of the non-eternal or ordinary perceptual knowledge (*janya pratyakṣa*). According to them, the ordinary perception (*janya pratyakṣa*), which is not produced from the property produced from the mental concentration (*yogaja dharmājanya*), not in turn produced from the determinate knowledge referring to the object of itself (*svaviṣayaka savikalpakājanya*) and which is not produced from the comprehesional relation characterized by universals (*sāmānya lakṣaṇā pratyāsattyajanya*), is the ordinary direct perception which is not produced from the comprehensional relation causing the direct perception of future objects (*anāgatagocara sākṣātākāra hetu pratyāsattyajanya*).

Further Gaṅgeśa explains the position of the Others (*anye*). According to them, knowledge of universals (*sāmānya jñāna*) and comprehensional relation characterized by universals (*pratyāsatti*) are to be included under the qualifierness relating to the object of knowledge produced from sense-organ (*indriya sambaddha viśeṣaṇatā*); and therefore, the perceptual knowledge (*pratyakṣa*), produced from the comprehensional relation characterized by universals, needs to be covered by the term '*janya pratyakṣa*' only.

The Others propose an alternative definition that ordinary perceptual knowledge (*janya pratyakṣa*) is the knowledge produced from its own qualificand (*svaviśeṣya janya*) only as being the object (*viṣayatvena*). According to them, the Soul (*ātman*), as being the qualificand, is not the cause of the inferntial knowledge and verbal cognition having the Soul as the qualificand (*ātma viśeṣyakānumiti śābda*); rather it is the cause of them only as being the inherent cause (*samavāyitvena*), as such knowledges can be produced even without the qualificand (*viśeṣya*).

The Others propose yet another alternative definition that the ordinary perceptual knowledge (*janya pratyakṣa*) is the knowledge produced from sense-organs (*indriya janya jñāna*). According to them, the sense-organs are intended to be the producers of knowledge (*janaka*) only as being the the sense-organs (*indriyatvena*). Thus, the sense-organs such as eye are the producers only as being the sense-organs, as otherwise the consecutive knowledge

(*anugata kārya*) cannot be obtained without the consecutive cause (*anugata hetu*) regularly. It should be noted that mind (*manas*) is the cause of the recollection and inferential knowledge etc. (*smṛty anumityādi*) only as being the mind (*manastvena*) and not as being the sense-organ (*indriyatvena*), as the same recollection etc. are not direct knowledges (*anubhava*).

Jñāna hetu manas samyogāśrayatva is Indriyatva and Jñānākaraṇaka jñāna is Pratyakṣa :

I. v. 5. The state of being the sense-organ is the state of being the substratum of the contact of mind, which produces the knowledge but does not produce the recollection. The life breath, body and Soul are (not the sense-organs, as they are) only the substratums of the contact of mind which produces the recollection. As an alternative, the state of being the sense-organ can be held to be the state of being the substratum of the contact of mind which produces the knowledge while not being the substratum of the clearly manifested particular quality other than the sound.

However, we, the Naiyāyikas, hold that the perceptual knowledge in general is the knowledge which does not have another knowledge as its means. The knowledge of the qualifier does not function as the means in the case of the qualificative perceptual knowledge due to the absence of any supporting operation. The knowledge of the qualifier is the cause in the case of the qualificative perceptual knowledge of the qualifier; however, the knowledge of the qualifier of the qualifier is not the means of the qualificative perceptual knowledge of the qualifier through the operation of the knowledge of the qualifier due to the absence of any proof.

In the case of the after-knowledge or recognition such as 'This is that one', the recollection of the thatness is the cause; however, the experience, i.e. the knowledge is not the means through the operation of mental impression. For, when the recognition is produced from the mental impression, the same would have the contingency of becoming recollection. The state of being what is produced from the mental impression is the regulating factor of something being only the recollection due to the brevity in assumption. Also, the mental impression needs to be established only as being the cause of the recollection.

Explanation :

Gaṅgeśa defines the sense-organ (*indriya*) as the substratum of the contact of mind (*manas samyogāśraya*), which produces the knowledge but does not produce the recollection (*smṛtyajanaka jñānahetu*). According to him, life breath, body and Soul etc. are not the sense-organs as they are the

substratums of the contact of mind producing recollection (*smṛti janaka manas samyogavat*). Also Gaṅgeśa proposes an alternative definition of the sense-organ as the substratum of the contact of mind producing the knowledge (*jñānahetu manas samyogāśraya*), while not being the substratum of the clearly manifested particular quality (*udbhūta viśeṣa guṇāśraya*) which is other than the sound (*śabdetara*).

Gaṅgeśa now presents the Naiyāyikas' definition of the perceptual knowledge. in general covering both ordinary and eternal knowledges. According to him, the perceptual knowledge is the knowledge not having another knowledge as its means (*jñānākaraṇakam jñānam*). And the knowledge of the qualifier (*viśeṣaṇa jñāna*) is not the means of the qualificative perceptual knowledge (*viśiṣṭa pratyakṣa*), as the same is devoid of any operation (*vyāpārābhāva*). It should be noted that the knowledge of the qualifier is the cause of the qualificative perceptual knowledge of the qualifier (*viśiṣṭa vaiśiṣṭya pratyakṣa*); however the knowledge of the qualifier of the qualifier (*viśeṣaṇa viśeṣaṇa dhī*) is not the means through the operation of the knowledge of the qualifier (*viśeṣaṇadhī*) due to the absence of any proof.

Gaṅgeśa notes that in the case of recognition (*pratyabhijñā*) such as 'This is that one' (*so' yam*), only the recollection of the thatness (*tattā smṛti*) is the cause (*kāraṇa*); but the experience (*anubhava*) is not the means (*karaṇa*) through the operation of mental impression (*samskāra*), as then the recognition would amount to recollection (*smṛti*). And the state of being what is produced from the mental impression (*samskāra janyatva*) is the regulating factor (*tantra*) of something being only the recollection (*smṛtitve*) due to the brevity in assumption.

Prābhākaras' Position : Sākṣāddhī is Pratyakṣa :

I. v. 6. The Prābhākaras hold here as follows : That the perceptual knowledge is the direct knowledge. And the directness of the knowledge does not constitute the generic property, as the regular manifestor is absent. Also, the directness of the knowledge does not constitute the state of being the knowledge produced independent of determinate knowledge. For, such a state does not pervade, i.e. apply to the perception of the similarity and the twoness and also the recognition of identity. On the contrary, that knowledge, which is not produced from the determinate knowledge with respect to whatever objects, is the direct knowledge with respect to the same objects. And all types of knowledges are only perceptual, i.e. direct in the case of the manifestation of the knower and the knowledge, as the same are not produced from another knowledge.

The consecutive (qualificative) knowledge referring to the generic property too is only perceptual, as the same is to be produced from the indeterminate knowledge of generic property and individual. The knowledge of the qualifier does not constitute the cause in the case of the qualificative perceptual knowledge of similarity etc. For, the qualificative knowledge arises immediately with respect to the object connected with sense-organ even without the knowledge of the qualifier. The knowledge of the opposite item such as the short object is not required for the perceptual knowledge of the long object. Rather, on the contrary, the knowledge of the short object is required for the activity involving the long object.

Inference and recognition etc., are not perceptual with respect to the probandum and the thatness, as they are to be produced from the knowledge referring to the probandum-aspect and the thatness- aspect respectively. Therefore, they are only non-perceptual. However, both inference and recognition are only perceptual with respect to the knowledge and the knower and also the thisness respectively.

Explanation :

Since the Naiyāyikas' definition of perception, viz. 'knowledge not having another knowledge as its means' (*jñānākaraṇakam jñānam*) does not apply to inference, which is perceptual with respect to the knowledge and the knower (*miti mātrāṁśe*) in the theory of the Prābhākaras, Gaṅgeśa introduces Prābhākaras' definition of perception. According to them, the perceptual knowledge (*pratyakṣa*) is the direct knowledge (*sākṣāddhī*). And the directness of knowledge (*sākṣāttva*) is not a generic property (*jāti*) due to the absence of any regular manifestor (*niyata vyañjaka*). Also it is not the state of being the knowledge produced independent of determinate knowledge (*savikalpakānapekṣa jñānatva*), as the same would not apply to the perceptual knowledge of the similarity and the twoness etc. (*sādṛśya dvitvādi pratyakṣa*). Thus, the Prābhākaras hold that the knowledge (*jñāna*), which is not produced from the determinate knowledge (*savikalpakājanya*) with respect to whatever objects, is the direct knowledge (*sākṣād dhī*) with respect to those very objects. Also, all the knowledges are only perceptual or direct in the case of the manifestation of knowledge and the knower (*mitimātṛ prakāśa*), as they are not produced from another knowledge.

The Prābhākaras note that the consecutive qualificative knowledge referring to the generic property (*jātau*) is only perceptual, as it is produced from the indeterminate knowledge of generic property and individual (*jāti vyakti nirvikalpaka*); and thus the definition is not under applicable. According to them, the knowledge of the qualifier (*viśeṣaṇa jñāna*) does not constitute

the cause of the qualificative knowledge of the similarly etc. (*sādṛśyādi viśuṣṭa vaiśiṣṭya pratyakṣa*), as the same can arise even without the knowledge of the qualifier provided that the object is connected with the sense organ. Further the Prābhākaras note that the knowledge of the opposite item such as the short one (*hṛsvādi jñāna*) is not required for the perception of the long one. Further, inference (*anumiti*) and recognition (*pratyabhijñā*) are not perceptual; but rather they are only non-perceptual (*paro'kṣa*), as they are to be produced from another knowledge with respect to the probandum (*meya*) and the thatness (*tattā*). However, they are perceptual with respect to the knowledge and the knower (*miti nātṛ*) and the thisness (*idantā*) respectively.

Refutation of the Mīmāmsakaikadeśins' position that Pratyabhijñā is Pratyakṣa:

I. v. 7. The Mīmāmsakaikadeśins propose here that the recognition (such as ' I know that this one is that') has the causality with respect to the manifestation of the thatness only as being the after-knowledge of the thatness, and not as being the determinate after-knowledge of the thatness. (Thus, the recognition is perceptual with respect to the thatness).

However, this is not correct. Then in the case of inference too, the inference would have the causality with respect to the manifestation of the probandum only as being the knowledge of the probans (and not as being the knowledge of the pervaded); and thus it would become perceptual, as the thatness is like the probandum'.

Explanation :

The Mīmāmsakaikadeśins propose now that recognition (*pratybhijñā*) too is only perceptual (*pratyakṣa*). According to them, the recognition *'so'yam'* is the cause of the manifestation of the thatness (*tattāprakāśa*) only as being the after-knowledge of the thatness (*tattā jñāna*) and not as being the determinate after-knowledge of the thatness (*tattā savikalpaka*).

However, the Prābhākaras refute the proposal. According to them, if the recognition is perceptual, then even the inference (*anumiti*) would become perceptual by manifesting the probandum as the knowledge of the probans (*liṅga jñānatvena*).

Refutation of the Prābhākaras' Position :

I. v. 8. Here we, the Naiyāyikas, reply : That suppose the recognition (' I know that this one is that') referring to the thatness is of the form of indirect knowledge, then the same would not originate; for, the required cause of the same, viz. probans etc. are absent. Suppose it is argued that only the sense-organ associated with the knowledge of the thatness is the cause of the recognition, then the recognition referring to the thatness would become only the direct knowledge; for, it is to be produced from the sense-organs. Also it cannot be admitted that the state of being produced from the sense-organ independently without the knowledge of the thatness is the regulating factor of the recognition being the direct knowledge. For, such a position involves the heaviness in assumption. Also since the recognition ' I know that this one is that' is to be produced from the sense-organ-associated with the other knowledge, the same would have the occasion to be non-perceptual with respect to the thisness as well. It is not possible to admit that both the expectancy for the other knowledge and the absence of the expectancy for the other knowledge are possible when only one knowledge, i.e. recognition is to be produced.

It may be argued that both expectancy and absence of expectancy are tenable in the case of two distinct aspects, i.e. the thisness and the thatness respectively. However, this is not correct. Since the two different aspects are the objects of only one knowledge, the recognition cannot be produced from the sense-organs. Further it should be noted that all types of knowledges, i.e. inference etc. cannot be perceptual with respect to the knowledge and the knower; for, the same knowledges are not produced from the sense-organs. And the sense-organs are the causes of only the direct knowledges. Supposing the two aspects of the knowledge and the knower of inference are to be produced from the mind, then the state of being produced from the mind would be required to be present even in the case of the probandum. Also it cannot be held that the state of being what is to be produced from the totality of causes of the knowledge in general is the regulating factor of the knowledge being the perceptual in nature; for, it involves the heaviness in assumption. And the knowledge in general does not mean the knowledgeness. For, the same knowledgeness is not to be produced. Also the same knowledge in general does not mean all the knowledges; for, in the case of perceptual knowledge, all knowledges cannot be produced individually from the totality of causes of all knowledges. Also the totality of all knowledges is unestablished as such.

Explanation :

The Naiyāyikas now refute the Prābhākaras' position that perceptual knowledge is direct knowledge, whereas inference and recognition are indirect knowledges (*paro'kṣa*). According ot them, the recognition (*pratyabhijñā*) referring to the thatness (*tattā*) cannot be of the form of the indirect knowledge (*parokṣānubhava*), as the cause of indirect knowledge (*taddhetu*) such as the probans is absent. Also the Naiyāyikas refute the argument that the sense-

organs (*indriya*) associated with the knowledge of the thatness (*tattā jñāna sahita*) is the cause of such a recognition. According to them, then the recognition referring to the thatness would need to become only the direct knowledge due to being produced from the sense-organs (*indriya janya*). Also the Naiyāyikas refute the argument that the state of being produced from the sense-organs independently without the knowledge of the thatness (*jñānānapekṣa*) is the regulating factor (*tantra*) of the recognition 'This one is that' being the direct knowledge. According to them, such a position involves heaviness; and also then the recognition would become non-perception or non-direct knowledge (*apratyakṣa*) with respect to the thisness-aspect (*idantāmśa*), as the same is produced only from the sense-organs associated with another knowledge. Further, the Naiyāyikas point out that one and the same knowledge, i.e. the recognition cannot have both expectantancy and non-expectancy for another knowledge.

The Naiyāyikas oppose the argument that both expectancy and non-expectancy (*tadubhaya*) exist in the two aspects (*amśe*), i.e. the thisness and the thatness respectively. According to them, the two aspects are the objects of only one knowledge; and therefore the recognition cannot be produced from the sense-organs. Also the Naiyāyikas note that all the knowledges such as inference (*sarvam jñānam*) cannot be perceptual, with respect to the knowledge and the knower (*mitimātramśe*), as they are not produced from the sense-organs; and the sense-organs are the causes of only direct knowledges. They further refute the argument that the two aspects, i.e., the knowledge and the knower of inference, can be produced from the mind (*mano janya*), on the ground that then even the aspect of probandum (*anumeyāmśa*) would be required to be produced from the mind. The Naiyāyikas refute the position that the state of being what is produced from the totality of causes of knowledge in general (*jñānamātra sāmagrī janyatva*) is the regulating factor of the knowledge being perceptual. According to them, such an assumption is heavy. Also the knowledge in general (*jñāna mātra*) cannot be the knowledgeness (*jñānatva*), as it is non-produced (*ajanya*). Also it cannot be all the knowledges (*sarva jñāna*), as the totality of causes of all knowledges (*sarva jñāna sāmagrī*) cannot be established.

Refutation of Pūrvapakṣin's definition :

I. v. 9. Moreover, since parts do not exist in the knowledge, only the aspects constitute the objects of knowledge (but not the parts). And another determinate knowledge cannot be the cause of the objects of perceptual knowledge. Otherwise, the inference and the recognition would require to have the perceptuality with respect to their own objects, i.e. the probandum and the thatness respectively. For, the objects (of the inference and the recognition) are not to be produced from the determinate knowledges.

Now, it may be proposed as follows : That in the case of the recognition, the knowledge of the thatness as referring to the thatness is the cause; and in the same way in the case of the inference, the knowledge of the probandum as referring to the probandum is the cause. However, in the case of perception, the knowledge of the particular objects, as referring to the knowledge, the knower, the thisness and the objectness of the substratum, is not the cause; rather, only the totality of causes of knowledge is the cause of them.

However, this is proposal not correct. The state of referring to the objects, in the case of the knowledge, is the state of having the nature belonging to the knowledge dependent on the causes of the knowledge itself. And the same being the particular nature of the knowledge, cannot be produced from the knowledge. Also the said definition of the perceptual knowledge does not apply to the knowledge of the staff-holder. Since the knowledge of the staff-holder, being the qualificative knowledge, like the inference, is to be produced from the (other) knowledge of the qualifier. Also the indirect knowledgeness cannot be an impeding condition. For, such an indirect knowledgeness does not pervade the probandum in the case of the recognition, the knowledge of the consecutive generic property, which is to be produced, and the first produced knowledge of the generic property and the individual.

The consecutiveness (of generic property) means the occurrence (of generic property) in the earlier experienced individual while occuring in the latter experienced individual; and since the earlier experienced individual is the qualifier, the knowledge of the same individual becomes the cause of the perceptual knowledge of the consecutiveness. Otherwise, the consecutive knowledge would become necessary even at first without the knowledge of the earlier individual.

Explanation :

Gangeśa now refutes the definition of the perceptual knowledge (*pratyakṣa*) that it is the direct knowledge (*jñāna*) not having another knowledge as the means (*jñānākarakaka*). According to him, only the aspects of knowledge (*amśa*) constitute the objects of knowledge (*viṣaya*); and another determinate knowledge cannot be the cause of the objects of perceptual knowledge. Otherwise, the inference (*anumiti*) and the recognition (*pratyabhijñā*) would need to become perceptual knowledges, with respect to the objects of them, i.e. the probandum and the thatness respectively, as they are not to be produced from another determinate knowledge.

The Pūrvapakṣin now proposes that in the case of recognition (*pratyabhijñā*), the knowledge of the thatness (*tattājñāna*), as referring to the thatness, is the cause; and in the case of inference (*anumiti*), the knowledge of the probandum (*meya jñāna*), as referring to the probandum, is the case. Thus, recognition and inference need not become perceptual knowledges. However, in the case of perception, the other knowledge, referring to the knowledge, the knowler (*mitimātṛ*) and the thisness and the objectness of substratum (*idantā dharmi viṣayatva*), is not the causes; and therefore perception can be direct knowledge in those aspects.

However, Gangeśa refutes the proposal. According to him, the state of referring to the objects (*tadviṣayatva*) of the knowledge is the state of having the nature belonging to the knowledge (*tadīya svabhāvatva*) as dependent on the causes of the knowledge itself(*svakāraṇādhīna*). And since the same cannot be produced from the knowledge (*jñānājanya*), the definition of perceptual knowledge is overapplicable to inference etc. Also since the qualificative knowledge such as 'This is the staff-holder' (*daṇdin*) is produced from the knowledge of the qualifier (*viśeṣaṇa jñāna*), the same definition is under applicable to the qualificative knowledge of the staff-holder. Further, the Naiyāyikas state that the indirect knowledgeness (*paro'kṣatva*) cannot be an impeding condition (*upādhi*), in the case of recognition etc., as the same does not pervade the probandum (*sādhyāvyāpaka*).

Further, Gangeśa points out that the consecutiveness (*anugatatva*) means the occurrence of generic property in the later experienced individual while occurring in the earliar experienced individual; and therefore, the knowledge needs to be the cause of the perception of the consecutiveness (*anugatatva pratyakṣa*). Thus, the Pūrvapakṣin's definition of the perceptual knowledge as 'knowledge not having another knowledge as its means' is untenable.

Conclusion of Gangeśa :

I. v. 10. That is why, the following position too gets refuted: "That the perceptual knowledge is the knowledge not produced from another knowledge directly. And only the mental impression is the direct cause of the recognition. Even the consecutive knowledge is produced from the impression in the case of generic property. And this way, only the impression of the adjunct of similarity is the cause in the case of the perception of similarity".

This is so because, such a definition of perceptual knowledge does not apply to the perceptual knowledge of the staff-holder, produced from the experience of the staff, i.e. the qualifier; and to the serially continuous perceptual knowledge. Only the preceding qualificative experience, as being the knowledge of the qualifier, is the cause of the following qualificative knowledge; and the mental impression cannot produce anything but the recollection. It has already been stated that otherwise recognition etc., being produced from mental impression, would become mere recollection.

Thus ends the definition of perceptual knowledge.

Explanation :

Gangeśa now concludes the section on definition of perceptual knowledge by refuting yet another definition of the Pūrvapakṣin. According to him, perceptual knowledge (*pratyakṣa*) cannot be defined to be the knowledge (*jñāna*) not directly produced by another knowledge (*jñāna sākṣād ajanya*); and this is dispite that only impression (*samskāra*) is the cause of recognition (*pratyabhijñā*) such as 'I know that this one is that'; only impression is the cause of the consecutive knowledge of generic property (*jātav anugatadhī*) and only impression of adjunct of similarity (*pratiyogi samskāra*) is the cause of the perception of similarity (*sādṛśya pratyakṣa*).

Gangeśa refutes such a definition of the Pūrvapakṣin on the ground that the same does not apply to the perceptual knowledge of the staff-holder (*daṇḍi pratyakṣa*), as it is only produced from the knowledge of the qualifier, i.e. the staff; and also it does not apply to the serially continuous perceptual knowledge (*dhārāvāhika pratyakṣa*), as it is only produced from the earliar qualificative knowledges. It should be noted that mental impression (*samskāra*) does not produce anything but the recollection (*smaraṇa*); and otherwise even recognition, being produced from impression, would become only recollection.

The End of the Pratyakṣalakṣaṇa

B

Theory of Comprehensional Relation (Sannikarṣa Vādaḥ) : Six Types of Relations

I. V. 11. Particular comprehensional relation is consecutive, i.e. non-deviating cause of particular perception. Perception of substance is produced from the relation of contact (of object with sense-organ); perception of both form and action is produced from the relation of inherence (of form and action) in the object connected (with sense-organ); perception of the formness etc. is produced from the relation of inherence (of the forness etc.) in that which inhers in the object connected (with sense-organ); perception of sound is produced from the relation of inherence (in the ear); perception of the soundness is produced from the relation of inherence in the object inherent (in the ear); and perception of absence of sound is produced from the relation of qualifierness, i.e. self-linking relation; and perception of the inherence and the absence of pot etc. is produced from the qualifierness connected with sense-organ. It must be noted that perception is produced only from the relation with the particular competent object; and not from relation with any object.

Explanation :

Gangeśa, after concluding the definition of perceptual knowledge, begins his theory of comprehensional relation (Sannikarṣavāda). According to the Naiyāyikas, only particular comprehensional relation (*sannikarṣa viśeṣa*) is a consecutive or non-deviating cause (*anugata hetu*) of particular perception (*pratyakṣa viśeṣa*) (Cf. Nyāy Sū. i.1.4). And particular comrehensional relation is devided into seven types : i) contact of object or substance with sense-organ (*samyoga*); ii) inherence in the object connected with sense-organ (*samyukta-samavāya*); iii) inherence in that which inheres in the object connected with sense-organ (*samjyukta samaveta-samavāya*); iv) inherence in the ear (*samavāya*); v) inherence in the object inherent in the ear (*samaveta samavāya*); vi) the qualifierness, i.e. self-linking relation (*viśeṣaṇatā*); and the qualifierness connected with the sense-organ (*indriya sambaddha viśeṣaṇatā*). These relations produce the perceptions of substance (*dravya*), form and action (*rūpakarman*), formness (*rūpatva*), sound (*śabda*), soundness (*śabdatva*), absence (*abhāva*), and inhernece (*samavāya*) respectively. And Gangeśa points out that perception is produced from the comprehensional

relation with only the particular competent object (*yogya*), as the incompetent object cannot be perceived in any case.

Argument that Mahāvayavāvacchedena Samyoga is cause :

I. V. 12. It may be held now as follows : That dispite the contact (of the sense organ) with the whole object, as delimited by the minute parts, i.e. atoms etc., perception of the whole object is not produced; and therefore only the contact (of the sense-organ) with the object as delimited by the large parts is the cause. Thus, it must be admitted that only the contact of sense-organ with the large parts of the object is the cause of perception of the whole.

It is not correct to argue that since the contact of the organ with the object to be perceived has the brevity compared to the contact of the organ with the parts delimiting the contact of the object to be perceived, only the same needs to be the cause of perception. For, such a contact of organ with the object to be perceived is overpervassive or overapplicable. From this negation, even the position that "since the contact of the organ with the object itself has the brevity as compared to the contact of the organ with the parts of the object itself, only the same needs to be the cause of perception" gets refuted.

Further, it should not be objected that if the contact (of the organ) as delimited by the object, is rendered redundant by the contact (of the organ), as delimited by the large parts of object, then even the same contact (of the organ) as delimited by the large parts gets rendundant by the contact (of the organ), as delimited by yet other small parts; and therefore the contact (of the organ) cannot constitute the cause of perception at all. For, when the contact (of the organ), as delimited by the more minute parts, is held to be the cause of perception of the whole, overapplication would become contingent.

Explanation :

That the contact (of the sense-organ) with the whole object, as delimited by the large parts (*mahāvayavāvacchedena*), is the cause of the perception of the whole object; for, the contact (of the sense-organ) with the object, as delimited by the small parts (*sūkṣmāvayavāvacchedena*), is not conducive to the perception. Therefore, the Pūrvapakṣin proposes that only the contact of sense-organ with the large parts (*avayavendriya samyoga*) is the cause of the perception of the whole object.

The Pūrapakṣin, however, refutes the argument that since the contact of the organ with the object to be perceived (*grāhya saṁyoga*) has the brevity compared to the contact of the organ with the parts (*avayavasamyoga*), the same needs to be the cause of perception. According to him, the contact of

the organ with the parts is overpervasive. Also, therefore, the Pūrvapakṣin refutes the parallel position that the contact of the organ with the object (*svasaṁyoga*) has the brevity compared to the contact of the organ with the parts of the object (*svāvayava samyoga*); and therefore the same needs to be the cause. Also, the Pūrvapakṣin refutes the objection that since the contact (of the sense-organ), as delimited by the large parts (*avacchedaka samyoga*), gets redundant by the contact (of the sense-organ), as delimited by the yet other smaller parts (*avacchedakāntara samyoga*), the contact of the sense-organ (*samyoga*) need not be the cause of perception of whole object at all. According to him, the contact (of the organ), as delimited by the more minute parts (*alpatara bhāgāvacchedena*), cannot be admitted to be the cause due to the overapplication.

Svagrāhya samyoga is the Cause :

I. V. 13. This is not so.The contact (of sense-organ), as delimited by the large parts, does not constitute the cause of the perception of the substance or that of the perception of the whole object in general; for, deviation of the same contact arises in the case of the perception of the Soul, atom of dust moving in sun–beam and the subtle parts of the mote. Rather therefore, the same contact (of the sense-organ), as delimited by the large parts, constitutes the cause of only the perception of the pot etc. This way, since the perception of the substance such as the Soul is to be produced from the contact (of sense organ) with the object to be perceived, even the perception of the substance such as the pot, is to be produced from the contact (of sense organ) with its object to be perceived similarly.

Supposing it is held that the perception of the substance such as the pot is not produced dispite the presence of the contact (of sense organ) with the subtle parts such as atoms, then let it be admitted that the contact (of sense organ) with the large parts is the delimitor of the causality, or that the same contact (of sense organ) with the large parts is the additional cause of the perception. However, the already assumed cause, i.e. the contact (of sense organ) with the object to be perceived need not be abandoned.

Explanation :

The Naiyāyikas refute the Pūrvapakṣin's position here. According to them, the contact (of sense organ) (*samyoga*), as delimited by the large parts (*sthūlāvayavāvacchedena*), cannot be the cause of the perception of the substance (*dravya graha*) or that of the perception of the whole object in general (*avayavi mātra graha*) due to the deviation of the same from the perception of the Soul (*ātma graha*) etc. Rather therefore, the same is the cause of only the perception of the substance such as the pot (*ghaṭādi graha*). Also the Naiyāyikas note that since the perception of the substance such as the Soul (*ātmādi dravya graha*) is produced from the contact (of sense organ) with the object to be perceived (*grāhya samyoga*), even the perception of the pot etc. (*ghaṭādi graha*) can be admitted to be produced from the contact (of sense organ) with its object to be perceived (*sva grāhya samyoga*).

However, the Naiyāyikas, on a second thought, admit that the contact (of sense organ) with the large parts can constitute the delimitor of the causality (*avacchedaka*) or the additional cause, if the perception of the pot is not produced dispite the contact (of sense organ) with the small parts. According to them, nevertheless, the assumed cause (*kḷpta hetu*), i.e. the contact (of sense organ) need not be abandoned due to the occasional failure of the same.

Samyukta samavāya is the cause :

I. V. 14. It may be objected now as follows : That let the perception of the whole object be admitted to be produced from the inherence in the object connected with sense organ; however, the contact of the organ need not be the cause of the same; for, the inherence in the object connected with the organ is assumed to be the cause of the perception of the form etc. And it is not correct to argue that only the contact (of the organ) is the cause (of the perception of whole object) due to the brevity. The same contact (of the organ) needs to be assumed to have the causality afresh again.

However, this objection is not correct. The contact of the sense-organ is already assumed to be the cause of the perception of the substance of Soul; and therefore, the same can be assumed to be the cause of the perception of the other substance such as the whole object, due to being the direct perception of the substance. The inherence in the object connected (with the organ) cannot be admitted to be the cause of the perception of the substance produced from the external sense-organ or the perception of the whole object; for, only the contact of the sense-organ needs to be assumed to be the cause of the perceptions of those due to the brevity.

It may be objected again as follows : That the inherence in the object connected with sense organ is not the producer of the perception of the odour; rather, only the contact (of the organ) with the substratum of odour is the cause of the same. And this way, even the inherence in that which inhers in the object connected need not be the cause of the perception, as the perception of the odourness too can be produced from the contact (of the organ) with the substratum of the substratum of the odourness. Also when (the contact with the substratum of) the odour is present, the absence of the perception of the odour is not produced even without the inherence of the odour. Also it is

not correct to argue that, this way, the perception of the future odour would become necessary in the case of the pot being connected with the sense-organ. For, even (the presence of) the odour constitutes the cause of the perception of itself. Also it is not correct to argue that since the odour is perceptible, the state of being the substratum of the relation of the sense-organ in the odour is inferable. For, the relation of inherence, which constitutes the cause of the perception of sound, is very much present even in the odour. Also when the (state of being the substratum of) relation of the sense-organ with the odour in general is inferred, the probandum would become unexampled.

No, this is not so. Suppose the inhernece of the odour is the qualifier in the position that the contact (of the organ) with the substance, having the inherence of the odour is the cause, then the contact (of the organ) with the substratum of the odour becomes the cause. However, suppose the inherence of the odour is merely an adventitious qualifier, then the substance connected with the organ in general would become adventitiously qualified; and thus, the perception of the odour of clothing would become contingent from the contact (of the organ) with the pot.

Explanation :

The Pūvapakṣin objects that the perception of the whole object (*avayavi graha*) is possible merely from the inherence in the object connected with sense organ (*samyukta samavāyin*); and therefore, the relation of contact with the organ (*samyoga*) need not be the cause of the perception of the whole object; and the same inherence in the object connected with sense-organ is assumed to be the cause of the perception of the form etc. in any way. According to them, however, the contact with the organ (*samyoga*) cannot be insisted to be the cause of the whole object due to the brevity, as the causality of the same (*kāraṇatā*) needs to be assumed again.

However, the Naiyāyikas refute the objection. According to them, the contact of the sense organ (*indriya samyoga*) is assumed to be the cause of the substance such as Soul (*ātma graha*); and therefore, the same can be assumed to be the cause of the other substance such as the whole object. The Naiyāyikas note that the inherence in the object connected with the organ (*samyukta samavāya*) cannot be the cause of the perception of the whole object (*avayavi graha*), as only the contact of the sense-organ (*samyoga*) needs to be admitted to be the cause of the perception of the whole object due to the brevity.

The Pūrvapakṣin objects that the inherence in the object connected with the organ (*samyukta samavāya*) need not be the cause of the perception of the odour (*gandha-grāhaka*), as only the contact (of the organ) with the substratum of the odour (*āśraya samyoga*) can produce the perception of the odour. Further, he objects that the inherence in what inhers in the object connected with sense organ (*samyuka samaveta samavāya*) too need not be the cause of the perception of the odourness (*gandhatva graha*), as only the contact (of the organ) with the substratum of the substratum of the odourness (*āśrayāśraya samyoga*) can produce the perception of the odourness. According to him, when the contact with the substratum of the odour is present, the non-perception of the odour (*gandhāgraha*) is not produced dispite the absence of the inherence of the odour. Also the perception of the future odour (*bhāvi gandha graha*) does not become contingent in the case of the pot connected with the organ (*samyukta ghaṭa*), as the presence of the odour is a necessary cause. Further, according to the Pūrvapakṣin, dispite the odour being perceptual (*pratyakṣa*), the state of being the substratum of the relation of the organ (*indriya sannikarṣāśrayatva*) need not be inferable, as the inherence (*samavāya*), the cause of the perception of the sound (*śabda pratyakṣa hetu*), is very much present in the odour.

The Naiyāyikas, however, refute the objection. According to them, the contact (of the organ) with the substratum of odour (*āśraya samyoga*) is the cause only if the inherence of the odour (*gandha samavāya*) is the qualifier (*viśeṣaṇa*). However, suppose the inherence of the odour is merely the adventitious qualifier (*upalakṣaṇa*), then the contact (of the organ) with the substratum of the odour cannot be the cause, as then the perception of the odour of clothing would become necessary from the contact (of the organ) with the pot.

Svasamavāyi Saṁyoga is not the cause :

I. V. 15. It may be proposed now as follows : That the contact (of the sense–organ) with the substance having the inherence (of odour) in itself is the cause of the perception of the odour; and the inherence is the delimitor of the causality there. (However, this is not correct.). Then, such a proposal would become equal to the position that in the case of the inherence in the object connected (with the organ) being the cause of perception of the odour, the contact is the delimitor of the causality and the inherence is the cause. And this process is generally called to be the wearing of the clothing by turning around border (hem) of clothing.

It may be argued now as follows : That the inherence in the object connected with sense–organ is neither contact, nor inherence, nor both (contact and inherence); for, they are absent in the odour and sense-organ. Also the inherence in the object connected with sense–organ cannot be considered to be the indirect relation of odour with the sense-organ.

For, suppose the indirect relation amounts to merely the contact and the inherence, then opposition (contradiction) would become contingent; and suppose it does not amount to more than contact and inherence, then it would go against the dogma of the Naiyāyikas.

However, this is not correct. Only sense-organ and sense-organ-contact and also the inherence in the substratum of sense-organ-contact constitute the indirect comprehensional relation. Otherwise, the consecutive perception of the generic property of blueness would become untenable in blue clothing, blue leather and blue blanket through the indirect comprehensional relation.

Explanation :

The Pūrvapakṣin proposes now that the contact (of the sense–organ) with the substance having the inherence of odour in itself (*svasamavāyi samyoga*) is the cause of the perception of odour; and the inherence in such a relation is merely the delimitor of the causality (*avacchedaka*). However the Naiyāyikas refute the proposal. According to them, such a proposal would become equal to the position that the inherence in the object connected (with the organ) (*saṁyogi samavāya*) is the cause and the contact is the delimitor of the causality; thus both positions are two borders of the same clothing, i.e. two sides of the same coin.

The Pūrvapaksin argues now that the inherence in the object connected with sense–organ (*saṁyukta samavāya*) can neither be classified as contact (*saṁyoga*), nor as inherence (*samavāya*), nor as both, as they are absent in the odour and the sense-organ. Also the Pūrvapakṣin argues that the inherence in the object connected cannot be the indirect relation (*paramparā sambandha*) of odour with the sense-organ, as indirect relation can neither be admitted to be merely the contact and the inherence due to contradiction, nor be admitted to be more than the contact and the inherence due to the going against the dogma of the Naiyāyikas.

However, the Naiyāyikas refute the argument. According to them, the indirect relation of inherence in the object connected with sense–organ means the sense-organ and sense-organ-contact (*indriya tatsaṁyoga*) and the inherence in the substratum of the sense-organ-contact (*tadāśraya samavāya*); and it is necessary to admit so as to explain the consecutive perception of the property of blueness (*nīlatva jāti*) in the blue clothing, blue leather and blue blanket through such an indirect relation.

Samyukta Samaveta Samavāya is the Cause and Rūpatva is Jāti :

I. V. 16. It should not be objected now that the perception of the property such as the formness is not produced from the inherence in what inhers in the object connected (with organ); for, the state of being what inhers in the substance is not recognized in the formness. Dispite the non-recognition of the state of being what inhers in the formness, the similarity in the form etc. is perceived from the inherence in what inhers in the object connected (with sense organ).

It should not be argued that the similarity between the forms etc. is perceived from the similarity between the substances only. Since the two different perceptions through the direct relations are valid (lit. non-distinct) in the absence of contradiction, only the opposite theory of the Naiyāyikas (viz. that the similarity between the substances is produced from the similarity between the qualities etc. through the indirect relation) would become contingent. Also dispite the dissimilarity between the substrata, the similarity between the forms and the tastes are perceived.

The formness, the tasteness, the sweetness, the odournes and the fragranceness are generic properties due to the consecutive knowledge. As a matter of fact, the knowledge with respect to form is only that 'This is blue' etc.; and not that 'This is form' and 'This is another form' etc.; however, the consecutive knowledge of form such as 'This is yellow form' and 'This is blue form' constitutes the proof of the generic property of the formness. It is not correct to argue that the state of being the quality to be perceived from only a single organ such as eye constitutes the formness etc.; for, the consecutive knowledge (such as 'This is blue colour') without contradiction refers to the generic property. The generic properties such as formness etc. are perceived dispite the non-perception of the same from the sense organs such as eye as being 'This is within the cognizance of senses' and 'This is beyond the cognizance of senses'. The consecutive perception cannot be produced from the non-consecutive condition. Also the absence of inference of form, taste and odour, which are beyond the cognizance of sense organs, would become contingent. The competency needs to be described by only the generic property such as the formness.

Explanation :

The Naiyāyikas refute the objection that the inherence in what inhers in the substance connected with sense organ (*samyukta samaveta samavāya*) need not be the indirect comprehensional relation of the formness due to the impossibility of the state of being what inhers (*samavetatva*) in the formness. According to them, perception of the similarity in the form etc. (*rūpādi sādṛśya*) needs to be produced from such a relation; and hence the same is a comprehensional relation.

The Naiyāyikas refute the argument that the perception of similarity between the forms etc. (*tad vyavahāra*) is produced from the similarity between the substance (*dravya sādṛśya*) only. According to them, since the two different perceptions through the direct relations are valid (*pratītyaviśeṣa*) without contradiction, only the Naiyāyikas theory that the similarity between the substances is produced from the similarity between the qualities through the indirect relation gets established; and further the similarity between the forms etc. (*rūpa sādṛśya*) is experienced dispite the dissimilarity between the substrata (*āśraya vaisādṛśya*).

The Naiyāyikas state that the formness (*rūpatva*), the tasteness and the odourness etc. (*rasatva gandhatva*) are the generic properties (*jāti*) due to the consecutive knowledge (*anugata pratyaya*). According to them, dispite the absence of the consecutive knowledge such as 'This is form' (*idam rūpam*), the consecutive knowledge such as 'This is yellow colour' (*pīto varṇaḥ*) constitutes the proof in establishing the generic property of the formness etc. The Naiyāyikas refute the argument that the state of being the quality to be perceived from only a single organ (*ekamātra grāhyatva*) contitutes the formness. According to them, the consecutive knowledge such as '*ayam nīlaḥ*' refers to the generic property such as the formness in the absence of contratiction. The generic property of formness can be perceived dispite the non perception of the same from the sense-organ as evidenced by 'This is beyond the cognizance of senses' (*indriya*). Also the qualities such as form etc., which are non-perceptible (*atīndriya*), cannot be even inferred. For, the competency of the perceptibility of quality (*yogyatā*) needs to be described by only the generic property such as the formness.

Objection that forms of organs need to be perceptible :

I. V. 17. As a matter of fact, in the Naiyāyikas' thoery, single or individual forms such as blue colour and yellow colour are eternal and not beyond cognizance of sense i.e. are perceptible; however, since the forms of the organs such as eye and nose are identical with the forms of substances such as light and earth, the same forms of organs need to become perceptible (due to being manifestable forms).

It is not possible to argue that one and the same form, while belonging to substance, is manifestable and, while belonging to sense organ is non-manifestable respectively; for, such a thoery would involve contradiction. Since the different qualities such as the form etc., which are known to be mutually excluded by way of having the different generic properties such as the formness etc., are perceived, the different sense organs such as the eye etc., which are mutually excluded, need to be inferred as the causes of the knowledges of such different qualities. Also since only after the inference of different sense-organs, which are mutually excluded, the knowledgs of the different qualities such as the form etc., which are mutually excluded, are possible, mutual dependence becomes contingent. Further, dispite the establishment of different instrumentalities of means in the case of knowledges of different forms such as blue colour and yellow colour, the establishment of the state of being perceived by particular means of knowledge would become untenable in the case of all the forms.

Now it may be held as follows : That one first infers the state of constituting light in the sense-organs, which are the means of knowledge of qualities or forms suchas blue colour and yellow colour, from the inference that "The sense-organs constitute light etc.; for, they are the manifestors of forms such as blue colour etc. while manifesting qualities such as odour, taste and touch etc., like light". And then after wards one obtains the consecutive knowledge of form in the case of blue colour and yellow colour etc. as being known from the organs constituting light etc. In the same way, one obtains the consecutive knowledge in the case of odour etc. as well.

However, this is not correct. Despite the absence of continuous knowledge, the consecutive idea is produced in the case of form and taste; and then the consecutive knowledge referring to the blue colour is produced. Therefore, the blueness is a generic property. However, the state of being the form to be perceived from eye cannot constitute the blueness. For, the same is over applicable to the yellow colour.

Explanation :

The Pūrvapakṣin raises the objection that in the Naiyāyikas' theory, individual forms such as blue colour and yellow colour (*nīlapītādi*) are not beyond cognizance of senses (*atīndriya*), i.e. are preceptible; however, since the forms of the organs are identical with the forms of the substances, the forms of organs would be required to be perceived from the organs only.

The Pūrvapakṣin refutes the contention that the forms of the substance are manifestable (*udbhūta*) and the organs of forms are non-manifestable (*anudbhūta*) due to contradiction. Further, the Pūrvapakṣin raises the objection that since different qualities, which are mutually excluded (*paraspara vyāvṛtta*), are perceived, the different organs, which are mutually excluded, need to be inferred as the causes of knowledges of such qualities; and also since only after the inference of different organs, the knowledges of different qualities are possible, mutual dependence (*anyonyā śraya*) becomes contingent. Further, he notes that all the forms cannot be established to have the state of being perceived by particular means of knowledge (*tattat kāraṇa grāhyatva*) due to mutual absence.

The Naiyāyikas propose here that one first infers the sense-organs, the means of the knowledge of qualities such as blue colour etc. (*upalabdhi karaṇa*), to be constituting light (*taijasa*) from the inference that '*gandha rasa sparśa vyañjakatve sati nīlādi vyañjakatvāt ālokavat*' ; and then one obtains the consecutive knowledge of form (*rūpākārānugata dhī*) in the blue colour etc. as being known from the organs constituting light (*taijasendriya grāhyatvena*); and thus mutual dependence does not become contingent.

However, the Pūrvapakṣin refutes the proposal. According to him, the blueness (*nīlatva*) can be the generic property (*jāti*) due to the consecutive knowledge (*anugata pratyaya*) in the form and also due to the consecutive knowledge referring to the blue colour (*anugata buddhi*). Nevertheless, the Pūrvapakṣin notes that the state of being what is to be perceived from eye (*cakṣur grāhyatva*) cannot constitute the blueness due to the overapplication of the same to the yellow colour.

Further objection that Forms need to be Single :

I. V. 18. Also the individual forms such as blue and red colours need to be only single. For, dispite the perception of difference of black shades, in the case of objects which have different black shades, the objects are recognized to have only single black colour by way of possessing the identity of colours.

It should not be argued that when the blue colourness is admitted to be occurring in many individual blue colours and also to be eternal, the same would have the contingency of becoming a generic property. The generic property is to be manifested only by the aggregate of parts. Also since the forms such as blue colour etc. occur in the whole (cow) consisting of parts, the state or condition of being more extensive and less extensive, as compared to the cowness etc., would become untenable in the blueness etc.

Now it may be argued again that the knowledge of the comparative degree of form such as 'This one is more blue than that one', is produced from the non-distinction of one form from the other form. However, this is not correct. For, one experiences the difference in forms as 'The blue colour is destroyed by baking; and the red colour is produced in the pot' etc. Also such an experience is not an illusion; for, there arises no contradiction. Also it is not correct to argue that the inherence of colour is the object of knowledge of the production and the loss of colours. For, the same inherence of colour is not specifically mentioned there. This way, further the individual qualities, viz. the tastes such as sweet and sour and the odours such as fragrance and non-fragrance would have the contingency of singularity due to being equal to the individual forms such as blue and non-blue colours. Also it should not be admitted that let it be so. The tastes such as sweet and sour are experienced

to have production and loss. Further, when the tastes such as sweet and sour etc. are admitted to have the singularity, the experience of comparative degree such as 'This is sweeter' would become untenable.

Explanation :

The Pūrvapakṣin further raises the objection that in the Naiyāyikas' theory, the individual forms such as blue and red colours (*nīlāruṇādi vyakti*) need to be only single (*ekaikā*), as the objects can be recognized to be of black colour (*tattvena pratyabhijñāna*) due to the identity of colours.

The Pūrvapakṣin refutes the argument that when the blue colourness is admitted to be occuring in many individual forms (*anekavyakti vṛtti*) and to be eternal (*nitya*), the same would become generic property (*jāti*). According to him, the generic property needs to be manifested by the aggregate of parts (*samsthāna*). Further since the individual colour occurs in the whole cow (*avayavin*), the condition of being more or less extensive (*parāpara bhāva*) as compared to the cowness etc. would become untenable.

The Pūrvapakṣin refutes the argument that the knowledge of the comparative degree of form such as '*ayam nīlataraḥ*' is produced from the non-distinction of one form from the other form (*anyarūpāsambheda*). According to him, difference in form such as '*pākena śyāmam naṣṭam*' is experienced. The Pūrvapakṣin notes here that such an experience is not an illusion. Further the Pūrvapakṣin states that the inference cannot be the object of knowledge of the production and the loss of colour (*utpāda vināśa pratyaya*) due to the non-mention of the same. Thus, the Pūrvapakṣin concludes that the individual qualities, viz. the tastes such as sweet and sour would become single in the Naiyāyikas' theory. And the same contingency cannot be desired, as then the experience of comparative degree such as '*ayam madhura taraḥ*' would become untenable.

Samavāya cannot be the Cause : Conclusion of the Pūrvapakṣin:

I. V. 19. It may be objected now that when the sound is perceived by means of ear as occurring by the inherence, all the sounds would be required to be perceived all the time. It should not be argued, however, that only the sound, produced as delimed by the orifice of ear, is perceived; for, the space delimited by the orifice of the ear is only ether; and therefore, cannot be distinguished. Suppose the orifice of ear is different from ether, then the sound could not inhere in there. Thus, it must be admitted that only that sound, which is competent to be perceived by the person, is perceived by the same person. However, the incompetent sound is never perceived.

It may be argued now as follows : That the competency of sound with respect to a particular person cannot be the very nature of sound; for, then the lack of generality would become contingent. Also the same (competency) cannot be the generic property of sound; for, the generic property cannot have the co-relativity. A cow cannot be held to be a non–cow with respect to a particular person. However, this argument is not correct. The state of having the co-relativity cannot be the delimitedness, like the lengthyness. Also the same cannot be admitted to be the state of being described by the knowledge of the counter positive like the absence. Therefore the same state of having co-relativity is the generic property which is either the cause or the delimitor of the causality in the case of the perception of sound.

That is why, it can be concluded that the generic property does not become part of what constitutes the efficient cause, as the same is admitted to be an associate cause of the perception of sound. The state of being common cause to all sound is very much desired for the generic property by all the parties, as the same is being recognized to be so (the common cause) by all the parties. In the case of the generic property of the cowness too, the state of being the common cause means only the state of being the cause or the delimitor of the causality. Thus, the competency of sound in general is non-generalized like the competency of the qualities.

Explanation :

The Pūrvapakṣin now concludes his Prima Facie view that only that sound which is competent to be perceived (*yogya*), and not the incompetent sound (*anya*), is perceived by the person. According to him, when sound is admitted to be perceived by means of ear as occurring by the inherence (*samavāya*), all the sounds would be required to be perceived all the time, as the inherence is eternal. And also according to him, only the sound, produced as delimitted by the orifice of ear (*karṇa śaṣkuly avacchedena*), cannot be admitted to be perceived, as the orifice of ear cannot be distinguished from the ether (*ākāśa*).

The Pūrvapakṣin refutes the argument that the competency of sound with respect to a particular person (*puruṣa viśeṣam prati yogyatva*) cannot be the very nature of sound (*svarūpa*), as then sound cannot be generalized; also the same competency cannot be the generic property of sound; as the generic property cannot have the co-relativity (*sapratiyogikatva*) like the cowness. According to him, the state of having the co-relativity (*sapratiyogikatva*) is neither the delimitedness (*sāvadhitva*) nor the state of being described by the knowledge of the counterpositive (*itaradhī nirūpyatva*); but rather, the same is the generic property which is either the cause or the delimitor of the causality.

Thus, the Pūrvapakṣin concludes that the generic property need not become efficient cause (*kurvadrūpa*), as the same is an associate cause (*sahakārin*). Also according to him, the generic property can be admitted to be the common cause of the perception of all sounds (*sarvasādhāraṇa tva*), as the same is recognized to be so, like the cowness. Thus, the Pūrvapakṣin concludes that the competency of sound in general (*śabda mātrasya yogyatva*) cannot be generalized like the competency of the qualities (*guṇa yogyatva*).

Establishment of Samavāya as Cause :

I. V. 20. No, this objection is not correct. Since sound is perceptual, the perception of the same needs to be produced from the comprehensional relation such as the inherence.

It should not be argued that the relation of inherence is overpervassive (of sound existing elsewhere) and no other relation is admissible as the means. For, only the particular relation of inherence as delimited by the contact of the orifice of ear is held to be the comprehensional relation. And the contact of the orifice of ear is the indicator, i.e. the qualifier of the substratumness described by the sound by the relation of inherence. Thus, when the non-pervassiveness of sound is established from the experience such as 'The sound exists here, but the sound does not exist there', only that sound, whose substratumness by the relation of inherence is delimited by the contact of orifice of ear, is perceived. However, that sound, whose substratumness by the inherence, is delimited by the absence of the contact of orifice of ear, is not perceived. Also since the substratumness of contact by the inherence is delimited by the contact of hand, but not by the absence of contact of hand, the same contact is perceived only in the place delimited by the contact of hand, but not anywhere else. Otherwise, suppose the contact of hand is not the delimitor of the substratumness, then all the substrata would become equal; and therefore the contact too would be required to be obtained, i.e. perceived everywhere.

It should not be argued that this way even the relation of inherence becomes of non-pervasive occurrence; for, the inherence never occurs in its substratum by yet another relation of inherence. However, absence is of pervassive occurrence by occurring by the self-linking relation of qualifierness. Also this way, all kinds of sounds need not be obtained in all places; for, dispite the inherence of sound occuring everywhere, absence of sound too occurs in some places.

Explanation :

The Naiyāyikas reply to the objection raised by the Pūrvapakṣin and establish that the inherence (*samavāya*) is the cause of perception. According

to them, sound (*śabda*) is perceptual (*pratyakṣa*); and therefore it needs to be perceived through the comprehensional relation such as the inherence (*pratyāsatti sādhana*).

The Naiyāyikas refute the argument that the relation of inherence (*samavāya*) is overpervassive in occurrence (*atiprasakta*) and no other relation is admissible (*anabhyupagata*) as the means. According to them, only the particular inherence as delimited by the contact of orifice of ear (*karṇa samyogā–vacchinna*) is the relation and the same is not over pervassive. And the contact of the orifice of ear (*karṇa samyoga*) is the indicator or qualifier (*paricāyaka*) of the substratumness described by the sound (*śabdādhāratā*). Thus, the Naiyāyikas establish that since non-pervassiveness of sound is established from the experience *'iha śabdo neha'*, the sound, whose substratumness (*ādhāratā*) by the relation of inherence (*samavāya vṛttyā*) is delimited by the contact of orifice of ear, is perceived; but the sound, whose substratumness is delimited by the absence of the contact of orifice of ear, is not perceived. Also they establish that the substratumness of contact (*samyogasya ādhāratā*) by the inherence is delimited by the contact of hand (*hasta samyogena*), but not by its absence (*tadabhāvena*); and therefore, the same contact is perceived only in the place delimited by the contact of hand and not elsewhere. It is necessary to admit so, as otherwise, if the contact of hand is not the delimitor (*anavacchedaka*), then the contact would be required to be perceived everywhere.

The Naiyāyikas further refute the argument that this way the inherence would become of non-pervassive occurrence (*avyāpya vṛtti*). According to them, the inherence never occurs in its substratum by another inherence. Also they note that absence (*abhāva*) is always of pervassive occurrence (*vyāpya vṛtti*), as it occurs by self-linking relation (*viśeṣaṇatayā*). And dispite the inherence of sound being of pervassive occurrence, the sound need not be perceived everywhere, as its absence (*śabdātyantābhāva*) is perceived in some places.

Proposal that Vīṇāvacchinna nabhas is śrotra :

I. V. 21. It may be proposed now as follows : That on account of the non–contradictory experience of sound such as 'Sound exists in Indian lute', even the ether, as delimited by the Indian lute, is the auditory organ; and hence only the ether, as delimited by the orifice of ear, cannot be the organ. For, we have the experience that 'Sound does not exist in the ear, but it exists only in the Indian lute'. Otherwise, the experience that 'Sound exists only in the orifice of ear' would become necessary.

It may be argued that the heaviness in assumption arises in the assumption of the endless (many) auditory organs on account of the endless

delimitors such as Indian lutes; and over pervasion arises in the generalization of endless auditory organs as the areas, i.e. substrata are only the delimitors of sound. However, this is not correct. When the knowledge of the substratumness of Indian lute. etc. is authoritative without contradiction, the heaviness in assumption is justified. On the contrary, the heaviness in assumption that sound is produced in the ether, as delimited by the orifice of ear in the order of the endless series of different sounds in all directions, is not justified; for, no justification exists for such an assumption.

It may be argued that since the persons staying at near by and far away places perceive the distinct properties of sounds such as the non-contradictory highness and the lowness, the distinction between the sounds is established; and therefore the continuous series of different sounds is possible to establish in the ether delimited by the orifice of ear. However, this is not correct. Such a series of sound is tenable due to the superimposition of the lowness in sound when the highness in sound is not grasped due to the defect of farness etc. The separated or interrupted sound is not percaived, like the sound in the separated or interrupted ear is not produced. For, in such a case, the contact of wind constituting the instrumental cause is absent. Indeed since the absence of separation or interruption is the cause, and also since the same absence of separation or interruption is weakened by the close proximity of sense-organs, even the non-obstruction of the orifice of ear is the cause. Thus, the perception of sound is not produced in the case of obstruction of the orifice of ear.

Explanation :

Gangeśa now explains the Pūrvapakṣin's view regarding the concept of auditory organ (*śrotra*). According to the Pūrvapakśin, ether (*nabhas*), as delimited by any producer of sound such as the Indian lute (*vīṇā*), and not as delimited merely by the orifice of ear (*karṇa*), needs to be admitted to be the auditory organs (*śrotra*). He supports this view on the ground that both experiences, viz. *'vīṇādau śabdaḥ'* and *'karṇe na śabdaḥ, kim tu vīṇāyām'* justify only the producer of sound to be the auditory organ.

The Pūrvapakṣin refutes the argument that the heaviness in assumption (*gaurava*) arises in admitting the endless auditory organs (*ananta śrotra*)on account of endless delimitors such as lutes; and overpervesion (*atiprasaṅga*) arises in generalizing the endless organs as the areas, i.e. substrata of sound (*śabda deśa*), as all the areas, i.e. substrata are only the delimitors of sound. According to him, the heaviness in assumption is justified as the knowledge of substratumness of the Indian lute etc. (*vīṇādi deśatā*) is authoritative.

Also the Pūrvapaksin refutes the argument that the continuous series of different sounds (*santāna*) is possible to establish in the case of the ether

delimited by the orifice of ear due to the perception of distinct properties of sound such as the highness and the lowness (*tāratva mandatva*) by the people staying at near by and faraway places. According to him, the series of different sounds can be explained due to the imposition of the lowness in sound (*mandatvāropa*) if the highness of sound (*tāratva*) is not grasped due to the defect of farness of sound etc. Also the interrupted sound (*vyavahita śabda*) cannot be produced due to the absence of the means, viz. contact of wind (*vāyusamyoga*). It must be noted that non-obstruction of orifice of ear (*karṇānupaghāta*) must be admitted to be the cause of the perception of sound, like the absence of interruption (*vyavadhānābhāva*) is admitted to be the cause. Therefore, sound is not perceived when orifice of ear is obstructed.

Reply of the Naiyāyikas : Karṇāvacchinna nabhas is Śrotra :

I. V. 22. No, this position is not correct. Sound is perceived in the ether as delimited by the orifice of ear. Since even the orifice of ear is the delimitor, only the ether as delimited by the orifice of ear is the auditory organ. For, the same is necessary and has the brevity. Also, the same ether as delimited by the orifice of ear is ruled to be the cause of the perception of sound in general. Only the means of direct perception of an object, while being connected with the body, is the organ; also the non-contradictory experience that 'I hear the sound of Indian lute through orifice of ear' proves the ether, as delimited by the orifice of ear, to be the means of the perception of sound.

However, (the ether etc. as delimited by) the Indian lute etc. are not the means of perception of sound. For, they are endless. Also they are not ruled to be the cause of the perception of sound in general. Also the ether, as delimited by the Indian lute etc., cannot be the auditory organ as the same is not connected with the body. Also no experience such as 'I hear the sound through Indian lute' that proves such a claim exists.

It may be argued now as to how is then the knowledge that 'Sound exists in the Indian lute' justified; for, the sound which is being heard does not have Indian lute as its substratum? However, this argument is not correct. There is no rule that the substratum such as tabular (or Indian lute) should be grasped in the case of all the sounds. Otherwise, doubt, absence and non-mention of the substratum would not be tenable anywhere in the case of sound. Also even in the case where the knowledge of the substratum exists, the Indian lute etc. have only the secondary substratumness due to the necessity or requirement of Indian lute etc. in producing the sound indirectly, like the substratumness of body in the case of 'Happyness exists in the body'. Even you, the Mīmāmsakas, need to admit only the secondary substratumness in the Indian lute etc., as the lute etc. are not directly the substrata of sound.

Explanation :

The Naiyāyikas now reply and establish that only ether, as delimited by orifice of ear (*karṇāvacchinna nabhas*), is the auditory organ (*śrotra*). According to them, such a position is necessary and has the brevity, as the same ether as delimited by the orifice of ear is ruled to be the cause (*anuvidhāna*) of the perception of sound in general (*śabda mātra*). Also only the means of direct perception (*sākṣāt pratīti sādhana*), which is connected with the body (*śarīra samyukta*), can be the organ (*indriya*); and the experience that '*karṇena vīṇāśabdam śṛṇomi*' proves only the ether, as delimited by the orifice of ear (*karṇa*), to be the means of perception of ear.

The Naiyāyikas further refute the position that ether, as delimited by Indian lute etc. (*vīṇādi*), can be the means of the perception of sound. According to them, lute etc. are endless (*ananta*) and also they are not ruled (*ananuviddhāna*) to be the cause of perception of sound in general (*śabda mātra graha*). Further, since the ether as delimited by the Indian lute etc. is not connected with the body (*śarīrāsamyukta*), the same cannot be the means of perception of sound; and no experience such as '*vīṇayā śabdam śṛṇnomi*', which can prove the ether, as delimited by lute, to be the means exists.

The Naiyāyikas refute the argument that when the ether as delimited by the Indian lute is not the means, the knowledge '*vīṇāyām śabdaḥ*' cannot be explained. According to them, substrata such as tabular and Indian lute etc. need not be grasped (*adhikaraṇa graha*) in the case of all the sounds. And suppose the substrata such as Indian lute etc. are grasped, then too the same can be admitted to have only the secondary substratumness (*tadadhikaraṇatva*), as the same are necessary to produce sound.

Avoidance of the perception of many sounds :

I. V. 23. It may be objected now as follows : That this way (in the theory that the ether as delimited by orifice of ear is the auditory organ)', perception of many *ga-* sounds would become contingent when many *ga-* sounds are produced in the orifice of ear. And it is not corret to argue that the totality of causes of the perception of another *(ga-)* sound is the impediment in the perception of one *(ga-)* sound; for, the totality of causes of another sound is not comprehended to be the impediment of perception in the case of noice sounds.

However, this objection is not correct. The high pitch sound impedes the perception of low pitch sound. On the contrary, suppose all sounds are equal in pitch, then the perception of many sounds simultaneously is only desired. And the non-perception of difference between sounds is due to the extreme similarity in form. This way, since the ether as delimited by Indian lute etc. is

not the auditory organ, the state of belonging to the same class of sounds as ones produced from the utterence of Maitra is the object of the knowledge such as 'I have been taught the Anuvāka (part of the Veda) by Maitra' and 'I have heard the same song which you have heard'. For, a particular generic property, existing in what is produced from the particular cause must necessarily be admitted in word. Otherwise, the inference of son etc. would not be tenable from the particular word, as no distinct particularity is ever possible excepting generic property. Also, this way, since the ether, as delimited by the orifice of ear, is the auditory organ, the perception of the sound produced from the Indian lute etc. is not possible from such an auditory organ without the production of sound in the way of continuous series of different sounds; and therefore, even the assumption of continuous series of different sounds is justified due to the absence of any other alternative.

Explanation :

The Taṭasthas now raise the objection that in the theory that the ether as delimited by orifice of ear is the organ, many *ga-* sounds would be required to be perceived simultaneously when many *ga-* sounds are produced in the orifice of ear (*karṇe*). According to them, the totality of causes of perception of another *(ga-)* sound (*anya graha sāmagrī*) cannot be the impediment of the perception of one *(ga-)* sound (*ekagraha*), as such a totality of causes is never experienced to impede the perception of one sound in the case of other noice sounds.

The Naiyāyikas, however, refute the objection. According to them, high pitch sound (*tāra*) always impedes low pitch sound (*manda*). Also suppose all sounds are similar in pitch (*tulya*), then all sounds can be perceived simultaneously; and non-perception of difference (*bhedā graha*) is due to the similarity in form (*sārūpya*). And, thus, when ether as delimited by orifice of ear is the organ, the state of belonging to the same class of sounds (*jātīyatva*) as ones produced from the utterence of Maitra (*taduccāraṇādi prayojya*) is the object of the knowledge that '*maitreṇāham anuvākam adhyāpitaḥ*' etc. The Naiyāyikas state that the generic property of soundness (*jāti*) existing in what is produced from the particular cause (*karaṇa viśeṣa*) must be admitted in sound. Otherwise, the inference of son etc. from a particular word, i.e. '*śabdaḥ mama putra prayojyaḥ vilakṣaṇa śabdatvāt*' would not be tenable. Now when ether, as delimited by orifice of ear, is the organ, the perception of the sound produced from Indian lute etc. needs to be explained only from the continued series of different sounds (*santāna krameṇa*); and therefore, the continued series needs to be assumed.

Method of Sound - production :

I. V. 24. One sound does not produce another subsequent sound by way of producing sound in the immediate atom-range; for, then the sounds produced from the sounds of cloud in the heaven etc. could never reach (people on) earth even in the other or next aeon. However, the first ever sound, having obtained the cause of contact, with the all-pervading gross element of wind struck by cloud etc. in the whole area, produces only one subsequent sound that pervades all the directions. Since the effects, produced as existing in the all-pervading elements, are produced in conformity with the contact with the cause, the subsequent single sounds too produce only yet single subsequent sounds everywhere as pervading more and more regions by sound-undulation-method like wave-undulation method. That is why, the people in one place perceive only one single sound at a time.

Since wind, like eye, has great speed, it travels very fast; and therefore, the subsequent sound is obtained, i.e. perceived quickly due to the production of the subsequent sound immediately after the (production of) first ever sound.And the low, the lower and the lowest types of sounds are produced from the different types of wind in the form of the low, the lower and the lowest type of sounds. Or as an alternative, in can be admitted that the first ever sound produces ten different sounds in ten different directions by the method of the nuclea Kadamba-glob; and the ten different sounds produce further ten continuous series of sounds again.

Explanation :

The Naiyāyikas explain now the sound production method and its perception. According to them, one sound does not produce another subsequent sound in the immediate atom region (*avyavahita paramāṇudeśa*), as then the same cannot be perceived in another region. Rather, the first ever sound (*ādya śabda*) produces another subsequent sound which exists in all directions (*sarvadigdeśa vartin*), after obtaining cause of contact (*saṁyoga nimitta*) with the all pervading gross element of wind. This is so because the effects produced as existing in all pervading elements (*vibhu kārya*) are produced only in conformity with the contact with the cause; and therefore, the subsequent single sounds too produce yet single subsequent sounds by sound undulation method (*śabda taraṅga*). Thus, the people in one place perceive only one single sound at a time.

Further, the Naiyāyikas explain that wind, like eye, has great speed (*mahāvega*) and travels very fast; and therefore, the subsequent sound is perceived due to the production of itself after the first ever sound. And the low, the lower, and the lowest types of sounds (*mandādi*) are produced from

the wind in the form of the low, the lower and the lowest types of sound (*mandatara-tama kramena*). As an alternative, however, the Naiyāyikas suggest that the first ever sound (*ādya śabda*) produces ten different sounds in ten different directions by the method of the nuclea Kadamba-glob; and the ten sounds further produce ten series of sounds (*śabda santāna*).

Justification of Kadamba golaka method :

I. V. 25. It may be objected now as follows: That how is it that one sound produces many (ten) different sounds, as the totality of causes of the sounds is same. However, this objection is not correct. One sound can produce many (ten) different sounds on all ten different sides (by the method of nuclea Kadamba-glob) due to the help of many different winds or due to the difference of antecedent absences.

It may be argued as follows : That in the case of the total identity of all other causes excepting the antecedent absences, the effects cannot be different due to the difference of mere antecedent absences; for, such different effects are never observed. However, this is not correct. Difference between effects is due to the difference between totalities of causes. And the difference between the totalities of causes is possible due to the difference between antecedent absences just as the difference is possible due to the difference between other causes. Otherwise, distinction between the effects would become untenable dispite the difference between inherent causes. The absence of distinction between the individual effects such as the pots is not observed in the presence of difference of causes. Dispite the absence of difference between other causes, the difference between the effects such as the forms produced from the cooking is observed due to the difference between the antecedent absences and the losses of earliar forms etc.

Now it may be argued as follows : That what is the determining factor that justifies the equality of causes such as the single antecedent absences and the single destructions of form etc. everywhere. For, dispite the deviation of the antecedent absence of odour etc. from the (production of) taste etc., the antecedent absences of taste etc. are not deviating from the (productions of) odour etc. However, this is not correct. The antecedent absences and the destructions of odour, taste and form etc. are deviating from the touch of wind; the antecedent absences of odour and taste are deviating from the form of light; and the antecedent absence of odour is deviating from the taste of water; and therefore the same are not the causes. Thus, the causality of antecedent absence of oneself is necessary. Also the antecedent absences of odour etc. are rendered redundant in the productions of form, taste and touch which are produced from cooking. For, the same absences are not observed

to be the causes. Also the absences of other entities are rendered redundant in the production of odour, as the antecedent absence of odour itself needs to be the cause.

Explanation :

The Naiyāyikas justify the production of sound by the method of the nuclea Kadamba-glob. According to them, dispite the identity of the totality of causes (*sāmagryabheda*), one sound can produce ten different sounds at ten different directions by the nuclea Kadamba-glob method due to the help of ten different winds (*aneka vāyu*) or due to the difference between antecedent absences (*prāgabhāva bheda*).

The Naiyāyikas refute the argument that when all the other causes excepting the antecedent absences are identical (*taditara hetu sākalya*), effects such as sounds cannot be different due to the difference of antecedent absences (*tad bheda*). According to them, effects can differ due to the difference between the totalities of causes (*sāmagrī bheda*). And the differene between the totalities of causes is possible due to the difference between the antecedent absences, as otherwise difference between effects (*kārya vaijātya*) would not be tenable dispite the difference between inherent causes (*samavāyi bheda*). In the case of forms (*rūpa*) produced from cooking (*pākaja*), the difference between forms is produced due to the difference between the antecedent absences (*prāgabhāva*) etc.

The Naiyāyikas refute further the argument that no determining factor (*vinigamaka*) exists to justify the equality of causes such as the single antecedent absences and the single destructions of form etc. (*ekaika prāgabhāva dhvamsa*), as the antecedent absence of odour deviates from taste while the antecedent absence of taste does not deviate from odour. According to them, the antecedent absences and the destructions (*prāgabhāva dhvamsa*) of odour, taste and form are diviating from the touch of wind (*vāyu sparśa*); the antecedent absences of odour and taste are diviating from the form of light (*tejorūpa*) and the antecedent absence of odour is deviating from the taste of water (*jala rasa*); and therefore only the antecedent absence of oneself (*svaprāgabhāva*) needs to be the cause of oneself. While the antecedent absences of others such as odour (*gandhādi prāgabhāva*) are redundant in the production of form, taste and touch etc., the antecedent absence of odour itself (*sva prāgabhāva*) is not redundant and is required for the production odour itself

Conclusion : Prāgabhāva and Samavetasamavāya are Causes:

I. V. 26. As an alternative, it can be held as follows : That dispite the antecedent absence being common to form, taste and touch, different odours

such as fragrance and non-fragrance are produced at different times due to the particularity of contact of fire only. However, the contact of fire cannot be the cause of form etc. in general; for, deviation would be contingent. In the same way, the contact of fire cannot be the cause of taste etc. in general. (Thus antecedent absent gets established as cause of effect in general.)

It may be objected now that antecedent absence in general cannot be the common cause of effect in general. For, the cause and the effect are not known to have mutually exclusive timings. And when all beings are liberated and antecedent absence is untenable, effect is not produced due to the absence of other associate causes only. However, this objection is not correct. Dispite the existence of other associate causes, antecedent absence needs to be the common cause, as the already produced effect is never produced again. Also it is not correct to argue that one totality of causes produces only one effect due to the very nature of the causes. It is ruled that the absence of production of an effect is caused by the absence of the totality of causes itself.

It is not possible to admit that an entity acquires the causality by co-existing with the effect. For, such an assumption involves heaviness. Also it is not correct to argue that an entity acquires the causality by co-existing with the effect due to the non-production of effect (from the cause) at the time of the inherent cause having the state or condition of destruction. Since only the existing inherent cause has the state of co-existence with effect, such a state of co-existence is not justified in the case of cause in general; and therefore the same state is useless in acquiring the causality. Also it is not correct to argue that the inherence in the inherent object is not the comprehensional relation producing the perception of the soundness; for, the generic property such as the soundness is absent. The generic property of soundness etc. can be established by the law establishing the generic property such as the formness etc.

Thus ends The theory of comprehensional relation in the Perception in the Tattvacintāmaṇi composed by Sri Gangeśopādhyāya.

Explanation :

Gangeśa concludes his Sannikarṣa vāda by establishing antecedent absence (*prāgabhāva*) as the cause of effect in general. According to him, dispite the antecedent absence being common to form etc. (*tulyatve*), different odours such as fragrance and non-fragrance can be produced due to the particularity of contact of fire (*agnisamyoga viśeṣa*) only. However, the contact of fire cannot be the common cause of form etc. due to the deviation. (*vyabhicāra*).

Gangeśa refutes the objection that antecedent absence cannot be the common cause (*hetu*) of effect in general (*kārya mātra*) due to the absence

of mutually exclusive timings (*vyatireka kāla*) of cause and effect. According to him, since an entity that is already produced (*utpanna*) cannot be produced again (*anutpāda*), antecedent absence needs to be the common cause of all the effects in general. Also he refutes the argument that one totality of causes (*ekā sāmagrī*) produces only one effect (*ekam kāryam*) by nature. According to him, the absence of production of an effect (*kāryānutpāda*) is ruled to be produced from the absence of totality of causes (*sāmagrī viraha*).

Further Gangeśa refutes the argument that an entity acquires the causality (*kāraṇatva*) by co-existing with the effect (*kārya sahabhāva*) on the ground that the same involves heaviness. Also he refutes that an entity acquires the causality by co-existing with the effect due to the non-production of the effect at the time of the inherent cause (*samavāya*) having the condition of destruction (*vinaśyad avastha*). According to him, such a fact establishes only the existing inherent cause (*samavāyi kāraṇa*) to be the cause of effect; and therefore, the state of co-existence (*saha bhāva*) is not conducive to the acquirement of the causality. Finally Gangeśa refutes the argument that the inherence in the inherent object (*samaveta samavāya*) need not be the comprehensional relation producing the perception of the soundness (*grāhaka*) due to the absence of the generic property of soundness (*śabdatva*). According to him, the soundness can be established to be the generic property by the law establishing the generic property such as the formness etc. (*rūpatvādi nyāya*).

The End of the Sannikarṣavāda in the Pratyakṣalakṣaṇavāda in the Pratkṣakhaṇḍa.

I. VI.

Theory of Inherence

as comprehensional relation

(Samavāya vādaḥ)

Prima facie view that Samavāya is not comprehensional relation:

I. vi. 1. It may be held now that since the inherence is not established, the same inherence cannot be the comprehensional relation (of perception of generic property, quality etc.). And the doubt as to "Whether the knowledge such as 'Clothing is white' refers to the qualifier–and the qualificand–relationship or not" impedes the establishment of the inherence as a comprehensional relation.

It may be argued now that generic property, quality and action and their respective substrata are experienced, i.e. perceived to be mutually related to each other (by the inherence.) And the qualificative knowledge and the qualificative designation cannot be tenable with respect to two entities of unrelated natures (and hence the inherence needs to be admitted as the relation).

However, this argument is not correct. The relation of inherence cannot appear to be the qualifier on the basis of the experience of the related entities; for, the relation of inherence is not known first. Also unlike the experience establishing contact such as 'These two objects are connected', the experience establishing the inherence such as 'These two objects are inherent' is lacking. Also the relation of inherence cannot appear to be the qualificand; for, the experience 'The inherence is the relation between these two items' is lacking. Also the relation of inherence cannot appear to be an independent item in its own nature; for, the experience of the objectness of the inherence such as 'I know the inherence' is lacking.

Now it may be proposed that 'The experience such as 'Pot is blue' refers to the qualifier–and the qualificand–relationship (of inherence); for, it is a qualificative knowledge, like the qualificative knowledge of staft-holder'. However, this proposal is not correct. For, there arises deviation impeding the inference (referring to the relationship of inherence) in the case of the experience such as 'The ground is known, desired and made to be potless'.

Also it is not correct to argue that "without impediment" is the qualifier to the probandum "referring to the qualifier and the qualificand–relationship". When only the absence of impediment is competent to establish the inference, the remaining portion of the probandum would become useless (in establishing the inference). Also the inference faces the fault of the existence of opposite probans proving the absence of the inherence due to the absence of competent probans establishing the inherence. Just as the absence of impediment is the probans conducive to the establishment (of the inherence), in the same way, the absence of the probans conducive to the establishment (of the inherence) is an impediment. Therefore, only a doubt (regarding the existence of the inherence) would arise when both impediment and conducive probans are absent.

Also it cannot be held that mere knowledge (of the inherence) is the means conducive to the establishment of the inherence. The knowledge cannot be established to be referring to the inherence. Otherwise, only mutual dependence would ensue (between the knowledge of the inherence and the inherence).

Explanation :

Gangeśa, after his 'Theory of comprehensional relations' (Sannikarṣa vāda), begins his 'Theory of inherence' (Samavāya vādaḥ) with the Prima facie view that the inherence cannot be the comprehensional relation of generic property, quality and action etc. due to the non-establishment of the same inherence (*samavāyāsiddhi*). According to the Pūrvapakṣin, there exists doubt (*vipratipatti*) as to 'Whether the experience such as 'Clothing is white' (*śuklaḥ paṭaḥ*) refers to the qualifier–and the qualificand–relationship or not' (*viśeṣaṇa sambandha viṣayā na vā*); and hence the inherence cannot be established.

The Siddhāntin raises the argument that generic property, quality and action and their respective substrata (*jāti guṇa kriyā tadvantau*) are experienced to be mutually related to each other by the inherence (*mithas sambaddhau*); and the qualificative knowledge and the qualificative designation (*viśiṣṭadhī vyapadeśau*) are not tenable regarding the two entities of unrelated natures (*asambaddha svarūpa dvaye*); and hence the inherence must be admitted as the comprehensional relation.

However, the Pūrvapakṣin refutes the argument. According to him, the relation of inherence cannot appear to be the qualifier (*viśeṣaṇa*) on the basis of the experience of related entities (*sambaddhānubhava*), as the inherence is not known first. Also according to him, the experience such as 'These two are inherent' (*samavāyinau imau*), which could have established the inherence, is lacking. Also, the relation of inherence cannot appear to be the qualificand

inherence (*sambandha viṣayā*); however, the same is illusory (*bhrāntā*); for, there exists contradiction (*bādhaka satvāt*)' as untenable. According to him, then the absence of both the potlessness (*aghaṭatva*) and the knownness (*jñātatva*) would become contingent in the ground; and the knowledge such as 'The ground is potless' would be lost. The Pūrvapakṣin points out that the relation between the absence of pot and the ground cannot be the contact or the inherence, or either of the two due to the contradiction and non-establishment. Also the relation there cannot be the relation in general (*sambandha mātra*), as the same is already established by way of being conducive to the knowledge of qualification (*jñāpakatvena*).

Now the Pūrvapakṣin refutes the proposal that the relation of qualifier is the regulator, i.e. the producer of the qualificative knowledge excluded from the non-qualificative knowledge (*aviśiṣṭa vyāvṛtta viśiṣṭa dhī niyāmakaḥ*). According to him, then the stated qualificative knowledge would establish only some other relation (*arthāntara*) such as the self-linking relation (*svarūpa sambandha*) like in the case of the qualificative knowledge of absence (*abhāva jñāna*). Further, the Pūrvapakṣin refutes the option of qualifying the probandum 'referring to the relation' (*sambandha viṣaya*) as 'different from the related' (*sambadhi bhinna*), as untenable, as then the inference would involve the deviation of the probans from the qualified probandum in the case of the knowledge of absence (*abhāva jñāna*). Also, the Pūrvapakṣin notes that the probans (*viśiṣṭa pratītitva*) qualified to be 'without impediment' (*bādhakābhāva*) as stated earliar (cf. T. C. I. vi.1) is untenable; and also the qualification 'the state of being different from the related' (*sambandhi bhinnatva*) is useless in the case of the probandum, as the qualificative knowledge of absence is possible even without a different relation of inherence (*bhinna sambandha*). And the mere particularity (*viśeṣa*), either of the form of the qualifierness (*viśeṣaṇatā viśeṣa*) or produced from the qualifier etc. (*prakārādi kṛta*), is quite tenable in the qualificative knowledge even without referring to the particular relation of inherence.

Also the Pūrvapakṣin refutes the Vaiśeṣikas' inference (Vaiśe Sūtra. vii. 2.26-28) that 'The exzperience of 'here' (*iha pratyayaḥ*) regarding the part, quality, action and generic property and their respective possessors (*avayava guṇa kriyā jāti tadvatām*) such as 'The clothing exists here in the threads' (*iha tantuṣu pataḥ*), 'The white colour exists here in the clothing' (*iha paṭe śauklyam*), 'The act of moving exists here' (*iha calanam*) and 'The clothingness exists here' (*iha paṭatvam*) is caused from the superstratum–and the substratum-relationship (*ādhārādheya bhāva nimittakaḥ*); for, it is a valid experience of 'here' (*yathārtheha pratyatvāt*), can establish the relation of inherence. According to him, such an inference is useless, as the same involves

the deviation of the probans in the case of the collective qualificative experience such as 'The absence of the pot and the knowledge exist here in the ground' (*iha bhūtale ghaṭābhāvo jñānam ca*); and the qualification 'without impediment' (*bādhakam vinā*) is not neccessary, as the qualificative experience can be tenable merely from the superstratum–and the substratum-relationship (*ādhārādheya bhāvāt*). The Pūrvapakṣin notes the law that what is required for the production (*utpatti*), sustainance (*sthiti*) and the knowledge (*jñapti*) is the substratum (*ādhāra*).

Bhaṭṭas' view that Viśeṣaṇatā (*svarūpa*) is the Relation :

I. vi. 3. The Others hold as follows : That the inherence gets established as the constituent part of the comprehensional relation of sense-organ, upon the annulment of the contact as the relation, from the inference that 'The sound, the generic property and the form etc. are related to the sense-organs; for, they are perceptible like the pot'. For, the sense-organ produces the knowledge of the object related to itself. That is why, the inherence is not perceptible, as the same does not have the relation with any sense-organ. Also the inherence cannot be established merely as being the relation of any qualifier. For, then, the infinite regress would become contingent (due to the endless assumptions of relations). Further, they note that the inherence can produce the knowledge of the objects related to it by mere nature of itself like the knowledge. For, the inherence, without any additional relation, produces the knowledge of anything related to it merely by its nature. However, it is not necessary that the inherence gets lost in the case of the generic property and others producing the knowledges of the objects related to themselves by mere nature of themeselves. For, the generic property and others would have the contingency of being non-perceptible in the absence of any relation with the sense organ like the inherence.

However, this proposal is incorrect. The self-linking relation is necessary (to be admitted as the comprehensional relation) dispite admitting the inherence (as the comprehensional relation). Further it may be held as follows: Let only the self-linking relation be the comprehensional relation of substance with quality or generic property like the relation of pot with the knowledge or like the relation of ground with absence. Thus, what is the need for the inherence being a relation, as the things can be grasped or known through the self-linking relation of the form of the self-nature only? For instance, sound can be known through the qualifierness with respect to the sense-organ; the soundness can be known through the qualifierness of the qualifier; the qualitities such as form can be known through the qualifierness of what is connected with the sense organ and the generic property such as the formness can be known through the qualifierness of the qualifier of what is connected with sense organ. Now it may be asked as to how can the quality etc. be

known (to exist in the substance) by means of sense-organ through the self-linking relation, since the things are not grasped in the substance by means of sense organ through the self -linking relation? However, we shall reply that this untenablility is equal to the untenability that all things cannot be known to exist in the substance through the inherence.

Explanation :

The Other scholars hold the view that the inherence (*samavāya*) can be established as the constituent part of the comprehensional relation of sense-organ (*indriya sambandha ghaṭakatayā*), when the contact gets refuted, as the relation, from the inference 'The sound, the generic property and the form etc. (*śabda jāti rūpādiḥ*) are related to the sense-organs (*indriya sambaddhaḥ*); for, they are perceptible (*pratyakṣatvāt*)'. According to them, sense organ perceives what is related to itself (*sambaddha grāhaka*); and hence the inherence is not perceptible (*pratyakṣa*) due to not being related to any sense organ. The Others refute the argument that the inherence can be established merely as the relation of any qualifier (*sambandhatvena*) on the ground that then infinite regress (*anavasthāna*) would become contingent by requiring yet another relation for the perception of the inherence. Further, they note that the inherence, like knowledge, produces the knowledge of what is related to itself (*svasambaddha vyavahāra kārin*). However, the inherence does not get lost when the generic property etc. (*jātyādi*) produces the knowledge of what is related to themselves; for, then, the generic property etc., like the inherence, would become imperceptible (*apratyakṣa*) in the absence of relation with sense organ (*indriyāsambandha*).

However, the Bhāṭṭas refute the view of the Other scholars. According to them, self-linking relation (*svarūpa sambandha*) is necessary to be a comprehensional relation in spite of admitting the inherence as a comprehensional relation. Further, the Bhāṭṭas refute the proposal that only the self-linking relation should be admitted as the relation of substance with quality or generic property (*dravyeṇa guṇa jātya dibhiḥ*) like that of pot with knowledge (*ghaṭa jñānayoḥ*) or like that of ground with absence (*bhūtalā bhāvayoḥ*); and hence there is no need to admit the inherence as the comprehensional relation. It should be noted that the self-linking relation varies according to different objects; and the actual form of the self-linking relation is the qualifierness of various kinds: The qualifierness with respect to the sense organ (*indriya viśeṣaṇatā*) is the comprehensional relation of sound (*śabda*); the qualifierness of the qualifier (*viśeṣaṇa viśeṣaṇatā*) is the comprehensional relation of the soundness (*śabdatva*); the qualifierness of what is connected with sense-organ (*indriya sambaddha viśeṣaṇatā*) is the comprehensional relation of the quality such as form (*rūpādi*) and the qualifierness of the qualifier of what is connected with the sense organ (*indriya sambaddha viśeṣaṇa viśeṣaṇatā*) is the relation of the formness etc. Also the Bhāṭṭa refute the view that since the things are not known to exist in the s'.bstance (*dravye*) through the self-linking relation (*svabhāvāt*), the quality etc. (*guṇādi*) cannot be known to exist in the substance through the self-linking relation. According to them, the things are not known to exist in the substance through the inherence (*samavāyena*) either; and so the untenablity is equal for both.

Refutation of the Position of the Gurus :

I. vi. 4. The Others, i.e. the Gurus hold here as follows : At the time of the baking of one side of the pot, both black and red colours are obtained successively at (the two sides of) the same pot; however, the obtainment of the such colours is not produced from such two (black and red) colours. Since the form is eternal, both the colours would be required to be obtained at the same time in the pot. Also since the form is eternal, the origination and the destruction are not tenable for the black and red colours; therefore, the same origination and destruction are necessary only for the relations of those colours. And the relation of the colours (that can have such origination and destruction) is only the inherence.

However, this view is not correct. The non-contradictory experience is that 'The black colour is lost and the red colour is produced etc.; and the same establishes the form to be non-eternal; and also the inherence is not mentioned to have the origination and the destruction anywhere. Also, the inherence, in your Guru's theory, is beyond the perception of senses, i.e. is transcendental. Otherwise, why should you not like the theory that even the knowledge of the whole substance, smell and taste etc. have the eternality; and only the inherence has both the origination and the destruction? For, the knowledge of the origination and the destruction of the form cannot be invalid without impediment or contradiction.

Explanation :

The Gurus propose now that at the time of the baking (*āmapākadaśā*) of one side of the pot (*ekatra ghaṭe*), both the black and the red colours are obtained successively at the two sides of the same pot (*śyāma rakta rūpopalambha*); however, the obtainment of the two colours is not produced from the two colours (*tadubhaya nibandhana*); and since the form is eternal (*nitya*), both the colours would be required to be obtained at the same time in the pot. Thus the Gurus establish that the two colours do not have the origination and the destruction (*utpāda vināśa*) due to being eternal; rather, only the relation of them has the origination and the destruction; and such a relation is the inherence (*samavāya*).

However, the Bhāṭṭas refute the Gurus' position. According to them, only the forms, i.e. the colours need to have the origination and the destruction due to the experience such as 'The black colour is lost and the red colour is produced' (*śyāmam naṣṭam raktam utpahnam*); and also the inherence cannot be admitted to have the origination and the destruction due to the non-description of the same. Also since the inherence is transcendental (*atīndriya*) in your theory, the same cannot have the origination and the destruction; otherwise, even the knowledge of the whole substance, odour and taste would become eternal and the inherence would have the origination and the destruction. For, the knowledge of origination and destruction of form (*utpāda vināśa pratīti*) cannot be invalid without contradiction.

Siddhāntin's Reply : Inference of the Inherence is tenable :

I. vi. 5. Here we, the Siddhāntins, state our conclusive reply. The inference establishing the inherence (as a comprehensional relation) could be that 'The qualificative knowledges of quality, action and generic property refer to the relations of qualifiers; for, they are qualificative knowledges, like the qualificative knowledge such as 'Person is a staff-holder'.

Also the deviation of probans does not annul such an inference. Even the qualificative knowledge of absence etc. refer to the relation of qualifier like the self-linking relation. However, it should not be argued that the inference establishes totally a different relation due to the fact that the qualificative knowledges of action etc. too refer here to only the self-linking-relation. For, such a relation of qualifier, which is the object of the qualificative knowledges of quality, action and generic property, while being established on account of the property of the inferential subject, gets established to be only a single relation due to the brevity. And such a single relation is only the inherence and not the self-linking relation. For, the self-linking relatin is endless due to the endlessness of individual natures of objects; and the self-linking relation is not established to be an ordinary relation (of quality etc.).

As an alternative, however, it can be admitted that 'caused by the relation of the qualifiers' is the probandum, and 'while being valid' is the qualifier of the probans, viz. 'the being the qualificative knowledge'. The relation of the qualifiers, however, gets established to be only one single relation (of inherence), as the same is the cause of the qualificative knowledge. Also the consecutive or generalized effect is delimited or regulated by only consecutive or generalized cause. However, the relations of the qualifiers cannot be the self-linking relations; for, the same self-linking relations are endless, and are non-consecutive or non-generalized. Also it cannot be argued that both types of relations, i.e. the inherence and the self-linking relation,

are non-conducive to the qualificative knowledge. Supposing the direct qualificative perceptions, i.e. knowledges do not refer to the relations or are not produced from the relations, then the qualificative knowledge would become necessary even in the case of (collective knowledge of) horse and cow etc.

Explanation :

The Siddhāntin now replies that the inference establishing the inherence as a comprehensional relation is tenable. According to him, the inference that 'The qualificative knowledges of quality, action and generic property (*guṇa kriyā viśiṣṭa buddhayaḥ*) refer to the relations of qualifiers (*viśeṣaṇa sambandha viṣayāḥ*); for, they are qualificative knowledges' (*viśiṣṭa buddhitvāt*) establishes the inherence as the comprehensional relation.

The Siddhāntin refutes the argument that the deviation of the probans (*vyabhicāra*) annuls the inference. According to him, even the qualificative knowledge of absence etc. (*abhāvādi viśiṣṭa buddhi*) refers to some relation such as the self-linking relation (*svarūpa sambandha viṣaya*); and hence the inference can establish the inherence as a comprehensional relation. Also he refutes the argument that the inference establishes totally different relation of self-linking relation (*arthāntara*) on account of the fact that the qualificative knowledge of action etc. refer to only the self-linking relation. According to him, the object of the qualificative knowledge of action etc., i.e. the relation, while being established on the strength of the property of inferential subject (*pakṣa dharmatā balena*), gets established to be only the inherence, and not the self-linking relation, due to the brevity. The self-linking relation is endless (*ananta*) due to the endlessness of natures of individual objects (*tattat svarūpa*); and the self-linking relation is never established to be an ordinary relation (*sambandhatvena*).

As an alternative, however, the Siddhāntin proposes that 'caused by the relation of the qualifier' (*viśeṣaṇa sambandha nimittakāḥ*) is the probandum; and 'while being the vaild' (*satyatva*) is the qualifier of the probans (*hetau*). According to him, the relation of the qualifiers (*viśeṣaṇa sambandha*), which is the cause of the qualificative knowledge, gets established to be only the single inherence (*ekaḥ*), as the consecutive effect, i.e. the qualificative knowledge (*anugata kārya*) needs to be regulated by only the consecutive single cause (*anugata kāraṇa niyamya*). However, the self-linking relation (*svarūpa*) does not get established, as the same is endless and non-consecutive. The Siddhāntin refutes the argument that both the inherence and the self-linking relation are not conducive to the qualificative knowledge (*aprayojaka*). According to him, when the direct qualificative perception (*viśiṣṭa sākṣātkāra*) is not referring

to the relation (*sambandhāviṣaya*), the qualificative knowledge would become necessary even in the case of collective knowledge of horse and cow (*gavāśvādau*).

Navyas' inference and Refutation of Viśeṣaṇatā as comprehensional relation :

I. vi. 6. The Navyas propose here as follows : That the inference (establishing the inherence) is that 'The qualificative knowledge of quality, action or generic property refers to the relation of the qualifier which is different from the relational subjunct; for, it is a qualificative knowledge referring to the positive entities not having any other objects; or it is a qualificative knowledge referring to the qualifier not to be described by any other qualifier. Therefore, the deviation (of the probans from the probandum) does not arise in the case of the qualificative knowledge of absence etc. Also, the inference cannot be non-conducive to the establishment of the inherence; for, it is based on the unconditioned relation of invariable concomitance. And the relation such as the inherence is the regulator of the qualificative knowledge excluded from the non-qualificative knowledge.

Or, as an alternative, it can be held that the inference establishes the inherence as being the comprehensional relation (of quality, action or generic property related to what is connected) with sense organs. And it can be explained as follows : That only the single consecutive inherence gets established, due to the brevity, on the strength of the property of the inferential subject, while the relation with what is connected with the sense organ becomes established as being the cause of the impediment to the direct relation, from the inference that 'The direct perception of quality, action or genetic property is to be produced from the relation (of quality etc. related to what is connected) with the sense- organs; for, it is a perceptual knowledge to be produced like the knowledge 'This person is a staff-holder'. For, a consecutive effect is to be produced from only a consecutive cause. However, the self-linking relation of the form of the qualifierness of what is connected with sense organ does not get established as the relation; for, such a self-linking relation, being of the form of the individual qualifiers such as form etc., is non-consecutive. Also this way, only the consecutive inherence, which is the relation (of the formness and the tasteness etc. residing in the form and the taste etc. related to what is connected) with sense-orgnas, gets established, as being the cause, in the case of the direct perception of the formness and the tasteness etc. For, it has the brevity. However, the qualifierness of what is connected with sense-organs does not get established as being the cause; for, the same qualifierness, being of the form of the formness etc., is non-consecutive.

That is why, even the following theory becomes refuted : 'That let only the contact and the qualifierness be admitted as the comprehensional relations (in the direct perception of sound and the soundness etc.); however, the foursome of inherence etc. need not be the comprehensional relations'. The qualifierness (of what is connected with sense-organs), being of the form of the individual qualifier, is non-consecutive. Also, on the other hand, once the inherence is admitted to be the comprehensional relation, the perceptibility becomes tenable due to the perceptibility of the two relateds, i.e. the relational adjunct and the relational subjunct.

Explanation :

The Navya-naiyāyikas propose their alternative inference establishing the inherence as a comprehensional relation. According to them, the inference, viz. 'The qualificative knowledge of quality, action or generic property (*guṇa kriyā jāti viśiṣṭa buddhiḥ*) refers to the relation of the qualifier different from the relational subjunct (*sambandhibhinna viśeṣaṇa sambandha viṣayā*); for, it is a qualificative knowledge referring to the positive entities not having any other objects (*nirviṣayaka bhāvaviśeṣaṇaka viśiṣṭa buddhitvāt*)' can establish the inherence, as the inference is not faulty having the probans deviating in the case of the qualificative knowledge of absence (*abhāvādi viśiṣṭa buddhi*). Also according to them, such an inference is not useless, in establishing the inherence (*aprayojaka*), as the same is based on unconditioned relation of invariable concomitance (*nirupādhika sambandha śālin*). Here the relation of inherence regulates the qualificative knowledge excluded from the non-qualificative knowledge (*aviśiṣṭa vyāvṛtta viśiṣṭadhī*).

The Navyas propose an alternative view that the inference can establish the inherence (*samavāya siddhi*) as the comprehensional relation of (quality etc. related to what is connected with) sense-organs (*indriya pratyāsatti*). According to them, the inference, viz. 'The direct perception of quality, action or generic property (*guṇa kriyā jāti sākṣātkāraḥ*) is to be established from the relation (of quality etc. related to what is connected) with sense-organs (*indriya sambandha sādhyaḥ*); for, it is a perception to be produced (*janya pratyakṣatvāt*)' establishes the inherence on the strength of the property of the inferential subject (*pakṣa dharmatā balāt*), as the relation with what is connected with sense-organs (*indriya saṃyukte sambandha*) is the impediment to the direct relation (*sākṣāt sambandha bādha kāraṇa*). Here the inherence, while being established, gets established to be only single (*ekaḥ*), as a consecutive effect (*anugata kārya*) requires a consecutive cause (*anugata kāraṇa*). However, the self-linking relation (*svarūpa sambandha*) of the form of the qualifierness of what is connected with sense-organ (*saṃyukta viśeṣaṇatā*) does not get established, as the same, being of the form of the

individual qualifier (*tattad rūpādi rūpa*), is not-consecutive (*ananugata*). Also the Navyas state that this way, only the consecutive inherence (*anugata samavāya*), which is the relation (of the formness etc. residing in the form etc. connected) with sense-organ (*indriya sambandha*), gets established as the cause (*kāraṇatvena*), in the case of the direct perception of the formness and the tasteness etc. (*rūpatva rasatva sākṣātkāra*) due to brevity. However, the qualifierness of what is connected with sense-organs (*indriya sambandha viśeṣaṇatā*) does not get established as the comprehensional relation, as the same, being of the form of the formness etc. (*rūpādi rūpa*), is non-consecutive (*ananugata*).

The Navyas' theory automatically cancells the parallel theory that only the contact and the qualifierness (*saṃyoga viśeṣaṇatā*) can substitute the comprehensional relations for the foursome of inherence etc. (*samavāyādi catuṣṭaya*) in the case of the perception of sound and the soundness etc. This is so because, the qualifierness, being of the form of individual qualifier (*tattat svarūpatvena*), cannot be consecutive. It should be noted that the perceptibility (*pratyakṣatā*) of the inherence is tenable due to the perceptibility of the relational adjunct and the relational subjunct (*samabandhi dvaya*) once the inherence is admitted to be the comprehensional relation (*pratyāsatti tvena*).

Vaiśiṣṭya is not Comprehensional relation :

I. vi. 7. It may be argued now as follows : That this way, when the contact and the inherence are contradictory, only the consecutive relation of qualification would become established as the comprehensional relation of absence and hence the cause in the case of direct qualificative perception of absence, as the same is a qualificative knowledge.

However, this argument is not correct. Suppose, the qualification is single (and consecutive) like the inherence, then the qualificative knowledge of the absence of clothing would become contingent in the place which possesses the clothing, but has the absence of pot. For, only the qualification of the absence of pot is the qualification of the absence of clothing. It should not be argued, however, that dispite the presence of the qualification of the absence of clothing in such a case, the absence of clothing is not present there; for, the absence of clothing is different from the qualification of the absence of clothing. Supposing the absence of the absence of clothing is the absence, then such an absence would difinitely be present there through the relation of qualification, as the qualification is only one and consecutive in all cases. And supposing the absence of the absence of clothing is a positive entity, then only the same clothing needs to be stated as the impediment (to the qualificative knowledge of the absence of clothing). This way, only the absence of clothing

would become the cause of the qualificative knowledge of the absence of clothing. And the absence of clothing does necessarily exist there (in the place of clothing) through the relation of qualification.

Supposing the qualification of absence varies in accordance with each different absence, then the single qualification could not be claimed to be the comprehensional relation, which is the cause or object in the case of the qualificative knowledge of absence; consequently only the non-consecutive qualification needs be stated as the cause and the object in the direct qualificative perception of absence (of clothing). However, in that case, let only the non-consecutive qualifierness, of the form of being individual qualifiers, be admitted as the comprehensional relation of absence, as the same is already assumed. And thus, what is the need for admitting endless qualifications as the comprehensional relations of absences? And even you, the Pūrvapakṣin, have admitted the qualifierness of what is connected with sense-organ to be the comprehensional relation in the case of the direct qualificative perception of the inherence and the qualification.

Explanation :

The Pūrvapakṣin now argues that only the consecutive relation of qualification (*anugata vaiśiṣṭya*) could be admitted to be the comprehensional relation of absence (*viṣaya*) and cause (*kāraṇa*) in the case of the direct qualificative perception of absence (*abhāva viśiṣṭa pratyakṣe*), as the contact (*saṃyoga*) and the inherence (*samavāya*) are proved contradictory. Accordingly, qualificative perception of absence too is a qualificative knowledge (*viśiṣṭa buddhi*); and hence the qualification can be the relation.

The Siddhāntin, however, refutes the argument. According to him, if the qualification (*vaiśiṣṭya*) is only single (*eka*), like the inherence, then the qualificative knowledge of the absence of clothing (*paṭābhāvadhī*) would become contingent in the place having the clothing (*paṭavati*), but has the absence of pot (*ghaṭābhāvavati*), as the qualification of the absence of pot (*ghaṭābhāva vaiśiṣṭya*) is identical with the qualification of the absence of clothing (*paṭābhāva vaiśiṣṭya*). Also the Siddhāntin refutes the argument that dispite the presence of the qualification of the absence of clothing (*paṭābhāva vaiśiṣṭya*) in such a case, the absence of clothing (*paṭābhāva*) is not present there; and hence the absence of clothing is distinct from the qualification of the absence of clothing. According to him, supposing the absence of the absence of clothing is the absence (*abhāvatve*), then such an absence would be required to be present there through the relation of qualification (*vaiśiṣṭyena*), as the qualification is only one; and also suppose such an absence of the absence of clothing is a positive entity (*bhāvatve*), then the same positive

entity of clothing (*paṭa*) would become the impediment (to the qualificative knowledge of clothing) (*pratibandhaka*). Thus, only the absence of clothing would become the cause of the qualificative knowledge of the absence of clothing (*paṭābhāva dhī hetu*); and the absence of clothing is necessarily present there through the relation of qualification (*vaiśiṣṭyena*).

Also the Siddhāntin points out that when the qualification varies according to each different absence (*praty abhāva vyakti*), the single qualification (*ekaḥ*) cannot be claimed to be comprehensional relation (*viṣaya*) or the cause (*kāraṇa*) in the qualificative knowledge of absence; and therefore only the non-consecutive qualification (*ananugata vaiśiṣṭya*) needs to be admitted as the comprehensional relation, and cause in the case of the direct qualificative perception of absence. However, compared to such a non-consecutive endless qualifications, only the non-consecutive qualifierness (*viśeṣaṇatā*), of the form of being individual qualifiers (*tattat svarūpā*), could be admitted to be the comprehensional relation; and such an eventuality cannot be an undesired contingency, as the Pūrvapakṣin has admitted the qualifierness as the comprehensional relation in the case of the perception of the inherence etc.

Rūpi nīrūpa vyavasthā :

I. vi. 8. Now it may be objected as follows : How can the respective difference of 'having form' and 'not having form' be possible (in the case of pot and wind respectively) when the inherence is only a single? And it cannot be argued that the inherence has the state of being the nature of the relation of form with the pot; however, it does not have such a state of being the nature of the relation of form with the wind. For, suppose the state of being the nature of the relation of form is the very nature of the inherence itself, then the same inherence cannot have the state of being the nature of the relation of the taste, as both the states are mutually contradictory. And no other nature of the inherence is possible to explain.

However, we shall state the reply. Dispite the presence of the inherence of form in the wind, the constant absence of form can exist in the wind; whereas the same constant absence of form cannot exist in the pot. How is it so? It is so because, the constant absence is the very nature of the substratum, i.e. the wind. Thus, the non-contradictory knowledge of 'having form' and 'not having form' can be explained in the case of pot and wind respectively.

Explanation :

The Pūrvapakṣin now objects that the respective difference of 'having form' and 'not having form' (*rūpi nīrūpa vyavasthā*) would become untenable in the thoery of admitting the single inherence as the comprehensional relation.

According to him, it is not possible to argue that the inherence (*samavāya*) has the state of being the nature of the relation of form (*rūpa sambandha rūpatva*) only with the pot, but it doesnot have the same with the wind. For, suppose such a state of being the very nature of the relation of form is the very nature of the inherence itself (*samavāyasya svarūpa*), then the inherence cannot have the state of being the nature of the relation of taste (*rasa sambandha rūpatva*), as both the states are mutually contradictory. And no other nature of the inherence is possible.

However, the Siddhāntin refutes the Pūrvapakṣin's objection. According to him, dispite the presence of the inherence of form (*rūpa samavāya*) in the wind, the constant absence of form (*rūpātyantābhāva*) exists in the wind; however, it does not exists in the pot. It is so, because the constant absence of form (*rūpātyantantābhāva*) is of the nature of the substratum, i.e. the wind (*adhikaraṇa svarūpa*). Thus, the knowledge of 'having form' and 'not having form' (*rūpi nīrūpa pratīti*) can be explained in the case of pot and wind respectively.

Refutation of Jñātatā :

I. vi. 9. It may again be objected as follows : That since the knowledge such as 'Pot is known' is quite common, even the knownness could be comprehensional relation. For, the knownness is not contradictory in the present pot; whereas the knowledge of the same knownness is illusory in the case of past and future pots.

However, this objection is not correct. Suppose the past and future pots do not have the knowness in them, then the knowledge regarding them would not be tenable; for, the knowledge regarding them is to be obtained from the knownness in them only.

It may be argued now that the knowedge of the knownness is the cause of the knowledge regarding the objects. However, it is not correct; for, it involves the heaviness in assumption; Also it may be held that in the case of past and future objects, only the knowledge and its objects are the objects of the knowledge of the knownness. However, then we shall reply that only the knowledge and its objects are the objects of the knowledge of the knownness in the case of the present object (pot) as well. We do not perceive any distinction between the objects in the case of knowledges of the knownnesses regarding the past and the present objects (pots)

Explanation :

The Pūrvapakṣin now raises the objection that the knownness (*jñātatā*) could be admitted as a comprehensional relation, as the same is known to

exist in the present pot (*vartamāne*); whereas the knowledge of the same is illusory in the case of past and future pots (*atītānagatayoḥ*).

However, the Siddhāntin refutes the objection. According to him, the knowedge regarding the past and the future pots (*vyavahāra*) would become untenable in the absence of the knownness in the past and future pots, as the knowledge is obtained from the knownness (*jñātatā sādhya*).

Also the Siddhāntin refutes the argument that the knowledge of the knownness (*jñātatā jñāna*) can be the cause of the knowledge of objects (*vyavahāra hetu*) due to the heaviness; .Also he refutes the position that only the knowledge and its objects (*jñāna tadviṣaya*) are the objects of the knowledge of the knownness (*jñātatā dhī gocara*) in the case of past and future objects. According to him, then only the same knowledge and its objects would become the objects of the knowledge of the knownness in the case of present object as well, as the distinction between the objects (*viṣaya vailakṣaṇya*) is untenable in the case of the knowledges of the knownness regarding the past and future objects.

Pūrvapakṣin's view that Abheda is the relation between Guṇa and Guṇin:

I. vi. 10. It may be proposed now as follows : That the inherence is not the relation between the quality such as form and the quality-possessor such as pot; rather, only the non-difference (i.e. the self-nature or identity) is the relation. For, the non-contradictory non-difference is experienced between the quality of blue colour and the quality-possessor of blue pot, in the case of the knowledge 'This pot is a blue pot', like the non-contradictory non-difference is experienced between the staff-holder and the person in the case of the knowledge 'Person is a staff-holder'. Suppose, the knowledges such as 'This Pot is a blue Pot' and 'Person is a staff-holder' refer merely to the relations of qualifiers, then the knowledges such as 'Person is a staff' like 'This pot is a blue pot' and knowledges such as 'Pot is bluish' like 'Person is a staff-holder' would become necessary. Therefore, it must be admitted that only non-difference is the object of reference in one case, i.e. in 'This pot is a blue pot'; and the relation of qualifier is the object of reference in another case, i.e. in 'Person is a staff-holder'; for, the knowledges differ on account of their objects of reference.

Or, as an alternative, it can be proposed as follows : That the blueness and the potness, which are the delimiting properties of the qualifierness and the qualificandness respectively, are known to be existing only in one substratum, i.e. the blue pot; like the staff-holderness and the personness are known to be existing in only one substratum, i.e. the staff-holding person. This way (due to the reference to such two delimiting properties in one

substratum), even the grammatical agreement or semantic correferentially between the qualifier–and the qualificand–words, viz. 'blue' and 'pot', becomes justified. For, the two words 'blue' (*nīlaḥ*) and 'pot' (*ghaṭaḥ*) have a single co-usage on account of the two different causes of usage, viz. the blueness and the potness. It cannot be argued that the word 'blue' (*nīlaḥ*) is intended to convey 'the possessor of blue colour' (*nīlavat*) either through the reinstatement of the lost possessive suffix (*matup*) or through the secondary usage of non-difference. For, we do not admit the co–usage to be conducive to the intended meaning (of identity); rather, we admit the cognition of non-difference between the blue colour and the pot to be conducive to the intended meaning (of indentity). Also, there exists no reason to assume the secondary usage of non-difference in the case of the word 'blue'; for, such an assumption is heavy. Also no contradiction arises in admitting the primary meaning (of blue colour) in such a case.

Explanation :

The Pūrvapakṣin now proposes that the relation between the quality (*guṇa*) such as the form (*rūpa*) and the quality - possessor (*guṇin*) such as the pot (*ghaṭa*) cannot be the inherence (*samavāya*); but rather, the relation is only the non-difference, i.e. the self-nature or identity (*abheda*). According to him, the experience of non-difference (*abhedānubhava*) is non-contradictory between the blue colour and the pot in the case of 'This pot is a blue: pot' (*nīlo ghaṭaḥ*) like between the staff-holder and the person in the case of 'Person is a staff-holder' (*daṇḍī puruṣaḥ*). The Pūrvapakṣin points out that suppose the knowledges such as 'This pot is a blue pot' and 'Person is a staff-holder' refer merely to the relation of the qualifiers (*viśeṣaṇa sambandha*), then even the knowledges such as 'Person is a staff' (*daṇḍaḥ puruṣaḥ*) like 'This pot is a blue pot' (*nīlo ghaṭaḥ*) and 'Pot is bluish' (*nīlī ghaṭaḥ*) like 'Person is a staff-holder' (*daṇḍī puruṣaḥ*) would become necessary. Therefore, the Pūrvapakṣin establishes that only the non-difference (*abheda*) is the object of reference (*viṣaya*) in 'This pot is a blue pot'; whereas the relation of the qualifier (*viśeṣaṇa sambandha*) is the object of reference in 'Person is a staff-holder', as the two knowledges differ due to their reference to different objects (*viṣaya*).

The Pūrvapakṣin, however, proposes an alternative view that the delimiting properties of the qualifierness and the qualificandness (*viśeṣaṇatā viśeṣyatāvacchedakayoḥ*), i.e. the blueness and the potness (*nīlatva ghaṭatvayoḥ*), are known to exist only in one substratum, i.e. the pot, like the staff-holderness and the personness (*dṇḍitva puruṣatvayoḥ*) are known to exist in one substratum, i.e. the person. According to him, this way, when the knowledges refer to the delimiting properties in one substratum, the grammatical agreement (*śābdam sāmānādhikaraṇyam*) between the qualifier

and the qualificand words, i.e. '*nīlaḥ*' and '*ghaṭaḥ*' can be explained, as the same words have a single co-usage (*eka pravṛtti*) on account two different causes of word-usages (*bhinna pravṛtti nimittābhyām*) such as the blueness and the potness. Also the Pūrvapakṣin refutes the argument that the nominative word '*nīlaḥ*' in '*nīlo ghaṭaḥ*' is intended to convey the possessor of blue colour (*nīlavat*) through the reinstatement of the lost possessive suffix (*matup*) or through the secondary usage of non-difference (*abhedopacāra*), as the usage is not conducive to the intended meaning of identity (*sādhaka*); rather, only the cognition of non-difference between blue colour and pot (*nīla ghaṭayor abheda pratīti*) needs to be conducive to the eintended meaning of identity. Thus, the assumption of secondary usage of non-difference (*upacāra kalpanā*) in the word is not justified, as the primary meaning (*mukhya*) is not contradictory.

Reply : Abheda is not the Relation between *guṇa* and *guṇin:*

I. vi. 11. Supposing the words 'white' and 'clothing' are synonyms, then the co-usage 'This clothing is a white clothing' would become untenable like the co-usage 'This pot is a jar'. Also, (when the white colour and the clothing are non-different), a blind person would need to have the perception of the form (white colour through skin), like the perception of the clothing (through skin); otherwise, he would need to have the non-perception of the clothing like the non-perception of the form (white colour) as well. Also in the case of clothing reddened by the thorn apple, the perception of white colour would become necessary like the perception of the clothing; otherwise, even the non-perception (through skin) of the clothing would beome necessary like the non-perception of the white colour. Also, the listener would bring any white object, when being asked to bring the white clothing. Also the statement 'This clothing is non-white' would become contradictory like the statement 'This clothing is non-clothing'; as the white colour and the clothing are non-different. Also when black and red colours are lost and produced, on account of fire-contact in one place of pot, both the loss and the production of black and red colours would become necessary in the entire pot. Also in the presence of pot, the loss and the production of the black and the red colours would not be tenable.

It may be proposed now as follows : That since the whiteness etc. are different from the substance, the co-usage 'This clothing is a white clothing' is made to indicate the difference (between the property and the substance). Therefore, the non-perception of the property of whitness becomes tenable even as the blind etc. has the perception of the white substance of clothing etc. And the non-difference of the property of the whiteness etc. from the substance of clothing etc. is not the inherence; but rather, it is the self-linking relation of the whiteness etc.

However, this is not correct. Suppose the properties such as the whiteness, the sweetness, the fragrantness, and the hotness are admitted to exist in the substance, then the same would be required to be perceived by the sense-organs such as the skin-touch which produce the perception of the substances. Also, it may be argued that the skin-touch etc. need not produce the perceptions of all the properties such as the whiteness in accordance with the law of perceptibility of the formness etc. by means of only fixed specific sense-organs. However, we shall reply that then, in the case of the properties such as the formness etc. existing in the substance, even the law of perceptibility of the properties by the fixed specific sense-organs would become untenable, as the properties, existing in the competent substance, are competent of being perceived by competent sense organs only. Also supposing the generic properties are held to be competent of being perceived only as belonging to individual qualities, then the lack of generalization would become contingent. Therefore, it must be admitted that the perceptibility of the formness etc. by the fixed sense organs is the proof of the difference between the quality, i.e. the form and the quality-possessor, i.e. the substance. Supposing the relation between the quality and the quality-possessor is only non-difference, then how can the knowledge of difference such as, 'The white is the form of the cloting' is possible? Further, on the contrary, the knowledge of non-difference such as 'The clothing is bluishness' would become necessary.

Explanation :

The Siddhāntin, i.e. the Naiyāyika states his reply here. According to him, when the words 'white' (*śukla*) and 'clothing' (*paṭa*) are synonyms and refer to the same meanings, the co-usage (*saha prayoga*) such as 'This clothing is a white clothing' (*śuklaḥ paṭaḥ*) would become untenable like the co-usage 'This pot is a jar' (*ghaṭaḥ kumbhaḥ*). Also when the quality of white colour and the quality-possessor of clothing have non-difference as their relation, even a blind person (*andha*) would be required to perceive the form (*rūpa graha*) like he percaives the clothing (*paṭa graha*) (through skin); otherwise on the contrary, the blind would be required not to perceive even the clothing (through skin) like he does not perceive the form. Also, when the clothing is reddened by the thorn apple (*mahārajata rakte*), one would be required to perceive even the white colour like the clothing; otherwise one would not be able to perceive even the clothing like the white colour. Also, the listener, after being asked to bring the clothing (*paṭam ānaya*), would bring any white object. Further, since the relation between the white colour and the clothing is non-difference (*paṭa śuklayor abhedāt*), the statement 'This clothing is non-white' (*aśaklaḥ paṭaḥ*) would become contradictory like the statement 'This clothing is non-clothing' (*apaṭaḥ pataḥ*). Again when in one place of pot, the black and red

colours (*ekatra śyāma raktayoḥ*) are lost and produced due to fire contact (*agni saṁyoga*), both the loss and the production of black and red colours would become necessary in the entire pot. Also when the pot is present (*ghaṭa sattve*), the loss and the production of the black and the red colours would become untenable.

The Pūrvapakṣin now proposes that dispite non-difference, the co-usage 'This clothing is a white clothing' (*śuklaḥ paṭaḥ*) is made to indicate the difference between the property of whiteness and the substance of clothing, as the property of whiteness and the substance of clothing (*śuklatvādīnām dravya bhedāt*). Thus according to him, the non-perception of the whiteness (*śuklatvādinām agraha*) by the blind becomes tenable dispite the perception of the white clothing etc. (*śuklādi graha*). And the non-difference (*abheda*) of the property of the whiteness from the clothing is not the inherence (*samavāya*), rather, it is only the self-linking relation (*svarūpa sambandha*)'.

The Siddhāntin, i.e. the Naiyāyika, however, refutes the *Primā facie* view. According to him, suppose the properties such as the whiteness etc. (*śuklatvādī*) are admitted to exist in the substance (*dravya vṛtti*), then the same would be required to be perceived through the sense-organs such as the skin-touch which produce the perception of the substance (*dravya grāhaka tvag*). Also, supposing the skin-touch etc. are not required to produce the perception of the properties such as the formness etc. in accordance with the law of perceptibility by means of fixed sense-organs (*prati niyatendriya grāhyatva*), then, in the case of the properties such as the formness etc. existing in the substance, the law of perceptibility by means of fixed sense organs itself would become untenable due to the competency of the generic property being perceived by the sense organ by existing in the competent substance (*yogya vṛtti*). And the properties such as the whiteness cannot be held to be competent of being perceived only as belonging to individual qualities (*tattad jātīyatvena*), as then lack of generalization would arises. Thus, the Naiyāyika concludes that only the perceptibility of the whiteness etc. by the fixed sense-organs (*pratiniyatendriya grāhyatā*) is the proof of the difference between the quality and the quality-possessor (*guṇa guṇi bheda*). The Naiyāyika notes that the knowledge of difference (*bheda buddhi*) such as 'The white is the form of clothing' (*paṭasya śuklam rūpam*) would not be tenable if the non-difference is the relation; and on the contrary, the knowledge of non-difference such as 'The clothing is bluishness' (*paṭo nīlimā*) would become contingent.

Mādhvas' View that Bhedābheda is the Relation :

I. vi. 12. All these faults (difficulties) apply only to the theory of total non-difference (as the comprehensional relation between the qualities and the

quality-possessors); however, we the Mādhvas, are the advocates of the theory of difference–cum-non–difference (as the comprehensional relation). Thus, the absence of the fault of repetition can be explained in the view of the difference (constituting the difference cum-non-difference). And the twin perceptions such as. 'Pot has white colour' and 'Pot is white' are stated to be the means establishing the difference–cum-non-difference. Or, alternately it may be admitted that the knowledge of semantic correferentiality to the difference, established in both the theories, is the means establishing the difference–cum–non-difference. Or, since the semantic correferentiality is not tenable between total difference and total non-difference, only the same lack of semantic correferentiality can establish the difference-cum-non difference.

It should not be argued, however, that the difference and the non-difference are of the forms of mutual exclusions; and therefore, how can the two mutually contradictory items come together in constituting one single comprehensional relation. The difference and the non-difference do not involve any mutual contradiction like the contact and its absence. Even you, the Siddhāntin, needs to admit the difference–cum-non-difference, as the relation, as the mutual absence, i.e. the difference of the black colour is established in the very substratum of the black colour on account of the non-contradictory experience such as 'This pot is red, but it is not black' after the baking.

It may be inferred that the mutual absenceness, i.e. the differenceness occurs in the substratum of non-pervassive occurrence; for, it is a property directly pervaded by the absenceness occurring in the constant absence like the constant absenceness. And the term 'constant' need not be the qualifier of the absence constituting the probans; for, the antecedent absence and the distruction having the items of non-pervasive occurrence, as the counterpositives, are of non-pervassive occurrence. Thus, from this inference too, difference–cum-non-difference gets established as the comprehensional relation.

Explanation :

Now the Mādhvas propose that the difference-cum-non-difference (*bhedābheda*) constitutes the comprehensional relation between quality and quality-possessor (*guṇa guṇinoḥ*). According to them, all the faults or difficulties (cf. I. vi. 11) apply to only the theory of total non-difference (*atyantābheda*); and hence the difference–cum-non-difference needs to be admitted as the comprehensional relation. And the twin perceptions such as 'Pot has white colour' and 'Pot is white' (*paṭasya śuklam rūpam, śuklaḥ paṭaḥ*) can be stated to be the means establishing the difference–cum-non difference as the relation. Or alternately, it may be admitted that the knowledge of

semantic correferentiality (*sāmānādhikaraṇya dhī*) to the difference (*bhede*) is the means establishing the difference–cum–non-difference (*abhede*). Or since semantic correferentiality is not tenable between total difference–and total non-difference (*atyantam abhede bheda ca*), the same lack of semantic correferentiality may be admitted as the means establishing the difference cum-non difference.

The Bhedābhedavādin refutes the argument that the difference and the non-difference (*bhedābhedayoḥ*) have the form of mutual exclusions (*paraspara viraha rūpa*); and therefore, the two mutually contradictory items (*paraspara viruddha*) cannot constitute one single comprehensional relation. According to them, the difference and the non-difference, like the contact and its absence (*samyoga tadabhāva*), do not have any mutual contradiction. And after baking a pot, the non-contradictory experience (*abādhitānubhava*) that 'This pot is red, but it is not black' (*rakto'yam na śyāmaḥ*) arises; and therefore, the mutual absence of black colour becomes established in the very substratum of black colour; thus even the Siddhāntin needs to admit the difference-cum-non difference as the comprehensional relation.

The Bhedābhedavādin states that the inference 'The mutual absenceness, i.e. the differenceness (*anyo'nyābhāvatvam*) occurs in the substratum of non-pervassive occurrence (*avyāpyavṛtti vṛtti*); for, it is a property directly pervaded by the absenceness occurring in the constant absence (*nityābhāva vṛtty abhāva sākṣād vyāpya dharmatvāt*)' can establish the difference–cum-non-difference; and the term 'constant' (*nitya*) need not be the qualifier of the absence constituting the probans; for, the antecedent absence and the destruction (*abhāva pradhvamsayoḥ*), that have the itmes of non-pervassive occurence as the counter positives (*avyāpya vṛtti pratiyogika*), are of non-pervassive occurrence (*avyāpya vṛttitvāt*).

Refutation of Bhedābheda vāda :

I. vi. 13. Here we, the Siddhāntins, state our reply. The absence of one entity may exist or may be known to exist in the substratum of the same entity only as delimited by the different parts or aspects of the substratum, like the absence of the contact of monkey exists in the substratum of contact, i.e. the tree, as delimited by the different parts of tree. For, instance, the mutual absence of the pot, as delimited by the black colour, exists in the pot as delimited by the red colour; or the absence of the mutual absence of the pot, as delimited by the red colour, exists in the same pot as delimited by the black colour. Therefore, in the case of 'This pot is a blue pot' too, let the pot have the difference from the blue colour pot, as the mutual absence of the blue colour Pot exists in the pot as delimited by the potness. However, let the pot

not have the non-difference (of blue colour pot), of the form of the absence of the mutual absence of blue colour pot, as the same absence of the mutual absence of blue colour pot is contradictory in the pot as delimited by the potness. Also the positive presence and the negative absence of one and the same entity cannot co-exist or known to co-exist in the same substratum, as delimited by the same property. Also the presence and the absence of the same entity cannot co-exist in the same substratum as delimited by another property. For, the same difference and non-difference are absent in the pot as delimited by the potness. Also the experience such as 'This pot is a blue pot' can be had even without the knowledge of difference and non-difference.

It may be argued now that let the difference be of the form of mutual absence; however, the non-difference need not be of the form of the absence of mutual absence; rather, it is something else. However, this argument is not correct. For, 'that something else' (than the absence of mutual absence) is not the cause of the knowledge of non-difference. Therefore, only the relation of (inherence of) blue colour appears with the pot in 'This pot is a blue pot'. It may be argued now that it has been stated that in that case (of the appearance of the relation of blue colour), the knowledge would be only 'This Pot is bluish' and not 'This pot is a blue pot'. However, we shall reply that supposing merely the state of referring to the relation of the blue colour with pot is necessary in the case of the knowledge such as 'This pot is bluish', then such a contingency is only desired. Now it may be argued that it is necessary to have the word expressing the relation (to express the relation of blue colour with the pot) in the case of the usage 'This pot is a blue pot'. However, then we shall reply that such a contingency is only desired, as only the word 'blue' (*nīlaḥ*) is meant to convey the possoessor of blue colour either through the reinstatement of the lost possessive suffix or through the secondary usage of non-difference.

Explanation :

The Siddhāntin states now the refutation of the theory of difference–cum-non-difference (*bhedābheda vāda*). According to him, it is possible that the absence of the same entity (*tasyaiva abhāvaḥ*) may exist in the substratum of the same entity (*tatraiva*), as delimited by different parts (*avaccheda bhedana*), like the absence of contact of monkey (*saṁyoga*) exists in the substratum of the contact, i.e. the tree. For instance, the mutual absence of the pot (*tasyaiva anyonyā bhāvaḥ*), as delimited by the black colour (*śyāmāvacchinnasya*), exists in the pot as delimited by the red colour (*raktāvacchinna*); and the absence of the mutual absence of the pot (*anyo' nyābhāvābhāva*) as delimited by the red colour exists in the pot as delimited by the black colour (*śyāmāvacchedena*). Therefore, in the case of 'This pot is a

blue pot' (*nīlo ghaṭaḥ*), the pot can have the difference from the blue colour pot (*nīlāt bheda*), since the mutual absence of the blue colour pot can exist in the pot as delimited by the potness (*ghaṭatvāvacchedena*). However, the pot cannot have the non-difference (*abheda*) of the form of the absence of the mutual absence of blue colour Pot (*nīlānyo'nyā bhāvābhāva rūpa*), as the same is contradictory in the pot as delimited by the potness. Further, the Siddhāntin notes that the presence and the absence (*bhāvābhāvayoḥ*) of one entity cannot co-exist or be known to co-exist in one substratum as delimited by one property (*ekāvacchedena*). Also the presence and the absence of one entity cannot co-exist in one substratum as delimited by another property (*avacchedakāntareṇa*), as the same difference and non-difference cannot exist in the pot as delimited by the potness (*ghaṭatvāvacchinne*). The experience 'This pot is a blue pot' is possible even without the knowledge of difference and non-difference.

The Bhedābhedavādin may argue that the difference (*bheda*) can be admitted to be of the form of mutual absence (*anyo'nyābhāva rūpa*); however, the non-difference (*abheda*) need not be admitted to be of the form of the absence of mutual absence (*bhedābhāva*); rather, it is something else. However, the Siddhāntin refutes the argument. According to him, nothing except the absence of mutual absence is the cause of the knowledge of non-difference (*abheda vyavahāra*). Thus, the Siddhāntin explains that only the relation (of inherence) of the blue colour (*nīla sambandha*) appears with pot in the case of experience 'This pot is a blue pot' (*nīlo ghaṭaḥ*). And the Siddhāntin terms the contingency of the knowledge such as 'This pot is bluish' (*nīlī ghaṭaḥ*) as desired when the relation of the blue colour appears as the object (*sambandha viṣayatva*) in the knowledge. Also the Siddhāntin terms the contingency of the possessive suffix (*matup*), in the usage 'This pot is a blue pot' (*nīlo ghaṭaḥ*) as desired, since the term 'blue' (*nīlaḥ*) can convey the possessor of blue colour either through the reinstatement of lost possessive suffix (*matupo lopāt*) or through the secondary usage of non-difference (*abhedopacārāt*).

Viśeṣaṇatā is grāhikā :

I. vi. 14. It may be held now as follows : That let, in the case of the perception of qualities such as sound and form, only the qualifierness or the qualifierness of what is connected with sense organ be the comprehensional relation conducive to the perception of them. Thus, what is the need for admitting the relation of inherence etc.?

Now it may be argued that the inherence is the cause in the qualifierness and the connected inherence etc. are the causes in the qualifierness of what is connected with sense-organ etc.; for, the same relations are not tenable without the inherence and the connected inherence etc. However, then we shall reply that the inherence and the connected inherence etc. are the causes of only the very nature of the qualifierness; however, they are not the causes of the state of being the comprehensional relation of the qualifierness. The inherence and the absence have the qualifierness even without the inherence and the connected inherence etc. Suppose you again argue that the connected inherence etc. are present in the qualifierness, then we shall reply that let them be present there; however, they need not be the comprehensional relations. Rather, only the qualifierness constitutes the comprehensional relation, as the same is already assumed to be the relation. Suppose you argue that the qualifierness cannot be known in the form etc. without the connected inherence etc., then we shall reply, that let the qualifierness not be known. For, the qualifierness is not the comprehensional relation as being known; rather, it is the comprehensional relation only as existing in its very nature.

No, this position is not correct. Since the sound etc. are the objects of direct perception, the qualifierness is grasped, in the case of the inference of the comprehensional relation of sense-organs, only after grasping the inherence in the sound etc.; and therefore, only the inherence, due to being recollected first, and not the qualifierness, due to being recollected last, is the object of direct perception.

Explanation :

The Viśeṣaṇatāvādin now proposes that only the qualifierness (*viśeṣaṇatā*) or the qualifierness of what is connected with sense organs (*indriya sambaddha viśeṣaṇatā*) may be admitted as the comprehensional relation conducive to the knowledge (*grāhikā*) of sound and form etc.; and therefore, the inherence (*samavāya*) is not required to be admitted as the comprehensional relation.

The Viśeṣaṇatāvādin refutes the argument that the inherence (*samavāya*) and the connected inherence are the causes (*upajīvya*) in the case of the qualifierness (*viśeṣaṇatā*) and the qualifierness of what is connected with sense-organs (*indriya sambaddha viśeṣaṇatā*) respectively due to the untenability of such relations otherwise. According to him, the inherence and the connected inherence are the causes of only the very natures of the qualifierness (*viśeṣaṇatā svarūpa*) and not of the state of being the comprehensional relation of the qualifierness (*pratyāsattitva*) on the ground that the qualifierness of the inherence and that of the absence are tenable even without the inherence and the connected inherence. Also the Viśeṣaṇatāvādin refutes the argument that even the connected inherence etc. (*saṁyukta samavāyādi*) are present in the qualifierness; and hence the same need to be the relations. According to him, it is possible that the connected inherence etc. are present in the qualifierness; however, they need not be the comprehensional relations

(*pratyāsatti*), as only the qualifierness is assumed to be the relation. Further, the Viśeṣaṇatāvādin refutes the argument that the qualifierness (*viśeṣaṇatā*) cannot be ascertained in the sound etc. without the connected inherence etc. (*saṁyuktasamavāyā- dikam*); and therefore, the same need to be the relations. According to him, the qualifierness is not the comprehensional relation as being known (*jñātā*); rather , it is so only as existing in its very nature (*svarūpasatī.*).

The Siddhāntin refutes the Viśeṣaṇtāvādin's proposal that the Viśeṣaṇatā is the comprehensional relation. According to him, the sound etc. are the objects of direct preception; and hence, in the case of the inference of the relation of sense-organs (*indriya sambandhānumiti*), the qualifierness (*viśeṣaṇatā*) is grasped only after the grasping of the inherence (*samavāya*) in the sound etc.; and therefore, only the inherence, which is recollected first (*prathamopa- sthita*), and not the qualifierness, which is recollected last (*caramopasthita*), is the object of knowledge, i.e. the comprehensional relation.

Indriya sambaddha viśeṣaṇatā is Relation of absence :

I. vi. 15. It may be objected now as follows : That the qualifierness of what is connected with sense-organs is not the comprehensional relation in the perceptual knowledge of the absence; for, then even the perceptual knowledge of the absence of the competent waterness etc. would become necessary in the atom etc. which are connected with the organ such as eye.

Rather, therefore, only the qualifierness of what is connected with the object to be perceived by the sense-organs is the comprehensional relation of the absence of the waterness. Also the absence of clearly manifest form in the great or gross element of wind, the absence of fragrance in the flower, or the absence of bitter taste in the jagary cannot be perceived by the sense organ such as eye. Rather, the same absences are inferred on account of the non-obtainment of the competent counterpositives.

Also the qualifierness of (what is connected with) sense-organs too is not the comprehensional relation (in the knowledge of absence). For, then the perceptual knowledge of the absence of the waterness, which is the qualifier in the sense organ of eye etc.; would become necessary from the senses such as eye etc. Also suppose the absence of sound is perceptible, then a distinct comprehensional relation needs to be assumed (to facilitate the perception of the same). For, in the absence of (the assumption of) a distinct comprehensional relation, the perception of the absence of sound would become untenable. No, this is not correct. Only the qualifierness of what is connected with sense organs is the comprehensional relation due to the brevity.

Explanation :

The Pūrvapakṣin now raises the objection that the qualifierness of what is connected with sense organs (*indriya sambaddha viśeṣaṇatā*) cannot be the comprehensional relation in the perception of absence (*abhāva graha*). According to him, when such a qualifierness is the relation, then the perception of the absence of the waterness etc. (*jalatvādeḥ*) would become necessary in the atom etc. (*paramāṇvādi*) which are connected with the organs such as eye. Rather, therefore, only the qualifierness of what is connected with the object to be perceived by sense organs (*svagrāhya sambaddha viśeṣaṇatā*) needs to be the comprehensional relation of absence. Further, he notes that the absence of the clearly manifest form (*udbūta rūpābhāva*) in the wind, the absence of the fragrance (*saurabhābhāva*) in the flower, and the absence of the bitter taste (*tiktatvābhāva*) in the jaggary are not perceived by the sense organs such as eye; rather, the same absences are to be inferred on account of the non-obtainment of the competent counterpositive (*yogyānupalabdhi*).

The Pūrvapakṣin raises the objection further that the qualifierness of (what is connected with) sense-organs (*indriya viśeṣaṇatā*) too cannot constitute the comprehensional relation in the perception of absence. According to him, when the same is the relation, then the perception of the absence of the waterness, etc. which are the qualifiers in the sense-organ of eye (*sva viśeṣaṇa jalatvādy abhāva*), would become necessary from the sense-organ such as the eye. The Pūrvapakṣin notes that suppose the absence of sound (*śabdābhāva*) is perceptible, then a distinct comprehensional relation needs to be assumed to facilitate the perception of the absence of sound.

However, the Siddhāntin refutes the objection. According to him, only the qualifierness of what is connected with sense-organs (*indriya sambadha viśeṣaṇatā*) needs to be admitted as the comprehensional relation (*pratyāsatti*) in the case of the perception of absence due to the brevity (*lāghava*).

Indriya viśeṣaṇatā is the Relation :

I. vi. 16. Also, this way, the perception of the absence of the waterness need not become necessary in the atoms. For, the absence of only that entity, the presence of which entity in which place is contradictory to the non-obtainment of the same, is perceived there in that substratum through the contact of the sense-organ.

Also the presence of the waterness etc. in the atoms etc. is not contradictory to the non-obtainment of the same. For, the non-obtainment of the waterness, like the earthness, is possible in the atoms etc., due to the absence of the competent connected inherence. However, the absence of the clearly manifest form in the great, i.e. gross element of wind is certainly to

be perceived by means of eye etc. For, the non-obtainment of the manifest form would become untenable in the presence of the manifest form etc. there in the wind. That is why, the absence of the self-nature of (i.e. identity with) demons etc. is perceptible in the pillar. For, suppose the demon has the self-nature of (i.e. identity with) the pillar, then the non-obtainment of the same demon, like the pillar, would become untenable.

Moreover, this way, even the absence of sound becomes perceptible; for, the presence of sound there in the substratum is contradictory to the non-obtainment of the same sound. Therefore, only the qualifierness of (what is connected with) sense organ is the comprehensional relation of the perception of sound. However, the presence of the waterness etc. in the eye is not contradictory to the non-obtainment of the same waterness there; and therefore, eye does not perceive the waterness etc.

Explanation :

The Siddhāntin refutes the objection that when the qualifierness of what is connected with sense organ (*indriya sambaddha viśeṣaṇatā*) is the comprehensional relation of absence, the perception of the absence of the waterness etc. (*julatvādyabhāva graha*) would become necessary in the atom etc. According to him, the absence of only that entity (*tasyābhāva*), the persence of which entity (*yat sattva*) in which place is contradictory to the non-obtainment of the same (*anupalabdhi virodhi*), is perceived there in that substratum through the contact of sense organ (*indriya sannikarṣa*).

Also the Siddhāntin refutes the argument that the presence of the waterness etc. (*jalatvādi sattva*) in the atoms etc. is contradictory to the non-obtainment of the same (*anupalabdhi virodhi*). According to him, the non-obtainment of the waterness is possible there due to the lack of competent connected inherence (*yogya saṁyukta samavāyābhāva*). However, he notes that the absence of the clearly manifest form (*udbhūta rūpādy abhāva*) can be perceived by eye etc. in the gross element of wind (*vāyau*), on the ground that the non-obtainment (*anupalabdhi*) of the same form would become untenable in the presence of the form there. Thus, even the absence of the self-nature of the demon (*piśāca tādātmyābhāva*) can be perceived in the pillar (*stambhe*), as the non-obtainment of the demon (*anupalabdhi*) would become untenable in the presence of the self-nature of demon in the pillar. Also the Siddhāntin maintains that even the absence of sound (*śabdasyābhāva*) becomes perceiptible through the qualifierness of (what is connected) with sense organ, on the ground that the presence of sound (*śabda sattva*) is contradictory to the non-obtainment of the same sound (*anupalabdhi virodhi*). Thus only the qualifierness of (what is connected with) sense-organ (*indriya*

viśeṣaṇatā) needs to be the comprehensional relation of absence. However, it should be noted that the presence of the waterness etc. (*jalatvādi sattva*) in the eye is not contradictory to the non-obtainment of the waterness (*anupalabdhi virodhi*); and hence the eye need not perceive the waterness etc.

Objection that Samavāya is the Relation of Absence :

I. vi. 17. It may be objected now as follows : That in the case of (the perception of) absence, the qualifierness does not constitute the comprehensional relation; rather, only the inherence constitutes the relation. For, the qualificative knowledge that establishes the inherence as the comprehensional relation is non-distict, i.e. equally strong.

Also it cannot be argued that the absence, when occurring through the inherence, would have the contingency of becoming presence. For, then the counter logic that 'The presence, when occurring through the inherence, would have the contingency of becoming absence' would be equally possible. Since the inherence is already assumed to be the comprehensional relation in the case of form etc., the assumption of the inherence as the relation in the case of absence is equal to that of the qualifierness. Also the assumption of the qualifierness in the case of absence is equal to that of the inherence. Also antecedent absence and destruction are inherent in the substratum of their respective counter positives. And destruction, produced from the loss of the substratum of its counter positive, inhers either in time or in place, as the same needs to be described, i.e. produced there.

Also it is not correct to counterargue that then the destruction would be required to be lost in the loss of the inhering substratum. For, then the lost or destroyed pot would be required to re-emerge. Also the positiveness is a preventive condition in the loss of the destruction. Otherwise, even for you, the Siddhāntin, the destruction, being something to be produced, would be required to be lost.

Now it may be argued as follows : That this way, when mutual absence and constant absence are eternal and inherent in many, they would have the contingency of becoming generic properties. And the positiveness cannot be held to be the determing cause in making something a generic property. For, such an assumption involves the heaviness. Also there is no distinction or difference in the qualificative knowledge of an absence on the basis of which the inherence can be abandoned as being the comprehensional relation of absence.

However, this argument is not correct. When the absences of potness etc. are admitted to constitute the generic properties, then the relative extensineness and the relative narrowness of the absences of the pot etc. in

comparison to the generic properties such as the existence, the substancesness and the earthness would become untenable. Also suppose these properties, i.e. the existence, the substanceness and the earthness, are pervaded, them the absencesof those properties would become necessary in the pot; and suppose these properties are pervaders, then the absence of the potness would become untenable in the generic property etc.

Explanation :

Some Sections of the Naiyāyikas now raise the objection that only the inherence (*samavāya*), and not the qualifierness (*viśeṣaṇatā*), should be admitted to be the comprehensional relation in the perception of absence (*abhāve*). According to them, the qualificative knowledge of absence (*viśiṣṭa pratīti*), that establishes the inherence as the relation (*samavāya sādhaka*), is equally strong.

These Naiyāyikas refute the argument that when the absence occurs through the inherence (*samaveta*), the same becomes presence (*bhāva*). According to them, the counter logic (*vaiparītya*) that when the presence occurs through the inherence, the same becomes the absence would prevent such an undesired contingency . Also they point out that since the inherence is already assumed, in the case of the perception of form etc., as the comprehensional relation (*pratyāsattitvena*), the assumption of the same in the case of the absence is equal to that of the qualifierness; whereas the assumption of the qualifierness is equal to that of the inherence. The antecedent absence and the destruction (*prāgabhāva pradhvamsau*) are inherent in the substrata of their respective counter positives (*pratiyogyāśraye*); whereas the destruction, produced from the loss of the substratum of its counter positive (*pratiyogy āśraya nāśa janya dhvamsa*), is inherent either in time or space as it is described, i.e. produced there.

The Sections of the Naiyāyikas note that the destruction (*dhvamsa*) need not be lost in the loss of the inhering substratum (*samavāyi nāśe*). According to them, if the destruction is lost, then the lost or destroyed pot would be required to re-emerge (*ghatonmajjana*); and otherwise, the destruction, being something to be produced (*janya*), would be required to be lost (*nāśāpatti*).

The Siddhāntin argues now that the mutual absense and the constant absence (*ano'nyātyantābhāvayoḥ*), when they are eternal (*nitya*) and inherent in many (*aneka samaveta*), would need to become the generic properties (*jāti*). And the positiveness (*bhāvatva*) cannot be admitted to be determining cause (*tantra*) in making something a generic property, as such an assumption is heavy. Also no difference (*viśeṣa*) exists in the qualificative knowledge of an

absence because of which the inherence can be avoided from being the comprehensional relation.

However, the Sections of the Naiyāyikas refute the argument. According to them; when the absence of the potness etc. are admitted to constitute the generic property, then the relative extensiveness and the relative narrowness of the absence *(parāparabhāva)* in comparison to the generic properties such as the existence, the substance and the earthness (*sattva dravyatva pṛthivītva*) would become untenable. Also when the generic properties are pervaded (*vyāpya*), they cannot exist in the pot etc.; and when they are pervassive (*vyāpaka*), the potness etc. need to exist in the generic property etc.

Reply of the Siddhāntin :

I. vi. 18. Here we state our reply. Supposing the absence occurs through the inherence, then the destruction would be required to be lost on account of the loss of the inherent cause. And the positiveness cannot be held to be the determining cause in making something what is to be lost, as the same is heavy. Also such a positiveness cannot be explained in the case of the antecedent absence. On the other hand, when the absence is held not to be occurring through the inherence, the destruction of pot etc. need not be lost dispite the same destruction being produced. For, the loss of the inherent substratum of the destruction etc. does not exist.

Now it may be argued that the destruction of pot etc. cannot be lost due to the undesired contingency of the re-emergence of the lost pot. However, this argument is not correct. The totality of causes does not stop producing its effect due to the fear of the loss of objective or purpose. Therefore, let the state of not occurring through the inherence, which facilitates the absence of re–emergence, be assumed in the destruction. Also when a series of destructions is assumed due to the loss of their respective inherent substrata, the last destruction of the series, which is contradictory to the distruction of parts beginning from pot, woule be required to exist in the atoms in the event of the loss of the pot and the pot-halves etc. upto the atoms etc. Thus, the destruction would become imperceptible (due to the imperceptibility of atoms). Also when the destruction of the pot is held to be inherent in the pot-halves, the same would become untenable to be described to exist in the ground. Also when the destruction is held to be inherent in both the pot-halves and the ground, the same could not be described to exist without the pot-halves, as the same destruction needs to be pervassive in its occurrence.

Thus ends the 'Thoery of inherence' in the Perception of the Tattvacintāmaṇi composed by Śri Gangeśopādhyāya.

Explanation :

Gangeśa now concludes his 'Theory of inherence' (Samavāya vāda) by refuting the objection that only the inherence, and not the qualifierness, constitutes the comprehensional relation of absence. According to him, when the absence is held to be occurring through the inherence in its substratum (*samavetatve*), the destruction (*dhvamsa*) would need to be lost due to the loss of the inherent cause (*samavāyi kāraṇa nāśa*). Also the positiveness (*bhāvatva*) cannot be held to be the determining cause (*tantra*) in making something what is to be lost (*nāśyatve*) due to the heaviness and due to the impossibility in the antecedent absence. On the other hand, when absence is held to be not occurring through the inherence (*asamavetatve*), the loss of the destruction of pot etc. would not become contingent dispite the same destruction being produced (*janyatve*). For, when absence occurs through the qualifierness (*viśeṣaṇatā*), the loss of the inherent substratum (*āśraya nāśa*) etc. cannot happen.

Gangeśa refutes the argument of the Sections of logicians that the destruction, dispite being inherent, need not be lost due to the contingency of there re-emergence of the destroyed pot (*ghaṭonmajjanāpatti*). According to him, no totality of causes (*sāmagrī*) stops from producing its effect merely because of the fear of the loss of objective (*prayojana kṣati bhaya*). Therefore, only the state of not occurring through the inherence (*asamavetatva*) must be admitted in the destruction which can facilitate the absence of re–emergence (*unmajjanābhāva*) of the destroyed pot. Also Gangeśa states that a series of destructions (*dhvamsa paramparā*) cannot be assumed in the event of the loss of their respective inherent substrata (*sva samavāyi nāśa*), as then the last destruction (*caramo nāśaḥ*), which impedes the destruction of parts beginning from pot (*ghaṭādi taddhvamsa virodhi*), would be required to exist in the atom (*paramāṇu vṛtti*) at the time of the loss of pot and pot-halves upto the atoms (*āparamāṇu nāśe*). Thus, the destruction would become non-perceptible (*apratyakṣa*) due to the imperceptibility of the inherent substrata of atoms. Also Gangeśa notes that when the destruction of pot (*ghaṭa dhvamsa*) is held to be inherent in only pot-halves (*kapāla samaveta tve*), the same cannot be described to exist in the ground; and when the same destruction is held to be inherent in both the ground and the pot-halves (*ubhaya vṛttitve*), the same destruction cannot be described to exist without pot-halves as the same destruction needs to be pervassive in its occurrence (*vyāsajya vṛtti*).

The End of the Samavāyavāda in the Pratyakṣakhaṇḍa.

I. VII.

Theory of Invalidity of Non-perception (Anupalabdhyaprāmāṇya vādaḥ)

Bhāṭṭās' view : Anupalabdhi is Pramāṇa :

I. vii. 1. The Bhāṭṭas hold as follows : That the knowledge of non-existence (of things) is not to be produced from any sense organ; rather, it is to be produced from the non-perception (non-obtainment) of the competent counter positive. For, the non-existence of the competent counter positive is not known in the case of the perception of the competent counter positive.

It should not be argued that this way, the knowledge of existence (of things) too needs to be produced from the non-perception of the non-existence (of things); and not from the sense-organs. For, sense-organs are assigned to be the producers in the case of the knowledge of existence (of things). Otherwise, the person of closed eyes would be required to have the knowledge of the existence of pot due to the non-perception of the non-existence of pot. That is why, the non-perception of non-existence (of things), although closely following, cannot constitute the cause of the knowledge of existence (of things). For, non-perception is rendered redundant by sense organs. When contact between sense organs and things is present, knowledge of existence of things is not delayed without the non-perception of non-existence of things.

It may be objected now that only sense organ is the cause even in the case of knowledge of non-existence (of things); for, the same sense organ is assigned to be the means of the knowledge of non-existence (of things). However, this is not correct. Since the sense organs such as the eye are not connected with or comprehensionally related to the non-existence (of things), the same are exhausted by producing the knowledge of the substratum (of non-existence of things) only.

Explanation :

Gangeśa after completing his 'Theory of inherence', begins his 'Theory of invalidity of non-perception' (*Anupalabdhy aprāmāṇya vāda*) with the objection of the Bhāṭṭa Mīmāmsakas. According to the Bhāṭṭas, the knowledge of non-existence (of things) (*abhāva graha*) cannot be produced from the sense organs (*indriyāt*); rather, it needs to be produced from only non-

perception of competent counter positive (*yogyānupalabdhiḥ*), as the non-existence of the competent counter positive is not known (*tadabhāvāgraha*) in the case of the perception of the competent counter positive (*tadupalambhe*).

The Bhāṭṭas refute the argument that then even the knowledge of existence (of things) (*bhāva buddhi*) needs to be produced from non-perception of non-existence (of things) (*abhāvānupalabdhi*), and not from the sense organs (*indriya*). According to them, sense organs are assigned to be the means of producing (*indriyānuvidhāna*) the knowledge of existence (of things) (*bhāva graha*); otherwise, a person of closed eyes (*nimīlitākṣa*) would be required to have the knowledge of the existence of the pot (*ghaṭa graha*) due to the non-perception of non-existence of pot (*abhāvānupalabdhyā*). According to them, therefore, the non-perception of non-existence (of things) (*abhāvānupalabdhi*), dispite closely following (*pṛṣṭhalagnā*), cannot be the cause (*hetu*) of the knowledge of existence (of things) (*bhāva graha*), as it is rendered redundant (*anyathā siddha*); and the knowledge of existence of things (*bhāva dhī*) is never delayed, without the non-perception of non-existence of things, provided that contact between sense organs and things (*indriyārtha sannikarṣa*) is present.

The Bhāṭṭas refute the objection of the Naiyāyikas that sense organs (*indriya*) need to be causes (*hetu*) in the case of the knowledge of non-existence of things (*abhāva grahe*), as the same are assigned to be the means of the knowledge of non-existence of things (*tad anuvidhānāt*). According to them, the sense organs such as the eye are exhausted (*tadupakṣayāt*) by producing the knowledge of the substratum (of non-existence of things) (*āśraya grahe*) as the sense organs are not connected with or comprehensionally related to non-existence of things (*prāpty abhāvena*); and the sense-organs produce the knowledge of only those that are connected with them.

Indriya is not Pramāṇa :

I. vii. 2. It may be argued now that the knowledge of substratum (of non-existence of things) is the operation of sense organ; and therefore, the same organ is not rendered redundant (in the knowledge of non–existence of things) by the knowledge of substratum (of non-existence of things); otherwise, even sense organ would not constitute the cause (of the knowledge of even existence of things), as the same is weakened, i.e. rendered redundant by the comprehensional relation of sense-organs with object. However, this is not correct. The state of being the operation of the sense-organ gets established only upon the establishment of the causality of the sense-organs; however, the causality of the sense-organs by itself is not established due to the absence of any comprehensional relation of the sense-organs with the objects i.e. non-existence of things. From this, even the following argument gets refuted: "That since separate positive and negative concomitances are known between the knowledge of substratum of non-existence of things and the sense organs, both of them have the causality like the staff (rod) and the wheel have the causality (in producing pot)". Since the sense organ does not possess any comprehensional relation (with the non-existence of things), the same cannot produce the knowledge of non-existence of things.

Also it is not correct to argue that the sense-organ, which is assisted by the comprehensional relation of the qualifierness, i.e. the self-linking relation, can produce even the knowledge of non-existence of things not assisted by any other comprehensional relaion. For, then, the comprehensional relation such as the connected inherence would be lost; and also then the sense-organ would be required to produce the knowledge of comprehensionally unrelated staff held by comprehensionally related Caitra; and also the sense-organ produces the knowledge of only those objects which are comprehensionally related with it. Also the qualifierness or the self-linking relation is not the comprehensional relation. For, the same is not assumed to be so elsewhere. Also the qualifierness cannot be assumbed to be present in the inherence; for, the same inherence is not admitted. And also for the same reason that the sense-organ is not admitted to have any comprehensional relation with the non-existence of things, the non-existence of things is beyond senses.

Explanation :

The Bhāṭṭas now refute the argument that the knowledge of the substratum of the non-existence of things (*adhikaraṇa dhī*) is the operation of sense-organ (*indriya vyāpāra*); and also therefore, sense-organ is not rendered redundant (*anyathā siddha*) by the knowledge of substratum of non-existence of things; for, otherwise sense-organ could not constitute the cause of the knowledge of non-existence of things, as the same is weakened by the comprehensional relation of sense organ with object (*sannikarṣo'pa ksīṇatayā*). According to the Bhāṭṭas, the state of being the operation of the sense-organ (*tadvyāpāratva*) gets established in the knowledge of substratum only upon the establishment of the causality of sense organ (*hetutva*); but the causality of sense-organ is not established due to the absence of comprehensional relation of sense-organ with objects (*prāpty abhāva*). Also this refutation of the argument cancells even the argument that "Since separate positive and negative concomitances (*pṛthag anvaya vyatireka*) are known between the knowledge of substratum of non-existence of things and sense-organ (*adhikaraṇendryiyayoḥ*), both of them have the causality' (*hetutva*)". Since the sense organ is devoid of comprehensional relation (*prāptyabhāva*), it cannot produce the knowledge of non-existence of things.

Further, the Bhāṭṭas refute the argument that sense-organ, which is assisted by the comprehensional relation of qualifierness (*prāpta viśeṣaṇa*), can produce even the knowledge of non-existence of things which is not assisted by the comprehensional relation (*aprāpta*). According to them, in that case, the comprehensional relation such as the connected inherence (*samyukta samavāya*) would be lost. Also, then sense-organ would be required to produce the knowledge of even the unrelated staff held by the related Caitra (*prāpta caitragatāprāpta daṇḍa*), as sense-organ needs to produce the knowledge of objects related with it (*prāpta grāhaka*). Further, they note that the qualifierness or self-linking relation (*viśeṣaṇatā*) cannot constitute the comprehension relation (*prāpti*) of sense-organ. Also the qualifierness cannot be assumed to be present in the inherence (*samavāye*), as the same inherence is not admitted by us. And thus, sense organ cannot have any comprehensional relation, with the non-existence of things; and therefore the non-existence is beyond senses (*atīndriya*).

Vedāntin's View :

I. vii. 3. It may be objected now as follows : That since the non-existence of things is to be known only from sense-organ, only the qualifierness, i.e. the self-linking relation needs to be assumed (as the comprehensional relation) here in the perception of the non-existence of things, as other comprehensional relations such as contact are contradictory. And it is like assuming the connected inherence (as the comprehensional relation) in the perception of form etc., as contact is contradictory.

However, we, the Vedāntins, reply here as follows : Since the non-weakened sense-organ is assigned to be the cause there in the case of the perception of the form etc., only the connected inherence is the comprehensional relation. Howevever, here, in the case of the perception of non-existence of things, sense-organ is assumed to be weakened by merely producing the knowledge of the substratum (of non-existence of things) due to the brevity. Therefore, sense-organ need not be assumed to have any other comprehensional relation of qualifierness due to the heaviness. Otherwise, since the skin-organ is assigned to be the means and the preceptual knowledge of wind is possible from the same organ even without the form, the same skin-organ should not be weakened even in producing the knowledge of form constituting the inferential probans of touch.

Moreover, there arises the fault of mutual dependence in the Naiyāyikas' theory that sense-organ-knowability (of non-existence) depends on the presence of the comprehensional relation of the qualifierness, i.e. the self-linking relation, and the comprehensional relation of the qualifierness depends

on the presence of the sense-organ-knowability. Also the qualifierness is nothing but the very nature of the object to be known or the self-linking relation. Also in the case of the (perception of touch from the) skin-organ etc., the self-linking relation is not the cause, i.e. the comrehensional relation; but rather, only the contact and the inherence etc. are so, i.e. the comprehensional relations as they are conducive. Also it is not correct to argue that since the contact and the inherence are mutually deviating, (and hence cannot constitute the comprehensional relations), the invariable concomitance, i.e. the rule needs to be constituted only as that sense-organ produces the knowledge of only that which is comprehensionally related with it. In the case of the examples given above, only the particular comprehensional relation, that is found to be present in the related object, is held to be the cause of perceptual knowledge of object. Therefore, in the case of the perception of things from eye and others too, only the comprehensional relations (such as the contact and the inherence etc.) must be admitted to be the causes. However, mere nature of the object to be known, i.e. the self-linking relation cannot be held to be the cause, i.e. the comperhensional relation (in the perceptual knowledge of non-existence of things). For, the rule is that the comprehensional relation is distinct from what is comprehensionally related. Nothing can be known by the same object through the same self-nature.

Explanation :

The Naiyāyikas now object that since the non-existence of things (*abhāva*) is to be known from sense-organ (*indriya grāhya*), only the qualifierness, i.e. the self-linking relation (*viśeṣaṇatā*) needs to be assumed as the comprehensional relation in the perception of non-existence of things, as the other comprehensional relations such as contact are contradictory. And in the case of the knowledge of form etc., the connected inherence etc. (*samyukta samavāyādi*) are assumed as the comprehension relations, as the other relations, i.e. contact etc., are contradictory.

The Vedāntins, however, refute the objection. According to them, the non-weakened sense-organ (*anupakṣīṇendriya*) is assigned to be the means there in the perception of form etc.; and therefore only the connected inherence is the comprehensional relation (*tathā*) there. However, since the sense-organ is weakened here in the case of the perception of non-existence of things (*iha*), by merely producing the knowledge of the substratum of non-existence of things, the same sense-organ need not be assumed to have any other comprehensional relation of qualifierness (*prāptyantara*). Otherwise, since the skin-organ (*tvak*) is assigned to be the means in the perception of wind, and the knowledge of wind (*vāyudhī*) is perceptible even without form; the same skin-organ need not be weakened even in the perception of form (*sparśaliṅga*).

The Vedāntins note that the fault of mutual dependence arises in the Naiyāyikas' theory, as the sense-organ-knowability (*indriya grāhyatva*) of non-existence of things depends on the presence of the relation of qualifierness (*viśeṣaṇatā*), and the qualifierness depends on the sense-organ-knowability. Also they note that the qualifierness is nothing but the very nature of the object to be known (*grāhya svarūpa*) or the self-linking relation. However, the self-linking relation (*svarūpa sambandha*) is not the cause (*hetu*), i.e. the comprehensional relation in the perception of things from organ; rather, only the contact and the inherence etc. are the relations. The Vedāntins refute the argument that since the contact and the inherence are mutually deviating (*anyo'nya vyabhicāra*), the sense-organ should be ruled in general to produce the knowledge of that which is comprehensionally related with it (*sambaddha*). According to them, since the particular relation is held to be the cause (*hetu*), in the given example, only the particular relations such as the contact and the inherence must be admitted to be the causes in the case of perceptions of things from eye etc. as well. Also, mere nature of the object to be known (*grāhya svarūpa*), i.e. the self-linking relation cannot be the comprehensional relation in the perception of non-existence of things. Here the rule is that the comprehensional relation (*sambandha*) needs to be distinct from what is comprehensionally related (*sambandhin*), as the same object cannot be known by the same object through the same self-nature.

Cakṣurindriya is not the Cause :

I.vii. 4. Morevoer, supposing the self-linking relation is the cause, i.e. the comprehensional relation (of the organs with the knowledge of non-existence of things), then let the knowledge of form etc. too be produced from the same self-linking relation; and therefore what is the need for assuming the inherence etc. as the comprehensional relations? Therefore, since only the contact and the qualifierness, i.e. the self-linking relation need to be the two comprehensional relations, the enumeration of comprehensional relations as six too becomes pointless. From the above refutation, even the following position gets refuted: "That the organ of eye requires the help of light; as the same eye has only the light as its associate cause."

The organ of eye cannot be the cause, i.e. the means of perception without the comprehensional relation. The light produces the knowledge of non-existence of things by comprising of the competency by way of producing the knowledge of the counter postive. This way, it may be argued as follows: That the eye too becomes the cause of the knowledge of the non-existence of things by way of producing the knowledge of the counter positive. For, only this way, the non-perception too is the producer of the knowledge of non-existence of things in the presence of the totality of causes producing the knowledge of non-existence of things which are other than what are pervaded by individual organs. However, this is not correct. Since the eye is not the cause of the knowledge of any thing without the comprehensional relation, the same eye becomes exhausted by the production of the knowledge of the substratum of non-existence of things only. Also it may be argued as follows: That this way when the blue object is known from skin-organ, the blind person would be required to have the knowledge of the non-existence of the blue object through the non-perception of the recollected yellow object. On the other hand, when the non-existence of things is to be known from the sense-organ producing the knowledge of the counter positive, such a problem does not become contingent, as the blind person does not have the sense organ of eye. However, this argument too is not correct. The sense-organ, which is admitted by the Naiyāyikas to be producing the knowledge of non-existence of things, is weakened actuallly by the production of the knowledge of the substratum of the non-existence of things only. Thus, it must be admitted that non-perception produces the knowledge of non-existence of things upon the knowledge of the substratum of the non-existence of things from the sense-organ producing the knowledge of the counter positive. Otherwise, the sense-organ would be required to produce the knowledge of the absence of the waterness in the atoms of water connected with the sense-organ of eye.

Explanation :

The Vedāntins refute the Naiyāyikas' view that the self-linking relation (*svarūpa sambandha*) is the cause, (*hetu*) i.e. the comprehensional relation of the organs with the knowledge of the non-existence of things. According to them, then the knowledge of the form etc. (*rūpādi graha*) too could be produced from the same self-linking relation; and therefore the assumption of the six fold comprehensional relations such as the inherence (*pratyāsatti*) would be useless. And this refutation automatically cancells the view that the organ of eye requires the help of light (*ālokāpekṣaṇe*), in producing perception, as the same has only the light as its associate cause (*tadeka sahakārin*).

According to the Vedāntins, the eye cannot be the means of perception without the comprehensional relation (*prāptim vinā*); and the light, which produces the knowledge of the counter positive (*pratiyogi grāhaka*), can then produce the knowledge of even the non-existence of things (*abhāva grāhaka*) by comprising of the competency (*yogyatā ghaṭaka*). Also the Vedāntins refute the argument that the eye too is the cause of the knowledge of non-existence of things (*hetu*) by way of producing the knowledge of the counter positive (*pratiyogy upalambhaka tvena*); for, even the non-perception (*anupalabdhi*) is the producer of the knowledge of the non-existence of things (*grāhikā*) only

this way in the presence of the totality of causes producing the knowledge of the non-existence of things (*tadupalambhaka sākalye*). According to them, the eye cannot be the cause of the knowledge of anything without the comprehensional relation (*prāptim vinā*); and also the same is exhaused with the production of the knowledge of the substratum of the non-existence of things (*āśraya graha*). Again the Vehāntins refute the argument that when the blue object (*nīla*) is known from the skin-organ (*tvag indriyopanīta*), the blind person would be required to have the knowledge of the non-existence of the blue object (*abhāva graha*), through the non-perception of the recollected yellow object (*smṛtapītā nupalabdhyā*); whereas when the non-existence of things is to be known from the sense-organ producing the knowledge of the counter postive (*pratiyogi grāhkendriya grāhyatve*), the blind need not have the knowledge of the non-existence of the blue object as he does not have the eye. According to them, the sense organ such as the eye (*indriya*), which is admitted to be the producer of the knowledge of the non-existence of thing (*abhāva grāhaka*), is weakenend by the production of the knowledge of the substratum of the non-exitence of things, (*āśraya graha*); and therefore it must be admitted that only the non-perception (*anupalabdhi*) produces the knowledge of the non-existence of things when the sense-organ, producing the knowledge of the counter positive, produces the knowledge of the substratum of the non-existence of things (*āśraya graha*). Otherwise, the eye would be-required to produce the knowledge of the absence of the waterness (*jalatvābhāva*) even as the atoms of the water are connected with eye.

Rūpādy abhāvapratīti is Anupalabdhiliṅgaka :

I. vii. 5. It may be objected by the Naiyāyikas as follows : That this way, the non-existence of form in the wind, the non-existence of bitter taste in the water and the non-existence of fragrance in the rock could not be known from non-perception, as the substrata of non-existences of things such as the wind are not known from the particular sense-organs such as the eye (producing the knowledge of the counter positives). It should not be argued that how are those non-existences of form etc. perceptible even for you, the Naiyāyikas, as the substrata such as the wind are not competent of being known by the particular sense-organs such as the eye. When the wind etc., i.e. the substrata of non-existences of things, are known from the probans or the sense-organs such as the skin-organ etc., the perception, having the non-existence of the competent form etc. as the qualificand, is produced from the eye etc. only; however, the perception, having the wind etc. as the qualificand, is not produced. For, only (the knowledge of) the competent qualificand is the cause of the perception.

However, we, the Vedāntins, reply that this is not correct. The knowledge of the non-existence of form etc in the wind etc. is inferred from the non-perception. And it is like the knowledge of the non-existence of things having the wind as the qualificand such as 'The wind is formless' is inferred by you, i.e. the Naiyāyikas.

Explanation :

The Naiyāyikas now raise the objection that the non-existence of form in the wind (*vāyau rūpābhāva*), the non-existence of bitter taste in the water (*jale tiktābhāva*) etc. cannot be known from the non-perception, as the substrata of such non-existences of things, i.e. the wind etc. cannot be known from the particular sense organs such as the eye etc. that are supposed to produce the knowledge of the counter positive (*pratiyogi grāhaka*). The Naiyāyikas refute the argument of the Vedāntins that they, i.e. the Naiyāyikas, cannot explain the perception of the non-existences of form etc., as the substrata of such non-existences are not competent of being known from the particular sense-organs such as the eye (*tadindriyāyogya*). According to them, when the wind etc. are known from the probans (*liṅgena*) or the sense-organs such as the skin-organ etc. (*tvagādinā*), the perception, having the competent non-existence of form etc. as the qualificand (*yoga rūpādy abhāva viśeṣyaka*), and not having the wind as the qualificand (*vāyvādi viśeṣyaka*), is produced from the eye only, as the knowledge of the competent qualificand (*yogya viśeṣya*) is the cause of perception.

However, the Vedāntins refute the objection. According to them, the knowledge of the non-existence of form etc in the wind etc. (*vāyvādau rūpādy abhāvāpratīti*) is to be inferred from only the non-perception (*anupalabdhi liṅgaka*); and it is like the Naiyāyikas' inference of the knowledge of the non-existence of form having the wind as the qualificand (*vāyu viśeṣyābhāva pratīti*) such as '*nīrūpo vāyuḥ*'.

Objection that Abhāvadhī is Indriyajanyā :

I. vii. 6. The Naiyāyikas may object, i.e. infer now as follows: "That the knowledge of the non-existence of the pot on the ground is to be produced from the sense-organ; for, it is directly perceptible". That is why the qualifierness, i.e. the self-linking relation needs to be assumed as the comprehensional relation of the organs with the knowledge of non-existence of things. It is not correct to argue that the direct sense-perceptiblity, i.e. the probans, is unestablished; for, in the Bhāṭṭas' theory that the non-existence of things is imperceptible, the state of being produced from the unknown means would become untenable. This fact can be explained as follows : That the listener infers that 'Caitra was not existent there inside the temple' through

the non-perception known from the speech of the trustworthy that Caitra, though closely followed inside the temple, was not perceived. Also suppose this way, the knowledge of non-existence (of things) is imperceptible, then the same cannot be produced from the unknown means (such as non-perception); for, the generic property of the imperceptibility is to be known from the known means. And the state of being produced from the known means is intended to mean the state of being produced from the knowledge of the means of knowledge. For, the actual means such as the probans etc. (as opposed to the knowledge of the prbans) are not actually the producers of knowledge of things. Therefore, it must be admitted that the knowledge of non-existence of things has the direct sense-perceptibility, as it is produced from an unknown means. Also, the state of being produced from the sense-organs cannot be an impeding or deviating condition of the perceptibility; for, the same perceptibility is inferred only from the same state of being produced from the sense-organs.

Explanation :

The Naiyāyikas now raise the objection that the knowledge of non-existence of things (*abhāvadhī*) can be infereed to be produced from the sense-orgnas (*indriya janyā*). According to them, the inference 'The knowledge of the non-existence of the pot (*abhāva dhī*) on the ground is to be produced from the sense organs (*indriya janyā*); for, it is directly perceptible (*sākṣāt kāritvāt*)' can establish the state of being produced from the sense-organs. And also, therefore, the qualifiierness, i.e. the self-linking relation (*viśeṣaṇatā*) gets established as the comprehensional relation of the organs with the knowledge of non-existence. The Naiyāyikas refute the argument that the direct sense-perceptibility, i.e. the probans is unestablished (*aprasiddha*). According to them, in the Bhāṭṭas' theory that the knowledge of non-existence is imperceptible (*paro'kṣa*), the state of being produced from the unknown means (*ajñātakaraṇakatva*) would become untenable. The Naiyāyikas explain this fact by stating that the listener infers that 'Caitra was not existent there inside the temple' (*nāsīt tatra caitraḥ*) through the non-perception (*anupalabdhi*) known from the speech of the trustworthy that Caitra, though closely followed inside the temple, was not perceived. Further, the Naiyāyikas state that when the knowledge of non-existence of things(*abhāva dhī*) is imperceptible (*paro'kṣā*), the same cannot be produced from the unknown means (*ajñānta kāraṇikā*), as the generic property of imperceptibility (*paro'kṣatva jāti*) is to be known only from the known means (*jñāta kāraṇa*). And the state of being produced from the known means (*jñāta karaṇa tva*) means the state of being produced from the knowledge of means of knowledge (*jñāna karaṇa tva*), as the actual means such as the probans (*liṅgādeḥ*) are not the producers of knowledge of things. Thus, the Naiyāyikas hold that the

knowledge of non-existence of things has only the direct perceptibility (*sākṣāt kāritva*), as it is produced from an unknown means (*ajñāta karaṇa tva*); and the state of being produced from the sense-organ (*indriya janya tva*) does not constitute the deviating condition of the perceptibility (*upādhi*), as the same perceptibility is to be known from the same state of being produced from the sense-organs.

Establishedment of the Bhāṭṭas' view:

Abhāva jñāna is Paro'kṣa and Anupalabdha

I. vii. 7. No, this position of the Naiyāyikas is not correct. The imperceptibility cannot be a generic property, as it would involve the contingency of cross-connection with the experienceness. Rather, therefore, the imperceptibility is merely the state of being the knowledge different from the perceptual knowledge. Thus, it must be admitted that the knowledge of non-existence of things is only imperceptible like recollection. And this fact can be explained as follows: Just as the verbal cognition etc., dispite being produced from the known means, are not inference; in the same way, the knowledge of substrata of non–existence of things produced from sense-organ, dispite being produced from the unknown means, is not inference and is perceptual; and the knowledge of non-existence of things, which is distinct from the knowledge produced from sense-organ and produced from non-perception of things, is non-perceptual. It should be noted that supposing the knowledge of non-existence of things has the perceptuality due to being produced from unknown means, then the verbal congnition etc. would have the contigency of inferentiality due to being produced from the known means. Supposing you argue that dispite being from known means, effects such as inference (and verbal uognition) differ due to the difference between the means such as the probans (and words) etc, then we shall reply that here in the case of the knowledge of non-existence of things too, the effects differ due to the difference betweens the means such as the unknown non-perception and the known sense-organs. Thus, it must be admitted that the state of being produced from sense-organs is conducive to the perceptuality and the state of not being produced from sense organs is conducive to the imperceptuality. However, it cannot be admitted that the state of being produced from the unknown means and the state of being produced from the known means are conducive to the perceptibility and the imperceptibility respectively due to the heaviness; and also such states are absent in recollection.

Explanation :

The Bhāṭṭas now establish their theory that the knowledge of non-existence of things is imperceptible (*paro'kṣa*) and non-perceptual

(*anupalabdha*). According to them, the imperceptibility (*paro'kṣatva*) is not a generic property (*jāti*), as it is cross-connected (*saṅkara*) with the experienceness (*anubhavatva*). Therefore, it is merely the state of being the knowledge different from the perceptual knowledge (*sākṣātkāra bhinna jñānatva*); and hence the knowledge of non-existence of things (*abhāva jñāna*) is only imperceptible (*paro'kṣa*). The Bhāṭṭas explain the fact that just as the verbal cognition etc. (*śābdādi*), dispite being produced from the known means (*jñāta karaṇa tvepi*), is not inference (*anumiti*); in the same way, the knowledge of substrata of non–existence of things produced from sense-organ (*indriya janya*), dispite being produced from the unknown means (*ajñāta karaṇatvepi*), is perceptual (*sākṣātkārin*); and the knowledge of non-existence of things produced from non-perception (*anupalabdhi janya*) is non-perceptual (*anupalabdha*). The Bhāṭṭas note that the state of being produced from the unknown means (*ajñāta karaṇatva*) cannot be conducive to the perceptuality of knowledge (*sākṣātkāritva*). According to them, then the verbal cognition etc. (*śābdādi*) would have the inferentiality (*anumititva*) due to being produced from the known means (*jñāta karaṇatva*). Also they refute the argument that the effects such as inference and verbal cognition (*anumityādi phala*), dispite being produced from the known means, differ due to the difference between the means such as the probans and the word (*liṅgādi karaṇa bheda*). According to them, here in the case of the knowledge of non-existence of things too, the effects can differ due to the difference between the unknown non-perception (*ajñātānupalabdhi*) and the known sense organ (*karaṇa*). Thus the Bhāṭṭas establish that the state of being produced from sense organs (*indriya janyatva*) and the state of not being produced from sense-organs (*tadajanyatva*) are conducive to the perceptuality (*sākṣāt kāritva*) and the impereceptuality (*paro'kṣatva*) respectively. However, they do not admit that the state of being produced from the unknown means and the state of being produced from the known means (*jñātā jñāta karaṇa janyatva*) are conducive to them.

Refutation of Kusumāñjalīkāra's objection :

I. vii. 8. The Kusumāñjalīkāra may object now as follows : That non-perception is not a separate means of knowledge of non-existence of things. For, only the mind, assisted by the mental experience of existence of things, can be the producer of the exernal experience of things. However, this objection is not correct. The existence, which qualifies the mental experience, is heavy and hence not conducive to the production of external experience from mind. Otherwise, since only the mind, assisted by the sense-organs, can be the producer of the external experience of things, other means of knowledge such as inference would become untenable to be the means of knowledge. Also it should not be argued, i.e. inferred that "This knowledge of non-existence of things is to be established from the mind, assisted by the means producing the knowledge of existence of things; for, it is an external knowledge of non-existence of things, like the knowledge of the non-existence of things produced from probans etc." The non-existence of things is not to be known from the sense-organs; for, it is non-existence of things, like the non-existence of the non-competent thing. Further, the above inference of the Kusumāñjalīkāra involves contradictory counter-inference, viz. "This knowledge of non-existence of things is not to be produced from the sense-organs; for, it is a knowledge of non- existence of things produced from probans etc."

It may be objected now as follows : That the means of knowledge, producing the knowledge of the counterpositive, produces the knowledge of even the non-existence of the same counterpositive like the inference etc. And since the sense-organ is the producer of the knowledge of the counterpositive, the same sense-organ produces the knowledge of even the non-existence of the counterpositive. However, this is not correct. The inference and the word, which produce the knowledge of the existence of things, cannot produce the knowledge of non-existence of things. Also it may be held that the means of knowledge, belonging to the same class of means as that producing the knowledge of counter positive, are the means producing the knowledge of the non-existence of the counterpositive. However, this is not correct. For, such a position involves deviation in the case of analogy. Also it should not be argued that the eyeness etc. exist in the means (eye etc.) producing the knowledge of non-existence of things; for, they are generic properties; however, the analogyness is not a generic property. We have already established the fact that the sense-organs such as eye cannot produce the knowledge of non-existence of things without the comprehensional relation.

Explanation :

The Bhāṭṭas now refute the Kusumāñjalīkāra's objection that non-perception (*anupalabdhi*) is not a separate means of knowledge of non-existence of things (*māna*), as only the mind (*manas*), assited by the mental experience of existence of things (*bhāvabhūta mānasa sahakṛta*), can produce the external experience of things (*bāhyānubhava janaka*). According to them, the existence (*bhāvatva*), the qualifier of mental experience, being heavy, is not conducive to the production of external experience. They note that otherwise, since only the mind, assisted by sense-organs (*indriya sahakṛta*), can produce the external experience of things, other means of knowledge such as inference would not be the means of knowledge (*māna*) at all. Also the Bhāṭṭas refute the argument, i.e. inference of the Kusumāñjalīkāra that 'The knowledge of the non-existence of things (*abhāva jñāna*) is to be established

from the mind (*manas sāddhya*) assisted by the means producing the knowledge of existence of things (*bhāva māna*); for, it is an external knowledge of non-existence of things (*bāhyābhāva jñānatvāt*)'. According to them, the non-existence of things (*abhāva*) is not to be known from the sense-organs (*indriya grāhya*); for, it is the non-existence of things (*abhāvatvāt*). Also they note that the inference of the Kusumāñjalīkāra is invalidated by the contradictory counter inference (*sat pratipakṣa*) that 'This knowledge of non-existence of things (*abhāva buddhi*) is not to be produced from the sense-organs (*nendriya janyā*); for, it is a knowledge of non-existence of things (*abhāva buddhitvāt*)'.

Also the Bhāṭṭas refute the objection that the means of knowledge (*māna*), that produces the knowledge of the counterpositive (*pratiyogi grāhaka*), produces the knowledge of even the non-existence of the same counterpositive (*tadabhāva*); and since the sense organ (*indriya*) is the producer of the knowledge of the counter positive, the same can produce the knowledge of the non-existence of the counterpositive (*abhāva grāhaka*). According to them, the inference and the word (*liṅga śabdayoḥ*), which produce the knowledge of the existence of things (*bhāva grāhakayoḥ*), cannot produce the knowledge of the non-existence of things (*tadabhāva grāhaka*). Also they refute the position that the means of knowledge (*māna*) belonging to the same class of means as that producing the knowledge of the counterpositive (*pratiyogi grāhaka jātīya*) can be the producer of the knowledge of the non-existence of the counter positive (*tathā*). According to them, such a view involves deviation in the case of analogy (*upamāne*). Further, they refute the argument that the eyeness (*cakṣuṣṭva*) etc. exists in the means (eye etc.) producing the knowledge of non-existence of things (*abhāva grāhaka vṛtti*); for, they are the generic properties (*jātitvāt*); and that the analogyness (*upamānatva*) is not a generic property. According to them, the fact that the sense organs such as eye cannot produce the knowledge of non-existence of things (*abhāvā grāhaka*) without the comprehensional relation (*prāptim vinā*) is established already.

Indriya produces Abhāvaviśiṣṭadhī and Anupalabdhi produces Abhāvadhī

I. vii. 9. It may be proposed now as follows : That the illusion of non-existence of things may exist in the existing substratum; and the same illusion is produced from the defect in the means of knowledge. And the recollection of the counter positive, the knowledge of the subsratum and the non-existence are not defective by nature; rather, the sense-organ is defective due to the defect of bile etc. and the same defective organ is the cause of illusion. Therefore, the same sense-organ is the means even in the case of the valid

knowledge of non-existence. However, this position is not correct. The defectiveness of the sense-organ too is merely the association of the defect; and nothing else; and the same association of defect is equally tenable in the non-perception as well. Also it cannot be proposed as follows: That the state of being produced from the sense-organ need to be explained by way of being the illusion not produced from the known means. And the state of being the means of valid knowledge of non-existence of things too can be explained in the sense organ only this way. Thus, what is the need for this wrong creation (assumption) of separate means of non-perception? However, this position cannot be admitted as 'Let it be so'. For, we have already replied, i.e. refuted the position due to the absence of any comprehensional relation of sense-organs with the non-existence. Moreover, when the non-existence of things, dispite being non-proximate, is known from the defect in the organ, the illusion of non–existence of things becomes possible from sense organ, like the illusion 'The rock is fragrant' from the eye. And we, the Bhāṭṭas, have already explained that the valid knowledge of non-existence of things is not produced from the sense-organ due to the lack of comprehensional relation.

It may again be proposed now as follows : That the qualificative knowledge of non-existence of things and its substratum are existent. However, the same qualificative knowledge cannot be produced from sense-organ due to being the knowledge of non-existence; the same cannot be produced from non-perception due to being the knowledge of existence; the same cannot be produced from both the sense organ and non-perception due to the contingency of cross-connection of generic properties; thus, only sense-organ must be admitted to be producing the knowledges of both existence and non-existence. However, we, the Bhāṭṭas, reply that the qualificative knowledge of the substratum as qualified by the non-existence known from non-perception such as 'The ground is the possessor the non-existence of things' is produced only from the sense-organ; and it is like the qualificative knowledge such as 'The sandal wood is frangrant' produced from the organ of eye. However, the knowledge of non-existence of things on the ground known from eye such as 'The pot does not exist on the ground' is produced from the non-perception; and it is like the knowledge such as 'The fragrance exists in the sandal wood' produced from the organ of nose. Some argue here that non-perception cannot be the means of knowledge of non-existence of things due to the absence of any operation; as only that which has the help of an operation is the means. However, this argument too is not correct. The rule is that only that which is related to the action, by excluding non-relation with action, is the means; however, the phrase 'that which has the help of an operation' cannot be the qualifier in the definition of the means due to the heaviness.

Explanation :

The Bhāṭṭas now refute the proposal that the illusion of non-existence (*abhāva bhrama*) occurring in the existing substratum (*bhāva vṛtti*) is produced from the defect in the means (*karaṇa doṣa*); and the recollection of the counter positive, the knowledge of the substratum and the non-existence of things (*pratiyogi smṛty āśraya grahānupalabdhayaḥ*) are not defective by nature; rather, only the sense organ (*indriya*) is defective (*duṣṭa*) by defect of bile etc.; and since the same defective sense organ is the cause of the illusion, the same sense-organ needs to be the means (*māna*) of even the valid knowledge of non-existence of things (*abhāva pramā*). According to them, the defectiveness (*duṣṭatva*) of sense-organs is merely the association of the defect (*doṣasāhitya*) and the same association of defect is quite tenable in the non-perception (*anupalabdhi*) as well. Also the Bhāṭṭas refute the proposal that the state of being produced from the sense-organs (*indriya janyatva*) needs to be admitted by way of being the illusion not produced from the known means (*jñāta karaṇājanya bhrama tvena*); and therefore the state of being the means of valid knowledge of non-existence of things (*abhāva pramā karaṇa tva*) too can be explained in the sense organ only this way; thus there is no need for the wrong assumption of separate means of non-perception. According to them, the sense - organ has already been denied the status of being the means due to the absence of comprehensional relation (*prāpty abhāvāt*) with the non-existence. Further, when the non-existence of things (*abhāve*), dispite being non-proximate (*asannikṛṣṭe*), is known from the defect (*doṣāt upte*), the illusion of things (*bhrama*) is possible from the sense-organ. Thus, the valid knowledge of non-existence of things (*abhāva pramā*) cannot be admitted from the sense-organs due to the absence of comprehensional relation.

Further, the Bhāṭṭas refute the proposal that the qualificative knowledge of non-existence of things and its substratum (*adhi karaṇābhāvayoḥ viśiṣṭa buddhi*) being the knowledge of both existence and non-existence, can be produced neither from sense-organ, nor from non-perception, nor from both; and hence only the sense-organ must be admitted to be producer of the knowledge of both (*ubhaya grāhaka*). According to them, the knowledge of the substratum, qualified by the non-existence known from non-perception (*anupalabdhyupanītā bhāva viśiṣṭa buddhi*) such as '*abhāvavad bhūtalam*', is produced from sense-organ; but the knowledge of non-existence of things on the ground known from the sense-organ (*cakṣur upanīta bhūtale abhāva buddhi*) such as '*bhūtale ghaṭo nāsti*', is produced from the non-perception. Also the Bhāṭṭas refute the argument of some (*yattu*) that the non-perception (*anupalabdhi*) cannot be the means of valid knowledge of non-existence (*pramāṇa*) due to the absence of any operation assisting it (*vyāpārābhāvāt*).

According to them, the rule is that only that which is related to the action (*kriyayā sambandhi*), with the exclusion of non-relation with action (*ayoga vyavacchedena*), is the means of knowledge; and hence the phrase 'that which has the help of operation' (*vyāpāravat*) need not be included in the definition of the means of knowledge.

Naiyāyikas' Refutation of Anupalabdhi:

I. vii. 10. Here we, the Naiyāyikas, state our reply. The knowledge of the substratum (of non-existence of things), produced from the sense-organ producing the knowledge of the counter positive, cannot be the associate cause of the knowledge of non-existence of things; for, in the case of the production of knowledge of the non-existence of things in the past from the other means, the deviation (of the knowledge of the substratum of non-existence of things) arises. Also, the knowledge of form etc. in the wind etc. is produced only from the sense-organ (eye); however, the same is not produced from the means of non-perception, as the non-perception is not known, i.e. is not established earlier. And the speech of the trustworthy that can produce the knowledge of non-perception is absent.

It may be argued now that only the unknown non-perception of the existence of form etc. produces the knowledge of the non-existence of form etc.; and it is like the non-perception of the pot producing the knowledge of non-existence of the pot on the ground. However, then we shall reply that since in your theory, the knowledge of existence of things is beyond the senses, the non-existence of things cannot be known from the non-perception of the competent counterpositive; and the non-perception in general cannot produce the knowledge of non-existence of things. Also it cannot be argued that let the knowledge of existence of things be admitted as competent to be produced from the non-perception. For, such a view would be contraditory to the established conclusion of the Mīmāmsakas. Also even suppose the knowledge is competent to be produced from the non-perception, then too let only the known non-perception be the means in the case of the non-existence of pot belonging to the ground; for, only the existence of the competent pot is possible to be known from non-perception. Thus, enough of discussion regarding the non-perception as a distinct means.

Explanation :

The Naiyāyikas now state their refutation of separate means of non-perception (*anupalabdhi*). According to them, the knowledge of the substratum of non-existence of things (*āśraya graha*), produced from the sense-organ producing the knowledge of the counter positive (*pratiyogi grāhakendriya*), cannot be the associate cause (*hetu*) of the knowledge of the non-existence of things, as the same knowledge of the substratum is deviating in the case of the knowledge of non-existence of things in the past (*prāṅ nāstitā grahe*) from

the other means such as inference. Also the knowledge of the non-existence of form etc. (*rūpādy abhāvadhī*) in the wind etc. (*vāyvādau*) is produced from the sense organ (*eye*) (*indriya janyā*); however, it is not produced from the means such as the non-perception (*anupalabdhi liṅga*), as the non-perception is not known earliar. And the speech of the trust worthy (*āptavākya*), which could have produced the knowledge of non-perception, is absent.

Also the Naiyāyikas refute the argument that only the unknown non-perception of the existence of form etc. (*ajñāta rūpādy upalambhasya anupalabdhi*) produces the knowledge of the non-existence of form etc. (*rūpādyanupalabdhi*). According to them, since in the Mīmāmsakas' thoery, the knowledge of existence of things (*upalambha*) is beyond senses (*atīndriya*), the non-existence of things (*upalambhā bhāva*) cannot be known from the non-perception of the competent counter positive (*yogyānupalabdhi*); and the non-perception in general (*anupalabdhi mātra*) cannot produce the knowledge of non-existence of things (*abhāvāgrāhaka*). Also they refute the argument that the knowledge of the existence of things (*jñāna*) is competent to be produced from the non-perception (*yogya*), as the same view would contradict the established conclusion of the Mīmāmsakas (*apasiddhānta*). Further, even suppose the knowledge of existence of things is competent to be known from non-perception, then too only the known non-perception (*jñātā anupalabdhi*) would be required to be the means (*liṅga*) in the case of the non-existence of the pot belonging to the ground (*bhūtalīya ghaṭābhāve*), as the existence of the competent pot (*yogya ghatopalabdhi*) could be known from the non-perception only. Thus, the Naiyāyikas establish that the non-perception cannot be a distinct means of knowledge of non-existence of things.

Anupalabdhi cannot be Inferred.

I. vii. 11. Now it may be argued as follows : That 'The knowledge of the non-existence of the pot is produced from the unknown means; for, it is being produced without the recollection of the probans etc'. However, this is not correct. Even the knowledge of the non-existence of form etc. in the wind etc. is produced without the recollection of probans etc. Thus, the being produced without the recollection cannot establish the non-perception as means. Also it may be argued as follows : That either the absence of being known as possessing the form or the non-perception of the state of possessing the form inferred from the absence is the probans. However, this too is not correct. The absence of being known as possessing the form is equal to the non-existence of form etc. in the wind etc; and therefore, the same cannot be known. Also suppose the absence of being known as possessing form is perceptible, then let the non-existence of form too be admitted as perceptible in the wind etc. Also the non-existence of things cannot be inferred from (the probans of) the absence of physical and oral activities; for, the same absence of physical and oral activities deviates from the non-existence due to the perception of the knowledge of indifference and the mute or passive dream. Also the absence of activity (instead of absence of physical and oral activities) in general too cannot be admitted as the probans; for, the absence of some activity is always deviating; and the absence of all activities cannot be known (and hence cannot be the probans).

Explanation :

The Naiyāyikas now refute the argument that 'The knowledge of non-existence of pot (*ghaṭābhāva dhī*) is produced from the unknown means (*ajñāta karaṇikā*); for, it is being produced without the recollection of the probans etc. (*liṅgādy anusandhānam vinā jāyamānatvāt*)'. According to them, the knowledge of non-existence of form (*rūpādya bhāva pratīti*) too is produced in the wind etc. without the recollection of probans etc. Thus the same cannot establish the non-perception as the means. Also they refute the argument that either the absence of being known as possessing the form (*rūpādi mattayā jñātatvā bhāva*) or the non-perception of the state of possessing the form inferred from the absence (*tadanumita rūpavattānupalabdhi*) is the probans that can infer the non-existence of form etc. According to them, the absence of being known as possessing the form in the wind etc. (*vāyvādau jñātatvā bhāva*) is equal to the non-existence of form in the wind etc. (*rūpādy abhāva tulya*); and hence the same cannot be known. And even the non-existence of form etc. can be admitted to be perceptible (*pratyakṣa*) in the wind etc. if the absence of being known as possessing the form is perceptible in the wind etc. Also the Naiyāyikas refute the argument that the non-existence of things (*anupalabdhi*) can be inferred from the probans of absence of physical and oral activities (*kāyavāg vyavahārābhāva*). According to them, such a probans of absence of physical and oral activities is deviating (*vyabhicāra*) from the non-existence due to the perception of knowledge of indifference (*upekṣā jñāna*) and the mute dream (*mūka svapna*). Also the absence of activity (*vyavahārābhāva mātra*) in general, instead of the absence of physical and oral activities, cannot be the probans, as the absence of some activity (*kasya cid vyavahārābhāva*) is always deviating, and the absence of all activities (*sarva vyavahārābhāva*) cannot be known at all.

Abhāva is inferred; but Anupalabdhi is not Liṅga :

I. vii. 12. Moreover, let the non-existence of pot etc. on the ground etc. be inferred either from the probans such as the absence of being known as possessing potor from the non-existence inferred from the same absence of being known as possessing pot etc; and thus what is the need for the

assumption of a distict means such as the non-percepion? Also the knowledge of the substratum (of non-existence of things), produced from the sense-organ producing the knowledge of the counter positive, becomes the associate cause of non-perception only in the case where the same non-perception cannot produce the knowledge of the non-existence of things without the help of the same knowledge of the substratum. And such a case of the non-perception (not producing the knowledge of non-existence of things) is never obeserved. Also it should not be argued that such a case of the non-perception not producing the knowledge of non-existence of things is observed in the case of the the non-existence of form etc. in the wind etc.; for, then the non-perception would become unestablished as a separate means.

Also it cannot be argued that the state of being the associate cause can be established in the case of knowledge of the substratum of non-existence of things from the invariable concomitance; for, this way, the knowledge of non-existence of the form etc., being produced in the wind etc. from the non-perception, would imply the knowledge of the substratum of non-existence of things as the cause. Also supposing the knowledge of the non-existence of form etc. does not imply the substratum of non-existence of things, then the knowledge of non-existence of things cannot be produced from the non-perception at all. Also suppose it is held that the knowledge of non-existence of things is not produced from the non-perception, but rather it is produced from the probans, then we shall reply that the same probans needs to be only the non-perception; and such a view has already been refuted. Moreover, the non-perception is not the probans; for, then the inference would be that 'The wind is formless' and not that 'The non-existence of form is present in the wind'. Also it may be asked as to why is the knowledge of the non-existence of pot on the ground possessing the pot not produced in the person having the recollection of the pot from the non-perception of the pot prior to the perception. Suppose you say that it is so due to the absence of pot, then we shall reply that the knowledge of the non-existence (of pot), produced from the object such as the non-existence (of pot), would become only perceptual and produced from sense-organ, as the same is produced from an object. Suppose you argue that only the (existence of) pot there at that time is an impediment to the knowledge of the non-existence of pot, then we shall reply that the non-existence of pot would be the producer of the knowledge of non-existence of pot.

Explanation :

The Naiyāyikas now reject the non-perception (*anupalabdhi*) as a separate means of knowledge. According to them, the non-existence of pot (*abhāva*) on the ground can be inferred either from the probans (*liṅga*) such as the absence of being known as possessing pot (*ghaṭa vattayā jñātatvābhāva*)

or from the non-existence of pot (*anupalabdhi*); and hence there is no need for a separate means such as the non-perception. The Naiyāyikas state that the knowledge of the substratum of non-existence of things (*adhikaraṇa jñāna*), produced from the sense-organ producing the knowledge of the counter positive (*pratiyogi grāhakendriya janya*), becomes the associate cause of the non-perception (*anupalabdhi sahakāri*) only in the case where the non-perception cannot produce the knowledge of non-existence of things (*abhāvadhī*) without the help of the knowledge of the substratum of non-existence of things. Thus such a knowledge of the substratum cannot be the associate cause. Further, the Naiyāyikas refute the argument that the non-perception is observed to be not producing the knowledge of non-existence of things, without the knowledge of the substratum, in the case of the non-existence of form in the wind etc. (*vāyvādau rūpādy abhāve*). According to them, then, the non-perception cannot be established to be a separate means of knowledge (*asiddhi*) at all.

Also they refute the argument that the state of being the associate cause (*sahakāritva*) can be established in the knowledge of the substratum of non-existence of things from the invariable concomitance (*vyāpti balāt*). According to them, then the knowledge of non-existence of form etc. (*rūpādy abhāva pratyaya*), being produced from the non-perception, would be required to imply the knowledge of the substratum of non-existence of things (*tādṛśāśraya*) as the cause; and if it does not imply the same, then the knowledge of non-existence of things cannot be produced from the non-perception (*anupalabdheḥ*). Also, they state that suppose the knowledge of non-existence of things is held to be produced from the probans (*liṅgāt*) and not from the non-perception (*anupalabdhi*), then the probans needs to be only the non-perception; and such an option is untenable. The Naiyāyikas note that the non-perception (*anupalabdhi*) cannot be the probans (*liṅga*). According to them, then the inference would be that 'The wind is formless' (*nīrūpo vāyuḥ*) and not that 'The non-existence of form is in the wind' (*vāyau rūpābhāvaḥ*). Also they ask as to why is the knowledge of non-existence of pot on the ground possessing the pot (*ghaṭavati*) not produced in the person having the recollection of the pot (*ghaṭa smṛtimataḥ*). According to them, suppose it is produced due to the absence of pot, then the knowledge of the non-existence of pot (*abhāva buddhi*), produced from the object such as the non-existence of pot, (*abhāvarūpārtha janyā*), would become only perceptual (*sākṣāt kāriṇī*) and produced from sense-organ (*indriya janyā*). And also the existence of pot (*ghaṭa*) cannot be an impediment to the knowledge of the non-existence of pot, as then the non-existence of pot (*abhāva*) would beome the cause of the knowledge of the non-existence of pot.

Refutation of Reiteration of Anupalabdhi :

I. vii. 13. The non-perception may be reiterated as a means by the Mīmāmsakas as follows : It may be so. However, Caitra, coming out after entering into the house, may be asked by somebody as to 'Whether Maitra was present there in the house'; and then Caitra, pondering over for a while, and understanding the non-existence of Maitra there through the non-perception, may reply that 'Maitra was not present there in the house'. And such an instance of the knowledge of non-existence of Maitra in the past time cannot be the recollection; for, the non-existence of Maitra was not experienced earlier due to the non-remembrance of Maitra earlier at the time of the experience of the house. Since this way, the non-existence of Maitra is experienced through the non-perception even without any operation of sense-organs, only the same non-perception must be admitted to be the cause (the means) of the knowledge of non-existence elsewhere too, as the same is already assumed to be the means. And in support of this view, the Tātparyatīkā (i.1.3) states as follows : "Since mere nature (existence) of the house is perceived, one (Caitra), while being asked by somebody regarding the existence of some one else (Maitra) and remembering mere existence of the object such as the house, may understand only the non-existence (of Maitra)".

However, this reiteration of the non-perception as the means by the Mīmāmsakas is not correct. In the case of the non-existence in the past time, the unknown non-perception cannot be the producer of the knowledge of the non-existence of Maitra like it is not the producer of the non-existence of pot on the ground. For, the house being non-proximate (far off), the non-perception of the competent counter positive is absent at that past time. Also, the known non-perception cannot be the producer of the knowledge of non-existence; for, then the infinite regress (*add infinitum*) would arise. Also the non-perception, being of the form of the non-existence of things, is required to be known from yet another non-perception. Suppose you argue that the non-perception of the existence of Maitra, while being only unknown and in its own nature, produces the knowledge of the non-existence of Maitra, then we shall reply that since in your Mīmāmsakas' theory, the existence of things is beyond the sense-organs, the absence of the existence of things cannot be known from the non-perception of the competent counterpositive.

Explanation :

The Mīmāmsakas now reiterate the non-perception as a means (*anupalabdhi*) as follows : That Caitra, coming out after entering into the house, may be asked by somebody (third person) as to whether Maitra was present there in the house (*tatra maitra āsīt*); and then Caitra, understanding

the non-existence of Maitra there through the non-perception (*anupalabdhyā*), may reply that 'Maitra was not present there in the house' (*nāsīt tatra maitraḥ*). And such a knowledge of the non-existence of Maitra in the past (*prāṅ nāstitā dhī*) is not a mere recollection (*smṛti*), as the non-existence of Maitra (*tadabhāva*) was not experienced due to the non-remembrance of Maitra earlier (*maitrāsmaraṇena*). And since in such a case, the non-existence of Maitra in the house is experienced through the non-perception (*anupalabdhyā*), the same non-perception must be admitted to be the means of knowledge of non-existence of things in other cases as well. And the Tātparyatikā (i.1.3) 'One Caitra, while being asked by somebody (third person) regarding the exitence of some one else (Maitra) (*tatrānyenāstitām pṛṣṭaḥ*), may understand only the the non-existence of Maitra' (*tadaiva pratipadyate*)' supports the view.

However, the Naiyāyikas refute the reiteration of non-perception (*anupalabdhi*) as a means. According to them, in the case of the non-existence in the past time (*prāṅ nāstitāyām*), the unknown non-perception (*ajñātānupalabdhi*) cannot be the producer of the knowledge of the non-existence of Maitra (*abhāva grāhikā*), as the non-perception of the competent counter positive (*yogyānupalabdhi*) is untenable due to the house being far off (*viprakṛṣṭa*). Also, the known non-perception (*jñātā*) cannot be the producer of the knowledge of non-existence, as then the fault of infinite regress (*anavasthā*) would arise. Also since the non-perception is of the form of non-existence of things (*abhāva rūpa*), it is required to be known from another non-perception (*anupalabdhy antara*). Further, the Naiyāyikas refute the argument that the non-perception of the existence of Maitra (*upalambhasyaiva anupalabdhi*), being unknown and in its own nature (*svarūpasatī*), produces the knowledge of non-existence of Maitra (*maitrānupalabdhi*). According to them, the existence of things (*upalambha*) is beyond the senses (*atīndriya*) in the Mīmāmsakas' theory; and hence the absence of exitence of Maitra cannot be known from the non-perception of competent counter positive (*yogyānupalabdhi*).

Abhāva pratīti is tenable from liṅga :

I. vii. 14. Now it may be proposed that in such cases, only the absence of the recollection of the house, which (house) is competent of being recollected as possessing competent Maitra, only as being unknown, is the producer of the knowledge of the non-existence of Maitra in the house. However, this is not correct. Suppose the absence of the recollection of the house in its own nature, i.e. as being unknown, is the cause of the knowledge (of the non-existence of Maitra), then both the doubt regarding the non-existence (of Mitra) and the opposite knowledge of the existence (of Mitra) would need to cease to exist in the presence of the absence of the recollection of the house

as possessing Maitra. And both doubt such as 'Was Maitra present there in the house or not' and the opposite knowledge such as 'Maitra was present there in the house sometimes' are experienced in such cases. It may be suggested now that the doubt and the opposite knowledge of the existence of Maitra are produced from merely the defect. However, it is not correct to argue that only the defects, that corrupt the extra ordinary means of valid knowledge, become the causes of the doubt and the opposite knowledge; and no defect that can corrupt the absence of the recollection of competent Maitra, which is naturally established to be the means, is found to exist. For, only the totality of defects constitutes the defectiveness of the means of knowledge. Nothing, by way of being non-proximate etc.; impedes the means of knowledge of things such as the eye etc.; rather, only the defects, in their own nature, impede the means of knowledge of things like the magical pearls etc. impede the burning power of fire. However, this suggestion is not correct. The non-perception would have the undesired contingency of unestablishment as the means of knowledge, as the knowledge of the non-existence (of Maitra) is possible from the unknown non-recollection of the competent Maitra only. Rather, it must be admitted, therefore, that the non-perception cannot be assumed as a separate means of knowledge, as the knowledge of the non-existence of Maitra is tenable in such cases from the probans such as the non-recollection of the competent Maitra, which is known from the mind and already assumed to be the means of knowledge.

Explanation :

The Naiyāyikas refute the Mīmāmsakas proposal that in such cases, the absence of the recollection of the house (*gehasya smaraṇābhāva*), which (house) is competent of being recollected as possessing competent Maitra (*yogya maitra vattayā smaraṇārha*), only as being unknown, is the producer of the knowledge of the non-existence of Maitra (*maitrābhāva grāhaka*) in the house. According to them, when the absence of the recollection of the house (*smaraṇābhāva*), in its own nature (*svarūpastaḥ*), i.e. as being unknown, is admitted to be the cause of the knowledge of the non-existence of Maitra (*grāhaka*), the doubt regarding the non-existence of Maitra and opposite knowledge of the existence of Maitra (*abhāvasamśaya viparyaya*), such as '*tatrāsīn na vā*' and '*kadācit tatrāsīt*' would become untenable in the presence of the absence of the recollection of the house as possessing Maitra. The Mīmāsakas suggest now that the doubt and the opposite knowledge of the existence of Maitra may be produced from merely the defect (*doṣāt*). Also they refute the argument that only the defects, that corrupt (*dūṣayantaḥ*) the extraordinary means of valid knowledge (*asādhārana pramākaraṇa*), are the causes of doubt etc. (*saṁśayādi hetavaḥ*); and no defect (*dūṣita*) that can corrupt the absence of the recollection of the competent Maitra (*yogyāsmaraṇa*), i.e. the means, is ever established. According to them, only the totality of defects (*doṣasāhitya*) constitutes the defectiveness of the means of knowledge (*karaṇānām duṣṭatā*). Also the non-proximity (*dūratva*) etc. do not impede the means of knowledge such as eye (*cakṣuḥ*); rather, only the defects in their own nature (*svarūpa sat*) impede the means of knowledge (*pratibandhaka*). However, the Naiyāyikas refute the Mīmāsakas' suggestion. According to them, then in that case, the non-perception (*anupalabdhi*) would become unestablished (*asiddhi*), as the knowledge of the non-existence of Maitra (*abhāvadhī*) is quite tenable from the unknown non-recollection of the competent Maitra (*ajñātāt yogyā smaraṇāt*) only. Therefore, the non-perception cannot be assumed to be a separate means of knowledge (*pramāṇāntara*), as the knowledge of non-existence of Maitra is tenable from the probans (*liṅga*) such as the non-recollection of the competent Maitra (*yogyāsmaraṇāt*) which is known from mind and already assumed to be the means (*pramāṇatvena klṛptāt*).

Consclusion : Abhāva jñāna is Pratyakṣa :

I. vii. 15. It may be argued now that the absence of the recollection of the competent (Maitra) is not to be known from mind; for, the comprehensional relation between the sense-organ and the non-existence (of things) is lacking and also the knowledge of the non-existence (of Maitra) is incompetent (to be obtained from senses). However, this arguement is not correct. The qualifierness of what is connected with sense-organ is assumed to be the comprehensional relation (between the the sense-organ and the non-existence of things) after the state of being what is produced from the sense-organ is established (in the knowledge of the non-existence of things) in conformity with the sense-organ; and it is so as the knowledge of the non-existence of form etc. in the wind etc. is non-inferential. And such a knowledge of non-existence of things is perceptual, as the experience such as 'I know the non-existence (of pot)' is not to be produced from the probans etc. And the knownness is not the probans, as such an option has already been refuted. It may be asked (argued) now as to how do you have (explain) the doubt regarding the non-existence of things and the opposite knowledge (of the existence of things).

However, this is not correct. The doubt regaring the inferential knowledge (of the non-existence things) and the opposite inferental knowledge (of the existence of things) are observed from the doubt regarding the probans and the opposite knowledge of the probans respectively. The inference (of the non-existence of Maitra) is valid when the skilful one ascertains the non-recollection (of Maitra), competent of recollection, after the experience of Maitra who is competent of being the object of single knowledge. That is why,

the qualified non-recollection, by ignoring the allready obtained mere non-recollection due to the deviation, becomes established to be the concentration of one desirous of knowing. Otherwise, the concentration would become untanble, as the non-recollection, in its mere nature, is the producer of the knowledge of the non-existence of things. Thus, it must be concluded now that the non-recollection of the competent counter positive (Maitra) is useful merely as being the probans. And the actual syllogism is that 'The house has the non-existence of Maitra at that time; for, it, dispite being recollected as possessing the measure etc. equal to that of Maitra etc., is not being recollected as possessing Maitra; and whatever is so is so; for instance the ground possessing the non-existence of pot'.

Thus ends The theory of invalidity of non-perception in the Perception in the Tattvacintāmaṇi composed by Śrī Gaṅgeśopādhyāya.

Explanation :

Gaṅgeśa now refutes the argument that the absence of the recollection of the competent Maitra (*yogya smaraṇābhāva*) is not to be known from mind, as the comprehensional relation (between the sense-organ and the non-existence of things) is lacking (*pratyasatyabhāvāt*) and also as the knowledge of the non-existence of Maitra is incompetent to be obtained from senses (*jñānasya ayogyatvāt*). According to him, the qualifierness of what is connected with the sense organ (*indriya sambaddha viśeṣaṇatā*) is assumed to be the comprehensional relation (between the sense-organ and the non-existence of things) (*pratyāsatti*) after the state of being what is produced from the sense organ (*tajjanyatve*) is established in conformity with the sense organ (*indriyānu vidhāneva*),; and it is so as the knowledge of the non-existence of form etc. in the wind etc. (*vāyvādau rūpādy abhāva pratīti*) is non-inferential (*alaiṅgika*). Also according to Gaṅgeśa, the knowledge of the non-existence of things (*tajjñāna*) is perceptual (*pratyakṣa*), as the experience (*anubhava*) such as 'I know the non-existence of pot' (*jānāmi*) is not produced from the probans (*liṅgādy ajanya*) and the knowenss (*jñātatā*) does not constitute the probans.

Gaṅgeśa further refutes the argument that the Naiyāyikas cannot explain the doubt regarding the non-existence of things (*abhāve samśaya*) and the opposite knowledge of the existence of things (*viparyaya*). According to him, the doubt regarding the inferential knowledge regarding the non-existence of things (*laiṅgika samśaya*) and the opposite inferential knowledge of existence of things (*viparyaya*) are possible from the doubt regarding the probans (*liṅga saṁśaya*) and the opposite knowledge of the probans (*viparyaya*) only. And the inference of the non-existence of Maitra (*anumiti*) is valid when the skillful person ascertains the non-recollection of Maitra, competent of recollection (*smaraṇārhasyā smaraṇam*) after the experience of Maitra who is competent

of being the object of single knowledge (*eka jñāna viṣayatā yogya*). Therefore, only the qualified non-recollection (*viśiṣṭāsmaraṇa*), by ignoring the mere non-recollection (*asmaraṇamātra*) due to deviation, is admitted to be the concentration (*praṇidhāna*) of one desirous of knowing; and otherwise the concentration would become untenable, as the non-recollection (*asmaraṇa*) in its mere own form (*svarūpasataḥ*) can produce the knowledge of the non-existence of things (*abhāva grāhaka*). Thus, Gaṅgeśa establishes that the non-recollection of the competent counter positive (*yogyāsmaraṇa*) is useful as probans (*liṅga*) only; and the actual syllogism (*prayoga*) could be that 'The house has the non-existence of Maitra at that time (*tad gehaṁ tadā maitrābhāva vat*); for, it, dispite being recollected as possessing the measure etc. equal to that of Maitra etc. (*tattulya parimāṇādi*), is not being recollected as possessing Maitra (*tadvattayāsmaryamāṇāṇa*)'.

The End of the Anupalabdhy aprāmāṇyavāda in the Pratyakṣakhaṇḍa.

I. viii.

Theory of Non-Existence (Abhāva Vādaḥ)

Mīmāmsakas' objection that Abhāva is Bhāvātman :

I. viii. 1. The Mīmāmsakas object here as follows : That non-existence of things is only of the nature of existence of empty substratum (of non-existence of things). Therefore, only the relation such as contact is the comprehensional relation that produces the knowledge of substratum; and consequently, the qualifierness, i.e. the self-linking relation need not be the comprehensional relation producing the knowledge of non-existence of things.

Explanation :

The Mīmāmsakas, who admit non-existence of things (*abhāva*) to be of the nature of empty substratum (*adhikaraṇa svarūpa*) and do not recognize it to be a distinct category, object now as follows : That non-existence of things is merely of the nature of existence of empty substratum (*bhāvātmān*); and therefore, only the relation such as contact (*samyogādi*) is the comprehensional relation producing the knowledge of substratum (*grāhaka*). According to them, thus, the qualifierness (*viśeṣaṇatā*), i.e. the self-linking relation need not be the comprehensional relation producing the knowledge of non-existence of things (*pratyāsatti*).

Prācya Naiyāyikas' Reply :

I. viii. 2. The Prācya Naiyāyikas state their reply here as follows : That the non-contradictory knowledge of non-existence of things such as 'The pot does not exist here on the ground' is indeed found to exist. And such a knowledge of non-existence of things such as the pot cannot be based on the mere substratum such as the ground; for, then the same knowledge would become contingent even in the ground possessing the pot. Also such a knowledge of non-existence of things is not based on empty substratum; for, empty substratum, as distinct from the ground possessing the non-existence of the pot, cannot be admitted. Also you my argue that the being mere ground is the being empty substratum. However, then we, the Prācyas, shall reply that the restatement of the non-existence of things apart from the mere empty

substratum such as 'The ground has the non-existence of the pot' becomes extra or unnecessary. Also in the case of non-difference between the non-existence of things and the empty substratum, the superstratum - and - the substratum relation would become untenable between the non-exitence of things and the empty substratum.

Explanation :

The Prācya Naiyāyikas now reply to the Mīmāmsakas' objection. According to them, the non-contradictory knowledge of non-existence of things (*abādhitā buddhi*) such as 'The pot does not exist here on the ground' (*iha bhūtale ghaṭo nāsti*) is experienced; and hence the non-existence of things needs to be a distinct category from the mere empty substratum. For, such a knowledge of non-existence of things such as the pot cannot be based on the mere substratum such as the ground (*bhūtalālambanā*), as then the same knowledge would be necessary even in the case of the ground possessing the pot (*ghaṭavati*). Also such a knowledge of non-exitence of things cannot be based on the empty substratum (*kevala tadālambanā*), as the empty substratum, as distinct from the ground possessing the non-existence of the pot (*atirikta kaivalya*), cannot be admitted. Also they refute the argument that the being mere ground (*bhūtala*) is the being empty substratum (*kaivalya*). According to them, then the restatement of non-existence of things such as the pot apart from the mere substratum such as the ground, viz. 'The ground has the non-existence of the pot' becomes extra or unnecessary. Also they refute the argument that there is non-difference (*abheda*) between the non-existence of things the and the substratum. According to them, then the superstratum - and - the substratum relationship (*adhārādheya bhāva*) would become untenable between the non-existence of things and the substratum.

Viśeṣa is Abhāvāśraya :

I. viii. 3. It may be argued now as follows : That even the advocate of a distinct non-existence of things, i.e. the Naiyāyika must admit that non-existence of things has a substratum; for, non-existence of things is experienced as delimited by a particular substratum such as ground. Thus, a distinction, which is based on the non-existence of things, necessarily exists in the substratum such as the ground. However, such a distinction cannot be merely the being the ground; for, then the non-existence of the pot would become necessary even in the ground possessing the pot. Also such a distinction cannot be admitted to be merely the being the ground possessing the non-existence of pot; for, then the mutual dependence would become contingent. Also such a distinction cannot be admitted to be only the being the ground possessing the pot; for, then contradiction would arise. (Thus the non-existence

of things cannot be a separate category different from its substratum). However, this argument is not correct. Only the distinct empty substratum such as the ground constitutes the substratum of non-existence of things; and such a distinct empty substratum is not consecutive or generalized. And even the non-consecutive or non-generalized substratum can be the substratum of the single non-existence of the pot, like it can be the substratum of the single counter positive, i.e. pot.

Explanation :

The Mīmāmsakas now argue that the Naiyāyika, advocating a distinct non-existence of things (*adhikābhāva-vādin*), must admit that non-existence of things (*abhāva*) has a substratum (*sāśraya*), as non-existence of things is experienced to be delimited by or invariably connected with a particular substratum such as ground (*deśādi niyamena*). Thus, according to them, a distinction (*viśeṣa*), which is based on the non-existence of things (*abhā vāśraya*), must be admitted to exist in the substratum such as the ground. However, such a distinction cannot be merely the being the ground (*bhūtala mātra*) due to the contingency of the non-existence of the pot in the ground possessing the pot (*ghaṭa vati prasaṅgāt*); also it cannot be merely the ground possessing the non-existence of the pot (*abhāva yukta*) due to the contingency of mutual dependence (*anyonyā śrayāt*); also it cannot be merely the being the ground possessing the pot (*ghaṭavat*) due to the contradiction (*virodhāt*). Thus, non-existence of things cannot be a separate category different from its subsratum. However, the Prācyas refute the argument. According to them, only the distinct empty subsratum (*viśeṣa*) such as the ground constitutes the substratum of non-existence of things (*abhāvāśraya*); and the same need not be consecutive or generalized only (*ananugata*); and such a non-consecutive subsratum too can be the substratum of a single non-existence (*ekāśraya*), like it can be the subsratum of the single counter positive of pot (*ghaṭāśraya*).

Existence and Perception of distinct non-existence of things (*Abhāva*) are tenable :

I. viii. 4. Moreover, suppose you ask as to where does the non-existence of things exist, we shall reply that the non-existence of things exists in the substratumwhere it is perceived to exist. And suppose you ask as to where does the non-existence of things is perceived to exist, we shall reply that it is perceived to exist in the substratum where it exists. Otherwise, one whould not recognize even the existence of the generic property such as the cowness, as the activity towards or usage of the individual cow would be tenable merely from the particular subsratum of the generic property of the cowness only. Also suppose you ask as to in what kind of ground does the non-existence of things such as the pot exist, we shall reply that the non-existence of the things such as the pot exists in the ground possessing the non-existence of the pot; and suppose you ask as to what kind of the ground exists at the time prior to the non-existence of things such as the pot, then we shall reply that the ground possessing the pot exists at that time; and the ground possessing the non-existence of pot exists at the time of the non-existence of pot. However, the intermediate time between the existence of things and the non-existence of things does not exist. Also the knowledge of superstratum - and - substratum-relationship such as 'The pot does not exist here on the ground' exists (and hence non-existence is distinct from substratum). Now you may argue that the ground is not known to be the substratum of the non-existence of things such as the pot; but rather, it is known to be merely the object of the knowledge of the non-existence of things such as the pot. However, then we shall reply that Āh, what a great cleverness in commentating! Even the experience of non-existence of things needs to be proved on the basis of commentary; and the category of non-existence of things such as the pot is described to be merely the empty substratum. The knowledge of the ground (possessing the non-existence of the pot) cannot constitute the knowledge of mere substratum such as the ground; for, the knowledge of the ground possessing the pot too constitutes the knowledge of mere substratum such as the ground.

Here the Mīmāmsakas may argue as follows : That the knowledge of the (substratum such as the) ground possessing the existence of things such as the pot does not constitute the knowledge of mere (substratum such as the) ground; rather, it constitutes the knowledge of both the substratum such as the ground and the superstratum such as the pot; and it is like the deityhood constituting both the Agni and Soma. However, this argument is not correct. For, in that case, the activity towards or usage of mere ground would become untenable from the knowledge of the (substratum such as the) ground possessing the existence of things such as the pot, as the mere ground does not constitute the object of such a knowledge. Also, you may argue that the activity towards or usage of mere ground would be tenable from another immediately arising knowledge referring to the mere ground. However, then we shall reply that the same knowledge referring to the mere ground constitutes the knowledge of mere substratum such as ground; and therefore, the activity towards or usage of non-existence of pot would become necessary in the ground possessing the pot. From this above refutation, the following argument of the Mīmāmsakas too gets refuted: "That a distinction must be admitted between the knowledge produced from the comprehensional relation of sense–organ with the mere ground and also the knowledge produced from the comprehensional relation of sense–organ with the ground possessing the pot.

For, the difference in the totality of causes is invariably connected with the difference in the effect. Thus, merely the ground possessing the non-existence of pot constitutes the meaning of the word 'mere substratum such as ground". For, the activity towards or usage of mere substratum such as ground is possible even from the ground possessing the pot.

Explanation :

The Naiyāyikas now explain as to where non-existence of things (*abhāva*) exists and how is it perceived. According to them, non-existence of things exists where it is perceived to exist (*yatra pratīyeta*) and it is perceived to exist where it exists (*yatrāsti*). Otherwise, even the existence of generic property such as the cowness (*gotvādika*) would not be necessary to recognize, as the activity towards or usage of the individual cow (*vyavahāra*) is possible merely from the particular substratum of the cowness (*āśraya viśeṣa*) such as the cow only. Also they explain that the non-existence of pot (*abhāva*) exists in the ground possessing the non-existence of pot (*abhāvavati*) at the time of non-existence of pot (*abhāva samaye*); and the ground (*bhūtala*) possessing the pot (*ghaṭavat*) exists at the time prior to the non-existence of pot (*abhāva pūrva samaye*), and the ground possessing the non-existence of pot exists at the time of non-existence of pot (*abhāva samaye*); and the intermediate time (*madhya samaya*) between the times of existence and non-existence of things does not exist. Thus, non-existence of things as distinct from substratum must be admitted due to the superstratum - and - substratum- relationship (*ādhārādheya bhāva*). The Naiyāyikas further refute the argument that the ground is not known to be the substratum of non-existence of pot (*abhāvādhāra*); rather, it is known to be merely the object of the knowledge of non-existence of pot (*tanmātra buddhi viṣaya*). According to them, such an argument is merely the cleverness in commentary and the non-existence of things such as the pot cannot be described to be merely the substratum such as the ground - (*tanmātra padārtha*). They explain that the knowledge of the ground possessing the non-existence of the pot (*bhūtala buddhi*) cannot constitute the knowledge of the mere substratum such as the ground (*tanmātra buddhi*); as the knowledge of the ground possessing the pot (*ghaṭavad bhūtala buddhi*) too constitutes the knowledge of the mere substratum such as the ground (*bhūtala buddhi*).

Also the Naiyāyikas refute the argument that the knowledge of the substratum such as the ground (*sā budhi*) possessing the existence of things such as the pot does not constitute the knowledge of the mere substratum such as the ground (*bhūtalasya*); rather, it constitutes the knowledge of both the substratum such as the ground and the superstratum such as the pot (*ghaṭabhūtalayoḥ*). According to them, then the activity towards or usage of

mere ground would become untenable (*bhūtalā vyavahāra*) from the knowledge of the substratum such as the ground possessing the existence of things such as the pot, as the mere ground does not constitute the object of such a knowledge. Also they refute the argument that the activity towards or usage of mere ground can be tenable from another knowledge referring to mere ground (*bhūtalaviṣayaka jñānāntara*). According to them, then the same knowledge referring to the mere ground (*bhūtala buddhi*) would constitute the knowledge of the mere substratum such as the ground (*tanmātra buddhi*); and hence the activity towards or usage of non-existence of pot (*ghaṭābhāva vyavahāra*) would become necessary in the ground possessing the pot (*addeśe*). Further, the Naiyāyikas state that the above refutation of the argument of the Mīmāmsakas cancells automatically the following argument: "That a distinction (*viśeṣa*) must be admitted between the knowledge produced from the comprehensional relation of sense-organ with the mere ground (*bhūtalendriya sannikarṣaja*) and the knowledge produced from the comprehensional relation of sense-organ with the ground possessing the pot (*ghaṭavad bhūtalendriya sannikarṣaja*) due to the difference in the totality of causes (*sāmagrībheda*); and thus mere ground possessing the non-existence of pot constitutes the meaning of the word 'mere substratum such as the ground' (*tanmātra padārtha*)" : According to the Naiyāyikas, the activity towards or usage of mere substratum such as ground (*bhūtala vyavahāra*) is possible even from the ground possessing the pot.

Nāstīti buddhi is the means of Atiriktābhāva :

I. viii. 5. Now it may be argued that the knowledge of the substratum of non-existence of things such as the ground, produced from the counter positive (pot) as well as from the others pervaded by the counterpositive (pot), is the non-existence of things such as the pot. However, this is not correct. Even the knowledge of the substratum of non-existence of things such as the ground, produced from the counter positive (pot), can be produced from what is other than the counter positive (clothing) in the case of the ground possessing the pot. Also it may be argued that the knowledge of the mere empty substratum of non-existence of things such as the ground, produced from mere counter positive (pot), is the non-existence of things such as the pot. However, this too is not correct. For, the meaning of the word 'mere empty substratum' constitutes the non-existence of things in your theory; but the same is not known. Also it may be argued that the knowledge referring to the substratum such as the ground, while not referring to the pot, is the non-existence of things such as the pot. However, this too is not correct. For, we have already replied negatively to such a position. (CF T.C. I. viii. 4). Moreover,

the non-existence of things has its description dependent on the description of the counter positive. However, the knowledge of the substratum (of non-existence of things) is not so. For, the description of the knowledge of the substratum (of the non-existence of things) is tenable even without the discription of the counter positive. It may be argued now that the knowledge of the perceptible counter positive is required for the activity towards (things); whereas nothing is required for the activity towards the non-existence of things, as it is already known. However, this is not correct. Such a position (of the non-existence of things being already known) is never observed, as the activity towards the non-existence of things is dependent on the obtainment (knowledge) of what is to be sought. Supposing the knowledge of mere substratum of non-existence of things, which is dependent on the recollection of the counter positives, constitutes the category of non-existence of things, then the knowledge of mere substratum of non-existence of things in the case of darkness etc. would not be tenable to constitute the non-existence of things. Consequently, one, walking in the darkness etc., could be hurt by the nail etc., as the knowledge of the non-existence of nail etc. would not be tenable without the recollection of its counter positive such as nail. Also water-course or drainage of water would not be tenable dispite the break in the bund in the deserted place; for, the peoples' knowledge of mere substratum of non-existence of things is totally absent at that time. Moreover, the re–emergence of the (lost) pot would become necessary in the case of the loss of the knowledge of mere substratum of non-existence of things such as the pot; for, the non-existence of the non-existence of the pot constitutes the existence of pot. Also suppose you hold that the non-existence of things such as the pot does not constitute a distinct category (from mere substratum of non-existence of things), then how can you explain the knowledge of mere substratum of non-existence of things such as the ground in the case where the knowledge of the substratum such as the ground possessing the pot exists; for, you do not recognize a distinct non-existence (loss) of the pot produced from the fall of hammer. Also suppose you ask as to what constitutes the means of knowledge or proof that establishes the distinct non-existence of things, then we shall reply that only the knowledge of non-existence of things such as 'The pot does not exist on the ground' constitutes the means of knowledge or proof.

Explanation :

The Prācya - naiyāyikas now establish their theory that the knowledge of non-existence of things (*buddhi*) that 'The pot does not exist on the ground' (*nāsti*) is the means of knowledge or proof of distinct non-existence of things (*atiriktābhāva*). They refute the argument that the knowledge of the

substratum of non-existence of things such as the ground (*bhūtala buddhi*), produced from the counter positive (pot) as well as from the others pervaded by the counter positive (pot) (*pratiyogi tadvyāpyetara*), is the non-existence of things such as the pot (*abhāva*). According to them, the knowledge of the substratum of non-existence of things such as the ground, which is produced from the counter positive (pot) (*tajjanitā*), can be produced from even what is other than the counter positive (clothing) (*taditara janitā*) in the case of the ground possessing the pot. Also the Naiyāyikas refute the argument that the knowledge of the mere empty substratum of non-existence of things such as the ground, produced from mere the counter positive (pot) (*tanmātra janitā*), is the non-existence of things such as the pot (*abhāva*). According to them, the meaning of the word 'mere empty substratum' (*mātrārtha*) should constitutes the non-existence of things (*abhāva*) in the Mīmāmsakas' theory; but the same cannot be known. Also they refute the argument that the knowledge referring to the substratum such as the ground (*bhūtala viṣayā*), but not referring to the pot (*ghaṭāviṣayā*), constitute the non-existence of things such as the pot (*abhāva*). According to them, such a position has already been refuted (Cf. T.C. I. viii. 4). The Naiyāyikas state that the non-existence of things (*abhāva*) has its description dependent on the description of the counter positive (*pratiyoginirūpaṇādhīna nirūpaṇa*); but the knowledge of the substratum of non-existence of things (*buddhi*) is not so. According to them, the description of the knowledge of the substratum of non-existence of things (*buddhi nirūpaṇa*) is tenable even without the description of the counter positive (*pratiyogi prakāśa*). Also they refute the argument that the knowledge of the perceptible counterpositive (*dṛśya pratiyogi jñāna*) is required for the activity towards the non-existence of things (*vyavahārārtham*); but nothing is required for the non-existence of things (*abhāva*), as it is already known (*jñāta*). According to them, such a position is untenable, as the activity towards the non-existence of things (*vyavahāra*) is dependent on the knowledge of the obtainment of what is to be sought (*vyavahartavya*). Also the Naiyāyikas refute the argument that mere substratum of non-existence of things (*tanmātradhī*), which is dependent on the recollection of the counter positives (*pratiyogi smaraṇāpekṣā*), constitutes the category of non-existence of things (*abhāva padārthāḥ*). According to them, then the knowledge of mere substratum of non-existence of things (*tanmātra dhī*) in the case of darkness etc. would not be tenable to constitute the non-existence of things (*abhāva*); and consequently one walking in the darkness etc. could be hurt by nail etc., as the knowledge of the non-existence of nail etc. (*kaṇṭakābhāva*) is not tenable without the recollection of the counter positive such as nail. Also water-drainage would not be tenable in the deserted place dispite the break in the

bund, as the peoples' knowledge of mere substratum of non-existence of things (*tanmātra buddhi*) is absent at that time. The Naiyāyikas object that if non-existence of things is the knowledge of mere substratum of non-existence of things, then the reemergence of the lost pot (*ghaṭonmajjana*) would become contingent in the case of the loss of the knowledge of substratum of non-existence of things such as the pot (*tanmātradhī nāśe*), as the non-existence of the non-existence of the pot (*ghaṭābhāvābhāva*) constitutes the existence of the pot (*ghaṭa*). Further, if the non-existence of things (*abhāva*) is not a distinct category (*atirikta*), then the knowledge of mere substratum of non-existence of things such as the pot (*tanmātra dhī*) cannot be explained in the case where the knowledge of the substratum possessing the pot (*ghaṭa saṃsṛṣṭatva buddhi*) exists, as the distinct non-existence of the pot (*atirikta viṣaya*) produced from the fall of hammer is not recognized. Thus on the basis of the knowledge of non-existence of things (*māna*) such as '*ghaṭo nāsti*', a distinct non-existence of things such as the pot (*atiriktābhāva*) apart from the substratum must be admitted.

Prābhākaras' Theory : Bhūtala jñāna is Abhāva :

I. viii. 6. The Naiyāyikas object here as follows : That the activity towards the non-existence of things becomes untenable (in the Mīmāmsakas' theory that the non-existence of things is mere empty substratum of non-existence of things) dut to the mutual dependence of the knowledge of non-existence of things and the knowledge of the empty substratum of non-existence of things. The Prābhākaras, in reply however, state here as follows : That the knowledge of the mere empty substratum such as the ground, which is different from the knowledge of the substratum such as the ground possessing the pot, is the cause of the activity towards the non-existence of things such as the pot. And it is not correct to state that the knowledge of the substratum such as the ground (possessing the pot) would become the non-existence of things such as the pot in the event of the lack of knowledge of the state of being the substratum possessing the pot, with regard to the ground possessing the pot due to the defect. The knowledge of the mere empty substratum such as the ground, which is different from the knowledge of the substratum such as the ground possessing the pot, constitutes the non-existence of things such as the pot; and the illusion of the non-existence of things such as the pot is due to the illusion of the mere empty substratum such as the ground. As a matter of fact, since the knowledge of the substratum, possessing the counter positive, is notestablished in the case of the constant absence, the knowledge of the mere empty substratum, which is different from the knowledge of the substratum possessing the counter positive, is the cause of the activity towards the contradictory non-existence of things. And the knowledge of the non-

contradictory or conforming negation of things (mutual absence) depends on the distinction in nature between the counter positive and the substratum of non-existence of things. Therefore, the knowledge of negation such as 'The ground is not the pot' is tenable dispite the ground being known as possessing the pot. Thus let the same knowledge of the substratum, which constitutes the cause of the knowledge of non-existence of things for others (Naiyāyikas), be admitted as the cause of the activity towards the non-existence of things. And the knowledge of the non-existence of things is not tenable without the knowledge of substratum. However, the knowledge of mere empty substratum such as the ground cannot constitute the cause of the activity towards the non-existence of the things such as the pot; for, then the same activity towards the non-existence of things such as the pot would become contingent even in the case of the substratum such as the ground possessing the pot. The knowledge of the mere empty substratum such as the ground cannot be distinguished from that of the ground possessing pot due to referring to the ground constituting the substratum of the non-existence of things such as the pot; for, dispite the presence of the counter positive such as the pot there in the ground, the knowledge of non-existence, viz. 'The same pot was not present there in the ground earliar' is observed.

Explanation :

The Naiyāyikas raise the objection now that the activity towards the non-existence of things (*abhāva vyavahāra*) becomes untenable in the Mīmāmsakas' theory that non-existence of things is mere substratum of non-existence of things (*abhāvādhikaraṇa*), as the knowledge of non-existence of things and the knowledge of substratum of non-existence of things (*anyo'nyāśyaya*) are mutually dependent. However, the Prābhākaras reply here as follows: That the knowledge of the mere empty substratum such as the ground (*bhūtala buddhi*), which is different from the knowledge of the substratum such as the ground possessing the pot (*ghaṭavad bhūtala buddhi*), is the cause of the activity towards the non-existence of things such as the pot (*abhāva vyavahāra kāraṇa*). Also they refute the argument that the knowledge of the substratum such as the ground possessing the pot (*bhūtala jñāna*) would become the non-existence of things such as the pot (*abhāva*) in the event of the lack of the knowledge of the state of being the substratum possessing the pot (*ghaṭavattvā jñāna*) with regard to the ground possessing the pot (*ghaṭavati*). According to them, only the knowledge of the empty substratum such as the ground (*bhūtala jñāna*), which is different from the knowledge of the substratum such as the ground possessing the pot (*ghaṭavato bhūtasya jñād bhinna*), constitutes the non-existence of things such as the pot (*abhāva*); and the illusion of the non-existence of things such as the pot

(*abhāva bhrama*) is due to the illusion of the substratum such as the ground (*tad bhramāt*). The Prābhākaras note that the knowledge of the substratum, possessing the counter positive (*pratiyogimad adhikaraṇa jñāna*) is not established in the case of the constant absence (*atyantābhāve*), and therefore only the knowledge of the mere empty substratum (*adhikaraṇa jñāna*), which is different from the knowledge of the substratum possessing the counter positive (*pratiyogi maj jñāna bhinna*), needs to be the cause (*kāraṇa*) of the activity towards the contradictory non-existence of things (*vyadhikaraṇābhāva vyavahāre*); and the difference in nature (*svarūpa bheda*) between the counter positive and the substratum of non-existence of things (*pratiyogy adhikaraṇayoḥ*) is the cause of the knowledge of non-contradictory or conforming negation (mutual absence) of things (*samānādhikaraṇa niṣedha pratīti*). According to them, therefore the negation such as 'The ground is not the pot' (*bhūtalam ghaṭo na*) can be possible even in the event of the ground being known as possessing the pot. Thus, the Prābhākaras establish that the same knowledge of the substratum, which constitutes the cause of the knowledge of non-existence of things (*abhāva jñāna kāraṇa*) for the Naiyāyikas, can be admitted to be the cause of the activity towards non-existence of things (*abhāva vyavahāra kāraṇa*). According to them, the knowledge of non-existence of things (*tad buddhi*) is not possible without the knowledge of substratum (*adhikaraṇa buddhi*). However, they note that the knowledge of mere empty substratum such as the ground (*bhūtala buddhi*) cannot be the cause of the activity towards the non-existence of things such as the pot; as then the same activity towards the nonexistence of things would become contingent in the ground possessing the pot (*ghaṭa vati*). Also they note that the knowledge of mere empty substratum such as the ground cannot be distinguished from thatof the ground possessing pot due to reffering to the ground constituting the substratum of non-existence of things such as the pot (*abhāvādhikaraṇa bhūtala viṣaya*); for, the knowledge, viz. 'The same pot was not present in the ground earliar' (*prārṇ nāsīdidam*) is observed dispite the presence of the counter positive pot in the ground at present.

Viśeṣa between Abhāva and Adhikaraṇa is not tenable :

I. viii. 7. Moreover, suppose the non-existence of things such as the pot is the qualifier of the substratum such as the ground, constituting the object of knowledge, then only the knowledge of the non-existence of things such as the pot would become the cause of the knowledge of the substratum such as the ground : However, suppose the same non-existence of things such as the pot is the adventitious qualifier of the same substratum, then no distinction could be maintained between the non-existence of things and the substratum. You, the Naiyāyikas, may hold that the non-perception of the substratum such as the ground as possessing the counter positive, viz. the pot, too constitutes the cause of the knowledge of the mere empty substatum such as the ground. However, this position is not correct. Despite the perception of the substratum such as the ground as possessing the counter positive, viz. the pot, the knowledge of the non-existence such as 'The pot was not present here in the ground earliar' is observed. The distinction between the knowledge of the mere empty substratum such as the ground and the knowledge of the non-existence of things such as the pot is only the distinct nature of the substratum and that of the non-existhece of things. However, the same distinction is not the mutual difference due to the infinite regress and the self (-mutual) dependence. It may also be admitted that the state of being the knowledge of the substratum such as the ground possessing the pot, as compared to the state of being the knoweldge of the mere empty substratum such as the ground, constitutes the contradictory distinction between the same knowledges. Also even in the Naiyāyikas' theory that the non-existence of things is distinct from its substratum, no means could prove the permanent constant absence or mutual difference (between non-existence of things and its substratum). For, when the counter positive is present in mind, the very nature of the substratum can act as the non-overpervassive factor proving the non-distinction of non-existence of things from the substratum. In the case of the presence of the counter positive, in the mind, the substratum can neither be identical with the counter positive nor with the possessor of the counter positive. That is why, you, the Naiyāyikas, can not admit another non-existence in one non-existence. For, the substratum does not have any distinction from non-existence of things.

Explanation :

The Prābhākaras now reply to the Naiyāyikas' question as to what constitutes the cause of the knowledge of the substratum such as the ground. According to them, when the non-existence of things such as the pot (*ahāva*) is the qualifier (*viśeṣaṇa*) of the substratum such as the ground constituting the object of knowledge (*jñāna viṣaya bhūtala*), only the knowledge of non-existence of things such as the pot (*abhāva jñāna*) would constitute the cause of the knowledge of the substratum such as the ground (*tajjñāna*); however, when the same non-existence of things such as the pot is merely an adverntitious qualifier (*upalakṣaṇa*) of the same substratum such as the ground, no distinction can be maintained between the non-existence of things and the substratum. Also the Prābhākaras refute the position of the Naiyāyikas that the non-perception of the substratum such as the ground as possessing the counter positive, viz. pot (*pratiyogimattayā anupalabdhi*) could be the cause of the knowledge of the substratum such as the ground (*kāraṇa*). According

to them, dispite the perception of the mere substratum such as the ground as possessing the counter positive, viz, pot, the knowledge of the non-existence of things such as 'The pot was not present here in the ground earliar' (*prāṅ nāsīt*) is quite tenable. The Prābhākaras observe here that the distinction between the knowledge of non-existence of things such as the pot and the knowledge of the substratum such as the ground (*buddhyoḥ viśeṣa*) is the distinct nature of the non-existence of things such as the pot and that of the substratum such as the ground (*svarūpa viśeṣau*). According to them, however, the same distinction is not the mutual difference (*anyo'nyābhāva*) due to the infinite regress (*anavasthānāt*). Also they admit that the state of being the knowledge of the substratum such as the ground possessing the pot (*ghaṭavad bhūtala jñānatva*), as compared to the state of being the knowledge of mere empty substratum such as the ground (*bhūtala jñānāpekṣayā*), can constitute the contradictory distinction (*vaidharmya bheda*) between the same knowledges. However, in the Naiyāyikas' theory that the non-existence of things is distinct from the substratum, no means (*māna*) could prove the distinction between the non-existence of things and the substratum, as the very nature of substratum (*adhikaraṇa svarūpa*) can act as the non-over pervassive factor proving the non-distinction (*anati prasañjaka*) of non-existence of things. That is why, you, the Naiyāyikas too do not admit another non-existence in one non-existence, as the substratum (*adhikaraṇa*) does not have any distinction from the non-existence of things (*tad vairūpya*).

Buddhi viśeṣa is due to Sāmagrī viśeṣa and Ghaṭavad bhinna bhūtala is Abhāva :

I. viii. 8. It may be argued now as follows : That knowledges differ due to (the difference between their) objects; however, in your Prābhākaras' thoery, the objects, i.e. the non-existence of things and the empty substratum do not differ, i.e. do not have difference. (Thus the knowledge of non-existence of things and that of substratum cannot differ). However, this argument is not correct. The objects are not the causes of difference between the knowledges; rather, distinct totalities of causes produce the distinct knowledges of things like the series of knowledges. As an alternatives, it may be admitted that the mere empty substratum such as the ground, which is distinct from the substratum such as the ground possessing the counter positive, viz. pot, is the non-existence of things such as the pot. Whereas the same ground is the substratum wherein the non-existence of things such as the pot exists in the theory of the others, i.e. the Naiyāyikas. And the so called difference between the non-existence of things and the mere empty substratum is nothing but the very nature of the substratum of non-existence of things. The knowledge of difference is tenable only in the case of the absence of the knowledge of

the non-existence of things such as the pot as being identical with the substratum such as the ground; and therefore, even you, the Naiyāyikas, admit that the difference is characterized by the difference in nature due to the knowledge that 'This empty ground does not become the ground possessing the pot now'. However, the only difference between our theories is that this above non-contradictory knowledge of negation refers to the difference of the form of mutual absence of grounds for you; whereas the same knowledge refers to the very nature of the substratum for us.

It may be argued now as follows : That how can the empty substratum such as the ground, which was indentical with the substratum such as the ground possessing the pot, become different from the substratum such as the ground possessing the pot? However, this is not correct. Even you cannot avoid such a state of difference in the substratum such as the ground after the establishment of the mutual difference on account of the non-contradictory and conforming negation, i.e. mutual absence. And it is equal to both of us that both mutual difference and mutual non-difference (identity) are not contradictory to the substratum at different times. Also suppose the empty substratum such as the ground, which possesses the non-existence of the pot, becomes identical with the substratum such as the ground possessing the pot now, then the usage that 'This ground is the possessor of pot' would become necessary at the empty substratum at that time. And suppose you argue that mutual difference and its absence are tenable in the substratum such as the ground as delimited by the pot and its absence, then we shall reply that you must know that the knowledge of the substratum such as the ground has the nature of mutual diffeence and its absence by way of being delimited by the knowledge of the substratum such as the ground possessing the pot (and its absence). It may be argued now as follows : How are the doubt as to 'Whether the pot exists on the ground or not' and the opposite knowledge as to 'The pot does not exist on the ground' possible?; for, when the counter positive, viz. pot is present in the mind, the knowledges of both the substratum such as the ground possessing the pot and its absence are tenable. However, this is not correct. The state of being different from what possesses the pot and the state of being different from the knowledge of the ground possessing the pot are not ascertained in the substratum such as the ground and also in the knowledge of the substratum such as the ground respectively due to defect. Also it may be asked as to how can the consecutive or common usage of non-existence of things is tenable due to the non-generalization of the nature of the substratum such as the ground and the knowledge of the substratum such as the ground?. However, this is not correct. This difficulty is equal even in the theory of those admitting a distinct non-existence of things.

Explanation :

The Prābhākaras refute the argument now that knowledges (*buddhi*) differ due to their objects (*arthanaiva bhedaḥ*); however, since in their theory, the objects, i.e. the non-existence of things and the empty substratum do not differ, the knowledge of non-existence of things and the knowledge of the substratum cannot differ. According to them, the objects (*artha*) are not the causes of the difference between the knowledges (*jñāna kāraṇa*); rather distinct totalities of causes (*sāmagrī viśeṣa*) produce the distinct knowledge of things (*buddhi viśeṣa*). Also, as an alternative, the Prābhākaras admit that the empty substratum such as the ground (*bhūtala*), which is different from the substratrum such as the ground possessing the pot (*ghaṭavad bhūtala bhinna*), is the non-existence of things such as the pot (*abhāva*); whereas the same ground is admitted to be the substratum of the non-existence of things such as the pot by the Naiyāyikas; and the so called difference (*bheda*) between the non-existence of things and the substratum is nothing but the very nature of the substratum (*svarūpa*). Also they note that the knowledge of the difference (*pratīti*) is tenable only in the case of the absence of knowledge of the non-existence of things (*apratiti*) as being identical with the substratum (*tādātmyena*); and therefore even the Naiyāyikas need to admit that the distinction is characterized by the difference in nature (*svarūpa bheda lakṣaṇa*), as the knowledge is that 'This empty ground does not become the ground possessing the pot now' (*idānīm idam bhūtalam ghaṭavad bhūtalam na bhavati*). Thus, the negation '*idam bhūtalam ghaṭavad bhūtalam na bhavati*' refers to the difference of the form of mutual absence of grounds (*anyo'nyā bhāva bheda*) for the Naiyāyikas; whereas the same refers to the very nature of the substratum (*svarūpa*) for the Prābhākaras.

Also the Prābhākaras refute the argument that the empty substratum such as the ground (*bhūtala*), which was identical with the substratum such as the ground possessing the pot (*ghaṭavad bhūtalābhinna*), cannot become different from the substratum such as the ground possessing the pot (*tadbhinna*). According to them, even the Naiyāyikas cannot avoid such a state of difference (*tathātva*) in the case of the establishment of mutual difference (*anyo'nyābhāva siddhau*) due to the non-contradictory and conforming negation (*abādhita samānādhikaraṇa niṣedha*). Also it is equal to both the Naiyāyikas and the Prābhākaras that mutual difference and mutual non-difference (*bhedā bhedau*) are not contradictory to the single substratum at different times. Also when the substratum such as the ground (*bhūtala*), possessing the non-existence of the pot, becomes identical with the substratum such as the ground possessing the pot (*ghaṭavad bhūtalābhinna*) now, the usage that 'This ground is the possessor of the pot' (*ghaṭavad bhūtala vyavahāra*) would be necessary at the empty substratucm at that time. Further, the Prābhākaras refute that both mutual difference and its absence (*anyo'nyābhāva tadabhāvau*) are not tenable in the ground, as delimited by the pot and its absence (*ghaṭa tadabhāvāvacchedena*). According to them, the knowledge of substratum such as the ground (*bhūtala buddhi*) has the nature of difference and its absence (*svarūpa bheda tadabhāva*) by way of being delimited by the knowledge of the substratum such as the ground possessing the pot (*ghaṭavad bhūtala buddhyavacchedena*) (and its absence) in their theory as well. Also the Prābhākaras refute the argument that the doubt as to 'Whether the pot exists in the ground or not' (*bhūtale ghaṭo'sti na vā*) and the opposite knowledge as to 'The pot does not exist on the ground' (*bhūtale ghaṭo nāsti*) would not be tenable, as the absences of both the substratum and its knowledge (*adhikaraṇasya tajjñānasya cābhāvasya*) are observed. According to them, the state of being different from what possesses the pot (*ghaṭavad bhinnatva*) and the state of being different from the knowledge of the ground possessing the pot (*ghaṭavad bhūtala jñāna bhinnatva*) are not ascertained in the substratum such as the ground (*bhūtale*) and in the knowledge of the substratum such as the ground (*tajjñāne*) respectively due to defect. Also they refute the argument that consecutive usage of the non-existence of things (*anugata vyavahāra*) is not possible due to the non-generalization of the nature of the substratum such as the ground (*bhūtala*) and the knowledge of the substratum such as the ground (*tajjñāna*). According to them, this difficulty is equal even in the theory that non-existence of things (*abhāva*) is distinct from substratum.

Abhāvatva cannot be defined properly :

I. viii. 9. The non-existence-ness cannot be the generic property : For, the same generic property cannot be the pervader of the mutual difference constituting the non-existence-ness. Also the non-existence-ness cannot be the state of being what contradicts the existence; for, the contradiction needs to be described by the non-existence; also the absence of co-existence of both the existence and the non-existence cannot be distinct from the very nature of the substratum. Also it cannot be the counter positiveness described by the existence; for, the counterpositiveness is of the form of being the absence of non-existence; and also the absence of non-existence, i.e. existence does not have the existence as its counterpositive. Also it cannot be the state of having a counter-correlative; for, the inherence and the similarity too have the counter-correlatives. Also it cannot be the state of being the nature belonging to the opposite; for, the same overextends to the knowledge etc. and the word 'nature' cannot be generalized in the sense of ones own form. Also the non-existenceness cannot be the state of being devoid of existence; for, it pertains to the existence only and the state of being devoid (of existence) has the form

of non-existence. Now it may be argued that the non-existenceness constitutes the state of having the constant absence of existence; and the constant absence is known inspite of not knowing the non-existenceness. However, this is not correct. The non-existence is not admitted with respect to (another) non-existence; and even if admitted, it would be admitted with respect to only the non-existence. Also it may be argued that the non-existenceness is the state of being devoid of the knowledge of existence; and the existence is abadoned, in the generic property etc. dispite the knowledge of the same due to contradiction. For, the non-existence is known to be contradictory to the existence. However, this is not correct. The contradictoryness of the non-existence cannot be distinct from the very nature of the empty substratum. Also it cannot be argued that the contradiction is the necessity of the lack of co-existence. Since the lack of co-existence constitutes the absence of the existence, the fault of self-dependence arises. It may be proposed that the non-existenceness is the distinction (lit the being dinstinct) from the existence. However, this is not correct. If the distinction is of the form of mutual difference from the self nature of substratum, then the said fault of self-dependence becomes contingent. The distinction from the existence needs to be thought over; and the state of being antecedent non-existence etc. needs to be described by the non-existence etc. Also suppose the distinction is admitted, then the lack of generalization of non-existences would be contingent even in the Naiyāyikas' theory of admitting a distinct non-existence. Therefore what is the need for admitting a distinct non-existence?. Now it may be argued that let then the usage of the existence of pot too be admitted on account of the particular self-nature of the substratum only (and distinct existence need not be admitted). However, this is not correct. The existence of the pot as distinct from the substratum such as the ground is experienced; and hence is necessary. Also it may be argued now that only a single non-existence (of pot) continues and hence is consecutive in all the cases. However, this is not correct. Since such a non-existence (of the pot) is eternal, the usage of non-existence (of the pot) would become contingent even at the time of presence of the counter positive (pot); also further the analysis (division) of non-existence as antecedent absence etc. would become contradictory.

Explanation :

The Prābhākaras now object that a distinct non-existence of things (*abhāva*) cannot be admitted as the non-existenceness (*abhāva tva*) cannot be defined properly. According to them, the non-existenceness cannot be the generic property (*sāmānya*), as the same cannot be the pervader of the mutual difference constituting the non-existenceness (*abhāvatva gatānyo'nyābhā vyāpaka*). Also it cannot be the state of being what contradicts the existence

(*bhāva virodhitva*), as the contradiction needs to be described by the non-existence (*abhāva nirūpya*); and the absence of co-existence (*sahāvasthānā bhāva*) of existence and non-existence (*bhāvābhāvayoḥ*) cannot be distinct from the very nature of the substratum (*svarūpānatirekāt*). The Prābhākaras state that it cannot be the counter positiveness described by the existence (*bhāva pratiyogitva*), as the counter positiveness is of the form of being the absence of non-existence (*abhāva viraha rūpatvāt*); also it cannot be the state of having a counter correlative (*sapratiyogitva*), as the inherence and the similarity (*samavāya sādṛśyādi*) too have counter correlatives. Also the non-existenceness cannot be the state of being the nature belonging to the opposite (*parakīya svabhāvatva*), as the same overextends to even the knowledge etc. (*jñānādi gata*). Also it cannot be the state of being devoid of existence (*sattā śūnyatva*), as it has the form of non-existence (*abhāva-rūpa*). The Prābhākaras refute the argument that the non-existenceness is the state of having the constant absence of existence (*sattātyantābhāvatva*), and the constant absence is known despite not knowing the non-existenceness (*abhāvatvānavagatau*), as the non-existence cannot be admitted with respect to another non-existence (*abhāve abhāvānabhyupagamāt*). Also they refute the argument that the non-existenceness is the state of being devoid of the knowledge of existence (*sattābodha vidhuratva*), and the existence (*sattā*) is abandoned in the generic property etc. (*sāmānyādau*) due to the contradiction of the non-existence to the existence. According to them, the contradictoryness of non-existence (*virodhitva*) cannot be abandoned as it is not distinct from the very nature of the empty substratum (*svarūpānatirekāt*). Also they refute that the contradiction is the necessity of the lack of co–existence (*sahānavasthāna niyama*). According to them, then the fault of self-dependence (*ātmāśraya*) arises due to the lack of co-existence (*anavasthāna*) constituting the absence of existence together (*avasthānābhāva*). Also the Prābhākaras refute the proposal that the non-existence is the distinction (lit the being distinct) from the existence (*bhāva bhinnatva*). According to them, when the distinction is the mutual difference from the self-nature of substratum (*svarūpānyo' nyābhāva*), the fault of self-dependence arises and the state of being the antecedent non-existence etc. (*prāgabhāvatvādi*) need to be described by the non-existence (*abhāva nirūpya*). Also, suppose the distinction is admitted, then the lack of generalization of non-existences would become contingent. Also they refute the argument that then the usage of existence of pot (*ghaṭa vyavahāra*) too would be required to be admitted from the particular self-nature of substratum (*svarūpa viśeṣa*) and a distinct existence need not be admitted. According to them, the existence of pot as distinct from the substratum such as the ground (*bhūtala vilakṣaṇa*) is experienced and hence is necessary. Also

they refute that a single non-existence (*eka abhāva*) which is continous and hence common to all cases (*anugata*) can be admitted. According to them, then the usage of non-existence of the pot (*abhāva vyavahāra*) would become contingent even at the time of the presence of the counter positive, viz. pot (*pratiyogi kāla*), as the non-existence is eternal (*nitya*). Thus, there is no need to admit a separate non-existence apart from empty substratum.

Establishment of Pūrvapakṣa :

I. viii. 10. As an alternative, it should be noted that even the Naiyāyika, who advocates a distinct non-existence of things, needs to admit that the particular consecutive knowledge of the substratum such as the ground is the cause of the knowledge of non-existence of things such as the pot; and therefore, it is better, i.e. justified that only the same knowledge of the substratum such as the ground is both the object of knowledge of non-existence of things and the means of the knowledge of non-existence of things, as the knowledges are intrinsically manifested by the totality of causes of themselves. It may be objected now as follows : That suppose the knowledge of the mere empty substratum such as the ground constitutes the non-existence of things such as the pot, then the knowledge of the counter positive such as the pot would not be required for the knowledge of the non-existence of things as the same knowledge of the empty substratum such as the ground is intrinsically mainfested by the totality of causes of itself. However, this is not correct. The knowledge of the counter positive such as the pot is required only for the usage of the non-exitence of things such as the pot; but not for the knowledge of the non-existence of things such as the pot. Also it may be argued that only in the case of the desire for the knowledge of the non-existence of things such as the pot, the knowledge of the extra, i.e. the counter positive such as the pot is required for the usage of the non-existence of things such as the pot. However, this is not correct. It is observed that (regardless of the desire for the knowledge of non-existence of things such as the pot), the knowledge for the extra, i.e. the counter positive such as the pot is required for the usage of the non-existence of things such as the pot, like the knowledge of the measure is required for the usage of the length. For instance, the measure such as the extension of hand, as delimited by more number, is the measure of length; and the opposite of such a measure is the measure of shortness. And such a measure of hand is experienced at the same time as that of the knowledge of the whole body. The designation of the length of hand requires the knowledge of measure, such as the hand-measure as delimited by less number etc. It should be noted that in our Mīmāmsakas' theory that the knowledge of mere empty substratum such as the ground constitutes the

non-existence of things such as the pot, even the desire for knowing the subtle elements such as the hair and the germs is useful, for obtaining the perceptibility, as the usage of the non-existence of things such as the pot requires the knowledge of the perceptible counter positive, viz. pot. It should not be objected that when the knowledge of mere empty substratum such as the ground constitutes the non-existence of things such as the pot, the re-emergence of the existence of things such as the pot would become contingent at the loss of the knowledge of the substratum such as the ground or at the absence of the non-existence of things such as the pot. The absence of the knowledge of the mere empty substratum such as the ground too constitutes merely another knowledge of mere empty substratum (and not the actual loss), like the non-existence of things such as the pot constitutes the knowledge of mere empty substratum such as the ground (and hence there is no contingency of re-emergence of the lost pot). Also it should be noted that the water-leakage is not untenable in the case of the breach in the bund in a deserted place; for, despite the non-existence of people there in the descerted place, the knowledge of the birds and other beings, regarding the breach in the bund, is possible. Now it may be objected as follows : That in the case of the liberation, i.e. non-existence of illusion, no justified means can exist in the pervasion of another person. However, this is not correct. The cause, i.e. the knowledge of the substratum of non-existence of illusion such as the person is assumed on account of the effect, i.e. the usage of the non-existence of illusion. Also, the rebirth would not become contingent at the loss of the knowledge of the substratum of non-existence of illusion, as the continous series of the knowledge of the same illusion is present. Also, the liberation of all the people would not become contingent, at the loss of the knowledge of the substratum of non-existence of illusion, as there is no justified means. Thus, everything is fine in the theory of the Prābhākaras that the nature of the empty substratum of the non-existence of things, which is different from the substratum possessing the counter positive, is the non-existence of things. Thus ends the Prima facie view.

Explanation :

The Prābhākaras now establish their prima facie view (*pūrvapakṣa*) that the nature of the empty substratum which is different from the substratum possessing the counter positive (*pratiyogi mad adhikaraṇa bhinnādhikaraṇa svarūpa*) is the non-existence of things (*abhāva*). According to them, even the Naiyāyika advocating a distinct non-existence of things (*abhāva vādin*) needs to admit that the particular consecutive knowledge of the substratum such as the ground (*anugatobhūtala buddhi viśeṣa*) is the cause of the knowledge of non-existence of things such as the pot (*abhāva jñāna kāraṇa*); and

therefore, the same knowledge of the empty substratum such as the ground is both the object of the knowledge of non-existence of things (*prameya*) and the means of the knowledge of non-existence of things (*pramāṇa*) due to the intrinsic manifestability (*svaprakāśatva*) of knowledges. The Prābhākaras refute the objection that when the knowledge of the mere empty substratum such as the ground (*tanmātra buddhi*) constitutes the non-existence of things such as the pot (*abhāvatve*), the expectancy for the knowledge of counter positive such as the pot (*pratiyogi jñānāpekṣā*) would not be necessary, as the same knowledge of substratum such as the ground is intrinsically manifested by the totality of causes itself (*svataḥ prakāśa*). According to them, the knowledge of the counter positive such as the pot is required for only the usage of the non-existence of things such as the pot (*vyavahāra*) and not for the knowledge of the non-existence of things (*na grahaṇāya*). Also they refute the argument that only in the case of the desire for the knowledge of non-exitence of things such as the pot (*jñānasya icchāyām*), the knowledge of the extra, i.e. counter positive such as the pot (*adhikāpekṣā*) is required for the usage of the non-existence of things such as the pot (*vyavahārārtham*). According to them, the knowledge of the extra, i.e. counter positive such as the pot is required for the usage of the non-existence of things such as the pot (*vyavahārārtham*) regardless of the desire for the knowledge of the same. The Mīmāmsakas note that in their theory that the knowledge of mere empty substratum such as the ground (*tanmātra buddhi*) is the non-existence of things such as the pot (*abhāva*), even the desire for knowing the subtle elements such as the hair and the germs (*keśakīṭādi sūkṣma jijñāsā*) is useful for the perceptibility (*dṛśyatā*), as the usage of the non-exitence of things such as the pot requires the knowledge of the perceptible counter positive such as the pot (*dṛśya pratiyogi jñānāpekṣa*). Also they refute the objection that in their theory of the knowledge of mere empty subtratum such as the ground constituting the non-exitence of things such as the pot (*tanmātra buddher abhāvatve*), the re-emergence of the existence of things such as the pot (*bhāvonmajjana*) would become necessary at the loss of the knowledge of the substratum such as the ground (*tad vināśe*) or at the absence of non-existence of things such as the pot (*abhāvā bhāve*). According to them, the absence of the knowledge of mere empty substratum such as the ground (*buddhy abhāva*), constitutes another knowledge of substratum (*buddhy antara*), like the non-existence of things such as the pot (*ghaṭābhāva*) constitutes the knowledge of mere empty substratum such as the ground (*buddhi*). They further note that the water leakage (*jala nissaraṇa*) is not untenable in the case of the breach in the bund (*bandha viccheda*) in a deserted place, as the knowledge of the birds etc. regarding the breach is possible despite the non-existence of people there. Also,

the Mīmāmasakas refute the objection that no justified means (*pramāṇa*) exists in the pervasion of another person (*puruṣāntara*) in the case of the liberation, i.e. the non-existence of illusion (*mokṣe*). According to them, the cause, i.e. the knowledge of the substratum of non-existence of illusion such as the person (*kāraṇa*) is assumed on account of the effect, i.e. the usage of the non-existence of illusion (*kārya*). Also, the rebirth (*samsāritā*) is not contingent at the loss of the knowledge of the substratum of non-existence of illusion (*buddhi nāśe*), as the continuous series of the knowledge of the same illusion (*buddhi dhārā*) is present; and also the liberation of all beings (*sarva mukti*) would not become contingent due to the absence of the justified means. Thus, the nature of the empty substratum different from the substratum possessing the counter positive (*pratiyogimad adhikaraṇa*) gets established to be the non-existence of things (*abhāva*).

Naiyāyikas' Siddhānta :

I. viii. 11. The conclusive view of the Naiyāyikas is as follows : That only a distinct non-existence of things, which refers to a counter positive, is experienced. For instance, the experience is such as 'This is not pot' and 'This is not clothing' etc. However, mere empty substratum of non-existence of things is never experienced. Therefore, counter positive is to be known from the knowledge of non-existence of things. And experience proves that knowledge of the non-existence of things is dependent on the knowledge of the counter positive, like the similarity of cow. And mere empty substratum or knowledge of mere empty substratum does not constitute non-existence of things; for, the knowledge of mere empty substratum is possible even without the knowledge of counter positive and also the counter positive does not become the object in the knowledge of mere empty substratum. And also suppose non-existence of things is not admitted to refer to a counter positive, then you must answer as to whose counter positive does pot constitute? Now it may be objected as follows : That the mere empty substratum or the knowledge of the mere empty substratum constitutes the non-existence of things; and the same does not refer to any counter positive. However, it should be noted that the usage of non-existence of things such as the pot requires the knowledge of the counter positive such as the pot; and therefore, the counter positive, i.e. the pot constitutes the object of the usage of non-existence of things such as the pot, as the usage of the counter positive pot and the usage of the non-existence of pot are mutually contradictory. However, this objection is not correct. The pot is experienced to be the counter positive of only the non-existence of the pot such as 'The pot does not exist here'; however, the same pot is not experienced to be the counter positive of the usage of non-

existence of the pot, which comes into being after the knowledge of the non-existence of the pot; for, the same pot is not known at the time of the experience of the non-existence of the pot. Also it may be objected that the counter positive, i.e. the pot is used or dealt (to be non-existent); but it is not experienced (to be non-existent). However, this is not correct. Such a usage of the non-existence of the pot is not tenable without the knowledge of non-existence of the pot. Also it is not justified to hold that the knowledge of the counter positive such as the pot is required for the usage of the non-existence of the pot. In the presence of the desire for the knowledge of what is to be used as non-existent, the expectancy for the knowledge of the more, i.e. the counter positive such as the pot is never seen for the sake of the usage of the non-existence of the pot. It may be argued now that the expectancy for the knowledge of the more, i.e. the counter positive pot is assumed here in the case of the usage of the non-existence of the pot due to the brevity; however, the same is not assumed in the case of the knowledge of the non-existence of the pot. However, this too is not correct. Such a causality of the knowledge of more, i.e. counter positive such as the pot is not ascertained in the case of the usage of the non-existence of things in general; and such a causality of the same in the case of the usage of non-existence of things in particular is not consecutive or common.

Explanation :

Gaṅgeśa now states the Naiyāyikas' conclusive view (*siddhānta*) that only a distinct non-existence of things (*abhāva*) as referring to a counter positive (*sapratiyogika*) is experienced. According to them, the experience (*anubhava*) of non-existence is always referring to a counter positive such as 'This is not a pot' (*ghaṭo na*) and 'This is not a clothing' (*paṭo na*); and never refers to mere non-existence of things (*tanmātra*). Therefore, counter positive needs to be known from the knowledge of non-existence of things (*abhāva vitti vedya*) only. Further, the experience proves that the knowledge of non-existence of things is dependent on the knowledge of counter positive (*pratiyogi jñānādhīna*). Further, the Naiyāyikas state that mere empty substratum (*kevalam adhikaraṇam*) or the knowledge of mere empty substratum (*tajjñāna*) cannot constitute non-existence of things (*abhāva*). According to them, knowledge of mere empty substratum is possible even without the knowledge of counter positive; and hence counter positive is not the object of knowledge of mere empty substratum (*aviṣaya*). They note that when the non-existence of things such as the pot is not admitted to refer to a counter positive (*sapratiyogika*), the pot cannot be proved to be the counter positive (*pratiyogin*). The Naiyāyikas refute the objection that mere empty substratum (*adhikaraṇa*) or knowledge of mere empty substratum (*tajjñāna*) constitutes the non-existence of things (*abhāva*) and the same does not refer to any counter positive (*apratiyogika*); however, the usage of non-existence of things (*abhāva vyavahāra*) such as the pot requires the knowledge of the counter positive (*pratiyogi jñāna*) such as the pot; and therefore, the counter positive pot (*ghaṭa*) can constitute the object of the usage of non-existence of things such as the pot, as the usage of the counter positive pot and that of the non-existence of pot (*ghaṭa tadabhāva vyavahārayoḥ*) are mutually contradictory. According to them, the pot is experienced to be the counter positive of the non-existence of pot such as 'The pot does not exist here' (*iha ghaṭo nāsti*); however, it is not experienced to be the counter positive of the usage of non-existence of the pot, which comes into being after the knowledge of non-existence of pot (*abhāva jñānā nantara bhāvin*), as the pot is not known to be the counter positive at the time of the experience of non-existence of the pot (*abhāvānubhava samaye*). Also the Naiyāyikas refute the objection that the counter positive pot is usedor dealt to be non-existent (*vyava hriyate' sau*), but it is not experienced to be non-existent (*anubhūyate'sau*). According to them, such a usage of non-existence of the pot (*tathā vyavahāra*) is not tenable without such a knowledge of non-existence of the pot (*tadṛśānubhava*). Also they refute the position that the knowledge of the counter positive pot (*pratiyogi jñāna*) is required for the usage of the non-existence of the pot (*vyavahāre*). According to them, the knowledge of the more, i.e. the counter positive pot (*adhika*) is never required for the usage of the non-existene of the pot, when the knowledge of what is to be used (*vyavahartavya jñāna*) is present. Also the Naiyāyikas refute the argument that the expectancy for the knowledge of more, i.e. the counter positive pot is assumed here (*iha*) in the case of the usage of the non-existence of the pot; but the same is not assumed in the case of the knowledge of the non-existence of the pot (*abhāve*). According to them, such a causality of the knowledge of the counter positive pot (*tathā kāraṇatva*) cannot be ascertained in the usage of the non-existence of things in general (*vyavahāra mātre*); and such a causality in the case of the usage of non-existence of things in particular (*vyavahāra viśeṣa*) is non-consecutive (*ananugata*).

Hṛsvatvadīrghatve in particular are different :

I. viii. 12. The shortness and the longness are particular measures and are distinct from measure in general. Even you, the Mīmāṃsakas, must admit that the shortness of measure is the state of being what is delimited, i.e. measured by the hand delimited in turn by more and less numbers; whereas the longness of measure is the knowledge of measure dependent on the knowledge of long and short measures. Therefore, dispite the experience of

the measure in general simultaneously together with the substance, the usage of measure in particular as long or short is not tenable due to the non-experience of the same measure in particular. Also the similarity of an animal with the cow, as pertaining to the Gavaya (Bos Gavaeus) in general, is experienced in general simultaneosly together with the knowledge of the Gavaya; however, the similarity of an animal with the cow in particular, as pertaining to the Gavaya, while pertaining to the cow is known as dependent on the knowledge of the cow. Therefore, the usage of the similarity of the Gavaya with the cow is not tenable at the time of the knowledge of the Gavaya.

Explanation :

The Naiyāyikas further explain that the shortness and the longness (*hṛsvatva dīrghatve*) are particular measures and are distinct from measure in general (*parimāṇāntare*). According to them, the shortness (*hṛsvatva*) of measure is the state of being what is delimited, i.e. measured by the hand etc. delimited in turn by more and less numbers (*alpādhika saṅkhyāvacchinna hastādyava cchedyatva*); and the longness of measure (*dīrghatva*) is the knowledge of measure which is dependent on the knowledge of long and short measures (*alpādhikāvadhi jñānādhīna jñāna*). Thus, the usage of measure in particular as long or short is not tenable dispite the experience of measure in general simultaneously together with substance. Also the Naiyāyikas explain that the similarity of an animal with the cow (*gosādṛśya*), as pertaining to the Gavaya (Bos Gavaeus) (*gavaya gata*) in general, may be expereinced in general simultaneously with the Gavaya (*tajjñāna samakālam*); however, the similarity of an animal with the cow (*gosādṛśyatva*) in particular, as pertaining to the Gavaya while pertaining to the cow, is dependent on the knowledge of the cow (*gojñānādhīna jñāta*). Thus, according to them, the usage of the similarity of the Gavaya with the cow (*sādṛśya vyavahāra*) is not tenable at the time of the knowlede of Gavaya.

Bhūtala does not constitute basis of ghaṭābhāva :

I. viii. 13. It might be so. However, the use of the word 'non-existence' is established in every one's theory sometimes on account of the knowledge of something. In such cases, only the empty substratum such as the ground constitutes the basis of the usage of the word 'non-existence of the pot'; for, nothing except the empty substratum, unlike the counter positive pot, is manifested in the knowledge of non-existence. Therefore, only that empty substratum, on the basis of which something becomes the object of the use of the word 'non-existence', would be admitted to be the non-existence of the pot. And the state of being the object of the use of the word 'non-existence', produced from the knowledge of the same, constitutes the comprehensional

relation of the form of being the counter positive and the relational subjunct between the pot and he ground. That is why the ground has the counter positive pot; for, the ground cannot be the object of the use of the word 'non-existence' without the knowledge of the counter positive by way of being the object of the use of the word 'non-existence' produced from the knowledge of the counter positive. And the knowledge of the analysis of the word 'non-existence of pot' too is produced from the same condition of being the object of the use of the word 'non-existence'. However, this objection is not correct. The empty substratum such as the ground is not the basis of the use of the word 'non-existence of pot'. For, the knowledge and the usage such as 'The substratum such as the ground is the non-existence of the pot' are lacking. Rather, only the knowledge and the usage such as 'The non-existence of pot exists on the ground' are found like 'The pot exists on the ground'. The knowledge and the usage such as 'The pot does not exist on the ground' reveal the non-existence of the pot as distinct from the substratum such as the ground. Moreover, it must be conceeded that the state of being the non-existence of the pot of the ground is the state of being the object of the use of the word 'non-existence of pot' produced from the knowledge of the pot. Therefore, the substratum such as the ground becomes the object of the use of the word 'non-existence of the pot' only when it is known to be the non-existence of the pot; and the same ground becomes the non-existence of the pot only when it is known to be the object of the use of the word 'non-existence of the pot'; and thus the the mutual dependece becomes contingent. For, the use of a word is ruled to be made only when the cause of the use of the word is known. And the state of being the non-existence of the pot is the cause of the use of the word 'non-existence of pot'. Supposing the substratum such as the ground has the counter positive, then the same would not appear to be non-existence merely without counter Positive like the similarity. Also it may be argued that the substratum such as the ground has the counter positive only at the time of the use of the word 'non-existence of the pot' and not otherwise, However, then it would follow that the ground becomes the object of the use of the word 'non-existence of the pot', produced from the knowledge of the counter positive, only when it has the state of having the counter positive and it would have the state of having the counter positive only when it has the state of being the object of the use of the word 'non-existence of Pot'; and thus the mutual dependence becomes contingent. For, the mere empty substratum such as the ground does not have the counter positive. Thus, this way, the state of being the object of the use of the word 'similarity with the cow', produced from the knowledge of the cow, be admitted as 'the similarity with the cow' of the Gavaya, and thus enough of admitting a distinct similarity

with the cow. Therefore, the category of substratum such as the ground having the counter positive pot gets denied. Also the mere substratum such as the ground does not constitute the non-existence of the pot; for, the superstratum-and-the substratum relationship is experienced between the non-existence of the pot and the ground. And such a relationship would not be tenable in the case of identity between the non-existence of the pot and the ground. Also when the substratum such as the soul, which is distinct from the soul having the sorrow, is held to be the non-existence of the sorrow, the liberation of the soul would have the contingency of not being one of the human goals; for, the substratum such at the soul is not to be obtained (with out sorrow through meditation etc.).

Explanation :

The Mīmāmsakas now object that the use of the word 'non-existence' (*abhāva pada prayoga*) is established on account of the knowledge of something (*kasya cijjñānāt*); and in such a case, only the empty substratum such as the ground (*bhūtala*) constitutes the basis of the usage of the word 'non-existence of the pot' (*prayogālambana*), as nothing except the substratum, unlike the counter positive pot (*ghaṭavad atirikta*) is manifested in the knowledge of non-existence of the pot. Therefore, only that empty substratum (*tat*), on the basis of which (*yadapekṣam*), some thing becomes the object of the use of the word 'non-existence' (*abhāva pada prayoga viṣaya*), would be admitted to be the non-existence of the same (*tasyābhāva*). Therefore, only that, on the basis of which, something becomes the object of the use of the word 'non-existence' (*yadapekṣam yasya abhāvapada prayoga viṣayatvam*), is the non-existence of the pot (*tat tasyābhāvaḥ*). And the state of being the object of the use of the word 'non-existence' (*abhāvapada prayoga viṣayatva*), produced from the knowledge of the same (*tad buddhi janita*), is the comprehensional relation (*sambandha*) of the form of being the counter positive and the relational subjunct between the pot and the ground (*ghaṭabhūtalayoḥ pratiyogy anuyogi rūpaḥ*). Thus the ground (*bhūtala*) has the counter positive Pot (*sapratiyogika*), as the ground cannot be the object of the use of the word 'non-existence' (*abhāvapada prayoga viṣaya*) without the knowledge of the counter positive (*tadbuddhim vinā*). However, the Naiyāyikas refute the objection. According to them, the empty substratum such as the ground (*bhūtala*) cannot be the basis of the use of the word 'non-existence of Pot' (*abhāva prayogālambana*). For, the knowledge and the usage (*pratīti prayogau*) such as 'The substratum such as the ground is the non-existence of the pot' (*bhūtalam ghaṭābhāvaḥ*) are never made. Rather, only the knowledge and the usage such as 'The non-existence of pot exists on the ground' (*bhūtala ghaṭābhāvaḥ*) are made. And the knowledge and the usage such as 'The pot does not exist on the ground' (*bhūtale ghaṭo nāsti*) reveals the non-existence of the pot as distinct from the substratum such as the ground (*bhūtalādhikaraṇā tirikta nañartha*). Also the Naiyāyikas state that the Mīmāmsakas must concede that the state of being the non-existence of the pot of the ground (*bhūtalasya ghaṭābhāvatva*) is the state of being the object of the use of the word 'non-existence of the pot' (*abhāvapada prayogaviṣayatva*). Consequently, the substratum such as the ground becomes the object of the use of the word 'non-existence of the pot' (*ghaṭābhāva padaprayoga viṣaya*) only when it is known to be the non-existence of the pot (*ghaṭābhāva*) and the same ground becomes the non-existence of the pot (*ghaṭābhāva*) when it is known to be the object of the use of the word 'non-existence of the pot' (*ghaṭābhāvapada prayoya viṣaya*); and thus the mutual dependence (*anyo'nyāśraya*) becomes contingent. For, the word is used only when the cause of the use of word (*pada pravṛtti nimitta*) is known; and the state of being the non-existence of the pot (*ghaṭā bhāvatva*) is the cause of the use of the word 'non-existence of the pot'. Also the Naiyāyikas point out that when the substratum such as the ground is admitted to have the counter positive (*sapratiyogika*), then the same would not appear to be the non-existence without the counter positive (*pratiyoginam vinā*). Also they refute the argument that the substratum such as the ground has the counter positive (*sapratiyogika*) only at the time of the use of the word 'non-existence of the Pot' (*ghaṭā bhāva pada prayoga daśā*). According to them, then the ground becomes the object of the use of the word 'non-existence of the pot' (*abhāvapada prayogaviśaya*) only when it has the state of having counter positive pot (*ghaṭa pratiyogikatve*); and it has the state of having the counter positive pot only when it becomes the object of the use of the word 'non-existence of the pot'. Thus, the mutual dependence (*anyo'nyāśra*) becomes contingent. Also they state that the mere empty substratum such as the ground (*bhūtala*) does not constitute the non-existence of the pot (*abhāva*); as the superstratum -and -substratum relationship (*ādhārādheya bhāva*) is experienced between the non-existence of the pot and the ground (*ghaṭa bhūtalayoḥ*); and the same relationship becomes untenable in the case of the identity (*abhede*) between the non-existence of the pot and the ground. The Naiyāyikas illustrate the impossibility of the empty substratum being the non-existence on the ground that when the substratum such as the soul (*ātman*) different from the soul having the sorrow (*duḥkhavad ātma bhinna*) is held to be the non-existence of the sorrow (*duḥkhā bhāva*), liberation of the soul (*mokṣa*) would not be tenable, as the soul is not to be obtained without sorrow through meditation etc.

Ghaṭavad bhūtala jñāna bhinna bhūtala jñāna cannot be Abhāva :

I. viii. 14. It may be objected now as follows : That the knowledge of the empty substratum such as the ground, which is distinct from the knowledge of the ground having the pot, is the non-existence of the pot; and the same non-existence of the pot is experienced to be having the ground as the substratum through the comprehension a relation of self-linking relation. However, this objection is not correct. It has already been stated (Cf. Tattva Cin. I. viii. 11) that the knowledge of the empty substratum such as the ground, due to not describing the counter positiveness of the pot, cannot constitute the non-existence of the pot. Moreover, there would arise the following two questions : i) Whether such a knowledge of the substratum such as the ground is the cause of the usage of the non-existence of the pot only as being the substratum such as the ground in its own form. ii) or whether the same is the cause of the usage of the non-existence of the pot as being experienced as the non-existence of the pot having the ground as the substratum? The first option is not tenable.; for, the knowledge of the substratum such as the ground in its own form, cannot appear to be (the cause of) the non-existence of the pot being the superstrtum of the ground. The second option is not tenable; for, the knowledge of the ground as having the counter positive pot is untenable at that time; and therefore the knowledge of the ground as different from the ground having the counter positive pot too is untenable. Also now it may be argued that the knowledge of the substratum such as the ground, which is different from the knowledge of the substratum such as the ground having the counter positive pot, is the non-existence of the pot. However, then it would follow that the knowledge of the substratum such as the ground is the non-existence of the pot provided that the knowledge of the state of being the ground as having the counter positive pot is not produced, due to the defect in the eye, in the ground having the pot. Thus, the same substratum such as the ground would become both the possessor of the pot and the possessor of the non-existence of the pot at the same time; and the knowledge of the non-existence of the pot and the usage of the existence of the pot would not be mutually contradictory as the objects of both are not contradictory. It may again be objected as follows : That the knowledge of the empty substratum such as the ground, which is different from the knowledge of the substratum such as the ground actually having the counter positive pot, is the non-existence of the pot. And the knowledge of the substratum such as the ground is not the non-existence of the pot provided that the ground has the pot. Also the usage of the non-existence of the pot in such a case is contradictory; for, the illusion of such a mere empty substratum such as the ground not having the pot is never observed in the case of the ground having the counter positive

pot. However, then we shall state as follows : You must hold that the knowledge of the substratum such as the ground, known as different from the knowledge of the substratum such as the ground having the counter positive pot, is the cause of the usage of the non-existence of the pot. However, the same is not tenable. For, when the knowledge of the substratum such as the ground is to be manifested either from the knowledge of the substratum manifesting itself or from the after-knowledge of the substratum, the knowledge of the non-existence of the pot cannot be manifested, as the counter positive of the difference, i.e. the pot is not known. Also the experience of the non-existence of the pot cannot be held to be manifested from some other knowledge of the substratum; for, the knowledge of the substratum such as the ground cannot be ascertained to be different from the knowledge of the substratum such as the ground having the counter positive pot without the ascertainment of the non-existence of the pot in the ground through the non-perception of the competent counterpositive pot.

Explanation :

The Mīmāmsakas raise the objection that the knowledge of the empty substratum such as the ground, which is different from the knowledge of the ground having the counter positive pot (*ghaṭavad bhūtala jñāna bhinna bhūtala jñāna*) is the non-existence of the pot; and the same non-existence of the pot is experienced to be having the ground as the substratum (*bhūtalā dhāratā*) through the comprehensional relation of self-linking relation (*svarūpa sambandhena*). However, the Naiyāyikas refute such a position. According to them, the knowledge of the empty substratum such as the ground (*bhūtala jñāna*) cannot constitute the non-existence of the pot (*abhāva*), as the same knowledge of the empty substratum does not describe the counter positiveness of the pot (*niṣpratiyogika*); and it has already been stated so (cf. T.C. I. viii. 11). Also they state that the two options, viz. i) that the knowledge of the substratum such as the ground is the cause of the usage of the non-existence of the pot (*abhāva vyavahārakāraṇa*) only as being the substratum such as the ground in its own form (*svarūpa sad*); and ii) that the same knowledge is the cause of the usage of the non-existence of the pot, as experienced in the form of the non-existence of the pot having the ground as the substratum (*bhūtalādhikaraṇaka niṣedha rūpatayā*) are untenable. According to them, the first option is untenable, as the knowledge of the substratum such as the ground in its own form cannot appear to be (the cause of) the non-existence of the pot being the superstratum of the ground (*bhūtalādheyatayā*). Also the second option is untenable, as the knowledge of the ground as having the counter positive pot (*ghaṭavad bhūtala jñāna*) is untenable at the time; and

therefore, the knowledge of the ground as different from the ground having the counter positive pot (*tad bhinna jñāna*) too is untenable. Further, the Naiyāyikas refute the argument that the knowledge of the empty substratum such as the ground, which is different from the knowledge of the ground having the counter positive pot (*ghaṭavad bhūtalajñānād bhinna bhūtala jñāna*), is the non-existence of the pot (*abhāva*). According to them, then the knowledge of the substratum such as the ground would become the non-existence of the pot, provided that the knowledge of the state of having the counter positive pot (*ghaṭa vattvā jñāne*) is not produced in the ground having the pot (*ghaṭavati*) due to some defect in the eye. Thus, the same substratum such as the ground (*tad*) would become both the possessor of the pot (*ghaṭavat*) and the possessor of the non-existence of the pot (*ghaṭābhāvat*) at the same time. Also the knowledge of the non-existence of the pot (*ghaṭābhāva jñāna*) and the usage of the existence of the pot (*tad vyavahāra*) would not be contradictory, as the objects of both do not differ. The Mīmāmsakas again raise the objection that the knowledge of the empty substratum such as the ground (*bhūtala jñāna*), which is different from the knowledge of the substratum such as the ground actually having the pot (*vastuto ghaṭavato bhūtalasya jñānād bhinna*), is the non-existence of the pot (*abhāva*). And the knowledge of the substratum such as the ground (*bhūtala jñāna*) does not constitute the non-existence of the pot (*abhāva*) in the case of the ground having the pot (*ghaṭa vati*). Thus, according to them, the usage of the non-existence of the pot (*vyavahāra*) can be contradictory in such a case, as the illusion of such a mere empty substratum such as the ground not having the pot (*tathāvidha bharma*) is not observed in the case of the ground having the pot. Howevever, the Naiyāyikas refute the objection. According to them, then the knowledge of the empty substratum such as the ground (*bhūtala jñāna*), known as different from the knowledge of the substratum such as the ground having the pot (*ghaṭavato bhūtalasya jñānād bhinnatvena jñāna*), needs to be the cause of the usage of the non-existence of the pot (*abhāva vyavahṛti hetu*); however, the same is not tenable, as the knowledge of the non-existence of the pot cannot be manifested (*tad aprakāśāt*) in the event of the knowledge of the substratum such as the ground (*adhikaraṇa jñāna*) manifesting from the knowledge of the substratum manifesting itself (*svaprakāśena*) or from the after knowledge of the substratum (*anu vyava sāyena*). Also they state that the experience of the non-existence of the pot canot be manifested from some other knowledge of the substratum (*jñānāntareṇa*), as the knowledge of the empty substratum such as the ground cannot be ascertained to be different from the knowledge of the substratum having the counter positive pot without the ascertainment of the non-existence of the pot (*ghaṭābhāva niścayam vinā*) in the ground through the non-perception of the competent counter positive pot (*yogyānupalabdhyā*).

Anugatābhāva vyavahāra would be untenable :

I. viii. 15. Further consecutive or generalized usage of non-existence of things would not be tenable, due to the non-consecutiveness or non-generalization of the substrata such as the ground and their knowledges. It should not be argued that even in the Naiyāyikas' theory that the non-existence of things is a distinct category, the contingency of the untenability of consecutive usage of non-existence of things remains same, as the consecutive non-existenceness is absent. The consecutive usage of mutual negation or non-existence of things is tenable, even without the consecutive non-existenceness, on account of the non-contradictory mutual negation such as 'The pot etc. are not clothing' with the help of single mutual negation of clothing. Also this way, the consecutive usage of constant non-existence of things such as 'The cowness does not exist in the pot etc.' is possible with the help of single constant non-existence of the cowness. Also the consecutive usage of destruction of things such as 'The pot is destroyed now in the pot halves existing on the ground' is possible with the help of single destruction of the pot. Also the consecutive usage of antecedent non-existence of things such as 'The pot does not exist in these pot-halves', during the non-origination of the pot, is possible with the help of single antecedent non-existence of the pot. This way, four consecutive usages of four types of non-existences of things are made with the help of four individual non-existences only. It should be noted that you, the Mīmāmsakas, cannot explain the consecutive usage of four different types of non-existences due to the non-consecutiveness or non-generalization of individual substrata and their knowledges. For, the consecutive usages of the four types of non-existences cannot be explained with the help of four types of individual non-existences. Thus, four different types of non-existences, become established as a distinct category. And we shall explain, immediately afterwords, in such a way, as to how the four different types of non-existences constitute one single category on account of one single non-existenceness.

Explanation :

The Naiyāyikas now state that consecutive or generalized usage of non-existence of things (*anugatā bhāva vyavahāra*) would become untenable in the Mīmāmsakas' theory that the non-existence of things is the empty substratum (*adhikaraṇa*). According to them, the empty substrata or their knowledges (*adhikaraṇa tajjñāna*) are non-consecutive (*ananugata*); and hence the consecutive usage of non-existence of things is not tenable. Also

the Naiyāyikas refute the argument that even in their theory that non-existence of things is a distinct category (*atiriktā bhāva pakṣe*), the consecutive usage of non-existence of things is not tenable due to the absence of the consecutive non-existenceness (*anugatā bhāvatva*). According to them, the consecutive usage of mutual negation (*anugata vyavahara*) is tenable on account of the non-contradictory mutual negation (*samānādhikaraṇa niṣedha*) such as 'The pot etc. are not clothing' (*ghaṭādir na paṭaḥ*) with the help of single mutual negation of clothing (*paṭānyo'nyā bhāvenaikena*). And the consecutive usage of constant non-existence such as 'The cowness does not exist in the pot etc. (*ghaṭādau na gotvam*) is tenable with the help of single constant non-existence of the cowness. And the consecutive usage of destruction such as 'The pot is destroyed in the pot halves existing on the ground' (*kapāleṣu bhūtaleṣu ghaṭo vinaṣṭaḥ*) is tenable with the help of single destruction of the pot. And the consecutive usage of antecedent non-existence such as 'The pot does not exist in the pot-halves' (*eteṣu ghaṭo nāsti*) is tenable with the help of single antecedent non-existence of the pot during the non-origination of the pot. Thus, in the Naiyāyikas' theory, the consecutive usage of four types of non-existences of things (*anugata niṣedha vyavahāra*) are possible with the help of four individual non-existences. The Naiyāyikas note that in the Mīmāmsakas' theory, the consecutive uasages of four different types of non-existences (*abhāva catuṣtaya*) are not possible due to the non-consecutiveness (*ananugatatva*) of individual substrata and their knowledges (*tattad adhikaraṇa tattad buddhīnām*). According to them, the consecutive usages of four different types of non-existences (*anugatābhāva catuṣṭaya vyavahāra*) can never be explained with the individual non-existences (*pratyekā bhāvena*). Thus, the four different types of non-existences (*abhāva vyakti catuṣṭaya*) are establishedd as a distinct category (*atirikta padārtha*). And the four different types of non-existences constitute one single category (*ekapadārthatva*) due to the single non-existenceness (*abhāvatvena*).

Samayaviśeṣayoga of Bhūtala is not Abhāva :

I. viii. 16. It might be so. However, we, the Mīmāmsakas, admit only the juncture of particular time to be the non–existance of the pot on the ground; whereas the Naiyāyikas admit the non-existence of things such as the pot, to be the non-existence of the pot on the substratum such as the ground. Thus, the knowledge of the superstratum - and - substratum - relationship such as 'The pot does not exist here on the ground' too becomes tenable, as the juncture of the particular time occurs on the ground. It should not be argued now that the non-consecutiveness or non-generalization is the defective condition in establishing the juncture of particular time as being the non-existence of things. For, such a defective condition is equally applicable even in the Naiyāyikas' theory that non-existence of things is a distinct category; as the generic property or condition such as the non-existenceness is absent. Also suppose a distinct property is to be admitted in the non-existence of things (by the Naiyāyikas) to generalize the knowledge and usage of non-existence of things, then, we the Mīmāmsakas too, admit that let the same property exist in the juncture of the particular time due to the brevity in generalization. However, this position the Mīmāmsakas is not correct. The juncture of particular time lacks in the competency for producing the usage of non-existence (of the pot) due to the non–possession of counter positive (pot). Moreover, even the (juncture of) particular time, like the the ground, is experienced to be the substratum of the non-existence of things; for, the knowledge is that 'The pot does not exist now on the ground'. Also it should not be argued that the juncture of particular time exists in particular time. For, the superstratum-and-substratum relationship becomes untenable in the case of the untenability of relationship due to identity. Also you must answer as to what is the particular time? Is it the state of being the substratum of the non-existence of things in the time or is it the very nature of the particular time. In admitting the first alternative, you in advertantly admit the non-existence of things as a distinct category. In admitting the second alternative, lack of consecutiveness or generalization arises. As for as I am concerned, particular time belongs to only one individual instance of non-existence of things. For, the same non-existence of things occurs in various times. Moreover, in your theory, knowledge and usage of substratum such as 'The substratum such as the ground occurs now' would become contingent, due to the juncture of particular time; for a particular qualifier produces the particular qualificative knowledge having itself as the qualifier. However, knowledge and usage of non-existence of things such as 'The non-existence of the pot occurs on the ground' would become untenable.

Explanation :

The Mīmāmsakas now raise the objection that the juncture of particular time (*samayaviśeṣayoga*), is the non–existence of the pot on the ground; whereas the Naiyāyikas admit that the non-existence of the pot (*abhāva*) is the non-existence of the pot (*ghaṭābhāva*) on the substratum such as the ground. According to them, the knowledge of the superstratum-and - substratum relationship (*ādhārādheya bhāva*) such as 'The pot does not exist here on the ground' (*iha bhūtale ghaṭo nāsti*) too becomes tenable, in this theory, as the juncture of the particular time occurs on the ground. The Mīmāmsakas refute the argument that the defective condition (*doṣa*) of non-

consecutiveness (*ananugama*) arises in admitting juncture of particular time (*samaya viśeṣa yoga*) to be the non-existence of things (*abhāvatve*). According to them, such a defective condition is equally applicable even in the Naiyāyikas' theory that the non-existence of things is a distinct category (*atiriktābhāva pakṣa*), as the generic property (*jāti*) or condition (*upādhi*) such as the non-existenceness (*abhāvatva*) is absent. Also they state that if a distinct property (*dharmāntara*) is to be admitted by the Naiyāyikas to generalize the knowledge and the usage of non-existence of things (*abhāva pratīti prayogānugamārtham*), then we can also admit a distinct property in the juncture of particular time (*samaya viśeṣa yoga*) for generalization. However, the Naiyāyikas refute the objection. According to them, the juncture of particular time (*samaya viṣeṣa yoga*) lacks of the competency for producing the usage of non-existence (of the pot) by not having any counterpositive (pot) (*niṣpratiyogikatvena*). Also they point out that like the ground, even the (juncture of) particular time (*samaya viśeṣa*) is experienced to be the substratum of non-existence of things (*abhāvādhāratayā*) in the form of the usage 'The pot does not exist now on the ground' (*idānim bhūtale ghaṭo nāsti*). Also the particular time cannot exist in the juncture of particular time (*tatsamaya viśeṣa yoga*). When the relationship is untenable due to identity (*abhede sambandhānupapattau*), the superstratum-and-substratum-relation (*ādhārādheya bhāva*) is impossible. Also they state that the Mīmāmsakas cannot answere as to what is the particular time (*samaya viśeṣa*). If the particular time is the state of being the substratum of the non-existence of things (*abhāvāśrayatā*) in the time, then the Mīmāmsakas inadvertently admit the non-existence of things (*abhāva svīkāra*) as a separate category; and if it is the very nature of the particular time (*tat samaya svarūpa*), then the lack of generalization (*ananugama*) results. And, the Naiyāyikas, on the other hand, admit that the particular time belongs to only one individual instance of non-existence of things (*ekābhāva vyakti*), as the non-existence of things occurs in various times (*nānā samaya vṛtti*). Also the Naiyāyikas state that in the Mīmāmsakas' theory, the knowledge and usage of substratum (*pratīti prayogau*) such as 'The substratum such as the ground occurs now' (*idānīm bhūtalam*) would become necessary due to the juncture of paticular time (*samaya viśeṣa yoga*), as the particular qualifier (*viśeṣaṇa*) produces the particular qualificative knowledge (*viśiṣṭa pratyaya*), having itself as the qualifier (*svaprakāraka*). Thus, the knowledge and the usage of non-existence of things such as 'The non-existence of the pot occurs on the ground' (*bhūtale ghaṭābhāvaḥ*) would become untenable.

Kapālādika would become Ghaṭādivyavahāra janaka :

I. viii. 17. On the contrary, suppose the usage of the non-existence of the pot on the ground is admitted to be produced from the substrata such as the juncture of particular times, then let the usage of existence of the pot etc. too be admitted to be produced from the individual substrata such as the pot halves etc., wherein the pot etc., as qualified by the particular aggregates of limbs, inhere; and thus what is the need for admitting counter positive such as the pot? And the knowledge of the counter positives is similar to that of the non-existence of things. From this refutation of objection, even the following objection gets refuted: "That at first, the pot is perceived to be existing here; and then hammer is perceived to be falling on the pot here; and lastly mere series of pieces of begger's bowls is perceived to be existing here; however, no non-existence of things, as distinct from counter positives, is perceived. Therefore, how can the scriptural statement of non-existence of things be realistic and what is the basis of such a statement of non-existence? Thus, only distinct series of pieces of pot halves of pot is perceived to exist ". A distinct destruction is experieced due to the knowledge of destruction such as 'The pot is destoryed from the fall of hammer. It should not be argued that mere empty substratum such as the ground or knowledge of the same substratum is produced from the fall of hammer. The substratum such as the ground and the knowledge of the substratum such as the ground exist even without the fall of hammer. Since in your Mīmāmsakas' theory, the same empty substratum and its knowledge constitute mere non-existence, the destructionness becomes untenable in non-existence. Also suppose the same is tenable, then non-existence in general would become destruction. Now it may be proposed that whatever is the destroyer in your Naiyāyikas' theory, the same destroyer or the substratum such as the ground or its knowledge associated with the destroyer, is the destruction in our Mīmāmsakas' theory. However, this too is not tenable. A destruction of the pot is experienced to be produced from the fall of hammer. However, the same destruction cannot be viewed to be the producer of the destruction of itself. Further, the destruction of the pot is experienced to have the counter positive such as the pot; however, the fall of hammer is never experienced to have any counterpositive such as the pot.

Explanation :

The Naiyāyikas observe here that if the usage of the non-existence of the pot (*ghaṭābhāva vyavahāra*) is held to be produced on the ground on account of the substrata such as the juncture of particular times (*tattat samaya viśeṣa yogāt*), then let the usage of the existence of the pot too be held to be produced from only the individual substratum such as the pot halves (*tattad kapālādika*) in which the pot inhers, due to the juncture of particular times; and thus, there is no need for admitting the counter positives such as the pot (*ghaṭādi*). And the knowledge of counter positive is similar to that of non-

existence of things. Also the Naiyāyikas now refute the objection that "First only the pot is perceived to be existing here; and then hammer is perceived to be falling on the pot; and lastly series of pieces of beggar's bowls is perceived to be existing; however, the non-existence of things, as distinct from counter positives, is not perceived; and therefore the scriptural statement of non-existence of things (*abhāva iti śruti*) cannot be admitted to be realistic and no basis for such a statement can exist; thus, only an independent series of pieces of pot halves belonging to pot can be admitted to exist". According to the Naiyāyikas, a distinct destruction (*atirikta vināśa*) is experienced on account of the knowledge of destruction such as 'The pot is destroyed from the fall of hammer' (*mudgara pātād vinaṣṭo ghaṭaḥ*). The Naiyāyikas refute the argument that mere empty substratum such as the ground (*kevala bhūtala*) or its knowledge (*tadbuddhi*) is produced from the fall of hammer (*tajjanyā*). According to them, mere empty substratum such as the ground or its knowledge exists even without the fall of hammer and thus a distinct non-existence of things must be admitted. Also the destructiveness (*vināśatva*) would become untenable in the non-existence, as it (non-existence) is mere substratum or its knowledge. Further, the Naiyāyikas refute the Mīmāmsakas' proposal that whatever is the destroyer in their (Naiyāyikas') theory (*vināśaka*), the same is the destruction in their (Mīmāmsakas) theory. According to them, the fall of hammer is the destroyer of the pot; and therefore, the destroyer cannot be the producer of destruction itself. (*tasya tajjanakatva*). Further, the destruction of the pot (*vināśa*) is experienced to be having a counter positive (pot); however the fall of hammer (*mudgara pāta*) is never experienced to be having a counter positive. Thus, the non-existence needs to be a distinct category from the empty substratum and thedestruction needs to be a distinct entity from the destroyer.

Viśeṣaṇatā is the Comprehensional relation :

I. viii. 18. The Mīmāmsakas may object now as follows : Since the substratum such as the ground does not have any comprehensional relation with the non-existence of things, how can the knowledge of the non-existence of the pot be possible on the ground? Suppose you Naiyāyikas state that the non-existence of the pot is related to the substratum such as the ground through the self-linking relation, then we shall reply that even the ground, having the counter positive pot, can be related to the non-existence of the pot, found on the cross-way, through the self-linking relation; for, the self-linking relation is nothing beyond the substratum such as the ground and the non-existence of the pot. Now, you Naiyāyikas may propose that merely the super imposition of the counter positive (pot) is the self-linking relation; and that is

why it is stated that the counter positive is negated after imposing it on the substratum. However, this position too is not tenable. The imposition of the counterpositive is dependent on the relation of the non--existence of things with the substratum; and the relation of the non-existence of things with the substratum is dependent on the imposition; and thus mutual dependence becomes contingent. However, this objection of the Mīmāmsakas is not correct. The competence of the non existence of things and its substratum for producing the qualificative knowledge without any other relation constitutes the self-linking relation. And the qualificative knowledge of the ground having the pot and that of the non-existence of the pot found on the cross way are not are not mutually contradictory. When a relation distinct from the knowledge and its object, like the relation distinct from the inherence and what inhers in, is admitted, fear of infinite regress becomes contingent; and therefore only the self-linking relation must be admitted as the comprehensional relation between the non-existence of things and its substratum. Consequently, the non-existence of things gets established to be a distinct category of things. Thus, the qualifierness, i.e. the self-linking relation gets established as the comprehensional relation of non-existence of things. Thus ends The theory of non-existence of things in the Perception in the Tattvacintāmaṇi composed by Śri Gangeśopādhyāya.

Explanation :

The Mīmāmsakas now raise the objection that since the substratum such as the ground (*bhūtala*) does not have any comprehensional relation (*sambandhābhāvāt*) with the non-existence of things (*abhāvena*), the knowledge of non-existence of the pot (*ghaṭābhāva pratyaya*) is untenable on the ground. According to them, the substratum such as the ground cannot be related to the non-existence of the pot through the self-linking relation (*svarūpasambandhāt*), as then even the ground having the pot (*ghaṭavad bhūtala*) can be related to the non-existence of the pot existing in the cross-way (*catvarīyābhāva*) through the self-linking relation; and the self-linking relation is nothing beyond the substratum such as the ground and the non-existence of the pot (*bhūtalam abhāvaśca*). Also they refute the proposal of the Naiyāyikas that the imposition of the counter positive (pot) on the substratum (*pratiyogy-āropa*) is the self-linking relation; and therefore, the counter positive is negated after imposing it (*āropya niṣidhyate*). According to them, the imposition of the counter-positive (*āropa*) is dependent on the relation of the non-existence of things (*abhāva sambandha*) and the relation of the non-existence of things with the substratum is dependent on the imposition,; and thus, mutual dependence results. However, the Naiyāyikas refute the objection. According to them, the self-linking relation (*svarūpa - sambandha*) is the competence of the non-existance of things and its

substratum for producing the qualificative knowledge (*viśiṣṭa pratyaya janana yogyatva*) without any other relation. And the qualificative knowledge (*viśiṣṭa pratyaya*) of the ground, having the pot, and that of the non-existence of the pot found on the cross-way (*ghaṭavad bhūtala catvarīyābhāvayoḥ*) are not mutually contradictory. Also they state that since infinite regress (*anavasthā*) would be contingent in admitting a relation distinct from the knowledge and its object (*jñāna viṣayayoḥ*), only the self-linking relation (*tādṛśa sambandha*) needs to be admitted between the non-existence of things and its substratum. Thus, the Naiyāyikas conclude that a distinct category of non-existence of things (*atiriktābhāva*) and a distinct comprehensional relation of self-linking relation (*tad grāhikā viśeṣaṇatā*) get established.

The End of the Abhāvavāda in the Pratyakṣakhaṇḍa.

I. ix.

Theory of Causes of Perception

(Pratyakṣa kāraṇa vādaḥ)

A

THEORY OF RELATION (Sannikarṣa vādaḥ)

Viṣayāloka sannikarṣa is the cause :

I. ix. 1. Particular comprehensional relation, which is six types, is the cause of particular perception. And here only the particular type of contact of particular light with particular object is the cause of particular type of perception of particular object. However, the contact of light with eye is not the cause of perception. For, the eye existing in light does not perceive the object existing in the darkness. Rather, on the contrary, only the eye existing in the darkness, may perceive the object existing in the light. Now it may be objected as follows : That now in this way, even the pot connected with the light from the other side, would be required to be perceived by the eye. And it is not correct to argue that the rule is that the totality of causes of perception of the whole object consisting of parts constitutes the totality of causes of the perception of the parts of oneself; and therefore, the pot delimited by light from the other side need not be perceived by eye. For, such a rule deviates in the case of the perception of the combination or constitute of three atoms; and no justification exists in the assumption of the rule that a distinct totality of causes needs to be admitted in the case of the perception of the parts of an object. Now it may be argued that the contact of the light with the pot as delimited by the parts facing the eye of the perceiver is the cause of visual perception of the pot. However, then we shall reply that let even the contact of the light with the sense organ such as the eye as delimited by the parts facing the eye of the perceiver be admitted as the cause of visual perception of the object. Also it may be argued that the contact of the eye on the parts delimited by the contact of the light is the cause of visual perception. And the contradiction to the perception of the objects existing in the same region pertains to only the two objects existing without spaces or close; for, otherwise the clothing and the gold and also the clothing and the water would have the contingency of non-perception. However, then we shall reply that let even the

contact of the light with the eye on the object delimited by the contact of pot be admitted as the cause of visual perception of the pot. Now it may be argued as follows : That suppose the contact of eye with the pot is the cause of perception of the pot kept on the ground having the contact of the light by the maxim of strainer, then we shall state that let even the contact of the light with the eye be admitted as the cause of perception of the pot kept on the ground having the contact of the eye with the pot. However, this argument is not correct. Since the contact of light with the object is ascertained to be the cause of perception on the strength of positive and negative concomitances, the visual perception of the pot can be explained by the same contact of light with the object. Hence the contact of the light with the eye need not be admitted as the cause of visual perception.

Explanation :

Gangeśa, after completing the 'Theory of non-existence of things' (Abhāva vāda), begins here his 'Theory of causes of perception' (*pratyakṣa karaṇa vāda*). At the very out set, he acknowledges that particular comprehensional relation (*sannikarṣa*), which is six types, is the cause of particular type of perception (*pratyakṣa viśeṣa*). However, according to him, only the particular contact of light (*āloka samyoga viśeṣa*) with the particular object (*viṣayeṇa*), but not with eye (*cakṣusā*), is the cause of perception, as the eye existing in light (*prakāśastha*), does not perceive the object existing in the darkness (*andha- kārastha*). However, the Pūrvapakṣin raises the objection that this way, the pot connected with light (*āloka saṁyukta*) from the otherside, too would be required to be perceived by eye. He refutes the argument that the object connected with the light on the other side need not be perceived, as the rule is that the totality of causes of perception of the whole object (*avayavi graha sāmagrī*) constitutes the totality of causes of perception of the perception of the parts of oneself. According to him, then the rule would deviate in the case of the constitute of three atoms (*tryaṇuka*) and a distinct totality of causes of perception is not justified in the case of perception of parts of an object (*pratyakṣāvayava*). Also the Pūrvapakṣin refutes the argument that the contact of light with the pot (*ghaṭāloka samyoga*) on the parts facing the eye is the cause of perception. According to him, then it would become necessary that even the contact of the light with the eye (*cakṣurā loka samyoga*) on the parts facing the eye is the cause of the perception. Also suppose the contact of the eye (*cakṣus saṁyoga*) on the parts of the object delimited by the contact of the light is the cause of the perception, and the contradiction to the perception existing in the same regin pertains to only the two objects existing without spaces (*nibidayoḥ*), then the contact of the light with the eye (*cakṣurāloka saṁyoga*) on the object delimited by the contact of the pot would be required

to be admitted as the cause of perception of the pot. Further, the Pūrvapakṣin refutes the argument that the contact of the eye with the pot (*cakṣurghaṭa saṁyoga*) is the cause of the perception of the pot kept on the ground having the contact of the light (*āloka samyoga sannihete*), by the maxim of strainer (*cālinī nyāyena*). According to him, the contact of the light with the eye (*cakṣurāloka saṁyoga*) needs to be admitted as the cause of the perception of the pot kept on the ground having the contact of the eye with the pot. However, Gangeśa refutes the Pūrvapakṣin's objection. According to him, the contact of the light with the object (*viṣayāloka samyoga*) is established to be the cause of the perception on the strength of positive and negative concomitances (*anvaya vyatirekābhyām*); and hence the visual perception of the pot can be explained by such a contact of the light with the object. Thus, there is no need to admit that the contact of the light with the eye (*cakṣurāloka saṁyoga*) is the cause of perception.

Udbhūta rūpa is the cause :

I. ix. 2. The other Naiyāyikas however, hold as follows : That suppose both the contact and the light are held to be the causes of perception, then the contact of light with the object gets necessarily established to be the cause of perception. Also, suppose both the contact of light and the contact of the object as delimited by the parts facing the eye are the causes of perception, then too the contact of light with the object gets established to be the cause of perception. It may be proposed now as follows : That suppose the contact of light with the object as delimited by the parts facing the eye is to be held to be the cause of perception, then let only the contact of light with the parts (of the object) be admitted as the cause of perception. However, this is not correct. Since the contact (of light) with the parts in general is over extending, only the contact (of light) with the parts of the object themselves needs to be stated (admitted) as the cause of perception. Thus, only the contact (of light) with the object itself gets established to be the cause of perception due to the brevity. Further, it has been stated already that suppose the contact (of light) with the object becomes redundent by the contact (of light) with the parts (of object), then the same contact of light with the object would not have the causality at all. Also this way, even the manifested or perceptible form of light needs to be the manifesting condition of perception by positive and negative concomitances. It may be proposed now that the manifested or perceptible form is merely the delimiting property of the causality of light; for, the hot vapour or heat etc. do not have the visual perceptibility. Also it cannot be argued that both perceptible form and light have the causality, as both of them have positive and negative concomitances with the causality; and otherwise

even the rotating staff or rod would need to become the delimitor of the (causality of the) wheel. For, when only the perceptible form and the light are present, the effect of perception (of pot etc.) is not produced. However, this proposal is not correct. Both the light and the perceptible form need to be the causes of perception, as no determining factor as to whether the lightness is the delimitor of the perceptible form or the perceptible formness is the delimitor of the light is possible. For, like the rotating staff and wheel, only one of the two, viz. the light and the perceptible form, does not have the positive and negative concomintances with the causality by leaving out the other.

Explanation :

The other Naiyāyikas (*anye*) hold that suppose both the contact and the light (*āloka saṁyogayoḥ*) are admitted to be the causes of perception (*hetu*), then the contact of light with the object (*viṣayāloka saṁyoga*) automatically gets established to be the cause of perception. Also suppose both the contact of light and the contact of the object (*viṣayā loka saṁyogayoḥ*), as delimited by the parts facing the eye, are the causes of perception, then too the contact of light with the object (*viṣayā loka saṁyoga*) gets established to be the cause of perception. The Naiyāyikas now refute the proposal that the contact of light with the parts (of the object) (*avayavā loka samyoga*) could be admitted to be the cause of perception, if the contact of light with the object (*viṣayāloka samyoga*) as delimited by the parts facing the eye (*abhimukhā vayavāvacchedena*) is to be admitted as the cause of perception. According to them, since the contact (of light) with parts in general (*avayava saṁyoga mātra*) is over extending, the contact (of light) with the parts of the object themselves (*svāvayava saṁyoga*) needs to be the cause; and instead, the contact (of light) with the object in question (*sva saṁyoga*) is better qualified to be the cause. Also the contact (of light) with the object cannot be rendered redundant by the contact (of light) with the parts (of the object) (*avayava saṁyoga)*, as then the same contact (of light) with the object would not have the causality (*kāraṇatā*) at all. The Naiyāyikas, further, propose that even the manifestated or perceptible form (*udbhūta rūpa*) of light constitutes the manifesting condition (*vyañjaka*) of perception due to positive and negative concomitances with the causality (*anvayi vyatire kitvāt*). Now the Pūrvapakṣin proposes that the manifested or perceptible form is merely the delimiting property of the causality of light (*tejaḥ kāraṇatāvacchedaka*), as the visual perceptibility (*cākṣuṣatva*) is lacking in the hot vapour. And the Pūrvapakṣin refutes the argument that both the perceptible form and the light are the causes as both of them have positive and negative concomitances (*anvayavyatirekin*). According to him, in the presence of mere perceptible form and light, the effect of perception of the object (*kārya*) is absent. However, the Naiyāyikas refute

the proposal. According to them, both the light and the manifested or perceptible form need to constitute the causes of perception, as no determining factor (*vinigamaka*) as to whether the lightness (*tejastva*) is the delimitor of the perceptible form or the perceptible formness (*udbhūta rūpatva*) is the delimitor of the light is tenable. Therefore, both the light and the perceptible form need to have the causality of perception; as positive and negative concomitances of only one of the two viz. the light and perceptible form is not tenable by leaving out the other.

Cakṣuṣo rūpa is vyañjaka :

Sampradāyavid's Position :

I. ix. 3. The Sampradāyavid holds here as follows : That this way even the form of eye would become the manifesting condition; for, the same constitutes the form of the manifesting light, like the form of light. And the perceptible formness or the perceptible formness belonging to the light does not consititute the manifesting condition in the case of the form being the manifester; for, the same are useless due to deviation and the heaviness in assumption. However, only the manifesting form constitutes the manifesting condition due to the brevity. Also the perceptible form existing in the object is the associate cause and constitutes the means of manifestation of perception. However, the fragrance brought in by the large whole wind, the cold and hot vapour and eye etc., dispite being closely associated with the sense organ and the light etc., are devoid of the presence of any crucial factors constituting the cause of direct perception of object; for, they are imperceptible, like the pot existing in the darkness. Therefore only the consecutive property (such as the formness) existing in the form etc., is the cause of perception due to the brevity. However, the property (such as the substanceness) existing in the substance is not the cause of percetion; for, then the perception of the form in the case of the perception of touch in the hot vapour etc. and the perception of the touch in the case of the percption of the form in the ray etc. would become contingent, as the perception is not distinct from what is being inherent in the same object as that of the manifestation. Otherwise, the non-perception of touch and form would become contingent. Also the consecutive property does not exist in both the form and touch; for, the causality is tenable by merely existing in only one of them such as the form. Also the consecutive properties existing in both the form and touch are different; for, dispite perceiving one, the other is not perceived. Also it is not correct to argue that narrow and extensive natures of generic properties would become untenable by way of being generalized individually as the formness (and the touchness) etc. For, the same natures of properties are different like the higherness (and

the lowerness) of pitches of sounds. Thus, only individual manifestation is .conducive to the perception of form etc. It may be objected now as follows : That let the manifestationness be admitted only in the case of the hugeness of objects; and the same is the cause or condition in the perception of things due to the brevity. But the same manifestationness need not be the condition inthe case of form due to the heaviness in assumption. However, this objection is not correct. The odour and the touch, by being perceptible, have the manifestationness dispite the absence of the manifestation of the hugeness of substratum; and therefore, the manifestationness occurs even in the form; for, it is the particular perceptible material quality; however, it does not necessarily occur in the case of the hugeness of the objects; for, it is the general quality. Also it may be objected as follows : That only the non-manifestationness is the generic property; and since the same is conducive to the non-perception, it can be assumed directly. And the perceptibility of objects arises on account of the absence of the non-manifestationness. However, this is not correct. Since the non-perceptibility is caused by the absence of the causes of perception, the generic property of the manifestationness needs to be assumed as the cause of perception due to the brevity. Thus, the absence of non-manifestationness need not be assumed to be the cause of perception after assuming the non-manifestationness as being the impediment to perception due to the heaviness. This is the say of the Sampradāyavids.

Explanation :

Gangeśa now explains the Sampradāyavids' Position. According to them, even the form of eye (*cakṣuṣo rūpa*) is the manifesting condition (*vyañjaka*), as it is the form of the manifesting light (*vyañjaka tejorūpa*). Also they clarify that when the form is the manifester (*vyañjaka*), the perceptible formness belonging to the light (*tejogatodbhūtarūpa tva*) does not constitute the manifesting condition (*upādhi*), as it is useless due to deviation; rather only the manifesting form (*vyañjaka rūpa*) constitutes the manifesting condition. The Sampradāyavids further hold that the perceptible form (*udbhūta rūpa*), existing in the object, is the associate cause (*sahakārī*) of the manifestation of perception. According to them, the eye etc. (*cakṣurādika*) are devoid of the presence of the crucial factors constituting the cause of direct perception of object due to being imperceptible (*apratyakṣa*). Therefore, only the consecutive property (viz. the formness) (*anugata sāmānya*), existing in the form etc., (*rūpādi vṛtti*), but not the property (viz. the substanceness) existing in the substance (*dravyagata*), constitutes the cause (*kāraṇa*); and otherwise the perception of the form in the hot vapour and the perception of the touch in the ray etc. would become contingent, as the perception is not distinct from what is being inherent in the same object as that of the manifestation

(*udbhavatvaikārtha samavāyāviśeṣāt*). Otherwise, the non-perception of touch and form would become untenable. According to them, the consecutive property need not be admitted to be occurring in both the form and touch (*ubhaya vṛtti*); as the causality is tenable even by existing in only one, i.e. the form (*rūpādi vṛttitvena*). Also the consecutive properties existing in both the form and touch are different, as dispite perceiving one (formness), the other (touchness) is not perceived. The Sampradāyavids refute the argument that the narrow and the extensive natures (*parāparabhāva*) of generic properties need not become untenable by way of being generalized individually as the formness and the touchness, as the same are different like the highness and the lowness of sound (*tāratva*). Thus, only the individual manifestations (*ekaikodbhava*) are conducive to the perception of form etc. The Pūrvapakṣin now objects that the manifestationness (*udbhavatva*) may be admitted only in the case of the hugeness (*mahatve*); and the same is the cause of perception of things. According to him, however, the same need not be the cause of perception of form etc. However, the Sampradāyavids refute the objection on the ground that the odour and the touch have the manifestationness, dispite the lack of manifestation of the hugeness of substratum (*āśrayamahatvodbhavābhāva*); and therefore the manifestationness occurs even in the form (*rūpe*) and not necessarily in the hugeness (*mahatve*) due to being a general quality. Again the Pūrvapakṣin objects that only the non-manifestationness (*anudbhavatva*) is the generic property; and the same can be assumed directly, as the same is conducive to non-perception; and the objects become perceptible in the absence of such a non-manifestationness. However, the Sampradāyavids refute the objection on the ground that the non-perceptibility (*apratyakṣatā*) is caused by the absences of the causes of perception (*pratyakṣakāraṇa viraha*); and therefore, only the generic property of the manifestationness needs to be assumed as the cause of perception (*pratyakṣa kāraṇa*) and the absence of non-manifestationness need notbe assumed to be the cause of perception.

Anudbhūtatvābhāvakūṭa is the Cause of perception :

I. ix. 4. However, we, the Siddhāntins state here as follows : Since narrow and extensive natures are not tenable in the case of the (two) generic properties, caused (facilitated) by the contacts of fire with the forms delimited by the whiteness etc., the manifestationness occuring in the forms must be admitted to be different. Consequently lack of generalization becomes contingent when the causality of form is admitted by way of being manifested. Therefore, it must be admitted that only the non-manifestationness, as pervaded by the whiteness of form etc., constitutes different generic properties; and the group of absences of such various generic properties is conducive to

the perception of form etc. Otherwise, the consecutive perception of form etc. would become untenable. In the same way, the group of absences of such various generic properties is conducive to the perception of touch etc. Also as an alternative, we shall hold as follows : That neither the manifestedness nor the non-manifestedness can constitute the generic property. Rather, only the state of having the property pervaded by the formness constitutes the manifestedness; and the absence of such a state constitutes the non-manifestedness. For, the generic properties such as the greater degee of whiteness and the greatest degree of whiteness are found to exist in the perceptible form. However, only the generic property of the whiteness exists in the form of steam and eye etc. For, no justified means, proving the generic property of formness, as pervaded by the whitness, exists there; further, the excellence (i.e. the higher degree of the whiteness than the greater and the greatest degree of whitness) is absent. Also it cannot be argued that the formness constitutes the means, which proves the generic property of formness, as pervaded by the whiteness, to be the cause of perception; for, then the perception of white form would become contingent when the same formness becomes the cause of the perception due to brevity. In the same way, the generic property of touchness cannot constitute the means, which proves the generic property of touchness to be the cause of perception. From this too, it cannot be established that the manifestationness as associated with the hugeness in form to be the cause conducive to the perception of form etc. For, the lack of perception exists in the case of wind etc. dispite the greater degree of hugeness.

Explanation :

The Siddhāntin now elaborates his theory. According to him, narrow and extensive natures (*parāpara bhāva*) are not tenable in the case of the two generic properties, which are caused (facilitated) by the contacts of fire with the forms delimited by the whiteness etc. (*śuklatvādinā*); and therefore the manifestationness occuring in the form (*rūpavṛtty udbhavattva*) is different. Thus, lack of generalization (*ananugama*) becomes contingent when the causality of form is admitted as being manifested (*udbhūtatvena*). Therefore it must be admitted that the non-manifestationness (*anudbhavatva*), as delimited by the whiteness etc. (*Śuklatvādi vyāpa*), constitutes different generic properties (*nānā jāti*); and the group of absences of such various generic properties (*tadabhāvakūṭa*) of manifestationnesses is conducive to the perception of form etc. Otherwise the consecutive perception of form etc. (*anugata pratyakṣa*) would become untenable. Also in the same way, the group of such various generic properties of manifestationnesses needs to be

the cause conducive to the perception of touch etc. As an alternative, the Siddhāntin again proposes that neither the manifestedness (*udbhūtatva*) nor the non-manifestedness (*anudbhūtatva*) constitutes the generic property (*jāti*). Rather, only the state of having the generic property pervaded by the formness (*rūpatva vyāpya jātimattva*) is the manifestedness (*udbhūtatva*) and the absence of such a state (*tad abhāva*) is the non-manifestednes. This is so because, the generic properties such as the greater degree of whiteness and the greatest degree of whiteness (*śuklatara tamatvādi*) exist in the perceptible form (*pratyakṣe rūpe*); and only the generic property of whiteness in general (*śuklatva mātra*) exists in the form of stream (vapour) and eye etc. due to the fact that the generic property as pervaded by the whiteness (*tad vyāpya jāti*) is not justified. Further the Siddhāntin refutes the position that the formness (*rūpatva*) is the justification for admitting the generic property of the formness as pervaded by the whiteness (*tadvyāpya jāti*). According to him, when such a generic property of formness becomes the cause of perception (*prayojaka*) due to the brevity, the perception of white form becomes contingent. In the same way, only the generic property of the touchness in general (*sparśatva*) needs to be admitted as the cause of perception of touch etc. (*sparśādi*). Therefore, the manifestationness, as associated with the hugeness (*mahattvena udbhavatva*), does not get established to be the cause of perception of form etc.; and this is justified, as the lack of perception is observed in the case of wind dispite the greater degree of hugeness (*mahattvotkarṣa*).

Impediment to Perception :

I. ix. 5. Now it may be objected as follows : That the fire existing in the frying pan, and the sun light manifesting the pot existing in the water, would be required to be perceived; for, the water and the frying pan are perceptible; and therefore, they have the perceptible forms. However, it cannot be argued that the particular contacts pertaining to them, i.e. the water and the frying pan, are the impediments to the perception of them. Since the water and the frying pan are to be manifested by the light, no impediment can exist in the perception of the water and the frying pan. Also suppose the same contacts pertaining to them, constitute the impediments to the perception, then, the non-perception of the fire connected with the frying pan and the sun-light connected with water would become contingent. It should be noted that the distinction between the contacts is not caused by the generic property; for, then the fault of cross-connection would arise due to the state of being produced from the contact of either of the two. Also, suppose the same contact is held to be various like the high pitch of sound, then the heaviness arises. Also, the individual contact cannot differ mutually; for, then lack of

generaliazation would become contingent. However, this objection is not correct. The sunlight existing in the water is definitely perceived. However, since both the light and the water are clear, they are not perceived distinctly from each other. Also, the very distinct light, which is of imperceptible form but of perceptible touch, gets produced in the frying pan by such parts which are associated with fire. Also in the same way, sometimes the fire gets produced in the extremely boiling oil due to the entry of the parts of fire of perceptible form. However, it is not correct to hold that the curd is produced in the same way by the curd-atoms associated with the milk; for, the curd is the substance to be produced from the destruction of milk; and the curd, like the split-milk, is to be materially produced by the material causes of the milk.

Explanation :

The Pūrvapakṣin now raises the objection that the fire (*vahni*) existing in the frying pan (*bharjana kapāla*), and the sunlight (*sūratejas*) manifesting the pot existing in the water, would be required to be perceived. According to him, the water and the frying pan are perceptible (*pratyakṣa*); and therefore, have perceptible form (*udbhūta rūpa*). The Pūrvapakṣin refutes the argument that the particular contacts pertaining to the water and frying pan (*tayoḥ saṁyoga viśeṣa*) constitute the impediments to the perception. According to him, the water and the frying pan are to be manifested by the light (*āloka vyaṅgya*); and therefore nothing can impede the perception of them. Also suppose the same contacts constitute the impediments (*pratibandhaka*), then the perception of the fire connected with the frying pan and the sun light connected with water would become imperceptible. The Pūrvapakṣin notes that the distinction (*viśeṣa*), belonging to the contacts (*samyoga*), is not caused by the generic property (*jātikṛta*); as then the cross-connection (*saṅkara*) would result due to being produced from the contact of either of the two (*anyatara karmajatvena*). Also he notes that suppose the same contact is various (*nānā*), then the heaviness arises. Also he notes that suppose the individual contact (*tatsamyoga*) differs, then lack of generalization would arise. However, the Siddhāntin refutes the objection. According to him, the sunlight existing in the water (*jalastha tejas*) is certainly perceptible; however, since both the water and the light are very clear, they are not perceived distinctly. Also, the light, which is of imperceptible form (*anudbhūta rūpa*) but of perceptible touch (*udbhūta sparśa*), is produced in the frying pan by the parts associated with fire (*vahni sahacarita*); and the fire too is produced in the boiling oil by the entry of parts of fire of perceptible form (*udbhūta rūpāvayava*). However, the Siddhāntin refutes the position that the curd (*dadhi*) is produced from the curd-atoms (*daddhi paramāṇu*) associated with

the milk. According to him, the curd is the substance to be produced from the destruction of milk (*dugdha dhvaṁsa*); and hence the same is to be produced materially from the material causes of milk (*dugdhopādāna*).

Siddhānta that Mahattva too is the cause :

I. ix. 6. Now it may be objected as follows : That the perceptible touch is not present in the fire of perceptible form. For, the knowledge of heat (hot vapour) is tenable there in the fire only by the regulation of another light associated with heat (not vapour). The totality of causes of perceptible form and the totality of causes of perceptible touch are known to have mutual contradiction in the case of the hot light etc. However, this objection is not correct. Both form and touch are ascertained in the fire from the non-contradictory recognition that 'I touch the same fire which I have seen' and also from the perception and the touching. Also the lightness is not an impediment in the production of the touch in the fire. The production and the non-production of qualities are caused by the difference between the instrumental causes. The lightness, being the generic property directly pervaded by the substanceness existing in the substance possessing form, exists in the substance (fire) possessing the perceptible form and touch. Also no contradiction can arise between perceptible form and perceptible touch, as both of them co-exist in water and earth. And the appearant contradiction (between form and touch) is caused in the case of light by the difference between the instrumental causes. Though the hugenes and the state of possessing many substances, which are associated with perceptible form, are equal due to the positive and negative concomitances by occurring in the same substance as bound by both, the hugeness or the state of possessing many substances or both such a state and the hugeness are not the determining causes in the case of perceptibility of substances; rather only the hugeness is the determining cause due to the brevity. For, in the case of luft of cotton, etc., the increase in the quality of hugeness produced from the collection occurs dispite the lack of increase in number of substances; and also in such cases, the excellence in the clarity of perception is observed.

Now, it may be argued as follows : That in the case of the heap of hair existing far away, the hugeness is lacking due to the non-increase in the number of substances; however, the perceptibility of substance (hair) occurs due to the state of having many substances produced from the contacts of similar single hair threads. Consequently, the state of having many substances is the determining cause in the perceptibility of form. However, this is not correct. The state of having many substances can constitute the cause of perception only by inherence. However, the same cannot be so by contact due to over extension. Thus, in the case of the perception of the object of distance,

contact with similar substances needs to be admitted as being the associate cause of the state of possessing the many substances. Instead, let the same contact with similar substances be admitted as the associate cause of the hugeness only. Now it may be argued as follows: That suppose the state of having perceptible form and the hugeness constitute the mere natural competency of the perceptibility of substance, then the same would not have the causality unlike the staffness.

However, this is not correct. Since the excellence in perception depends on the excellence in the state of having perceptible form and the hugeness, both of them have the causality. The absence of the effect does not conform usually to the absence of the excellence in the causes. However, this is not so in the case of the staffness. Also since the qualifying properties differ, (the perception of) the substance has the nature of both (the state of having the perceptible form and the hugeness). Both of them, have the causality, in the case of the visual perception of substance, by way of being the objects of perception. However, the same two constitute the delimitors of the causality in the case of the (perception of) substance by way of being common properties.

Explanation :

The Pūrvapakṣin now raises the objection that the perceptible touch (*udbhūta sparśa*) is absent in the fire of perceptible form (*udbhūta rūpa*); and the knowledge of heat (*ūṣma buddhi*) is tenable in the fire only by the regulation of another light associated with heat. Also the totality of causes of perceptible form and the totality of causes of perceptible touch (*udbhūta rūpodbhūtasparśa sāmagryoḥ*) are contradictory in the case of the hot light etc.

However, the Siddhāntin, the Naiyāyika refutes the objection. According to him, both form and touch are ascertained in fire from the perception and the touching (*darśana sparśanābhyām*). Further, he states that the lightness (*tejastva*) is not an impediment (*bādhaka*) to the production of touch in the fire, as the production and the non-production of qualities are caused by the difference between the instrumental causes (*nimittabheda*). The lightness (*tejastva*) exists in the substance (fire) possessing the perceptible form and touch (*udbhūta rūpa sparśavad vṛtti*). Also perceptible form and perceptible touch are not contradictory, as both of them co-exist in water and earth; and the contradiction between form and touch is caused in the case of light by the difference between the instrumental causes (*nimitta bheda*).

The Siddhāntin points out here that dispite that the state of having many substances and the hugeness (*mahatvāneka dravya vattvayoḥ*), as associated with perceptible form, are equal due to the positive and negative concomitances (*anvaya vyatireka tulyayoḥ*), by occurring in the same

substance as bound by both (*yuga naddha vāhityā*), the same are not the determining causes (*tantra*); rather, only the hugeness (*mahattva*) is the cause in the case of the perceptibility of substance (*dravya cākṣuṣatve*). According to him, the increase in the quality of hugeness (*utkṛṣta parimāṇa*) produced from the collection (*pracaya*), occurs in the case of tuft of cotton, dispite the lack of the increase in the number of substances; and hence only the hugeness is the cause of perception.

Also the Pūrvapakṣin argues that in the case of the heap of hair existing far away (*dūrastha keśarāśi*), the hugeness (*mahatva*) is lacking due to the non-increase in the number of substances; however, the perceptibility of substance (hair) (*dravya pratyakṣatā*) occurs due to the state of having many substances (*aneka dravya vattva*); and therefore, the state of having many substances too needs to be admitted as the determining cause (*tantra*) of perception.

However, the Siddhāntin refutes the argument on the ground that the state of having many substances (*aneka dravya sambandhitva*) can be the cause of perception only by inherence (*samavāyena*) and not by contact (*saṃyogena*); and therefore, in the case of the perception of the objects of distance, the contact with similar substances (*sajātīya saṃyoga*) needs to be admitted as the associate cause of the state of possessing many substances; however, instead the same similar contacts can be admitted to be the cause of the hugeness only.

Also the Pūrvapakṣin argues that suppose the state of having the perceptible form (*udbhūta rūpa vattva*) and the hugeness (*mahattva*) constitute the mere natural competency (*svarūpa yogyatā*) of the perceptibility of substance (*dravya pratyakṣatā*), then the same cannot have the causality (*kāraṇatā*).

However, the Siddhāntin refutes the argument on the ground that the excellence in perception (*pratyakṣotkarṣa*) depends on the excellence in the state of having perceptible form and the hugeness; and therefore both of them have the causality. The absence of the effect (*akārya*) does not usually conform to the absence of the excellence in the causes (*akāraṇotkarṣa*). However, this is not so in the case of the staffness. Both the state of having the perceptibile form and the hugeness have the causality in the case of the visual perception of substance (*cākṣuṣa dravya jñāna*) by way of being the objects of perception (*viṣayatvena*). However, the same two constitute the delimitors of the causality (*kāraṇatāvacchedaka*) in the case of the (perception of) substance by being consecutive properties (*anugatatvena*).

B

Theory of Perception of Wind (Vāyu pratyakṣa vādaḥ)

Pūrvapaksin's view : Wind is perceptible and Ubdhūtarūpa vattva is not Tantra in the perception of wind :

I. ix. 7. It may be held (by the Pūrvapakṣin) now as follows : That the state of having the perceptible form is not the determining cause in the case of perception of substance. For, wind is perceptible (even without perceptible form). And the perceptibility of wind can be inferred as follows : "Wind is perceptible; for, it is the substratum of perceptible visual touch; or it is the substratum of perceptible touch while having the hugeness like in the pot". And no deviation of probans arises in the case of the hot vapour due to the perceptibility. Also, the probans is not non-conducive (in proving perceptibility of wind). For, the state of having the perceptible touch while having the hugeness is conducive to the state of being perceptible by sense of touch. However, the state of having the perceptible form is not so due to the heaviness.

Also it cannot be argued that the state of having the perceptible form, which pervades the probandum delimited by the property of the subject and also which pervades the probandum delimited by the probans, is the deviating condition of inference; for, the same state is not conducive to the state of being perceptible by sense of touch; also the experience of perception of wind such as "Wind blows" arises after the operation of skin organ, i.e. touch. Also, the state of being perceptible by sense of touch cannot be held to be destroyed in the non-perception of the probans of touch; for, then the same destruction would become contingent in the pot as well. Also, when the touch is held to be inferential, the cognition would be that 'Touch exists in the wind'; however, the cognition would not be that 'Wind is neither hot nor cold'. Also even when the touch is not perceived, the cognition of perception such as 'Wind is cold' is produced at times. Also it cannot be claimed that such a cognition of perception as 'Wind is cold' is produced only upon the wind being inferred to be conducive to the knowledge of cold substance; for, no contradiction arises even in admitting otherwise; and the imposition of contradictory quality is untenable in the case of the perception of a particular quality.

Now it may be held that the state of not being perceptible by sense of eye is an impediment to the state of being perceptible by sense of touch; for, that which is not being perceived by eye is not perceived by sense of touch

also. However, then we shall reply that sense of eye would become only the producer of knowledge of substance and sense of touch would perceive only touch like that in the wind; and the regonition of substance and touch too would be possible only by sense of eye and sense of touch respectively. Now it may be held that since experience of touch of substance is unavoidable, sense of touch produces the perception of touch only as associated with the substratum; however, then we shall admit that the perception of touch as associated with substratum is equally tenable even in the case of wind by sense of touch.

Now it may be objected that the rule is that the only when the number and measure etc. existing in substance are perceived, the substance is perceived in the absence of impeding defect; and since the number and measure etc. are never perceived in wind under any circumstances, wind is not perceptible at all. However, this is pot correct. Such a rule does not apply to the (perception of) individual substance. Even when the number and measure of the clothing hanging from the back of a gentleman, are not perceived, the clothing is perceived by the organ of skin. Also, the number and measure etc. are perceived in wind in the case of the blowing of wind of similar type, and the striking touch of wind is perceived in the body.

Explanation :

Now Gangeśa begins his Theory of perception of wind. with the introduction of the Pūrvapakṣin's view. According to the Pūrvapakṣin, the state of having the perceptible form (*udbhūta rūpa vattva*) is not the determining cause of perception of substance (*tantra*), as wind (*vāyu*) is perceptible even without perceptible form. And the inference, viz. 'Wind is perceptible (*vāyuḥ pratyakṣaḥ*); for, it is the substratum of perceptible touch while having the hugeness (*mahatve sati udbhūta sparśa vattvāt*), proves the perceptibility of wind. Also the inference proving the perceptibility of wind is not faulty by the deviation of the probans (*vyabhicāra*) in the hot vapour (*uṣman*), as the perceptibility occurs there. Alsothe probans is not non-conducive (*aprayojaka*) in proving the perceptibility of wind, as the state of having the perceptible touch while having the hugeness (*mahatve sati udbhūta sparśavattva*) is conducive to the state of (wind) being perceptible by sense of touch (*spārśana pratyakṣatve*).

The Pūrvapakṣin refutes the argument that the state of having the perceptible form (*udbhūta rūpa vattva*), which pervades the probandum delimited by the property of subject (*pakṣa dharmāvachinna sādhya vyāpaka*) and also pervades the probandum delimited by the probans (*sādhanāvacchinna sādhya vyāpaka*), is the deviating condition of inference (*upādhi*). According

to him, such a state is not conducive to the state of being perceptible by sense of touch (*spārśana pratyakṣatve*); and also the experience of perception of wind such as 'Wind blows' (*vāyur vāti*) arises after the operation of skin organ (*tvag indriya vyāpāra*). Also the state of being perceptible by sense of touch cannot be destroyed in the non-perception of the probans of touch (*sparśa liṅgāgrahe*), as the same destruction would become contingent in the pot. Also the touch would not be inferential, as then the cognition would be that 'Touch exists in the wind' (*sparśo vāyuvṛttiḥ*); however, it would not be that 'Wind is neither hot nor cold' (*anuṣṇāśīta sparśo vāyuḥ*). Also he rejects the position that such a cognition of perception as 'Wind is cold' (*śīto vāyuḥ*) is produced only upon the inference of the wind being conducive to the knowledge of cold substance (*śīta dravyo panāyakatvena*). According to him, the imposition of the contradictory quality (*āropa*) is untenable in the case of the perception of a particular quality. Also the Pūrvapakṣin refutes the position that "The state of not being perceptible by sense of eye (*acākṣuṣatva*) is an impedement to the state of being perceptible by sense of touch (*spārśanatve*) (*tantra*); for, that which is not being perceived by sense of eye (*cakṣuṣā anupa labhya mānasya*) is not perceived by sense of touch (*tvacā anupalabhāt*)". According to him, sense of eye produces merely the knowledge of substance (*dravya grāhaka*) and sense of touch produces the knowledge of touch. Also suppose the sense of touch produces the knowledge of touch as associated with substratum (*āśrayasahita sparśa*), then the same perception of touch as associated with substance is equally tenable in the case of wind by sense of touch.

Also the Pūrvapakṣin refutes the rule that only when the qualities such as the number and measure etc. (*saṅkhyādi*) existing in the substance are perceived, the substance is perceived; and since the qualities such as the number and measure etc. are never perceived in wind, the same wind is not perceptible. According to him, such a rule cannot be applied to the perception of individual substance (*vyaktau*). Depite the non-perception of the number and measure of the clothing hanging from the back, the clothing is perceived by the organ of skin. Also the number and measure etc. (*saṅkhyā parimāṇā di*) are perceived in the case of the perception of blowing of wind (*vāyv abbighāta*) in the body.

Siddhānta that wind (*Vāyu*) is Imperceptible :

I. ix. 8. This might be so. However, wind is not perceptible. For, the state of having the perceptible form, while having the hugeness, is the cause conducive to the perception of substance produced from the external organ of sense. When the possiblility of a cause exists, the abandonment of the same cause is untenable.

However, the state of having the particular quality to be perceived by the produced external sense organ, or the state of having the particular quality, which has the community of locus with the hugeness of effect, does not constitute the cause. For, then the yellow substance existing in tongue, the perceptible bitter taste and the fragrant substance brought by wind would need to be perceptible.

Explanation :

The Siddhāntin, however, proposes the wind to be imperceptible on the ground that the state of having the manifest or perceptible form (*udbhūta rūpa vattva*), while having the hugeness (*mahatve sati*), is the cause conducive to the perception of substance produced by the external organ of sense (*bahirindriya ja dravya pratyakṣe*). According to him, when the possibility of a cause exists, the abandonment of the possibility of such a cause is not tenable. Also he notes that the state of having the particular quality (*viśeṣa guṇavattva*) to be grasped by the produced external sense-organ (*bahirindriya grāhya*), or the state of having the praticular quality (*viśeṣa guṇa vattva*), which has the community of locus with the hugeness of effect (*kārya mahattva samānādhikaraṇa*), does not constitute the cause. For, then the yellow substance existing in tongue etc. would be required to be perceptible.

Pūrvapakṣin's Refutation :

I. ix. 9. No, this position of the Siddhāntin is not correct. The state of having the perceptible form is not the cause of perception. For, then the yellow substance belonging to the eye would be required to be perceptible.

As an alternative, we, the Pūrvapakṣins, may admit that the state of having the manifested or perceptible touch is the cause of perception of wind. Also this way, imperceptibility need not occur in the sun-ray. For, the ray is the form of light; however, it does not constitute the substance. And the perception of light, i.e. the substatum of ray, is dependent on the cause, such as the perceptible form; and it is similar to the perception of the hot vapour in your theory.

It may be asked now as to how are the contact and the action etc. perceived in the rays etc. However, we shall reply that they are never perceived in the lunar, solar and lamp-rays. Since the form of the ray of sapphire etc. is not obtained in the earliar region, but is obtained in the next region, the contact and the separation etc. of the substratum of the ray of sapphire are to be inferred through the probans. And this is like the inference of the contact etc. in the blowing of wind after the perception of the touch in general through sense organ of skin in your theory. From this, the following position too gets

refuted: "That smoke and vapour are not the objects of perception by sense of touch; and therefore they need to be the objects of perception by sense of eye dispite the absence of perceptible form. Otherwise, the perceptibility of the contact and separation and action etc., occuring in the smoke etc., would not be tenable, due to the absence of any conducive characteristics".

The state of having many particular qualities, that are competent to be perceived by external sense organs, cannot be the cause of perception. For, then, the atom of dust moving in the sun beam and the ray of light would become imperceptible in your theory. Also such a theory is heavy.

It may be argued now that let both of them, i.e. the state of having the perceptible form and the state of having the perceptible touch , be admitted to have the causality (lit. thusness) due to the lack of determining factor; but the wind is imperceptible. However, we shall reply that then in your theory, in the case of the perception of substance produced from external sense-organ, both the state of having the perceptible touch and the state of having the perceptible form would culminate into being the causes separately with regard to the perception of the wind by sense of touch and the perception of the pot by sense of eye; and thus the heaviness arises. However, I have the brevity in assumption. For, the state of having the perceptible form is the cause in the case of the state of being perctived by sense of eye and the state of having perceptible touch is the cause in the case of the state of being perceived by sense of touch. The state or condition of having a quality, which is conducive to the perceptibility of an entity in particular, is conducive to the perceptibility of the same entity in general in a general way. Therefore, the state of having the particular perceptible quality, which determines the causality of external organ perceiving substance, is the cause conducive to the state of being perceived by sense organ in general. Since particular and general perceptions are ruled to be caused by different conditions, one and the same state or condition cannot be the cause conducive to the perceptions of both substances. Thus the wind is perceptible.

Explanation :

However, the Pūrvapakṣin refutes the position of the Siddhāntin that the wind is imperceptible. According to him, the state of having the perceptible form (*udbhūta rūpavat tva*) cannot be the cause of perception of substance, as then the yellow substance existing in the eye would be required to be perceptible.

Also he suggests that, as an alternative, the state of having the perceptible touch (*udbhūta sparśavat tva*) can be admitted to be the cause of perception of wind. According to him, this way, even the ray (*prabhā*) need not become imperceptible (*apratyakṣa*), as the ray constitutes only the form of light and the perception of light, i.e. the substratum of ray, is dependent on the cause, i.e. the perceptible form. (*pratyakṣa rūpa liṅga*).

The Pūrvapakṣin now replies to the question as to how are the contact and the action etc. perceived in the rays. According to him, the contact etc. are never perceived in the lunar and other rays. Also since the form of the ray of sapphire etc. (*indranīla prabhā*) are not obtained in the earliar region, the contact etc. of the substratum of ray of sapphire are to be inferred through the probans (*liṅga*). From this, the Pūrvapakṣin refutes the position that "Smoke and vapour (*dhūmabāṣpayoḥ*) are not the objects of perception by sense of touch (*aspārśana*), and therefore they are only the objects of perception by sense of eye (*cākṣuṣa*); and otherwise the perceptibility of the contact and the action etc. occurring in the smoke etc. would become untenable".

The Pūrvapakṣin refutes the argument that the state of having many particular qualities (*aneka viśeṣa guṇa vattva*), that are competent to be perceived by external sense-organs (*bahirindriya yogya*), is the cause of perception. According to him, then the atom of dust moving in the sun beam and the ray of light (*trasareṇu prabhayoḥ*) would become imperceptible (*apratyakṣa*).

Also the Pūrvapakṣin refutes the argument that both the state of having the perceptible form and the state of having the perceptible touch (*ubhaya*) could be admitted to be the cause of perception due to the lack of determining factor (*vinigamakābhāva*); however, wind is imperceptible. According to him, then this way, both the state of having the perceptible touch and the state of having the perceptible form would become the causes of the perception of substance produced from external organ, with regard to both the perception of the wind by sense of touch (*spārśana pratyakṣatve*) and the perception of the pot by sense of eye (*cākṣuṣatve*); and hence the heaviness results. Also, the Pūrvapakṣin states that he has the brevity, as the state of having the perceptible form (*udbhūta rūpa vattva*) is the cause in the case of perception by sense of eye (*cākṣuṣatve*) and the state of having the perceptible touch (*udbhūta sparśavattva*) is the cause in the case of perception by sense of touch (*spārśanatve*). Also the state or condition of having a quality, which is conducive to the perceptibility of an entity in particular (*viśeṣe prayojaka*), is conducive to the perceptibility of the same entity in general (*sāmānya prayojaka*). Therefore, the state of having the particular perceptible quality (*udbhūta viśeṣa guṇa vattva*), which determines the causality of external organ perceiving substance (*bahirindriya vyavasthāpaka*), is the cause conducive to the state of being perceived by sense organ in general (*sāmānya prayojaka*). Also since particular and general perceptions are ruled to be produced by

different conditions (*bhinna prayoja*), one and the same state or condition cannot produce the perceptions of both.

Spṛśāmi is Valid in wind :

I. ix. 10. It may be objected now as follows : That "Suppose wind is the substance constituting the object of direct perception produced from the external organ of sense, or suppose the wind is the substance constituting the object of the direct perception produced from the sense of touch, then it would be the substance of perceptible form; however, wind is not so; and therefore, it is not the object of direct perception. For, the substance constituting the object of such a direct perception is ruled to be producing the form".

However, this objection is not correct. The substance is the producer of the form only as being inherent in what is the possessor of form; however, it is not so as being the substance constituting the object of such a direct perception. For, such a state (of being the substance constituting the object of perception) arises subsequent to the production of form.

Now it should be observed as follows : Suppose the pot is the substance to be perceived by the sense organs that are other than the eye, then it would be the substance which is formless, touchless and imperceptible by sense of eye. Also suppose the sense-organ of touch is the external organ of sense which perceives the substance, then it would be the possessor of form, and the producer of the perception of form, but not the producer of the perception of touch, like the sense of eye. However, sense organ of touch is not so; and therefore it is not such an external organ of sense; and thus the pot too would not be the object of perception by the sense organ of touch, and the knowledge regarding the number etc. belonging to the pot would be required to be produced by the inference like in the case of blowing of air. However, the fact is that the recognition such as 'I feel the sense of touch' is produced even in the case of the wind like in the case of the pot.

Explanation :

The Siddhāntin now raises the objection that "Suppose wind (*vāyu*) is the subtance constituting the object of direct perception (*sākṣātkāra viṣaya dravya*), produced from the external organ of sense (*bahirindriya janya*), or suppose it is the substance constituting the object of direct perception (*sākṣātkāra viṣaya dravya*), produced from the sense of touch (*spārśana*), then it would be the substance of perceptible form (*udbhūta rūpa*); however, wind is not so; and therefore it is not the object of direct perception. For, the substance constituting the object of such a direct perception is ruled to be producing the form (*rūpa junakatva niyamāt*)". However, the Pūrvapakṣin refutes the objection. According to him, the substance (*dravya*) is the producer of the form (*rūpa janaka*), only as being inherent in what is the possessor of form (*rūpavat samavetatvena*) and not as being the substance constituting the object of direct perception (*sākṣātkāra viṣaya dravyatvena*), as such a state arises subsequent to the production of form.

The Pūrvapakṣin observes that suppose the pot (*ghaṭa*) is the substance to be perceived by the sense organs other than the eye (*cakṣur iterendriya grāhya dravya*), then it would become formless, touchless and imperceptible by sense of eye. Also, suppose the sense organ of touch (*tvag indriya*) is the external organ of sense (*bahir indriya*) perceiving the substance, then it would be the producer of the perception of form (*rūpa grāhi*), but it would not be the producer of the perception of touch (*sparśa grāhaka*) like the organ of eye. However, the sense organ of touch is not so, and therefore it is not the external organ of sense. Thus, the pot too would not be the object of perception by the sense- organ of touch (*tvag indriya grāhya*). However, it should be noted that the recognition (*anuvyavasāya*) such as 'I feel the sense of touch' (*spṛśāmi*) is produced in the case of the wind like in the case of the pot, and hence wind is perceptible.

Only Udbhūta sparśa is the Tantra :

I. ix. 11. Now it may again be argued as follows : That even the perceptible form, like the perceptible touch, is the cause of perceptibility by the sense of touch; for, the perceptibility of substance by the sense of touch, like the perceptibility by the sense of eye, is observed in the case of the substance having the perceptible form.

However, this argument is not correct. Despite the state of having the percept ible form, the perceptibility by the sense of touch is absent in the case of the ray of the sun etc.; and therefore, the state of having the perceptible touch is necessary in the case of the perceptibility by the sense of touch. Thus the state of having the perceptible form becomes redundant in the case of the perceptibility by the sense of touch. On the other hand, the absence of the perceptibility by the sense of touch does not occur due to the absence of the perceptible form in the presence of the perceptible touch.

It may be objected that let the manifestation belonging to the touch be admitted as the cause of the perceptibility by the sense of touch; however, the form need not be admitted as the cause.

However, we shall reply that both touch and its manifestation are the causes of perceptibility by the sense of touch; but the form is not the cause. In the presence of both touch and the manifestation of touch, the absence of

perceptuality by the sense of touch is not observed due to the absence of form. As a matter of fact, the generic properties of the manifestationnesses belonging to the form and the touch constitute merely the delimitors of the causality; however, they do not constitute the causes of the perceptibility by the sense of touch.

Explanation :

The Siddhāntin now raises the argument that even the perceptible form (*udbhūta rūpa*), like the perceptible touch (*udbhūta sparśa*), is the cause (*tantra*) of the perceptibility by the sense of touch (*spārśanatve*). According to him, the perceptibility by sense of touch is observed in the case of the substance having the perceptible form (*udbhūta rūpavattve*).

However, the Pūrvapakṣin refutes the argument. According to him, the perceptibility by the sense of touch (*spārśanatva*) is absent in the ray of sun etc. dispite the state of having the perceptible form (*udbhūta rūpavattve*); and therefore only the state of having the perceptible touch (*udbhūta sparśa*) needs to be the cause in the case of the perceptuality by the sense of touch. Thus, the state of having the perceptible form (*udbhūta rūpavattva*) is redundant in the perceptibility by the sense of touch. Also when the perceptible touch (*udbhūta sparśa*) is present, the absence of the perceptibiality by the sense of touch (*spārśanatvābhāva*) does not occur dispite the absence of the perceptible form (*udbhūta rūpābhāva*).

Also the Siddhāntin raises the objection that the manifestation belonging to the touch (*sparśagataḥ udbhavaḥ*) needs to be the cause of the perceptibility by the sense of touch (*spārśanatva*); and the perceptible form need not be the cause.

However, the Pūrvapakṣin replies that both the touch and its manifestation (*sparśaḥ tadudbhavaśca*) are the causes of perceptibility by sense of touch; but the form (*rūpa*) is not the cause. According to him, the absence of perceptibility by the sense of touch is not observed in the absence of form, provided that touch and its manifestation are present. Also the generic properties of the manifestationnesses (*udbhavatva jāti*) belonging to the touch and the form constitute merely the delimitors of the causality (*kāraṇatā vacchedake*); but do not constitute the causes (*kāraṇe*).

Theory of the Navīnas :

Wind (*Vāyu*) is Imperceptible (*apratyakṣa*) :

I. ix. 12. Here we, the Navīnas, state our position. Mere perceptible touch cannot constitute the cause of the perceptibility of substance (wind) by sense of touch. Since the perceptible touch exists in the hot summer vapour and hot and cold substance brought by wind, the number, measure, contact, separation and action existing in such summer vapour and the hot and cold substance, would become perceptible. Also since the number etc. are perceptible only by existing in the competent individual substances, they are ascertained to be competent of perception by the totality of causes producing the knowledge of substance. Also dispite the absence of any defect in the substance of the class of hot vapour, the number is never perceived in the hot vapour by any one in the event of touching it by hand like in the case of pot. In the same way, suppose the state of having perceptible form in general is the cause of perception, then the perception of the number beloning to the moon rays and the yellow substance would become contingent in the event of the perception of the moon rays etc. and the yellow substance belonging to the eye. Despite perceiving mimutely vapour etc., we do not observe the numbers such as the twoness etc., the measure such as the expanse of hand and the action in the case of vapour etc. like in the case of the pot. Thus, both the state of having the perceptible touch and the state of having the perceptible form constitute the causes of the perception of substance by external organs due to mutual deviation of each one of them and also due to the absence of any determining factor. Therefore wind is imperceptible.

Also this way, we do not transgress the established conclusive theory of the Naiyāyikas. In the perception such as 'Conch is yellow', one perceives only the yellow colour of the yellowness of the eye; however one does not perceive the yellow substance as such; for, the yellow substance has its parts divided like the light (has its parts divided) in the rays, as stated by the commentator. This is the position of the Navīnas.

Explanation :

The Navinas among the Naiyāyikas state here their position. According to them, the mere perceptible touch (*udbhūta sparśa mātra*) does not constitute the cause (*tantra*) of the perceptibility of substance by sense of touch (*spārśanatve*); for, then the number etc. (*saṅkhyādi*) existing in the hot summer vapour etc. would need to become perceptible, as the perceptible touch exists in the hot summer vapour etc. Also since the number etc. are perceptible (*yogya*) only by existing in the competent individuals (*yogya vyakti vṛtti*), they are ascertained to be competent of perception by the totality of causes (*sāmagrī grāhya*) producing the perception of substance. The number is never perceived by anyone in the event of touching of the vapour by hand like in the case of pot. Now suppose the state of having the perceptible form in general (*udbhūta rūpa vattva mātra*) is the cause of perception, then the perception of number belongings to the moon rays (*tadgata saṅkhyā graha*) would become necessary

in the event of the perceptibility of the moon rays etc. (*candrādyudyotasya pratyakṣatve*). Despite perceiving the vapour etc. minutely, we do not observe the number such as the twoness in them. Therefore, both the state of having the perceptible touch (*udbhūta sparśavattva*) and the state of having the perceptible form (*udbhūta rūpavattva*) constitute the causes of the perceptibility of the substance by external organs of sense (*bahir indriya dravya pratyakṣatve*) due to mutual deviation of each one of them (*vyabhicārāt*). Thus, wind (*vāyu*) is imperceptible (*apratyakṣa*).

The Navīnas further state that the established conclusion of the Naiyāyikas is not transgressed when the wind is held to be imperceptual. According to them, in the perception such as 'Conch is yellow' (*pītaḥ śaṅkhaḥ*), one perceives only the yellow colour of the yellowness of the eye (*nayana pitta pītimā*); and one does not perceive the yellow substance (*pitta dravya*) as such; as the yellow substance has its parts divided (*vibhaktāvayavattvāt*) like in the case of rays.

Sampradāyavids' View : Wind is Imperceptible :

I. ix. 13. The Traditionalists (Sampradāyavids) hold here as follows : Suppose only the state of having the perceptible touch, but not the state of having the perceptible form, is admitted to be the cause of perception of substance, then the perceptibility of the separation from the earlier region and the contact with the next region would become untenable in the case of the row of birds moving; for, the circle of rays belonging to the earliar and the next regions would not be the object of perception by not having the perceptible touch. Thus, in the theory of the Others, the inferential cognition of movement such as 'This row of birds moves' would not be tenable from the probans of the circle of rays. Also, in the theory of us, the inferential cognition of movement such as 'Moon and stars move', based on the probans of contact and the separation, would not be tenable with respect to the Moon and Stars.

Also it should not be argued that the inference of movement of row of birds is tenable from the probans of the contact and the separation of birds after inferring the contact and the separation in the next and the earliar regions through the perception and the non-perception of birds; for, the probans cannot be established due to the non-perception of the earliar and the next regions. Therefore, the state of having the perceptible form needs to be the cause conducive to the perception of wind. Thus wind is imperceptible.

Explanation :

The Sampradāyavids too now establish that the wind (*vāyu*) is imperceptible (*apratyakṣa*). According to them, when only the state of having

the perceptible touch (*udbhūta sparśa vattā*) is admitted to be the cause of the perception of substance, the separation from the earliar region and the contact with the next region (*pūrvadeśa vibhāgottara deśa saṁyoga*) would not be perceptible in the case of the row of birds moving, as the circle of rays (*prabhāmaṇḍala*), belonging to the earliar and the next regions, is imperceptible due to not having the perceptible touch. Thus, in the Others theory, the cognition of movement (*pratīti*) such as 'This row of birds moves' (*calati*) could not be tenable from the probans of circle of rays. And in the theory of us, the cognition of movement such as 'Moon and stars move' (*gatyanumana*) based on the probans of contact and separation (*saṁyoga vibhāga liṅgaka*) would not be tenable. The Navīnas refute the argument that the inference of movement of row of birds (*gaty anumāna*) can be tenable from the probans of the contact and the separation of birds after inferring them in the next and the earliar regions. According to them, the probans cannot be established due to the non-perception of the next and the earliar regions. Thus, the Sampradāyavids establish that only the state of having the perceptible form (*udbhūta rūpa vattva*) needs to be the cause conducive to (*prayojaka*) the perception of the wind. Thus, the wind is imperceptible (*apratyakṣa*).

Explanation of the knowledge 'Wind is cold' (*Śīto vāyuḥ*) :

I. ix. 14. It may be objected now as follows : That in the theory that the wind is inferable, the invalid knowledge of superimposition of the cold touch such as 'Wind is cold' cannot refer to the cold touch in the wind; for, the qualificand, i.e. the wind is not competent of possessing the cold touch. It should not be argued that the reference to the cold touch in the wind is untenable only in the case of the valid knowledge of the wind. For, no contradiction arises with respect to the reference to the cold touch in the case of knowledge of the wind in general. Also it is not correct to argue that such an invalid knowledge as 'Wind is cold' refers to the imposition of the cold touch, known through the sense of touch, on the wind which is known through inference; or that it refers to the imposition of the identity of cold substance with the wind; for, the mind cannot perceive the four qualities such as touch which are inferred through the wind; also cold touch cannot be inferred through the wind. Also it is not correct to argue that such an invalid knowledge refers to the imposition of cold touch known through mind on the wind inferred as the cause of the knowledge of cold substance; for, the cold touch cannot be imposed on the wind which is inferred as the non-substratum of the cold touch. Also the invalid knowledge of cold touch such as 'Wind is cold' cannot constitute the illusion produced from external organ of sense; like the knowledge 'Conch is yellow'. For, then the same invalid knowledge

would become contingent, due to the force of defect, even in the case of inferential knowledge of distinction. Further, even the person, not knowing the medium (means) of knowledge of cold substance, has the invalid knowledge of cold touch such as 'Wind is cold'. Also the same invalid knowledge cannot constitute the illusion of the form of inference produced from the fallacy of probans; for, the cold touch, by way of having the wind as the probans, cannot be the object of illusion due to not being known. Also such an invalid knowledge as 'Wind is cold' cannot be held to be the superimposition of the identity of the recollected wind on the cold substance inferred through the cold touch; for, the same knowledge constitutes the cognition of the cold touch which has the wind as the qualificand. That is why, the view that such an invalid knowledge has the body, i.e. the form of illusion such as 'This cold touch belongs to wind' becomes refuted. Also such an invalid knowledge as 'Wind is cold' cannot constitute mere mental knowledge of cold touch in wind like the illusion of dream and the superimposition of the relation of the object merely assumed by oneself; for, the same invalid knowledge conforms to the operation of sense-organ of touch.

Here, we, the Sampradāyavids state our reply : The superimposition of the cold touch, which is grasped as existing in the water, by way of being contradictory property to the wind, is tenable on the wind on account of the defect in the sense organ, like the illusion (superimposition) of quarters on the sky. In the same way, the inference of the state of belonging to the wind can be tenable in the case of the cold touch on account of the superimposition of the state of being the probans of wind on the cold touch. Also it should not be argued that this way, the knowledge of cold touch such as 'This wind is cold' would not be tenable. For, the knowledge such as 'Wind is cold' is tenable on account of the superimposition of the cold touch through the mind that 'This wind is cold' after the inferential knowledge such as 'This cold touch belongs to the wind', like the knowledge such as 'Wind is not hot'. Thus, the wind is only inferable.

Explanation :

The Pūrvapakṣin now raises the objection that when the wind is inferable, the invalid knowledge of superimposition of cold touch (*āropa*) such as 'Wind is cold' (*śīto vāyuḥ*) cannot refer to the cold touch in the wind, as the qualificand, i.e. the wind (*viśeṣya*) is not competent of possessing the cold touch (*ayogya*). Also the Pūrvapakṣin refutes the argument that the reference to the cold touch in the wind is untenable only in the case of valid knowledge of the wind (*pramā*). According to him, no contradiction (*bādhaka*) arises in the case of reference to the cold touch in the knowledge of the wind in general (*sāmānye*). Also the Pūrvapakṣin refutes that the invalid knowledge of cold

touch 'Wind is cold' refers to the superimposition of cold touch (*śītāropa*) known through sense of skin on the wind (*vāyau*) which is known through inference (*anumānopanīta*). According to him, the mind (*manas*) cannot perceive the four qualities such as touch which are inferred through the wind. Further he refutes the argument that such an invalid knowledge refers to the imposition of cold touch (*śītāropa*) known through the mind on the wind (*vāyau*) inferred as the cause of the knowledge of cold substance (*śīta dravyopa nāya katvena*). According to him, the cold touch cannot be imposed on the wind which is inferred as the non-substratum of cold touch (*śītānāśraya tvena*). Also he refutes the argument that such an invalid knowledge as 'Wind is cold' is an illusion (*bhrama*) produced from external organ of sense (*bahirindriya janya*). According to him, then the same invalid knowledge would become contingent, due to the force of defect, even in the case of inferential knowledge of distinction (*ānumānika viśeṣa grahe*). Also he refutes the argument that such an invalid knowledge as 'Wind is cold' is the illusion (*bhrama*) of the form of inference (*anumitirūpa*) produced from the fallacy of probans (*liṅgābhāsa janya*). According to him, the cold touch (*śīta sparśa*), by way of having the wind as the probans (*vāyu liṅgatvena*), cannot constitute the object of illusion (*bhramā viṣaya*). Also the Pūrvapakṣin refutes the position that such an invalid knowledge as 'Wind is cold' is the superimposition of the identity of the recollected wind (*smṛta vāyu abhedāropa*) on the cold substance inferred through the cold touch (*śīta sparśānumite*). According to him, the same invalid knowledge constitutes the cognition of cold touch having wind as the qualificand (*vāyu viśeṣyaka śītapratyaya*). Also thus, the view that such an invalid knowledge has the form of illusion (*bhrama śarīra*) that 'This cold touch belongs to the wind' (*śīta sparśo' yam vāyoḥ*) gets refuted. Further, the Pūrvapakṣin refutes the view that such an invalid knowledge as 'Wind is cold' cannot constitute mere mental knowledge of cold touch (*mānaso'yam*), like the illusion of dream (*svapna vibhrama*). According to him, the invalid knowledge conforms to the operation of sense-organ of touch (*tvag indriya vyāpārā nuviddhāna*).

However, the Sampradāyavids refutes the objection of the Pūrvapakṣin. According to them, the superimposition (*āropa*) of the cold touch (*śīta sparśa*), grasped as existing in the water (*jalavṛtti*), by way of being a contradictory property to the wind (*vāyu vaidharmyeṇa*), can be tenable on the wind (*vāyau*), on account of the defect in sense organ (*doṣa māhātmyāt*), like the inference of the state of belonging to the wind (*vāyavīyatvānumāna*) is tenable in the cold touch on account of the superimposition of the state of being the probans of wind (*vāyu liṅgatvā ropa*). Also the Sampradāyavids refute the argument

that this way the knowledge such as 'This wind is cold' (*śīto vāyuḥ*) would become untenable. According to him, the knowledge such as 'Wind is cold' is tenable on account of the superimposition of cold touch through mind (*manasāropāt*) such as 'This wind is cold' after the inferential knowledge such as 'This cold touch belongs to the wind' (*śīto'yam vāyavīyaḥ*). Thus, wind is only inferable and not perceptible.

Establishment of Vāyur vāti and Vāyuḥ Śīto vāti :

I. ix. 15. It may be objected now as follows : How is the inferential knowledge such as 'Wind blows' possible after the operation of the sense-organ of touch? For, the contact and the separation, that constitute the probans of such an inferential knowledge of blowing, are imperceptible. Also it should not be argued that the act of striking of the wind against the body is the probans of the inferential knowledge of the wind; for, the act of striking, being of the form of contact, cannot be perceptible.

However, this objection is not correct. The act of striking against the body can be inferred through the particular happyness and the sorrow produced from the act of striking; and then the state of being produced from the stream possessing the touch can be inferred in the act of striking; and finally then the act of blowing of wind can be inferred from the stream. Also this way, the person, who does not know such a medium (means), cannot have the inferential knowledge of the act of blowing of wind.

Again it may be objected as follows : How is the single inferential qualificative knowledge such as 'Cold wind blows' possible? Since the knowledge of wind, as qualified by the cold touch, is mental and the knowledge of the act of blowing is inferential, the cross-connection of generic properties would become necessary in the case of inferential qualificative knowledge. However, this objection too is not correct. Since the act of blowing is inferred in the wind, which is recollected as qualified by the cold touch, the single inferential qualificative knowledge of the act of blowing of the wind is tenable. However, the two qualifiers, viz. the cold touch and the act of blowing are not cognized simultaneously to be existing at the wind. Also this way, in our theory, the heaviness in assumption does not lead to the deffect in the theory; for, the stronger contradiction prevents the perceptibility of both the qualifiers in the wind. Also this way, when the causality of the state of having the perceptible form has been established in the case of the perceptibility of the substance, produced from external organ of sense, the same state of having the perceptible form, which pervades the probandum, delimited by the property of the subject or which pervades what is delimited by the probans, constitutes the impeding condition in the case of the inference establishing the

perceptibility of wind. Also it should not be argued that the fault of the establishment of a different objective would become contingent in the case of the establishment of the deviation and the absence of the qualified entity; for, the same establishment would culminate into the establishment of the deviation and the absence of the qualificand, i.e. the probandum of the percibility the wind. And this point will be stated in the section dealing with impeding condition.

Explanation :

The Pūrvapakṣin now raises the objection that the inferential knowledge such as 'Wind blows' (*vāyur vāti*) would become untenable after the operation of the sense-organ of touch (*tvag vyāpārānantaram*), as the contact and the separation constituting the probans of such a knowledge (*talliṅga samyoga vibhāgayoḥ*) are imperceptible. Also the Pūrvapakṣin refutes the argument that the act of striking of the wind against the body (*vāyvabhighāta*) is the probans of the inferential knowledge of the wind (*talliṅga*), as the act of striking against the body, being of the form of the contact, cannot be perceptible.

However, the Siddhāntin refutes the objection. According to him, the act of striking against the body (*abhighāta*) can be inferred through the particular happyness and the sorrow (*sukha duḥkha viśeṣeṇa*) produced from the act of striking (*abhighta janya*) ; and then the state of being produced from the stream possessing the touch (*sparśavad vegajanyatva*) can be inferred in the act of striking; and thus the act of blowing of the wind (*karman*) can be inferred from the stream. Therefore, the person not knowing such a medium or means (*praṇālī*) cannot have the inferential knowledge of the blowing of the wind (*pratyaya*).

Now the Pūrvapakṣin again raises the objection that the qualificative knowledge such as 'Cold wind blows' (*vāyuḥ śīto vāti*) is untenable. According to him, the knowledge of the wind as qualified by the cold touch (*śīta viśiṣṭa pratīti*) is mental (*mānasa*), and the knowledge of the act of blowing (*karma pratīti*) is inferential (*ānumānika*); and therefore, cross-connection of generic properties (*jāti saṅkara*) would result in the qualificative knowledge. However, the Siddhāntin again refutes the objection. According to him, the act of blowing (*karman*) is inferred in the wind, recollected as qualified by the cold touch (*śīta viśiṣṭatvena smṛte*); and therefore, inferential qualificative knowledge of the act of blowing of the wind (*viśiṣṭa vaiśiṣṭya*) is tenable. Nevertheless, the two qualifiers, (*ubhayam viśeṣanam*), viz. the cold touch and the act of blowing are not cognized simultaneously together in the wind. Also, the Siddhāntin observes that the heaviness in assumption (*kalpanā gaurava*) does not lead to any defect in the theory (*doṣa*), as the stronger contradiction prevents the

perceptibility of both the qualifiers together in the wind. Also the Siddhāntin observes that when the causality of the state of having the perceptible form (*udbhūta rūpavattva*) is established in the case of the perceptibility of the substance produced from the external organ of sense (*bahirindriyaja dravyapratyakṣatve*), the same state of having the perceptible form, which pervades the probandum (*sādhya*) delimited by the property of the subject (*pakṣadharma*) or which pervades what is delimited by the probans (*sādhana*), constitutes the impeding condition (*upādhi*) in the inference establishing the perceptibility of wind (*pratyakṣatva sādhyakānumāne*). Further, the Siddhāntin refutes the argument that the fault of establishing different objective (*arthāntara*) would become contingent in the estabishment of the deviation and absence of the qualified (*viśiṣṭasya vyabhicāra vyatirekayos*). According to him, the same establishment culminates into the establishment of the deviation and the absence of the qualificand, i.e. the probandum of the perceptibility in the wind. (*viśeṣya vyabhicāra vyatireka*). Thus, wind is inferential and not perceptible.

Soul (*ātman*) is Perceptible (pratyakṣa) :

I. ix. 16. It may be objected as follows : That the soul, like the wind, is only non-perceptible; for, the state of having the perceptible form is the cause of the perceptibility of substance. And it is not correct to argue that since the knowledge of the soul such as 'I know' arises even without the knowledge of the probans, the knowledge of the soul does not have the inferentiality. Since the person, who does not comprehend the knowledge of the soul, cannot possess the qualificative knowledge of the soul such as 'I know', the knowledge constitutes the probans of the inference. Also it may be argued that when the soul is only inferable, the knowledge, referring to the present tense such as 'I know the pot now', would become untenable; for, the knowledge of the pot becomes destroyed in the third moment preceding the inference of the soul. However, this is not correct. The knowledge referring to the present tense (such as 'I know the pot now') can arise by taking into account the large time-condition. For instance, the inference of the activity such as 'The pot-maker makes the pot' arises on account of the perception of the probans, viz. the activity in the case of the pot-maker.

However, we, the Siddhantins state our reply here. That the soul is perceptible due to the recognition of identity such as 'The same I, who has perceived the pot, touch the pot'. Now it should not be argued that only the inferential knowledge of identity of the soul such as "I, who is the substratum of the knowledge of the pot produced from this sense organ of touch, am identical with the one who is the substratum of the knowledge of the perception of the pot; for, I am the object of the 'I'-knowledg belonging to me, like the substratum of the knowledge of the perception of the pot" is produced in the case of such a recognition of identity. Since the aspect of 'I' (soul) is imperceptible, the (perception of the) probans of inference cannot be established. Also it should not be argued that at first the soul is inferred through the knowledge and then the state of belonging to the soul is inferred in the knowledge of the soul; and then finally the inferential knowledge of the state of being the object of 'I'-knowledge belonging to me is produced in the case of the soul. For, the recognition of identity, viz. 'The same I, who has perceived the pot, touch the pot' is produced even in the person who does not know the said medium (means). Also the recognition of identity does not arise with respect to the wind. For, the wind, which has gone away due to the possession of the movement, cannot be known again. The knowledge of the wind is of the form of inference of the state of belonging to the same class of substance, as the knowledge of the identity due to the knowledge of identity that 'The same wind which has blown behind, blows again in front'. Thus, it becomes established that "The wind is not perceived by the external organ of sense; for, it is a formless substance, like the sky". Also it should not be objected here that the state of being the substratum of perceptible touch, which pervades the probandum delimited by the probans, is an impeding condition. Since the perceptible touch does not constitute the probans in the inference, the said condition cannot pervade the probandum.

Explanation :

The Pūrvapakṣin now raises the objection that the soul (*ātman*), like the wind (*vāyu*), becomes only non-perceptible (*a pratyakṣa*), as the state of having the perceptible form (*udbhūta rūpavattva*) is the cause (*tantra*) of the perceptibility of substance (*dravya pratyakṣatve*). The Pūrvapakṣin refutes the argument that since the knowledge of the soul (*pratyaya*) such as 'I know' (*aham jānāmi*) is possible even without the knowledge of the probans (*liṅga jñāna*), the same knowledge of soul is not inferential (*laiṅgika*). According to him, the person not comprehending the knowledge of the soul cannot possess the qualificative knowledge of the soul (*viśiṣṭa pratya;ya*) such as 'I know', and hence the knowledge constitutes the probans of the inference (*liṅga*). Also he refutes the argument that when the soul is only inferable, the knowledge referring to the present tense (*vartamāna pratyaya*) such as 'I know the pot now' (*ghaṭam aham jānāmi*) would become untenable, as the knowledge of the pot becomes destroyed in the third moment preceding the inference of the soul (*anumiti pūrva tṛtīyakṣaṇe*). According to him, the knowledge referring to the present tense '*ghaṭam aham jānāmi*' can arise by taking into account

the large time frame-condition (*sthūlasamayopādhi*). Thus, the soul, like the wind, is imperceptible or inferential.

However, the Siddhāntin refutes the objection. According to him, the soul (*ātman*), unlike the wind (*vāyu*), is perceptible (*pratyakṣa*), as the recognition of identity (*abheda pratyabhijnāna*) such as "The same I, who has perceived the pot (*yo'ham ghaṭam adrākṣam*) touch the pot (*ghaṭam spṛśāmi*)' proves. Also the Siddhāntin refutes the objection that the inferential knowledge of identity of soul (*ātmābheda pratyaya*) such as "I, who is the substratum of the knowledge of the pot produced from the organ of touch (*sparśanendriya janya jñānā śrayo' ham*), am identical with the one who is the substratum of the knowledge of perception of the pot" (*taddarśana jñānāśrayā bhinnaḥ*); for, I am the object of the 'I'–knowledge belonging to me (*madīyāham pratyaya viṣayatvāt*)" is produced in the case of the recognition of identity. According to him, the aspect of 'I' (soul) (*madaṁśa*) is imperceptible; and therefore the perception of the probans of inference (*anumāna liṅga*) is unestablished. Also the Siddhāntin refutes the argument that at first the soul is inferred through the knowledge (*jñānenātmānumāna*); and then the state of belonging to the soul (*ātmīyatva*) is inferred in the knowledge of the soul; and finally the inferential knowledge of the state of being the object of 'I'–knowledge (*aham pratyaya viṣayatva*) is produced in the soul. According to him, the recognition of identity *'yo'ham so'ham'* is produced even in the person who does not know such a medium or means (*praṇālīm aviduṣaḥ*). Further the Pūrvapakṣin refutes the argument that the recognition of identity (*pratyabhijñāna*) can arise with respect to the wind. According to him, the wind which has once gone (*gata*), due to possessing constant movement, cannot be known again. The knowledge of the wind is of the form of inference of the state of belonging to the same class of substance (*tajjātīyānumiti rūpa*), as the knowledge of identity that 'The same wind which has blown behind, blows again in front' (*sa eva purovātaḥ*) arises.

Thus Siddhāntin concludes that 'The wind is not perceived by external organ of sense (*vāyuḥ bahirindriyāpratyakṣaḥ*); for, it is a formless substance (*nīrūpa dravya tvāt*). Also he refutes the objection that the state of being the substratum of perceptible touch (*udbhūta spārśanāśrayatva*), which pervades the probandum delimited by the probans (*sādhanāvacchinna sādhya vyāpaka*), is an impeding condition of the inference (*upādhi*) of wind. According to him, the perceptible touch does not constitute the probans of the inference (*ahetu*); and hence the said condition cannot pervade the probandum (*sādhyāvyāpaka*).

C
Theory of the Lightness of Gold (Suvarṇataijasattva vādaḥ)

Gold would be Imperceptible when the Percetible touch is the cause :

I. ix. 17. Moreover, when the state of having the perceptible touch is admitted to be the cause of the direct perception of the substance, produced from the external organ of sense, the substance of light of the form of the gold would not be perceptible; for, the same substance of light, of the form of the gold, like rays, has only the imperceptible touch. However, the form of the same light is only perceptible. Nevertheless, the same perceptible form is overcome by the supporting yellow form.

Here the act of overcoming means the act of coming into relation with a stronger form of the same class. This way, the act of overcoming of the perceptible from of gold becomes tenable even in the case of not grasping the yellow form in the darkness. It should not be aruged now that the perception of the gold in the darkness becomes contingent, as the light, though overcome, is perceived; and another light cannot be admitted to be the manifesting agent in the case of the light, i.e. the gold. The substance becomes perceived by means of eye only when the form of the substance is being perceived. And the real form of the gold is not perceived due to the overcoming by the yellow form; and the supporting yellow form is not perceived due to the absence of ray.

Explanation :

Gangeśa, after completing his 'Theory of perception of wind' (*Vāyu* pratyakṣa vāda) begins his 'Theory of the lightness of gold (Suvarṇa taijasatva vāda). He states that when the state of having the perceptible form (*udbhūta rūpa vattva*) is the cause of the direct perception of the substance produced from external organ of sense (*bahir indriya janya dravya sākṣātkāra*), the substance of light of the form of gold (*suvarṇa rūpa tejo dravya*) would not be perceptible, as the same light, i.e. the gold has only the imperceptible touch. (*anudbhūta sparśa vattvāt*). He notes further that the form of the same light (*rūpa*), however, is only perceptible (*udbhūta*). Nevertheless, the same form is overcome by the supporting yellow form (*upaṣṭambhaka pītarūpa*).

The act of overcoming (*abhibhava*) means the act of coming into contact with a stronger form of the same class (*balavat sajātīya sambandha*). Thus, the overcoming is tenable even while not grasping the yellow form

(*pītāgrahaṇe*) in the darkness. However, the Siddhāntin refutes the argument that the gold would be required to be perceived (*suvavṇopalambhāpatti*), in the darkness, as the light, (*tejas*), in the darkness, though overcome, is perceived; and another light (*tejo'ntara*) cannot be admitted to be the manifesting agent (*vyañjaka*) in the case of the light, i.e. the gold. According to him, any substance becomes perceived by the eye only when the form of the substance is perceived; and since the form of the gold (*suvarṇa rūpa*) is not perceived due to the overcoming by the yellow form. (*abhibhava*); the gold is imperceptible.

Gold is not Earth Substance But Light :

I. ix. 18. It may be objected now as follws : That the form of fire, though overcome by the tawny and reddish form, manifests both fire itself and others; in the same way, the real form of gold, though overcome by the yellow form, should manifest gold itself and others. However, this is not correct. In the case of fire, only the ray, whose form is not overcome, but which is related to the fire of overcome form, and which is pervading the middle portion etc. of fire, manifests both fire itself and others. (However, in the case of gold, the ray is not so).

As an alternative, it can be assumed as follows : That in the case of fire, the form and the brightness are not overcome; but rather only the whiteness is overcome (and hence the form can manifest the fire and others); however, in the case of gold, the form itself is overcome; and hence it cannot manifest the whiteness and the brightness, though not overcome, due to the non-manifestation of the individual, i.e. the gold.

Also the form of the gold, as distinct from the substratum of the yellowness and the heaviness, i.e. the earth, is not unestablished. For, the yellow form of the gold, which remains undestroyed even in contact with extreme heat of fire, cannot belong to any substance of different class except light. Also such an undestroyed yellow form of gold would become untenable (in the event of gold being earth) in the absence of relation with the liquid substance; for, the contact with extreme heat of fire is ruled to be producing the form distinct from the earliar form in the case of any thing belonging to the earth substance. The burning and lack of burning are observed in the case of clothing etc. in the event of contact with water and its removal. Therefore, the non-earthness of gold can be inferred as follows : "The gold, being melted, would become the possessor of the form different from the earliar original yellow form, if not connected with the fluid or liquid substance impeding the distinct form, while being the earthen substance connected with extreme heat of fire, like the pot connected with fire. Otherwise, such a gold would only be water, but neither the earthen substance nor the thing connected with fire.

Explanation :

The Siddhāntin now refutes the objection that the real form of the fire (*vahnirūpa*), though overcome by the tawny and reddish form (*aruṇa kapilādi rūpābhibhūta*), manifests both fire itself and others; and in the same way, when gold is light, the real form of the gold (*kanaka rūpa*), though overcome by the yellow form, should manifest both gold itself and others. According to him, in the case of fire, only the ray (*prabhā*), whose form is not overcome (*anabhibhūta rūpa*), but which is related to the fire of overcome form (*abhibhūta rūpa vahni sambaddhā*) and which is pervading the middle portion of fire (*vahnimadhyādi vyāpinī*), manifests both the fire and others. However, in the case of gold, the ray is not so.

The Siddhāntin proposes an alternative position. According to him, in the case of fire, the form and the brightness (*rūpa bhāsvaratve*) are not overcome; but rather only the whiteness (*śuklatva mātra*) is overcome; and hence the form can manifest the fire and others; however, in the case of gold, the form itself (*rūpa*) is overcome; and hence it cannot manifest the whiteness and the brightness (*śuklatva bhāsvaratve*), though not overcome, due to the non-manifestation of the - individual, i.e. the gold (*vyakty agrahāt*). Also the form of the gold, which is distinct from the substratum of the yellowness and the heaviness (*pītima gurutvāśraya*), i.e. the earth, is not unestablished. According to him, the yellow form of the gold (*pīta rūpa*), which remains un destroyed even in contact with extreme heat of fire (*atyantānala samyoge*), cannot belong to any other substance except light (*vijātīya*). Also such an undestroyed yellow form of gold is untenable in the case of gold being earth (*anupapanna*) in the absence of relation with liquid substance (*drava dravya sambandhe*), as the contact with extreme heat of fire is ruled to be producing a distinct form in the case of earth substance (*pārthive*). The Siddhāntin notes that burning and lack of burning (*dāhādāhau*) are observed in the clothing etc. in the event of contact with water and its removal. Therefore, the non-earthness of gold is proved by the inference such as "The gold being melted (*dhmāyamānam kanakam*) would need to possess the form different from the earliar original yellow form (*pūrva rūpa vijātīya rūpa vat*), provided it is not connected with the fluid substance impeding the distinct form (*vijātīya rūpa pratibandhaka drava dravya samyuktam*), while being the earthen substance connected with extreme heat of fire (*atyantāgni saṁyogi pārthivatvesati*)". Otherwise, such a gold would only become water (*jalam*), but neither the earth substance (*pārthiva*) nor the thing connected with fire (*agnisamyogi*).

Form of Inference establishing Gold as Light :

I. ix. 19. The actual form of inference establishing the gold to be light can be as follows : "That the yellow gold, connected with extreme heat of fire, is connected with the liquid substance, impeding the change of form of different class; for, it is the non-earthen substance, which is not the substratum of the change of form, distinct from the earliar form, while being connected with the extreme heat of fire, like the yellow clothing existing in the middle of water connected with fire". Or the form of the inference can be as follows : 'That the yellow gold is connected with the liquid substance impeding the production of the form distinct from the yellow form; for, it is the non-substratum of the form distinct from the yellow form, while having the contact with fire day and night, like the yellow clothing existing in the middle of water connected with fire for whole lot of time".

Also it is not correct to argue that such a contact with extreme heat of fire is useless. For, the contact with extreme heat of fire, in the case of earth substance, is the producer of the change of form of distinct class without the connection with the liquid substance impeding change of form. Also such a liquid substance connected with gold cannot be water; for, the same is not the substratum of the natural liquidity. Also the same liquid substance connected with gold cannot be held to be of non-manifested or non-perceptible liquidity. Since the burning is observed in the cold slab of rock due to the contact with fire, the non-manifested or non-perceptible liquidity cannot be an impediment to the burning; also the same yellow gold has the artificial liquidity (caused by the contact with extreme heat of fire).

Also the gold cannot be admitted to have the mere earthenness due to having the artificial liquidity; for, when mere liquidity of the earthen substance is held to be the impediment to the change of form of different class, the same impedance to the change of form would become contingent even in the case of clarified butter (*ghee*) etc. Further, on the contrary, the change of form would become contingent even in the case of gold. Since the element of contact with heat of fire supporting change of from too is earthen, the same cannot impede the change of form of different class. As a matter of fact, otherform of light except gold is neither the substratum of the artificial liquidity caused by extreme heat, nor is the impediment to the change of form of distinct class; rather, the same is only the cause, i.e. producer or the change of form. However, the same gold, has the perceptible form by being perceptible subtance, and has the lightness by being the substance other than the earth and water. Therefore, the state of being an impediment to the change of form becomes established in the liquid light (gold) by the means of knowledge

establishing the lightness in the gold. Thus, it must be admitted (inferred) that the liquidity existing in the yellow substance of gold does not get destroyed while coming into contact with (extreme heat of) fire; for, it is impeded by the liquidity of the light (gold), like the liquidity of the ghee existing in the water connected with fire.

Explanation :

Gangeśa now illustrates the inference which establishes the gold to be light. According to him, the inference "The yellow gold (*pītam*) connected with extreme heat of fire (*atyantāgni samyogi*) is connected with the liquid substance impeding the change of form of distinct class (*vijātīya rūpa prati bandhaka drava dravya samyuktam*); for, it is the non-earthen substance, not being the substratum of the change of form distinct from the earliar form (*pūrva rūpa vijātīya rūpā nadhikaraṇāpārthivatvāt*) while being connected with extreme heat of fire (*atyantāgnisamyogitve sati*)" or the inference "The yellow gold (*pītam survaṇam*) is connected with the liquid substance impeding the production of the form distinct from the yellow form (*pītarūpātirikta rūpotpatti pratibandhaka drava dravya saṁyuktam*); for, it is the non-substratum of the form distinct from the yellow form (*pītarūpātirikta rūpānāśrayatvāt*), while having the contact with fire day and night (*naktam divam agnisamyoge'pi*)" can prove the gold to be the light.

Also Gangeśa refutes the argument that the contact with the extreme heat of fire is useless (*aprayojaka*) in the change of form. According to him, the contact with the extreme heat of fire (*atyantāgni samyoga*) in the earthen substance, without the contact with the liquid substance impeding the change of form (*virodhi dravya dravya sambandham vinā*), is the producer of the change of form of distinct class (*vijātīya rūpa janaka*). Also such a liquid substance (*drava dravya*) canot be water (*jala*), as the same is not the substratum of natural liquidity (*svābhāvika dravatva*). Further, the liquid substance connected with the gold cannot be of non-manifested or non-perceptible liquidity (*anudbhūta*), as the non-manifested liquidity cannot be an impediment to the burning (*dāhāvirodhitvāt*) and also as the gold has the artificial liquidity (*naimittika dravatva*).

Gangeśa clarifies here that the gold cannot have the mere earthenness (*pārthivatva*) due to the artificial liquidity. According to him, when mere liquidity of the earthen substance (*druta parthiva*) is held to be the impediment to the change of form of different class (*vijatīya rūpa pratibandhakatve*), the same impedance to the change of form (*tathātva*) would become contingent even in the case of clarified butter etc. (*ghṛtādi*). Also, otherwise, the change of form (*rūpa parāvṛtti*) would become contingent even in the gold. Since the

element of contact supporting the change of form (*upaṣṭambhaka*) is earthen, the same cannot impede the change of form of different class.

As a matter of fact, Gaṅgeśa notes that another form of light except the gold (*tejo'ntara*) is neither the substratum of artificial liquidity (*naimittika dravatvādhikaraṇa*), nor is the impediment to the change of form of distinct class (*vijātīya rūpa pratibandhaka*); rather, it is only the cause of change of form (*tajjanaka*). However, the same gold is the possessor of form (*rūpavat*), by being the perceptible substance (*pratyakṣa dravyatvena*) and has the lightness (*tejastva*) by being the substance other than earth and water (*pṛthivī jalānyatvena*). Thus, the state of being an impediment to the change of form (*tathātva*) is established in the liquid light (glod) by the means of knowledge establishing the lightness in the gold (*dharmi grāhakā māna*). Therefore, Gaṅgeśa proposes that the liquidity existing in the yellow part of gold (*pīta bhāga dravatva*) does not get destroyed, while coming into contact with the extreme heat of fire, as it is impeded by the liquidity of the light (gold) (*druta tejas pratibandhāt*).

Position of Udayanāchārya :

Druta tejas is Rūpaparāvṛtti pratibandhaka :

I. ix. 20. It may be objected now as follows : That suppose the liquid light (gold) has the state of being an impediment to the change of form of distinct class; then even the clothing etc., existing in the middle of liquid gold, would not have the change of form, like the clothing existing in the middle of water. However, this is not correct. The liquid light (gold) impedes the change of form of distinct class in this world only in the case where the yellow substance is being experienced as the gold and also where the supporting cause (of contact with the heat of fire) exists in the partless liquid gold; however, it does not impede the change of form elsewhere. For, the positive and negative concomitances are experienced only in that way. Therefore, it becomes necessary to admit that only the gold is established by experience to have the supporting nature of being the impediment to the change of form (in association with the extreme heat of fire).

Now it may be argued as follows : That let only the gold be admitted to be the impediment to the change of form; and enough of assuming a wicked distinct liquid light. However, this is not correct. Only in the presence of supporting element in general, the liquid light is established to have the nature of being the impediment to the change of form of distinct class by the means of knowledge that establishes the substratum, i.e. the gold. Therefore, the impeding nature of the liquid light is established only in that form of being liquid light. And the logical argument that "Supposing the liquid light (gold) is the impediment to the change of form, then the same would impede even the change of the form of clothing etc." and its opposite are refuted by the non-establishment and establishment respectively. The ordinary solid gold, being experienced, is not established to have the supporting nature of being impediment to the change of form by either the means of knowledge that establishes the substratum (gold) or by any other means; therefore, the state of being the cause of change of form of the contact (with the extreme heat) of fire, which is established by positive and negative concomitances, in the absence of contact with the contradictory liquid earthen substance, cannot be refuted. And this is the position of Udayanācārya.

Explanation :

Udayanācharya refutes the objection that suppose the liquid light (*druta tejas*) has the state of being the impediment to the change of form of distinct class (*vijātīya rūpa pratibandhakatva*), then even the clothing etc., existing in the middle of liquid gold (*druta suvarṇa*), would not have the change of form (*rūpa parāvṛtti*). According to him, the liquid light (*druta tejas*) impedes the change of form of distinct class (*vijātīya rūpa*) only when the yellow substance (*pītadravye*) is experienced as gold (*suvarṇatvena anubhūya māna*) and the supproting cause of contact with the extreme heat of fire (*upaṣṭambhaka*) exists in the partless liquid gold. Thus, the gold too gets established to have the supporting nature of being impediment to the change of form (*upaṣṭambhakatva*).

Also Udayana refutes the argument that only the gold (*suvarṇa*) can be admitted to be the impediment to the change of form (*svarūpa parāvṛtti pratibandhaka*); and the liquid light (*druta tejas*) need not be the impediment. According to him, the liquid light (*druta tejas*) is established to have the nature of being an impediment to the change of form of distinct class (*vijātiya rūpa pratibandhaka svabhāvatva*) by the means of knowledge establishing the substratum, i.e. gold (*dharmigrāhaka māna*); and therefore the impeding nature of the liquid light gets established only in the form of being the liquid light. Also according to him, the logical argument (*tarka*) that 'Suppose liquid light (*druta tejas*) is an impediment to the change of form (*rūpa parāvṛtti pratibandhaka*), then the same would impede even the change of form of even clothing etc. (*paṭādi rūpa parāvṛtti*)' is refuted by the non-establishment. The ordinary solid gold, which is being experienced (*anubhūya māna suvarṇa*), is not established to have the supporting nature of being an impediment to the

change of form (*upaṣṭambhaka rūpaparāvṛtti svabhāva*) by the means of knowledge establishing the substratum (gold) (*dharmigrāhaka māna*). Therefore, the state of being the cause of change of form (*rūpa parāvartakatva*) of the contact (with the extreme heat of) fire (*agnisamyoga sya*), which is established by positive and negative concomitances (*anvaya vyatireka*) in the absence of contact with the contradictory liquid eathern substance (*virodhi drava dravya sambandhe*), need not become refuted. And thus, Ācārya establishes the liquid light to be the cause of the change of form.

Position of the Navinas :

Gold is not Water :

I. ix. 21. The Navīnas hold here as follows : "The liquid gold, which is the substratum of the perceptible liquidity not being destroyed by even the intense heat of fire, belongs to the category of light; for, it possesses form while being other than the categories of water and earth, like fire". Also this inference does not involve the fault of non-establishment. For, the same liquid gold is established to be the possessor of form by being the substratum of the perceptible liquidity.

Also such a gold cannot be water; for, the same is not the substratum of the natural liquidity; it is the substratum of the artificial liquidity and devoid of the unctuousness like lack. If the unctuousness is present in the gold, then the same gold would have the contingency of being the collection or aggregate of substance dependent on the unctuousness and the liquidity. Also the same gold cannot be earth; for, the same is the substratum of the liquidity which is not destroyed even at the contact with the extreme heat of fire, like the atoms of water.

Here we introduce the qualifier such as "when the contract with the contradictory liquid substance is absent" in the definition of gold; and therefore, the definition does not involve any deviation in the case of the ghee existing in the boiling water. Also the introduction of such a qualifier does not involve any uselessness. For, only the state of being the liquidity of earth is the cause conducive to the loss of the liquidity of the earth such as lac powder and ghee due to the contact with the extreme heat of fire. And, when the usefulness of a common or consecutive property is tenable, the abandonment of the same is not justified in the absence of contradiction. Also the state of being the liquidity of ghee cannot be the cause; for, the same involves the non-consecutiveness. Also the state of being the articial liquidity or the state of being the liquidity in general cannot be the cause. For, then the loss of liquidity would be required in the gold as well.

Now, it may be objected as follows : That the natural liquidity, though non-earthen, but existing in the oil and other products such as waters, is destroyed due to the contact with the extreme heat of fire. Therefore, only the consecutive property is the cause of the loss of liquidity by the law of grass, alter and pearl. However, this is not correct. Only the individual properties such as the state of being the liquidity of earth, the state of being the liquidity of water, and the state of being the produced liquidity of the substance are the causes conducive to the loss of the liquidity of earth, the loss of the liquidity of water and the loss of the liquidity in general by the brevity. From this, the opposite inconclusive reason or *reductio ad absurdum* that "The object of dispute, i.e. gold is earth; for, it is the substratum of artificial liquidity, like ghee" gets refuted. The same opposite inconclusive reason or *reductio* ad *absurdum* lacks of strength to prove otherwise, as the conducive *reducitio ad absurdum* is absent and also as the opposite *reductio ad absurdum* such as the contingency of the loss of the liquidity due to the contact with extreme heat of fire is present.

Explanation :

The Navīnas now propose the inference that "The liquid gold which is the substratum of the perceptible liquidity (*pratyakṣa dravatvādhikaraṇa*) and which is not being destroyed by the intense heat of fire (*atyantāgni samyogena*), belongs to the category of light (*taijasa*); for, it possesses form (*rūpa vatvāt*) while being other than the categories of water and earth (*jala pṛthivībhyām anyatve sati*)" can prove the lightness in the gold. According to them, the inference does not involve the fault of non-establishment (*asiddhi*), as the gold is the possessor of form by being the substratum of the perceptible liquidity.

Also the Navīnas point out that the gold is not water (*jala*), as the same is not the substratum of the natural liquidity (*sāmsiddhika dravatvānā śraya*) and is only the substratum of the artificial liquidity (*naimittika dravatvā śraya*) while being devoid of unctuousness (*snehaśūnya*). If the gold has the unctuousness, then it would need to become the aggregate of substance dependent on the unctuousness and liquidity (*dravatvādhīna saṁgraha*). And they point out that the gold cannot be earth (*pārthiva*), as the same is the substratum of the liquidity (*dravatvādhikaraṇa*) not destroyed by the contact with the extreme heat of fire (*atyantāgnisamyoge anucchidyamāna*).

Further, the Navīnas introduce the qualifier (*viśeṣaṇa*) such as "when the contact with the contradictory liquid substance is absent (*asati virodhi drava dravya sambandhe*)" in the definition of gold; and hence the definition need not deviate from the ghee existing in the boiling water (*kvathyamāna*

jalastha ghṛta). Also the qualifier is not useless (*aprayojaka*) as the state of being the liquidity of earth (*pṛthivī dravatvatva*) is the cause of the loss of the liquidity of earth (*pṛthivī dravatvocchede*) due to the contact with the extreme heat of fire (*atyantānala samyogena*); and the usefulness of a common property (*anugatasya prayojakatva*) is not to be abandoned when the contradiction does not exist (*asati bādhake*). According to them, the state of being the liquidity of ghee (*ghṛtadravatva*) is not the cause, as the same is non-consecutive (*ananugata*); and the state of being the liquidity in general (*dravatva tva*) cannot be the cause, as then the loss of liquidity would be required in the gold as well.

Also the Navīnas refute the objection that the natural liquidity (*sām siddhika drava tva*), though non-earthen (*apārthiva*), but existing in the oil etc., is destroyed due to the contact with the extreme heat of fire (*atyantāgni samyogād*); and therefore, only the consecutive property (*anugata*) needs to be the cause of the loss of liquidity (*dravatvoccheda prayojaka*) by the law of grass, alter and pearl (*tṛṇāraṇimaṇi nyāya*). According to them, only the individual properties such as the state of being the liquidity of earth (*pṛthivī drava tvatva*), the state of being the liquidity of water (*jaladravatvatva*) and the state of being the produced liquidity of substance (*janya rasavad dravatva tva*) are the causes (*prayojaka*) of the loss of the liquidity of earth (*pṛthivī dravatvoccheda*), the loss of the liquidity of water (*jala dravatvoccheda*) and the loss of the liquidity in general (*dravatva mātroccheda*) respectively. Therefore, the opposite inconclusive reason (*sat pratipakṣa*) that "The object of dispute (*vivāda viṣaya*), i.e. gold is earth (*pṛthivī*); for, it is the substratum of the artificial quality (*naimittika dravatvā śrayatvāt*)" becomes refuted, as the same lacks of strength due to the absence of conducive *reductio ad absurdum* (*anukūla tarka*) and the presence of opposite *reductio ad absurdum* (*pratikūla tarka*).

Tejas does not have natural dravatva :

I. ix. 22. It may be objected now as follows : That the earthness is the delimitor of the causality of the inherent cause in the case of the artificial liquidity; for, the delimitorship of any property cannot be abandoned in the absence of any contradiction. However, this is not correct. For, then the artificial liquidity would become contingent even in the case of earthen pot etc.

Also an intermediate property of the earthness cannot be a single and common delimitor of the causality of the inherent cause of the artificial liquidity in the case of the earthen ghee and the earthen lac etc. For, the artificial liquidity, limited to the earthen substance, cannot exist in the non-earthen

substances. The intermediate property, which is limited to the property of the earthness of the earth moving cross–wise and burning upwards, cannot be admitted; for, the same is absent in the earthen substance such as pot etc. Also, on the contrary, the intermediate property, which is limited to the particular intermediate property of the earthness, cannot be admitted; for, the same is present even in the earthen lac etc. apart from the earthen ghee.

It may be objected now as follows : That in the earthen substance, which is the substratum of yellow colour and the heaviness, the state of being the substratum of the liquidity, not being lost by the contact with the extreme heat of fire, is the deviating probans in the presence of the supporting contact of fire; for, the gold does not remain non-liquid in the case of the liquidity of light, as the experience is that 'The yellow substance (gold) is liquid'. However, this objection is not correct. For, the natural liquidity is absent in the yellow gold. Since the liquidity of earthen substance has the contingency of the loss on account of the extreme heat of fire, the knowledgde of yellow substance (gold) as liquid is an illusion by contradiction.

Now it may be objected as follows : That then in that case, the yellow gold would be required to be perceived only as solid substance. However, this too is not correct. The parts of yellow gold, like the parts of the ink and the honey etc. existing in the middle of water, would become the substratum of the loose contact due to the connection with the liquid substance. However, the parts of gold do not have the liquidity. Also such a contingency of the loose-contact does not arise in the case of ghee etc. For, no contradiction arises in the case of liquidity in the ghee etc.

Explanation :

The Pūrvapakṣin now raises the objection that the earthness (*pṛthivītva*) is the delimitor of the causality of the inherent cause (*samavāyi kāraṇatāvacchedaka*) in the case of the artificial liquidity (*naimittika dravatve*), as the delimitorship of a property should not be abandoned in the absence of contradiction (*bādhaka*). However, the Navīnas refute the objection on the ground that then the artificial liquidity would become contingent even in the case of earthen pot etc. (*ghaṭādi*).

Further the Navīnas state that an intermediate property of the earthness (*pṛthivītvāvāntaram*) cannot be the single and common delimitor of the causality of the inherent cause (*samavāyi kāraṇatāvacchedaka*) of the artificial liquidity in the case of the earthen ghee etc., as the artificial liquidity limited to earthen substance (*pṛthivīniyata naimittika dravatva*) cannot exist in the non-earthen substance. Also according to them, the intermediate property, limited to the property of the earthness (*tajjāti niyata*), of the earth moving

cross-wise, cannot be admitted, as the same is absent in the earthen substance such as pot (*ghaṭādi*). Further, according to them, the intermediate property limited to the particular intermediate property of the earthness (*pṛthivītvāvāntara viśeṣa*), cannot be admitted, as the same is present even in the earthen lac etc. (*lākṣādi*).

However, the Pūrvapakṣin raises the objection that in the case of the earthen substance (*pārthive*), which is the substratum of the yellow colour and the heaviness (*pītima gurutvāśraye*), the state of being the substratum of the liquidity (*dravatvādhāratva*), not being lost by the contact with the extreme heat of fire, is the deviating probans (*anaikāntika*) in the presence of the supporting contact of fire (*upaṣṭambhake*). According to him, the yellow gold does not remain non-liquid (*adrava*) in the case of the liquidity of light (*dravatva daśāyām*), as the experience is that 'The yellow substance (gold) is liquid' (*pitam drutam*). The Navinas, however, refute the objection. According to them, the natural liquidity is absent in the yellow gold. (*dravatvābhāva*). Since the liquidity of earthen substance (*pārthiva dravatva*) has the contingency of loss (*ucchittyāpatti*) due to the contact with the extreme heat of fire, the knowledge of yellow substance (gold) as liquid (*druta pratīti*) is illusion.

Also the Navīnas refute the objection that then the yellow gold (*pīta*) would be required to be perceived only as solid substance (*kaṭhiṇa*). According to them, the parts of the yellow gold (*tadavayava*), like parts of ink etc., existing in the middle of water, would become the substratum of the loose contact (*praśithila saṁyogāśraya*), due to the connection with liquid substance. However, the same parts of gold do not have the liquidity (*dravatva*); whereas the parts of ghee etc. can have the liquidity, as there is no contradiction (*bādhaka*).

Theory of Others : Liquidity (Dravatva) is produced in Gold :

I. ix. 23. The Others hold here as follows : That the liquidity is certainly produced in the light, i.e., the gold etc. in the presence of the supporting element (of contact with the extreme heat of fire etc.); for, the experience of liquidity cannot be denied easily. Also the loss of the liquidity is not possible in the light, i.e. the gold; for, the liquid substance of light, i.e. the gold is the impediment to the loss. Also it should not be argued that the means of knowledge, i.e. the proof is absent in the case of liquid light, i.e. liquid gold. For instance, the same liquid light can be established by positive inference as follows : "That the yellow gold, which is the substratum of the liquidity, is connected with the liquid substance, which is an impediment to the loss of the liquidity; for, it is an earthen substance, constituting the substratum of the liquidity, which is not being lost even while coming into contact with the extreme heat of fire, like the ghee existing in the middle of boiling water". Also such an inference does not involve any uselessness. For, the loss and the absence of the loss of the earthen liquidity are observed in the association and the absence of the association of the contradictory liquid substance with the contact of extreme heat of fire.

Or as an alternative, the liquid light can be established by negative inference as follows : "That in the case of doubt regarding the lightness and the earthenness (in the gold) in the presence of the possession of both form and the other than the waterness, the substratum of the liquidity (gold), which is the object of dispute, belongs to the light; for, it is the substratum of the impermanent liquidity, which is not lost even in the contact with the extreme heat of fire, provided that the contact with liquid substance is absent; and whatever is not so, is not so, like the water and the ghee". This is the form of negative inference.

Also, such an inference does not involve the fallacy of over-wideness; for, the same over-wideness constitutes the fallacy only in the case of not grasping the particularity. And this fact can be explained as follows : Just as the over-wide probans establishes the probandum in the subject of inference by being excluded from the counter subject of inference possessing the absence of probandum, in the same way, the over-wide probans establishes the absence of probandum in the subject of inference by being excluded from the subject of inference possessing the probandum; and therefore, the over-wideness constitutes the fallacy by arousing the inconclusiveness of reason.

Also it should not be argued that the opposite (or inconclusive) probans, which establishes the absence of probandum and culminates into the establishment of the earthness in the gold, has an equal strength (with the probans establishing the liquid lightness in the gold); for, the same opposite probans has the weaker strength due to the absence of favourable *reductio ad absurdum*. Further, the oppsite probans, has only weaker strength due to the contradictory *reductio ad absurdum* that "Suppose the liquid light (gold) were earthen, then it would have been the substratum of the liquidity, which is being lost by the extreme heat of fire in the absence of relation with the contradictory liquid substance, like oil". On the other hand, the inferential probans that establishes the lightness in the gold has the greater strength due to the presence of favourable *reductio ad absurdum* that "Supposing this liquid light (gold) were not the substance of light while possessing the form other than that of water, and also supposing this were the earthen substance, then it would have been the substratum of the liquidity which is being lost by the extreme heat of fire"; and also due to the absence of contradictory *reductio ad absurdum*.

Suppose over-narrow or peculiar probans constitutes the fallacy by way of producing the doubt regarding the probandum and its absence due to being excluded from both subject and counter subject possessing probandum and its absence respectively, then only the probans, which is associated with the non-perception of particularity, needs to be the cause of doubt regarding the probandum. In the present context, however, the probans, which is associated with favourable *reductio ad absurdum* and the perception of particularity, constitutes the conducive factor to the establishment of the probandum (the lightness in the gold) by way of being the probans of negative concomitance. Therefore, the peculiarity of probans constitutes the fallacy when the perception of particularity is absent in the case of both the categories of probandum and its absence. It should not be argued that this way even the expression such as "Sound is non-eternal; for, it is a sound" would be required to possess valid probans. Such an expression is desired to possess the valid probans at the time of the perception of the particularity only.

Explanation :

Others(*anye*) among the Naiyāyikas propose that the liquidity (*dravatva*) is certainly produced in the gold in the presence of supporting element (of contact with the extreme heat of fire etc.) (*upaṣṭambhake*). According to them, experience of liquidity (*anubhava*) cannot be denied. Also the loss of liquidity (*taduccheda*) by the extreme heat of fire (*atyantāgni samyogena*) does not occur in the gold, as the liquid substance (*drava dravya*) of light, i.e. the gold is an impediment.

The Others refute the argument that the means of knowledge (*māna*) is absent in the case of liquid light, i.e. the gold (*druta tejas*). According to them, the liquid light, i.e. the gold can be established by the positive inference that "The yellow gold (*pītam*), which is the substratum of the liquidity (*dravatvā dhikaraṇam*), is connected with liquid substance (*drava*), which is an impediment to the loss of liquidity (*dravatvoccheda pratibandhaka*); for, it is an earthen substance consitituting the substratum of liquidity (*dravatvādhāra pārthivatvāt*) which is not being lost even in contact with the extreme heat of fire". Also according to them, such an inference, is not useless (*aprayojaka*), as the loss and the absence of the loss of the earthen liquidity (*pārthiva dravatvocche dānuccheda*) are observed in the case of the association and the absence of association of the contdradictory liquid substance (*virodhi drava dravya sambandhā sambandhe*) with the contact of extreme heate of fire.

Also the Others (*anye*) hold that the liquid light can be established by the negative inference such as "That in the case of doubt regarding the lightness and the earthenness (*taijasatva pārthivatva sandehe*), 'the substratum of liquidity (*dravatvādhikaraṇm*), which is the object of dispute (*vivādā dhyasita*), belongs to the light (*taijasam*); for, it is the substratum of the impermanent liquidity (*anitya dravatvādhāratvāt*), which is not lost even while coming into the contact with the extreme heat of fire (*atyantā gnisamyoge*), provided that the contact with liquid substance is absent; and whatever is not so, is not so (*yannaivam tan naivam*) like the water'.

Also the Others note that such an inference does not involve any fallacy of over wideness (*asādhāraṇya*), as the same constitutes the fault only in the case of not grasping the particularity (*viśeṣādarśana*). According to them, the over-wide probans (*asādhāraṇa*), establishes the absence of probandum in the subject of inference (*sādhyābhāva sādhaka*) by being excluded from the subject possessing the probandum (*sādhyavad vyāvṛttatvena*), like it establishes the probandum in the subject of inference (*sādhya sādhaka*) by being excluded from the counter subject possessing the absence of probandum (*sādhyā-bhāvavad vyāvṛttatvena*); and thus the over wideness (*asādhāraṇya*) constitutes the fallacy by arousing the incoclusiveness of reason (*sat pratipakṣotthāpaka*).

Also the Others refute the argument that the opposite (or inconclusive) probans, which establishes the absence of probandum (*sādhyābhāva sādhaka*) and culminates into the establishment of the earthness in the gold (*pṛthivītva siddhi paryavasāyin*), has an equal strength (with the probans establishing the lightness in the gold) (*tulya bala*). According to them, the same opposite probans has the weaker strength (*hīna bala*) due to the absence of favourable *reductio ad absurdum* (*anukūla tarkābhāva*). Further the opposite probans has only the weaker strength due to the contradictory *reductio ad absurdum* (*pratikūla tarka*) that "Suppose the liquid light (gold) were earthen (*pārthiva*), then it would have been the substratum of the liquidity, which is being lost by the extreme heat of fire in the absence of association with the contradictory liquid substance like oil". On the other hand, the inferential probans, that establishes the lightness in the gold (*taijasatva sādhaka*), has the greater strength (*adhika bala*) due to the presence of favourable *reduction ad absurdum* (*anukūla tarka*) that "Suppose the liquid light (gold) were not the substance of light, while possessing the form other than that of water, also suppose this were the earthen substance, then it would have been the substratum of the liquidity which is being lost by the extreme heat of fire".

The Others clarify here that suppose the over-narrow or peculiar probans (*asādhāraṇa*) constitutes the fallacy (*doṣa*) by way of producing the doubt regarding the probandum and its absence (*tadubhaya samśaya janaka*) due

to being excluded from both subject and counter subject possessing probandum and its absence respectively (*sādhya tadabhāvavad vyāvṛtta tvena*), then only the probans which is associated with the non-perception of the particularity (*viśeṣā darśana sahita*) is the cause of doubt regarding probandum (*samśāyaka*). However, in the case of present inference, the probans, which is associated with favourable *reductio ad absurdum* and perception of particularity (*anukūlatarka viśeṣa darśana sahita*), constitutes the conducive factor to the establishment of the probandum (the lightness in gold) (*sādhaka*) by way of being the probans of negative concomitance (*vyatirekitayā*). Therefore, the Others note that, the overwideness of probans (*asādhāraṇya*) constitutes the fault (*doṣa*) when the perception of the particularity is absent on the side of both probandum and its absence. Also the Others refute the argument that the expression such as 'Sound is non-eternal; for, it is a sound (*śabdaḥ anityaḥ śabdatvāt*)' too would be required to possess valid probans (*hetu*). According to them, such an expression is only desired to possess the valid probans at the time of the perception of the particularity (*viśeṣa darśana daśāyām*).

Final Establishment of the Lightness (*tejastva*) in gold :

I. ix. 24. Yet Others establish the lightness in the gold as follows: 'That the lightness does not exist merely in the non-liquid substance possessing form; for, it constitutes the generic property directly pervaded by the liquidity existing in the substance possessing form, like the earthness. As an alternative, however, the lightness can be established in the gold as follows : "That the lightness exists in the liquid gold; for, it constitutes the generic property directly pervaded by the substanceness existing in the substance possessing form, like the waterness.

Also the state of existing in the possessor of the liquidity does not constitute an impeding condition of the inference. For, the fast liquid light can be established from the inference, viz. "The state of having the liquidity is the counter positive of the constant absence having the community of locus with the liquidity; for, it is the property pervaded by the substanceness existing in non-liquid substance like the clothiness". And then the liquidity can be established in the light (gold) from the general inductive inference that "Because of not being the pervader of the probandum"; and thereafter the lightness can be established in the gold from the inference that 'The liquid gold, which is the object of dispute, is the light; for, it is the substratum of the permanent liquidity which is not being lost by the extreme heat of fire; and whatever is not so, is not so, like water".

Explanation :

Yet Others (*anye*) now explain the lightness (*tejastva*) in the gold (*suvarṇa*). According to them, the inference that "The lightness (*tejastva*) does not exist merely in the non-liquid substance possessing form (*nādrava rūpavan mātra vṛtti*); for, it constitutes the generic property directly pervaded by the liquidity existing in the substance possessing form (*rūpavad vṛtti dravyatva sākṣād vyāpya jātitvāt*) or the inference that 'The lightness (*tejastva*) exists in the liquid gold (*drutavṛtti*); for, it constitutes the generic property directly pervaded by the substanceness existing in the substance possessing form (*rūpavad vṛtti dravyatva sākṣād vyāpya jātimatvāt*)" establishes the lightness in the gold.

Also they state that the state of existing in the possessor of the liquidity (*rasavad vṛttitva*) does not constitute an impeding condition of inference (*upādhi*). According to them, "The state of having the liquidity (*rasavattva*) is the counter positivee of the constant absence having the community of locus with the liquidity (*dravatva samānādhikaraṇātyantābhāva pratiyogī*); for, it is the property pervaded by the substanceness existing in the non-liquid substance (*adrutavṛtti drayvatva vyāpya dharmatvāt*)" can establish the fast liquid light (*druta tejas*); and then the liquidity can be established in the light (gold) from the general inductive inference (*sāmānyato dṛṣṭa*) that "Because of not being the pervader of the probandum (*sādhyāvyāpakatvāt*); and thereafter the lightness can be established in the gold from the inference that "The liquid gold (*drutam*) is light (*taijasam*); for, it is the substratum of the permanent liquidity (*nitya dravatvādhikaraṇatvāt*) which is not being lost by the extreme heat of fire".

Avoidance of Upādhi :

I. ix. 25. It may be objected now as follows : That the state of existing in the light in general constitutes the impeding condition in the case of first inference. Also the lightness cannot constitute what is other than the subject of inference; for, the lightness of a lamp etc. needs to be excluded from the subject of inference.

However, this objection is not correct. Since the liquid lightness can be established in the object of dispute, i.e. the gold by the stronger probans contradicting the opposite non-lightness, the said impeding condition cannot pervade the probandum. Thus, this way, many inferences, which can establish both the earthenness and the lightness in the object of dispute, i.e. the gold do exist ; however, it should be noted that the inference that establishes the lightness in the gold is stronger due to the *reductio ad absurdum* contradicting the opposite view of the earthenness.

Explanation :

The Pūrvapakṣin now raises the objection that the state of existing in the light in general (*tejo mātra vṛttitva*) constitutes the impeding condition (*upādhi*) in the first inference. According to him, the lightness cannot constitute what is other than the subject of inference (*pakṣetara*), as the lightness of lamp etc. (*pradīpatvādi*) needs to be excluded from the subject of inference (*vyāvartya*).

However, the Others refute the objection. According to them, the liquid lightness (*drutataijasatva*) can be established in the object of dispute, i.e. the gold by the stronger probans contradicting the opposite non-lightness (*vipakṣa bādhaka*); and hence the impeding condition (*upādhi*) cannot pervade the probans. Thus, the Others note that dispite many inferences, being capable of establishing both the earthness (*pārthivattva*) and the lightness (*taijasatva*), only the inference establishing the lightness in gold is stronger due to the *reductio ad absurdum* contradicting the opposite view (*vipakṣa bādhaka tarka*).

Probans is not Futile (*asiddha*) :

I. ix. 26.. Now it may be objected again as follows : That the fast liquid state and the faster liquid state are cognized in the gold in successive order; and therefore the liquidity of gold is lost due to the loss of the gold from the contact with the extreme heat of fire. Thus, the probans becomes unestablished or futile. Also it should not be argued that the loss of the liquidity, of the form of the destruction of the liquidity not having the community of locus with the antecedent absence of the liquidity, cannot exist in the gold; for, the next liquidity is produced in the gold, dispite the loss of the earlier liquidity; and the same is true in the case of the ghee as well. For, when the earliar liquidity is lost in the gold, the destruction of the liquidity, not having the community of locus with the antecedent absence, can exist, as the another next liquidity cannot be produced in the lost substratum of the gold.

However, this objection is not correct. The liquidity of the gold is lost due to the loss of the substratum (gold); however, it is not lost due to the contact with (the extreme heat of) fire. On the contrary, suppose the liquidity of gold is lost due to the contact with (extreme heat of) fire, then, the liquidity would not be produced, like in the case of ghee; for, the contact with (extreme heat of) fire, which destroys the liquidity is an impediment to another liquidity. Thus, 'Because of being the substratum of the liquidity which is the counter positive of the destruction caused by the contact with the fire, while having the contact with the fire' constitutes the meaning of the probans. Or, as an alternative, it should be noted that the totality of causes of the liquidity, having the community of locus with the fire, is absent in the ghee at the time of the loss of the liquidity; whereas the same totality of causes is present in the case of the gold. Thus, 'The liquidity possessing another intermidiate generic property of liquidity, which does not exist in the counterpositive of the destruction of the liquidity produced from the contact with the fire, assiciated with the totality of causes of the liquidity having the community of locus with the contact with fire' constitutes the meaning of the probans.

Explanation :

The Pūrvapakṣin now objects that the probans (*hetu*) of the inference establishing the lightness in the gold is unestablished or futile (*asiddha*). According to him, the fast liquid state and the faster liquid state (*druta drutatarādi*) are cognized in the gold in successive order; and therefore the liquidity of the gold (*tad dravatva*) is lost due to the loss of the gold (*suvarṇa nāśa*) from the contact with the extreme heat of fire. Thus, the probans becomes futile. Also he refutes the argument that the loss of the liquidity (*uccheda*) of the form of the destruction of the liquidity (*dravatva dhvamsa rūpa*), not having the community of locus with the antecendent absence of the liquidity (*dravatva prāgabhāvāsamānādhikaraṇa*), cannot exist in the gold, as the next liquidity is not produced (*agrima dravatva*) in the gold at the loss of the earliar liquidity. According to him, when the earliar liquidity is lost in the gold, the destruction of the liquidity can exist in the gold, as the next liquidity cannot be produced in the lost substratum of the gold.

However, the Others refute the objection. According to them, the liquidity of the gold (*suvarṇa dravatva*) can be lost only due to the loss of the substratum (gold) (*āśraya nāśa*); however, it cannot be lost due to the contact with (the extreme heat of) fire (*agnisamyoga*). If the liquidity of the gold is lost due to the contant with the (the extreme heat of) fire, then another liquidity would not be produced (*dravatvāntara*), as the contact with the extreme heat of fire, that destroys the liquidity (*dravatvocchedaka*), is an impediment to another liquidity (*prati bandhaka*). Thus, "Because of being the substratum of the liquidity (*dravatvādhikaraṇatvāt*) which is the counter positive of the destruction caused by the contact with the fire (*nāśa pratiyogika*) while having the contact with the fire (*agni samyoyitve sati*)" constitutes the probans (*hetu*). The Others note, as an alternative, that the totality of causes of the liquidity (*dravatva sāmagrī*), having the community of locus with the fire, is absent in the ghee at the time of the loss of the liquidity; whereas the same totality of causes is present in the gold (*suvarṇe*). Thus, "only the liquidity (*dravatva*) possessing another intermediate liquidity (*dravatvāvāntara sāmānya vad*), not existing in the counter positive of the destruction (*dhvamsa pratiyogy avṛtti*), produced from the contact with the fire associated with the totality of causes

of liquidity (*dravatva sāmgrī samavahitāgnisamyoga janya*) having the community of locus with the contact with fire" constitutes the probans.

Vyatirekin and Anvaya Vyatirekin Inferences :

I. ix. 27. Alternatively it can be held as follows : That in the case of atoms of ghee, another liquidity is not produced after the loss of the first liquidity at the time of the contact with the fire; for, the liquidity is absent in the case of the ashes of the ghee produced from the contact with the fire. In the same way, suppose the liquidity of golden atoms is lost due to the contact with the fire, then the gold produced from such golden atoms would become non-liquid. Therefore, the negative inference that "The (golden) atoms producing the gold are not earthen; for, they are the substrata of the liquidity which is not being destroyed by the extreme heat of fire, like the water-atoms; also therefore, the same golden atoms belong to the light, and whatever atom is not so, is not so, like the atoms of ghee" needs to be admitted. Also therefore, the positive -negative -inference that "The gold, produced from the non-earthen atoms or produced from the light-atoms, is non-earthen or is light; for, it is produced from the atoms which are the substrata of the liquidity not being destroyed even in contact with the extreme heat of fire" needs to be admitted for proving the lightness in the gold.

Explanation :

Gaṅngeśa now proposes an alternative view that in the case of atoms of ghee (*ghṛta paramāṇu*), another liquidity (*dravatvāntara*) is not produced at the loss of the first liquidity (*dravatva nāśe*) due to the contact with the fire, as the liquidity is absent in the ashes of ghee produced from the contact with the fire (*tadārabdha bhasmani*). In the same way, suppose the liquidity of golden atoms (*suvarṇa paramāṇu dravatva*) is lost due to the contact with the fire, then the gold produced from such golden atoms (*tadārabdha suvarṇa*) would become non-liquid (*adrava*). Therefore, the negative inference (*vyatirekin*) that "The (golden) atoms (*paramāṇavaḥ*) producing gold (*suvarṇārambhakaḥ*) are not earthen (*na pārthivaḥ*); for, they are the substrata of the liquidity which is not being destroyed by the extreme heat of fire (*atyantāgni samyogena anucchidyamāna dravatvādhikaraṇatvāt*); or they are light (*taijasāḥ*); and whatever atom is not so, is not so (*yannaivam tannaivam*)" needs to be admitted to establish the lightness in the gold. Also, therefore, the positive-negative-inference (*anvaya - vyatirekin*) that 'The gold (*suvarṇam*), produced from the light -atoms (*taijaisārabdham*), is light (*taijasam*); for, it is produced from the atoms which are the substrata of the liquidity (*dravatvādhikaraṇa paramāṇvārabdhatvāt*) which is not being destroyed even in contact with the extreme heat of fire" needs to be admitted - for proving the lightness in the gold.

Ekadeśin's Position : Gold is a Distinct Substance :

I. ix. 28. The Ekadeśin holds here as follows : "That the substratum of the liquidity, i.e. the gold cannot be the light; for, it is yellow". And this inference does not involve the futility of probans. For, the cognition that 'The yellow substance of gold is a liquid substance' establishes the liquidity in the gold. Also it cannot be argued that the cognition of yellow form is an illusion; as the contradiction arises due to the contingency of the earthenness in the case of the yellowness in the gold. For, no contradiction arises in the case of the non-earthenness of the gold even while admitting the yellowness of form, like in the case of the non-earthenness of the gold while admitting the whiteness of form. The earthness is not the cause of the artificial liquidity, due to the over extension; in the same way, the being invariably connected with odour is not the cause of the yellowness of form like in the case of artificial liquidity.

Also it should not be argued, by the Naiyāyikas, that the gold, by being the possessor of yellow form, while being what is other than water and earth, constitutes the light. For, such a state is useless in proving the lightness in the gold. Otherwise, even the wind, by being the possessor of touch, while being what is other than water and light, would need to constitute the earth.

Now it may be argued as follows : That since the form, liquidity and odour are absent, the wind need not constitute such an earth. Also, if the form, liquidity and odour are held to be non-manifest (in the wind constituting the earth), then many types of concomitances such as 'The earth has either clearly perceptible form, or liquidity or odour' would involve contradiction. However, this argument is not correct. Many types of comcomitances such as 'The light, while being non-liquid is perceptible', 'The perceptible light has either the perceptible form or touch' and 'The light is illuminator of both itself and other' are contradictory to even the case of light. Also you, the Naiyāyikas, yourself have established that the substance, which is the substratum of the artificial liquidity, is not the earth. Thus, it becomes established that the yellow gold, which is the substratum of the artificial liquidity, constitutes totally a distinct substance". This is the position of the Ekadeśin.

Thus ends the 'Theory of causes of perception' in the Perception, in the Tattvacintāmaṇi composed by Śri Gangeśopādhyāya.

Explanation :

Gangeśa concludes his 'Theory of causes of perception' (Pratyakṣa kāraṇa vādaḥ) with the theory of the Ekadeśin. According to him, the

substratum of the liquidity, i.e. the gold (*dravatvādhikaraṇa*) cannot constitute the light (*na tejas*), for, it is yellow (*pītatvāt*)". Also according to him, the inference does not involve any futility of probans (*asiddhi*), as the cognition that 'The yellow substance of gold is a liquid substance' (*pītam drutam*) establishes the liquidity in gold. Also the Ekadeśin refutes the argument that the cognition of yellow form in the gold (*pīta pratiti*) is an illusion (*bhrama*), as the contradiction (*bādhaka*) arises due to the contingency of the eartheness in the case of the yellowness in the gold. According to him, no contradiction arises in the case of the non-earthness of the gold (*apārthivatve*) even while admitting the yellowness (*pītatve*). The being invariably connected with odour (*gandhaniyata tva*) is not the cause (*tantra*) of the yellowness (*pītatve*), like the earthness (*pṛthivītva*) is not the cause of the artificial liquidity (*naimittika dravatve*).

Further, the Ekadeśin refutes the Naiyāyikas' argument that the gold (*suvarṇa*), by being the possessor of yellow form (*rūpitvena*), while being what is other than water and earth (*pṛthivī jalānyatve sati*), constitutes the light (*tejas*). According to him, such a state is useless (*aprayojaka*) in proving the gold to be the light. And otherwise, even wind (*vāyu*), being the possessor of touch (*sparśa vattvena*), while being what is other than water and light, would need to constitute earth (*pṛthivī*).

Also the Ekadeśin refutes the argument that the wind need not constiture the earth, as the form, liquidity and odour are absent. And when form etc. are held to be non-manifest (*anudbhava*), the concomitance 'The earth has cleary the perceptible form, or liquidity or odour' (*prithivī udbhūta rūpa rasa gandhā dyanyatama vatī*) would become contradicted. According to him, many types of contradictions (*vyāpti virodha*) such as 'The perceptible light has either of the two, i.e. touch and light' (*pratyakaṣam tejaḥ pratyakṣa rūpa sparśadyanyatarad eva*) are contradictory to even the case of light. Also the Ekadeśin clarifies that even the Naiyāyikas need to admit that the substance, which is the substratum of to artificial liquidity (*dravatvādhikaraṇa*) is not necessarily earth. Thus, the Ekadeśin establishes that the yellow gold (*pītam suvarṇam*), which is the substratum of the artificial liquidity (*naimittika dravatvādhikaraṇa*), is quite a distinct substance (*dravyāntaram*) and not merely what is other than water.

The End of the Pratyakṣakāraṇavāda in the Pratyakṣakhaṇḍa.

I.X.

THEORY OF AUTOMIC NATURE OF MIND

(Mano'ṇutva vādaḥ)

Establishment of Mind (*Manas*)

I.X.1. It may be objected now as follows : That the qualification 'the state of being what is prodced by sense-organs', whcih constitutes the difinition of perceptual knowledge (Nyāy Sū. i. 1.4), does not pervade, i.e. apply to the perceptual knowledge of the special particular qualities of Soul such as the pleasure (as the same is not produced by the ordinary sense-organs such as the eye).

However, this objection is not correct . The knowledge of the special particular qualities such as the pleasure, which is not produced by the ordinary sense -organs such as eye , is produced by the distinct sixth organ of sense, i.e.the mind; for, it is a perceptual knowledge to be produced, like the percetual knowledge of form; also any perceptual knowledge, to be produced, needs to be produced by sense -organ. Thus, such a definition of perceptual knowledge can pervade, i.e. apply to the perceptual knowledge of the qualities such as the pleasure. Also since the qualities such as the pleasure do not constitute the objects of perceptual knowledge produced from ordinary sense - organs, such as the sense of touch, the inference does not establish any unintended different sense - organ in the form of sense of touch. (This way, the mind too gets established to be a distinct sixth organ of sense).

Explanation

Gangeśa, after his 'Theory of causes of perception' (Pratykṣa kāraṇa vāda), begins his 'Theory fo automic nature of mind' (Mano' ṇutva vāda). At the very out set, he refutes the Pūrvapakṣin's objection that the definition of perception, viz. 'The knowledge produced from sense organs (*indriyajanya jñāna*),(NyāySū.i.1.4) does not pervade or apply to the perceptual knowledge of the special qualities of the soul such as the pleasure (*sukhādi pratyakṣa*), as the same is not produced by mere sense-organs such as the eye. According to him, the knowledge of the special qualities such as the pleasure (*sukhādi pratyakṣa*) is not actually produced from the already recognized means of knowledge such as the eye (*jñāta karaṇā janya*), but it is produced by the

distinct sixth organ of sense, i.e. the mind (*indriya janya*), as it is a produced perceptual knowledge(*janya pratyakṣa*). Thus, the definitiion of perception can pervade or apply to the perceptual knowledge of the special qualities such as the pleasure. Further he points that the qualities such as the pleasure do not constitute the objects of ordinary sense organs such as the sense of touch (*sparśādy aviṣayatvena*), the inference need not establish the unintended different sense organ in the form of the sense of touch (*tvagādinā*) as the means of perception of the pleasure etc. Thus, the mind too gets established to be a sixth sense organ.

Mīmāmsakas' position that Mind is all pervassive

I.X.2 The Mīmāmāsakas hold here as follow : That when the mind gets established as (the sixth sense -organ) having the difference from the substances such as the earth etc. by way of not producing any single direct perception of ordinary qualities such as odour, taste, form, touch etc., the same mind gets established to be a unique substance which is devoid of both touch and parts due to the brevity. Further, they hold as follows: That such a mind is all pervassive; for, it is the substratum of the contact constituting the non-inherent cause of knowledge; for, of it is the eternal sense organ; for, it is the substance which does not produce another substance while being eternal like the Soul. Also the large dimension cannot constitute the impeding deviating condition of the inference estableshing the mind; for, the same large dimension pervades only the probans.

Explanation

The Mīmāmsakas hold here that the mind is all pervassive (*vibhu*). According to them, the mind, when being established to be a sixth sense -organ, as different from the substances such as the earth etc (*pṛthivyādi bheda siddhau*), by way of not producing single direct perception (*ekamātra sākṣātkā rājanakatvena*), of ordinary qualities such as odour, becomes established to be a unique substance devoid of touch (*nissparśa*) and devoid of parts (*niravayava*) due to the brevity. Also according to them, such a mind is all pervassive (*vibhu*), as it is a substance not producing another substance(*dravyānārambhakatvāt*) while being eternal (*nitya*), and also as it is the substratum of the contact constituting the non- inherent cause of knowledge (*jñānāsamavāyi kāraṇa samyogādhāratvāt*) while being an eternal sense - organ (*nityendriya*). Further, the large dimension (*mahattva*) cannot constitute an impeding deviating condition (*upādhi*) of inference establishing the mind, as the same does pervade the probans(*sādhana vyāpaka*).

Objection that Sukhādi are Avāntara jāti yogin

I.x.3. It may be objected now as follows: That the special qualities such as the pleasure are associated with the intermediate generic properties of the qualityness existing in the qualities, that have the contact with the five material substances possessing motion as their non- inherent cause; for, they are the non- eternal special qualities existing in the eternal Soul, like the sound and form produced from the cooking.

However, this objection is not correct. Since the sound is a substance according to the Bhāṭṭas, the state of existing in a non-soul, the state of not being produced from the sense -organs producing the knowledge of the special qualities different from the sound, and the state of being the qualities existing in the five substances possessing motion constitute the impeding deviating condition of inference; and hence such an inference is useless. Further, the qualification of 'the state of being the substances possessing motion' included in the body of cause is too heavy. Also as an alternative, let it be admitted that the special qualities such as the pleasure constitute a totally unintended different thing by way of being produced from the contact of body and soul.

Explanation

The Pūrvapakṣin now raises the objection that the special qualities such as the pleasure (*sukhādikam*) are associated with the intermediate gereric properties of the qualityness existing in the qualities (*guṇavṛtti guṇatvāvāntara jātiyogī*) that have the contact with the substances possessing motion as their non-inherent cause (*mūrta saṁyogāsamavāyi kāraṇaka*), as they are non-eternal special qualities existing in the eternal Soul (*nitya vṛtty anitya viśeṣa guṇa tvāt*) like the form produced from the cooking (*pākaja rūpavat*).

However, the Mīmāmsakas refute the objectioin. According to them, the sound is a substance, as held by the Bhāṭṭas; and hence the state of existsing in a non-soul (*anātma vṛttitva*), the state of not being produced from the sense - organs producing the knowledge of the special qualities different from the sound (*śabda bhinna viśeṣa guṇa grāhakendriyā janyatva*) and the state of being the qualities existing in the five substances possessing motion (*mūrtavṛtti guṇatva*) constitute the impeding deviating condition of the inference; and hence such an inference cannot establish the pleasure etc. as the intermediate qualities.Further, the Mīmāmsakas admit that the pleasure etc. can be produced from even the contact of body and soul (*śarīrātma saṁyogaja*).

Mind need not be Automic to explain Rule of Regionality

I.x.4 It may be objected by the Naiyāyikas now as follows: That the rule of regionality of the effect of all–pervassive cause is dependent on the non-inherent cause, i.e. the contact of the mind with the Soul; and therefore the

state of belonging to the limited region of the pleasure etc. would not be teuable in the production of the special qualities such as the pleasure in all the (regions of) souls from the contact of the all–pervassive mind. Therefore, the mind needs to be automic in nature.

However, this objection is not correct. You, the Naiyāyikas, should explain as to what is the rule of regionality ?. Is it that the non- inherent cause, i.e. the contact of the mind, produces the effect of the all–pervassive cause in the region delimited by itself, viz. the contact ; or is it that the non- inherent cause definitely produces the effect in the region delimited by itself; or is it that the non- inherent cause produces the effect only in the region delimited by itself ? In the first opotion, the cause imposing the production of the effect such as the pleasure in all the regions, i.e. souls is absent. In the second ooption, the cause , such as the contact with the automic mind, would need to produce the effect such as the pleasure in both the region (soul) delimited by itself as well as in the region (soul) beyond due to the absence of the governing factor. In the third last option, even you the Naiyāyikas would face the undesired contingency of the production of the pleasure etc. in mere automic region. Further, no contradiction would arise in the theory of the all pervassiveness of the mind.

Explanation

The Naiyāyikas raise the objection that the rule of regionality (*prādeśikatva niyama*) of the effect of the all–pervassive cause (*vibhu kārya*) is dependent on the non-inherent cause (*asamavāyyadhīna*) such as the contact of the mind; and therefore when the special qualities such as the pleasure are produced in all the souls *(ātma mātre)* from the contact of the all–pervassive mind (*vibhu mano yoga*), the rule of the state of belonging to the limited region *(niyata deśatā)* of the effects such as the pleasure would not be tenable. Therefore, the mind (*manas*) needs to be automic (*aṇu*) in nature.

However, the Mīmāmsakas refute the objection. According to them, the Naiyāyikas need to clarify the nature of the rule.(*niyama*). as to whether the non- inherent cause (*asamavāyi kāraṇa*) produces the effect of the all–pervassive cause (*vibhu kārya*) such as the pleasure in the region delimited by itself (*svāvacchinne*); or whether it produces definitely the effect in the region delimited by itself (*svāvacchinne janayaty eva*); or whether it produces the effect only in the region delimited by itself (*svāracchinne eva*). The Mīmāmsakas state that in the first option, the cause imposing the production (*āpādaka*) of the effect in all the regions is absent; in the second option , the cause of the contact with the automic mind (*aṇu manassamyoga*) would need to produce the effect in both the region delimited by itself (*svavacehinne*) and in the region beyond (*adhika deśe*); and in the third option, the Naiyāyikas need to admit the production of the effect of pleasure in the mere automic region (*aṇu mātra deśe*). Thus, the mind can be all pervassive.

Asamavāyin requires Nimitta to produce

I.x.5. The Naiyāyikas may propose now as follows: That the state of belonging to the less and more regions of body occurs in the special qualities such as the pleasure in accordance with the instrumental cause such as the sandle wood etc; and it is like the same state occurring in the sound in acourdance with the instrumental cause such as the contact with the wind. However, the same state does not occur in the pleasure etc. in acordance with the non- inherent cause such as the contact of the mind.Thus, the special qualities such as the pleasure etc. occur in the regions of body as delimited by the instrumental cause such as the sandle wood only.

However, we, the Mīmāmsakas reply that then let the occurrence of such a state be conditioned by the same instrumental cause even in our theory that the mind is all–pervassive. Moreover, it should not be argued that the all pervading non- inherent cause of the effect, i.e. the contact of the mind with the Soul definitely produces its own effect such as the pleasure in the region as delimited by itself only, like the non- inherent cause of the sound, i.e. the contact of the drum with the ether produces its effect of sound in the region delimited by itself; thus, the special qualities such as the pleasure would be produced even in the region not delimited by the instrumental cause such as the sandle wood. The non- inherent cause such as the contact of the mind with the soul is the cause , in the case of the pleasure belonging to the regioin of body of sandle wood only by depending on the contact of the instrumental cause of the sandle wood with the region; and therefore, how can the non-inherent cause such as the contact of the mind produce the pleasure belonging to the region of sandle wood without depending on the contact of the sandle wood ? Further, how can the instrumental cause such as the sandle wood, which is the producer of the pleasure in the region of body as delimited by (the contact with) itself, produce the pleasure in the region of the body as not delimited by (the contact with) itself ? Also how can the pleasure, produced from the sandle wood in the region, which is to be produced by the contact with the sandle wood of the particular region, be produced without the contact with the sandle wood of the particular region?.

Explanation

The Naiyāyikas propose now that the state of belonging to the less and more regions of body (*nyūnādhika deśatā*) occurs in the special qualities such

as the pleasure (*sukhādi*) in accordance with the instrumental cause such as the sandle wood (*nimitta candanādy anurodhena*); like the same state occurs in the sound in accordance with instrumental cause such as the contact with the wind (*nimittavāyusamyogānurodhāt*); however, the same state does not occur in the pleasure etc. in accordance with the non-inherent cause such as the contact with the mind (*asamavāyyānu rodhāt*). Therefore, the special qualities such as the pleasure (*sukhādika*) occur in the regions delimited by the instrumental cause such as the sandle wood (*tadavacchinne*) only.

However the Mīmāmsakas refute the proposal. According to them, supposing such a state occurs in the special qualities in accordance with the instrumental cause, then the same state can occur there in accordance with the instrumental cause even in the theory that the mind is all pervassive (*vaibhave*). Further the Mīmāmsakas refute the argument that the all–pervading non-inherent cause of the effect (*vibhu kāryāsamavāyin*), i.e. the contact of the mind with the Soul definitely produces its own effect of pleasure etc. in the region as delimited by itself (*svāvacchinne*) only; and therefore, the special qualities such as the pleasure (*sukhādi*) would be produced even in the region not delimited by the instrumental cause such as the sandle wood etc.(*candanādy anavacchinne*). According to them, the non- inherent cause such as the contact of the mind (*asamavāyin*) causes the pleasure belonging to the region of the sandle wood (*taddeśīya candana sukhe*) only by depending on the contact of the instrumental cause of sandle wood with the region (*taddeśīya candana sambandha sāpekṣa*); and hence the non-inherent cause such as the contact of the mind need not produce the pleasure belonging to the region of sandle wood without depending on the contact of the sandle wood (*tanirapekṣa*). Also, the instrumental cause such as the sandle wood, by being the producer of the pleasure (*sukha janaka*) in the region as delimited by the contact with itself (*svāvacchinne*), cannot produce the pleasure in the region not delimited by the contact with itself (*svānavacchinne*). Also the pleasure, produced from the sandle wood in the region (*taddeśīya candana sukha*), which is to be produced by the contact with the sandle wood of the particualr region (*taddeśa candana sambandha janya*), cannot be produced without contact with the sandle wood of the particular region.

Production of various special qualities are desired

I.x.6. It may be proposed now as follows: That in the theory of the all pervassiveness of mind, a delimiting condition must be admitted in the production of the special qualities such as the pleasure. Consequently, dispite the presence of various instrumental causes, only one of the many special qualities such as the pleasure or the pain etc., and not many qualities, is produced in the region of the body as delimited by the contact with the sandle

wood paste or the burning. For, the rule is that only one of the many special qualities of the all pervading cause is produced in one region at one time. Otherwise, suppose the instrumental cause, i.e. the contact with the sandle wood paste etc. is the delimiting factor, then various qualities such as the pleasure and the pain, like the various sounds, would be required to be produced simultaneously due to the contact with various instruments.

However, this proposal is not correct. Many sounds are produced simultaneously in the ear, as delimited by the auditory passage of the ear, due to the various instrumental causes. Otherwise, the auditory perception of various noise sounds would not be tenable. Also in the same way, in the case of presence of various instrumental causes such as the caontact with sandle wood paste and burning in various regions of the body, both the pleasure and the pain are established to be produced simultaneously by experince; and hence the simultaneous production of various special qualities is a desired contingency. Also the knowledge of simultaneous production of various special qualities cannot be illusion. For, no contradiction would arise in the admittance of production of various special qualities at once. Also it is not correct to infer a sequential order in the case of productiion of various special qualities, in accordance with the admittance of sequential order elsewhere, i.e. in the case of production of various sounds. For, the sequential order elsewhere, i.e. in the case of production of various sounds is necessary due to the sequential order of various instrumental causes.

Explanation

The Naiyāyikas now propose that in the Mīmāmsakas' theory of the all pervassiveness of the mind (*mano vaibhave*), a delimiting condition (*niyatopādhi*) must be admitted to regulate the production of the special qualities such as the pleasure (*sukhādy utpattau*). Therefore, dispite the presence of various instrumental causes such as the sandle wood paste and the burning etc. (*nānā nimitta samavadhāna*), only one of the many special qualities such as the pleasure or the pain (*sukha duḥkhādiṣu ekam*), and not many (*nānā*), is produced in the region delimited by the contact with the sandle wood paste or the burring etc. According to the Naiyāyikas, the delimiting condition is necessary, as the rule is that only one of the many special qualities of the all–pervading cause (*vibhu viśeṣa guṇa*) is produced in one region (*ekāvacchedena*) at one time. And suppose the instrumneta1 cause such as the sandle wood paste or burning (*nimitta*) is admitted to be the delimitting factor (*avacchedaka*), then various qualities such as the pleasure and the pain would be reuired to be produced at one time due to the contact with various instruments.

However, the Mīmāmsakas refute the proposal. According to them, like the various sounds (*nānā śabda*) produced in the ear (*śrotre*), as delimited by the anditory passage of the ear (*karṇa śaṣkulyavacchadena*) due to the various instrumental causes (*nānā nimittāt*), both the pleasure and the pain (*sukha duḥkhayoḥ*) are established to be produced (*anubhava siddha*) simultaneously in the presence of various instrumental causes such as the contact with the sandle wood paste and the burning (*candana dahanādi sambandhe*); and therefore simultaneous production of various special qualities is a desired contingency (*iṣṭāpādana*). Thus there is no need to assume any delimiting condition as a regulator. Further, the Mīmāmsakas hold that the knowledge of the simultaneous production of various special qualities (*yaugapadya pratyaya*) is not illusory (*bhrama*), due to the absence of contradiction (*bādhakābhāvāt*). Also they hold that a sequential order (*krama*) need not be inferred in the production of various special qualities, unlike in the case of the production of various sounds .(*anyatra*). According to them, the sequential order in the production of various sounds is necessary due to the sequential order of various instrumental causes (*nimitta kramādhīna*).

Conclusion of Pūrvapakṣa: Mind is all–pervassive and not Automic

I.x.7. Thus, it can be concluded by inferring as follows: That the qualities such as the pleasure and the pain, which constitute the objects of controversy, are produced from the simultaneously produced non- inherent causes.; for, they are being produced simultaneously, like the simultaneously produced pot etc. Also since such an experience of simultaneous production is non contradictory, the inference does not involve any non- establishment.

From this, the folowing inference too gets refuted : "That suppose the pain in the foot is produced from the non- inherent cause, i.e., the contact with the automic mind, as delimited by the body, then the same pain would be pervassive of the entire body". When the presence of the instrumental causes (such as the sandle wood paste and the burning) is the governing cause of the production of the effect, the non-inherent cause (such as the contact of the mind) would become non- conducive or useless. Otherwise, when the inference is admitted evern in the theory of the Naiyāyikas that the mind is automic in nature, the special qualities such as the pleasure and the pain would not be pervassive of the body. The rule of regionality does not apply in the case of the pleasure belonging to the egoism, repetition and desire and also in the case of the knowledge, the desire, the effort and the hatred . Also the rule is that the effort pervassively occurs in the parts of the body as delimited by which parts the desire for the action of them occurs; and therefore, the activity too occurs in the same parts, as it is necessary. Further, the brevity

ensues in our (Mīmāmsakas) theory that the knowledge and the desire for the action have no fixed regionality. Otherwise, in the theory of the Naiyāyikas that the mind is automic in nature, the effort would need to have the automic regionality or the limited body - regionality.

Explanation

The Mīmāmsakas conclude now by inferring as folows: " That the qualities such as the pleasure and the pain (*sukha duḥkhāni*), which are the objects of controversy (*vivāda viṣaya*), are produced from the simultaneously produced non- inherent causes (*yugapad utpaunāsamavāyi kāraṇakāni*); for, they are being produced simultaneously (*yugapad utpadyamānatvāt*)".

Also they hold that since the experience of simultaneous production is non- contradictory (*abādhitānubhavāt*), the inference does not involve any non- establishment (*asiddhi*). Also this way, the Mīmamsakas refute the inference that suppose the pain in the foot (*caraṇa duḥkha*) is produced from the non-inherent cause, i.e. the contact with the automic mind, as delimited by the body (*śarīrāvacchinnāsamavāyihetuka*), then the same pain would be pervassive of the entire body (*śarīra vyāpaka*); for, the mind is all–pervassive (*vibhu*) in their theory.The mīmāmsakas point out that the presence of the instrumental causes such as the sandle wood pest and the burning (*nimitta samava dhāna*), cannot be held to be the governing cause (*tantra*) of the production of the effect, as then the non-inherent cause such as the contact with the mind (*asamavāyin*) would become non- conducive or useless (*aprayojaka*). Also they point out that otherwise when the inference is admitted, even the Naiyāyikas, cannot explain the special qualities such as the pleasure (*sukhādi*) to be pervassive of body (*śarīra vyāpaka*), as the mind is automic in nature in their view. Further, the Mīmāmsakas hold that the rule of regionality is not applicable (*deśāniyama*) in the case of the pleasure belonging to the egoism (*ābhimānika*), repetition (*ābhyāsika*) and desire (*mānorathika*) and also in the case of the knowledge, the desire, the effort and the hatred. Also they hold that the effort (*prayatna*) pervasively occurs in the parts of the body, as delimited by which parts (*tadavacchedena*), the desire for the action of them occurs (*śarīrā vayaveṣu yatkriyāyām icchā*); and therefore the activity (*ceṣṭā*) too occurs in the same bodily parts. It should be noted that the Mīmāmsaka's theory that knowledge and desire have no fixed regionality (*aniyata deśa*) has the brevity, as no delimiting factor needs to be assumed. Also it should be noted that in the Naiyāyikas' theory that the mind is automic in nature (*aṇutva pakṣe*), the effort (*prayatna*) would be required to have the automic reginality (*aṇudeśatva*) or the limited body-regionality (*śarīra mātra deśatva*).

Nimittāvacchedena Ātmamanassamyoga is Asamavāyin.

I.x.8. The Others, however, hold as follows: That the contact of the soul with the mind as delimited by the particular instrumental cause (such as the sandle wood) constitutes the non-inherent cause in the case of the pleasure etc.; for, the pleasure etc. are produced in the region of the body, as delimited by the sandle wood etc. However, the contact of the mind with the soul in general does not constitute the non-inherent cause, as it would be over extensive.

Also Yet Others hold as follows: That the special qualities such as the pleasure of only those objects are produced in the body in which the antecedent absence of the same qualities such as the pleasure exist.

Expantion

Gangeśa now explains the view of the Others (*anye*). According to them, only the contact of the mind with the soul, as delimited by the particular instrumental cause such as the sandle wood (*tannimittāvacchedena ātmamanassamyoga*), and not merely the contact of the mind with the soul in general (*ātma manassamyoga mātra*), constitutes the cause in the production of the pleasure etc., as the same pleasure etc. are produced only in the region of the body as delimited by the instrumental cause, i.e. the sandle wood paste etc.

However, it should be noted that according to Mathurā nātha, this portion of T.C. is an interpolation; and hence he does not comment on the portion.

Also Gangeśa explains the view of Yet Others (*apare*). According to them, the special qualities such as the pleasure of only those objects (*tat sukhādika*) are produced in the body in which the antecedent absence of the same qualities (*yat sukhādi prāgabhāva*) exist. This view clarifies that only the non existing things can be produced, and hence the non- inheent cause too produces only the non- existing pleasure etc.

Mind need not be Automic

I.x.9. Some scholars, however, hold as follows: That the antecedent absence of the qualities such as the pleasure is necessary for the production of the qualities, by way of being the pervader of the causes, in the case of the presence of the totality of causes (factors) other than the antecedent absence of the qualities.

However, this position is not correct. The antecedent absence of the qualities would have the undesired contingencey of being the non- cause (when it is considered to be mere necessity in the presence of all the other

causes). For, in the case of the presence of the totality of causes other than the antecedent absence, the absence of the effect such as the production of the knowledge of pleasure wouldnot occur due to the absence of the antecedent absence only.

From this even the following objectiion gets refuted: That the all pervassive and non delimiting thing cannot constitute any organ of sense due to the over extension. Therefore, like the auditory passage of the ear in the case of the ether, only the regular or delimiting thing must be admitted to be the condition conducive to the knowledge of qualities. However, such a condition cannot be the body or merely the parts of the body. Also it cannot be the delimited whole or the substratum of the activity merely. For, the non pervassive qualities such as the pleasure are produced in the various parts of the body. Consequently, this way, only a subtle sense organ needs to be assumed as the condition conducive to the perception of the qualities. Thus, the same condition can constitute the mind as well; and hence what is the point in admitting an all pervassive separate mind as the condition. And all the means of knowledge, producing the knowledge of substrata, are only contradictory to such all pervassive mind.' Despite the fact that the all- pervassive mind, by way of being a sense -organ, has the entire body as its condition, the special qualities such as the pleasure can be explained to have the fixed regionality, due to the instrumental causes such as the sandle wood paste only.

Also it should not be argued that since the simultaneous knowledge of all the qualities is untenable dispite the connection of the objects with many sense- organs simultaneously at once, the mind, which is inferred to be the associate conducive factor of the sense organs, needs to be automic in nature; and hence the same automic mind is the extra ordinary organ of sense which produces the knowledge of the special qualities such as the pleasure due to the brevity; and thus the causes of the all pervassiveness of the mind become contradicted. In the Naiyāyikas' theory of automic nature of the mind, only the knowledge of the desired sound is produced, dispite the fact that many sounds are inherent in the ear, due to the desire to know only a particular sound or due to the particular sound being the property of the instrument; in the same way, in the Mimāmsakaś theory of all pervassiveness of the mind, the non-production of simultaneous knowledge of many qualities is tenable dispite the association of many qualities with the mind. Whereas in the case of the others, such as the eating of large circular cake, etc, the simultaneous production of knowledge of many etities is only desired.

Explanation

Some Scholars (*Yattu*), however propose that the antecedent absense of the qualities such as the pleasure (*prāg abhāva*) is necessary for the production

of the qualities by way of being the pervader of the causes (*tad vyāpakatvena*), in the presense of the totality of causes other than the antecedent absense of the qualities (*tad itara hetu sākalye*).

However, the Mīmāmsakas refute the proposal. According to them, then in that case, the antecedent absense of the qualities would become a non-cause (*ahetu*). For, in the presense of the totality of causes other than the antcedent absense (*tad itara hetu sākalye*), the absense of the effect such as the production of the knowledge of the pleasure (*kāryābhāva*) would not occur due to the absense of the antecedent absense (*tad abhāvena*) only.

Now the Mīmāmsakas refute the following position of the Naiyāyikas. "That the all pervassive and non- delimiting thing (*vyāpakam anavacchinnam*) cannot constitute any organ of sense (*nendriyam*) due to the overpervasion; and therefore only the delimiting thing must be admitted to be the condition conducive to the knowledge of qualities (*upādhi*). However, such a condition cannot be the body (*śarīra*), the mere parts of the body (*tadavayava mātra*); regularly delimited whole (*niyatas tad avayavī*); or the substratum of the activity merely (*caṣṭā śraya mātra*). This is so because the non- pervassive qualities such as the pleasure are produced only in the various parts of the body. Thus only the subtle sense organ (*sūkṣmam indriyam*) needs to be assumed as the conducive condition; and hence the all pervassive mind (*vibhu*) cannot be the condition(*upadheya*)." According to them, although the all pervassive mind (*vibhu manaḥ*), by way of being a sense organ (*indriyatvena*), has the entire body (*śarīra mātra*) as its condition (*upādhi*), the special qualities such as the pleasure (*sukhādi*) can be explained to have the fixed regionality (*niyata deśatā*) due to the instrumental causes such as the sandle wood paste (*nimitta vaśāt*).

Also the Mīmāmsakas refute the argument that since the simultaneous knowledge of all the qualities (*yugapat jñāna*) is untenable dispite the connection of the objects with many sense - organs at once (*ekadā aneka viṣayendriya sambandhe*), the mind (*manas*), inferred to be the associate of the sense organs (*sahakāritayā*), needs to be automic in nature (*aṇu*); and hence the same automic mind can be the extraordinary sense organ which can produce the knowledge of the special qualities such as the pleasure (*sukha grāhaka*) due to the brevity; and thus the causes of the all pervassiveness of the mind (*vaibhava hetu*) are contradicted. According to them, in the Naiyāyikas theory of the automic nature of mind (*aṇutva pakṣe*), only the knowledge of the desired sound (*bubhutsita mātra śabda*) can be produced, dispite that many sounds are inherent in the ear, due to the desire to know only a particular sound (*bubhutsā vaśāt*) or due to the particular sound being the property of the instrument (*karaṇa dharmatvāt*); in the same way, in the Mīmāmsakas

theory of the all pervassiveness of mind, the non production of simultaneous knowledge of many qualities (*yugapad jñānānutpatti*) can be tenable dispite the association of many qualities with the mind (*vyāsaṅga daśāyām*).

Siddhānta: Mind is Automic in nature

I.x.10. Here we, the Naiyāyikas, state our conclusion. Despite that different sense organs are connected with their respective (different) objects at the time of the close association with the mind, it is established by experience that only the knowledge of the particular object is produced by only the particular sense organ and not by any other. Therefore, the mind, due to whose-non- association, the simultaneous knowledges of different objects are not produced, is the governing factor of the production of the knowledge of the particular object by way of assisting the particular organ individually. And therefore, the same mind is the producer of the particular quality such as the pleasure. Thus, the all–pervassiveness of the mind is contradicted by the means of knowledge establishing the substance such as the mind.

Also this fact can be illustrated as follows: " That the sense organs such as the nose, tounge, touch and ear of Maitra, having the visual percaptual knowledge, which are connected with their respective objects, are devoid of the contact (with the mind) causing the direct perceptions of all their respective objects; for, they are not the producers of the direct perceptions of all their respective objects at the same time, like the sense- organs not connected with the pot".

Or as an alternative, it might be admitted that only one of the many sense organs constitutes the subject of the inference. Otherwise, in the presence of all the causes, the simultaneous production of the knowledges of all the objects would become contingent.

It should not be argued that even in the Mīmāmsakas' theory that the mind is all pervassive, the delay in the productioin of many knowledges of all the objects simultaneously is due to the delay in the transcendental merits. In the persence of all the causes, other than the contact of the mind, even the transcendental merit is present. Otherwise, sense-organ, i.e. the mind would have the contingency of the loss of causality.

Also it should not be argued that the order in the production of knowledges of different objects is due to the desire to know the particular object; for, the person having the direct perception of the dance is seen to be having the knowledge of even the other desired objectsdue to the desire to know them. The desire to know the particular object cannot constitute the cause of the knowledge of the object of the particular sense organ; for, the knowledge

arises even in the case of the object not desired to be known. Also the same desire to know one object cannot constitute the impediment to the knowledge of another object; for, the knowledge of the clothing arises even when the desire to know the pot exists. The desire to know the particular object, which causes the knowledge of the intended object, connects the mind with the particular sense - organ by dragging the mind away from the other sense organ through the effort involving the mind causing activity; and thus it becomes indirectly the cause of the knowledge of the desired object and impediment to the knowledge of what is other than the desired object; however, it is not so directly. Therefore, the same desire to know the particular object, dispite being present, is not directly conducive to the production of the knowledge of the particular object in the absence of the attention of the mind.

Explanation

Now the Naiyāyikas state their conclusion (*siddhānta*). According to them, though many different sense organs are connected with their respective (different) objects (*indriyāṇām svasva viṣaya sambandhe*) at the time of the close association of the mind (*vyāsaṅga daśāyām*), the knowledge of only the particular object (*jñāna*) is produced by only the particular sense organ (*ekasmāt*) and not by any other (*nānyasmāt*); and therefore the mind (*manas*), due to whose non- association (*yasyāsambandhāt*) the simultaneous knowledges of different objects are not produced (*yugapad jñānāni*), is the governing factor of the production of the knowledge of the particular object (*adhiṣṭhāyaka*) by way of assisting the particualr organ individually (*tad indriya sahakāri krameṇa*). Thus, the same mind needs to be the producer of the particular quality such as the pleasure (*sukhādi grāhaka*); and hence the all–pervassiveness of the mind (*vibhutva*) is contradicted by the means establishing the substance such as the mind (*dharmi grāhaka māna bādhita*). Also the Naiyāyikas illustrate the governing factor- status of the mind by the inference that " The sense - organs such as the nose etc. (*ghrāṇa*) of Maitra, having the visual perception (*cākṣuṣa jñāna vataḥ*), which are connected with their respective objects (*sva sva viṣaya sambaddhāni*), are devoid of the contact (of the mind) causing the direct perception of all their respective objects (*sva sva viṣaya sākṣātkāra hetu saṁyoga śūnyāni*); for, they are not the producers of the direct perceptions of all their respective objects (*sva viṣaya sākṣātkārā janakatvāt*) at the same time". Also the Naiyāyikas state that only one of the many sense-organs such as the nose constitutes the subject of inference (*pakṣa*), as otherwise in the presence of all the causes (*hetu sākalye*), simultaneous production of all the knowledges of all the objects (*yugapad jñānotpatti*) would become contingent.

Further the Naiyāyikas refute the Mīmāmsakas' argument that even when the mind is all pervassive (*vibhu*), the delay in the production of many knowledges of all the objects (*vilamba*) simultaneously can be explained due to the delay in the transcendental merits (*adṛṣṭa vilambāt*). According to them, in the presence of all the causes other than the contact of the mind (*taditara hetu sākalye*), even the transcendental merit needs to be present. Thus only the contact of the mind needs to be the cause of the perception of the particular object.

Also the Naiyāyikas refute the argument that order in the production of knowledges of different objects (*krama*) is due to the desire to know the particular object (*bubhutsā vaśāt*). According to them, the desire to know the particular object cannot constitute the cause of the knowledge of the object of particular sense-organ (*sva viṣaya jñāne*); for, the knowledge arises even in the case of the object not desired to be known (*abubhutsita*). Also desire to know one object cannot constitute an impediment to the knowledge of another object (*anya jñāna pratibandhikā*); as the knowledge of the clothing (*paṭa jñāna*) arises even in the case of desire for knowing the pot (*ghaṭa bubhutsā*). The desire to know the particular object causing the knowledge of the intended object (*abhimatārtha grāhiṇī*) connects the mind with the particular sense organ by dragging the mind from the other sense organ (*indriyāntarāt*) through the effort invloving the mind, causing activity (*kriyā hetu mano gocara prayatna dvārā*); thus the desire becomes the cause of the knowledge of the desired object (*hetu*) and the impediment to the knowledge of what isother than the desired object (*pratibandhikā*) only indirectly. Therefore, the desire is not conducive to the knowledge of the object in the absence of the attention of the mind (*mano gocara praṇidhānābhāve*).

Avoidance of knowledge of different objects: Manas samyoga viśeṣa is not cause

I.X.11. It may be argued here as follows: That let only the particular cantact of the mind with the sense -organs be assumed as the cause of the perceptual knowledge of the particular object. Also this way, when the contact of the mind with the sense organ, which is already assumed to be the cause of perceptual knowledge, is assumed to be a distinct cause of perceptual knowledge, the other particular causes of perceptual knowledge need not be lost. For, even the other causes have the positive and negative concomitance. (And hence can be proved to be the causes).

However, this argument is not correct. The particularity in the case of the contact of the mind with the sense-organ cannot be of the from of the generic property; for, the consecutive cause proving the same cannot be

established; and also the crossconnection, with the other gereric properties, would be contingent. Also the same particularity cannot be of the from of the associate cause; for, then the same would have the contingency of being the cause of percepotual knowledge of object.

Now it may be proposed as follows: That let the order in the case of the actions, i.e. the perceptual knowledges be admitted as the property of the instruments or the means of knowledge such as eye etc. One single instrument or means such as the eye does not produce many actions (knowledges) of the same class at one place or at the similar place as delimited by one single place; rather it produces only one action (knowledge). Also since the qualifier 'at one place' is added, the deviation in the production of actions does not arise in the case of the instruments such as axe, contact with fire and word etc.

However, then we shall reply that in such a case, one single instrument might have to produce many different actions as delimited by the eye etc. like the ear produes the different sounds at different regions and also like the contact with the fire produces different actions in the case of atoms.

It may be proposed now again as follows: That one single means of knowledge such as the eye produces only one single knowledge at a time in one place in the soul; and it is like one single means of collective knowledge producing only single collective knowledge. How otherwise only one collective knowledge is produced in the presence of many totalities of causes.? Here some may hold as follows: That the effect of knowledge is a necessity if the totality of causes of some knowledge is present; however, if the totality of causes is not present, how can the order in the actions be admitted as the property of the instruments or means of knowledge such as the eye.? For, such a property of the instruments amounts to the distinct associate cause of knowledge.

However, this proposal is not correct. The different actions, i.e. the different knowledges of different objects have the similarity with the collective knowledge of many objects. It may be held that since one instrument or means of knowledge such as the eye produces only one knowledge of the object at a time and also since it does not produce more than one knowledge of the object, the totality of causes becomes absent there in the soul due to the absence of the causes of different knowledges itself. However, then we shall state that in the case where one means of knowledge, i.e. one of the five sense organs produces only one type of knowledge of one particular object, and not the other four types of knowledges of different objects, a governing factor must be admitted. Otherwise who would be able to solve the quarel of the sense organs in the production of the knowledges of their respective objects.

Also this way, simultaneous knowledges of many objects need not be produced from one single sense organ; however, no one can avoid

simultaneous knowledges of many objects from different organs, like the collective knowledge of many objects produced from the same organ. Also it is not correct to argue that the single simultaneous knowledge of many objects is untenable due to the cross-connection of the property of visual knowledgeness etc. This arguement is not different from the argument that sense organ should not produce any one knowledge due to the contradiction to the effects. Or, let the knowledge of distinct class such as the visually perceptual knowledge be produced due to the presence of the totality of causes like the variegated or spotted colour is produced due to the presence of the totality of causes. However, suppose you argue that the production of one perceptual knowledge of one object is possible due to the strength of the effect there, then we shall demand that a distinct cause be assumed for the absence of the effect such as the simultaneous knowledge of many objects here. Suppose the mutual contradiction is the cause of the absence of many knowledges of different objects, then knowledge of object ingeneral would become untevable and not merely one single knowledge of many objects. This is the stated position of the Naiyāyikas.

Explanation

The Pūrvapakṣin argues now that the particular contact of the mind with the sense organ (*indriya manas saṃyoga viśeṣa*) may be assumed to be the cause (*hetu*) of perceptual knowledge of particular object (*viṣaya viśeṣa grahe*). According to him, when the contact of the mind with the sense-organ, already assumed to be the cause of perceptual knowledge (*siddha kāraṇa bhāva*), is assumed to be the distinct cause of perceptual knowledge (*viśeṣa kalpane*), the other causes (*hetvantara*) need not be lost. For, the other causes are proved to be the causes by positive and negative concomitances (*anvaya vyakircka*).

However, the Siddhāntin, the Naiyāyika, refutes the argument. According to him, the particularity (*viśeṣa*) in the case of the contact of the mind with the sense organ (*manaḥ saṃyoge*) cannot be considered to be the cause, as the same can neither be of the form of the generic property (*jāti rūpa*) due to the cross-connection (*jāti saṅkara*), nor be of the form of the associate cause (*saha kāri rūpa*) due to the contingency of the same becoming the cause (*hetu*).

Also the Pūrvapakṣin proposes that the order in the case of the actions, i.e. the perceptual knowledges (*kriyā krama*) can be admitted as the property of the instruments or the means of knowledge (*karaṇa dharma*) such as the eye; and one single instrument or means such as eye does not produce many actions, i.e. knowledges of the same class (*eka jātīyām anekām kriyām*) at same place; rather it produces only one action, i.c. the knowledge (ekām).

However, the Siddhāntin refutes the proposal. According to him, then in such a theory, one single instrument may have to produce many different

actions (*anekām. kriyām*), like the contact with the fire (*agnisamyoga*) produces many different actions in the case of atoms-(*paramāṇau vijātīyā*).

Also the Pūrvapakṣin proposes that one single means of knowledge such as the eye (*jñāna karaṇa*) produces only one single perceptual knowledge (*ekam jñāna*) at one place in a soul; and it is like one single means of the collective knowledge producing only single collective knowledge (*samūhālambana karaṇa*). Also according to him, the effect of knowledge is a necessity if the totality of causes of some knowledge (*apara jñāna sāmagrī*) is present; also suppose the totality of knowledge is absent, then the order in this actions cannot be admitted as the property of instruments of knowledge.

However, the Naiyāyika refutes the proposal. According to him, the different actions, i.e. knowledges of different objects (*kārya*) is equal or similar to the collective knowledge of many objects (*samūhālambana sāmyāt*). Also the Naiyāyika refutes the proposal that since one instrument or means of knowledge such as the eye (*karaṇa*) produces only one knowledge of an object (*ekamātra janaka*) at a time and does not produce more than one knowledge of the object (*aparājanaka*), the totality of causes becomes absent (*sāmagryasattvāt*) in the soul due to the absence of the cause (*kāraṇābhāvena*) of the knowledges of different objects. According to him, in the case where one means of knowledge, i.e. one sense organ among five organs produces only one type knowledge of one particular object, and not the other types of knowledges of different objects, a particular governing factor (*niyāmaka*) must be admitted to govern the production of the single knowledge of the object from the single organ.

Also the Naiyāyika observes that though simultaneous knowledges of many objects need not be produced from one single sense organ, the simultaneous knowledges of many objects (*yugapaj jñāna*) cannot be avoided from different organs, like the collective knowledge. And also single simultaneous knowledge of many objects cannot be avoided due to the fear of cross-connection of the property of perceptual knowledgeness (*cākṣuṣatva*); for, then not a single knowledge would be tenable from any sense organ due to the contradiction to the effects (*phalavirodhena*). Also according to him, the knowledge of distinct class such as the perceptual knowledge (*cākṣuṣādi vijātīya*) can be admitted to be produced due to the presence of totality of causes, like the spotted colour. Also according to him, if the visually perceptual knowledge of one object is possible due to the strength of the effort (*phala balāt*), then a distinct cause (*hetu*) needs to be assumed for the absence of the simultaneous knowledges of many objects (*phalābhāve*). Also, if the mutual contradiction (*anyonya pratibandhaka*) is the cause of the absence of many knowledges of many objects, then knowledge of object in general would become untenable.

Manas as Karaṇa dharma

I.X.12. It may be proposed now as follows: That the sense organ such as the eye does not produce the perceptual knowledge in association with the other sense - organs; for, one sense organ does not have the competency in the production of the knowledge of the object of the other sense-organ. Also no other cause, i.e.-organ could be associated in the production of the perceptual knowledge of the object of one organ, like in the case of the production of the perceptual knowledge (such as) 'The sandle wood is cool, fragrant and clear'. Also it cannot be argued that each sense-organ, ready or competent of producing the perceptual knowledge of its own object, produces the knowledge of its own object only by way of including the knowledges of the objects of other sense-organs due to the co- operation of other causes, i.e. other organs. For, the rule is that the different means of knowledges of different objects do not produce the knowledges of different objects together with each other. Also it cannot be argued that each sense-organ is the producer of only the aspect of knowledge of the particular object; for, the object is the aspect of the knowledge itself.

No, this proposal is not correct. The sense - organs do not have the nature (capacity)of producing the knowledges of different objects together in association with each other. However, the knowledge of different objects is a collective one. When various knowledges of different objects become contingent simultaneously due to the presence of different totalities of causes of knowledges of different objects, the mind, as being the property of instruments or means of different knowledges, would produce only one action of knowing referring to all the different objects, like the collective knowledge of different objects. Also it should not be argued that since the mind is not competent in producing another action, i.e. another knowledge referring to another object at the time of the production of one action, i.e. one knowledge referring to one particular object, it cannot produce single action, i.e. single knowledge referring to all the different objects.? Though mind does not have any competency for producing different actions, i.e. different knowledges, it does have the competency for producing one single action, i.e. one collective knowledge referring to all the different objects.

Explanation

The Pūrvapakṣin again proposes that the sense organ such as the eye (*cakṣurādi*) does not produce the perceptual knowledge in association with other sense organs (*sambhūya*) due to the fact that one sense-organ has no competency (*asāmarthyāt*) in the production of the knowledge of the object of another sense organ(*anya viṣaye*). According to him, the other cause, i.e.

the other organ cannot be associated in the production of the knowledge of the object of one organ. Further, the Pūrvapakṣin refutes the argument that each sense organ (*indriya*), ready or competent of producing the perceptual knowledge of its own object (*sva sva viṣaya jñānāya*), produces the knowledge of its own object (*sva- sva viṣaya*) only by including the knowledges of the objects of other organs (*tattad viṣayam ādāya*) due to the co-operation of other- causes, i.e. other organs (*kārāṇāntara sahakāra*). According to him, the rule (*niyama*) is that the different means of knowledges of different objects (*bhinna viṣaya pramāṇa*) do not produce the knowledges of different objects together with each other (*sambhūyā janaka*). Also, each sense organ (*tattad indriya*) cannot be the producer of only to the aspect of knowledge of the particular object (*tattad jñānāmśe*); for, the object is the aspect of knowledge itself.

However, the Naiyāyika refutes the proposal. According to him, the sense- organs (*indriyāṇām*) do not have the nature (capacity) of producing the knowledges of diffeent objects together in association with each other (*sambhūya*); however, the knowledge of different objects is collective (*ārthaḥ samājaḥ*). When varous knowledges of different objects (*nānā jūāna*) are contingent simultaneously due to the presence of different totalties of causes of knowledges of different objects (*pratyeka jñāna sāmagrī*), the mind (*manas*), as the property of means of different knowledges (*karaṇa dharma tvena*), would produce only one action of knowing referring to all the diffeent objects (*tāvad gocarām ekām kriyām*). Further, he refutes the argument that since the mind is not competent (*samartha*)in producing the knowledge referring to another object (*apara viṣaya kriyā*) at the time of the production of the knowledge referring to one particular object (*eka kriyā jñāna daśyām*), it cannot produce one single knowledge referring to all the different objects. According to him, the mind has the competency for producing one action, i.e. one collective knowledge referring to all the different objects (*eka kriyāyām*), though it lacks of the competency for producing different actions, i.e. different knowledges (*bhinna kriyāyām*).

Bubhutsā is not the Hetu

I.X.13. As a matter of fact, the mind may produce even the knowledge of another object (i.e. another quality), like the knowledge of one object (i.e. one quality), due to the lack of any particular reason, as both the objects (i.e. qualities) are non-distinct or equal. Also since the mind need not produce (the knowledge of) only one object, there arises the contingency of either the production of the knowledges of many objects or the non-production of the knowledge of any object; however, there is no chance of the production of the knowledge of only one object. Thus, a governing factor needs to be admitted to avoid such an undesired contingency. However, in the case of collective knowledge of many objects, only one totality of causes needs to be admitted on the strength of the effect, and also on account of mutual expectancy of objects.

Now it may be objected by the Mīmāmsakas as follows: Suppose the mind is automic in nature, then how is only the desired sound, though low in pitch, but not any other sound high in pitch, perceived. It may be held that in the case of sound, only the desire to know a particular sound is the impediment to the perception of other sounds; for, non- perception of other sounds is in conformity with the desire to know a particular sound. Or as an alternative, suppose you think (hold) that the totality of causes of the perception of the particular sound desired to be known is stronger than that of the perception of the other sounds, due to the observasion of the effect (i.-e. the perception of only the desired sound) without any exception, then we shall reply that in our (Mīmāmsakaś) theory of the all pervassiveness of mind too, the non-production of simultaneous knowledges of different- sounds can be explained due to such a totality of causes only.

No; this objection is not correct. The desire to know the particular quality (sound) is not the cause of the perception of the particular quality (sound); also the same desire is not the impediment to the perception of the other qualities (sounds); and it has already been stated earliar. Moreover, in the case of the desire to know all the qualities, there would arise a contingency of absence of knowledge of any object (i.e. any quality) due to the impedance of each other; or there would arise a contingency of the knowledges of all the objects (i.e. all the qualities) due to the equal strength of the totality of causes of the knowledge dependent on the desire to know all of them. However, there would not arise the knowledge of only one object (i.-e. quality) in the person who has attentively listened to five different sounds. It should not be objected here that the knowledges of all the qualities do indeed arise simultaneously. For, an order in the productions of the knowledges of different qualities (sounds) needs to be inferred in such a case. Otherwise, how are the knowledges of all different qualities (i.e. sounds) not produced despite the attentive listening of all the sounds due to the desire to know all of them (sounds)?.

Explanation

Some scholars now observe that mind may produce even the knowledge of another object (*apara*), like the knowledge of one object (*eka*) due to the lack of any particular reason and also as both objects are non-distinct or equal (*aviśeṣāt*). Further, they observe that since the mind need not produce the

knowledge of only one object (*ekām*), the production of the knowledges of many abjects (*aneka jñānotpattiḥ*) or the non-production of the knowledge of any object (*jñānānut patti*) becomes contingent. Therefore, a governing factor needs to be admitted (*niyāmakam ästheyam*) to avoid such a contingency. However, in the case of collective knowledge of many objects (*samūhālambane*), only one single totality of causes (*ekā sāmagrī*) needs to be admitted due to the mutual expectancy of objects (*parasparāpekṣitatvena*).

The Mīmāmsakas object here that suppose the mind is automic in nature (*mano' ṇutve*), then how can olny the desired sound (*bubhutsita śabda*) of low pitch and not any other sound of high pitch be perceived. And it may be held that in the case of sound (*śabde*), the desire to know a particular sound (*bubhutsā*) is the impediment (*pratibandhikā*) to the perception of other sounds (*itara graha*) due to the fact that non- perception of other sounds (*agraha*) is in conformity with the desire to know the particular sound. Also suppose the Naiyāyikas hold that the totality of causes of the perception of the particular sound desired to be known (*bubhutisita śabda graha sāmagrī*) is stronger on account of the effect (perception of only the desired sound) without any exception, (*ananya gatika kārya*), then in our Mīmāmsakas' theory of the all pervassiveness of the mind (*vaibhave*), too, the non- production of simultaneous knowledges of different sounds (*yugapad jñānā nutpatti*) can be explained due to the same totality of causes only.

However, the Some scholars refute the objection. According to them, the desire to know the particular quality (sound) (*bubhutsā*) is not the cause (*hetu*) of the perception of the qualities such as the sound or form (*rūpādi graha*); and also the same desire is not an impediment (*pratibandhikā*) to the perception of other qualities.(*itara grahe*). Also according to them, in the case of the desire to know all the qualities (*rūpādi sakala bubhutsā yām*), absence of knowledge of any object (i.e. any quality) (*ajñāna*), or knowledge of all objects (i.e. all qualities) would become contingent due to the impedance of each other (*paraspara pratibandhāt*) and also due to the strength of totality of causes of knowledge dependent on desire to know all of them (*bubhutsādhīna sāmagrī*); however, the knowledge of only one object (quality) would become untenable in the person who has attentively listened to five different sounds (*pañcāvadhāna*). However, the simultaneous knowledges of all the qualities (*sarveṣām*) cannot be produced; as an order (*krama*) in the productions of knowledges of different qualities needs to be admitted; and otherwise the absence the knowledges of different sounds (*anyeṣām*) would become impossible on account of the attentive listening of all the sounds due to the desire to know all of them (*sarvabubhutsādhīna praṇidhāna*).

Śrotra manas saṁyoga viśeṣa cannot be Hetu

I.X.14. It may be objected again by the Mīmāmsakas as follows: That in the theory of the Naiyāyikas that the mind is automic in nature, either the knowledges of all the songs or the absence of the knowledge of any song, would become contingent in the event of ten different people reciting ten different songs and also in the event of the desire to know all of them or close attentive listening of all of them, as said before; however, the knowledge of only one song would not be tenable.

Here some Naiyāyikas hold as follows: That in the event of the contact of ear with mind or the contact of soul with mind, the same particular contact of organ with mind must be admitted to be the cause of perception of the particular sound, and the impediment to the perception of all the sounds other than the particular sound in accordance with the production of the effect, i.e. the perception of the particular sound (song).

However, this position is not correct. Even in our Mīmāmsakas' theory that the mind is all pervassive, invariable concomitance of the mind with only one song is tenable when the particular contact of organ (ear) with the mind is admitted to be the cause of perception of the particular sound. Since the common or cousecutive nature is absent, deviation occurs in the cause-and - effect relation ship in the position that the particular individual contact of ear with mind constitutes the cause of perception of particular sound and also the impediment to the perception of other sounds. Also suppose the particularity of the particular contacts (of ear with mind) is admitted to be the consecutive generic property, then the cross- connection of the generic properties would become contingent. Also suppose the same particularity of contact of ear with mind is a facilitating condition, then let the same particularity of contact be admitted to be the cause of perception of only the particular sound; and hence the mind need not be the cause.

Explanation

The Mīmāmsakas raise the objection here that in the theory of the Naiyīyikas that the mind is automic in nature, (*aṇutve*), either the knowledges of all the sounds (*sarveṣām jñānam*) or the absence of the knowledge of any sound (*ajñānam*) would become confingent in the case of ten songs being recited by ten people and in the case of the desire to know all of them (*tāvad gocara bubhutsāyām*) or close attentive listening of all of them (*praṇidhāne*); however, the knowledge of only one song (*eka jñāna*) would not arise.

Some Naiyāyikas suggest here that in the case of the contact of ear with mind (*śrotra manas samyoge*) or the contact of soul with mind (*ātma manas saṁyoge*), the same particular contact of ear with mind (*kaścid viśeṣaḥ*) must

be addmitted to be the cause (*hetu*) of the perception of the particular song and the impediment (*pratibandhaka*) to the perception of the songs other than the particular song, in accordance with the effect, i.e. the perception of the particular song (*kāryonneya*).

However, the Mīmāmsakas refute the suggestion. According to them, even in the theory that the mind is all pervassive (*vaibhave*), invariable concomitance of the mind with only one song (*vyāsaṇga*) is tenable when the particular contact of ear with mind (*indriya manas saṁyogaviśeṣa*) is admitted to be the cause of the perception of the particular sound. Also since the consecutive nature is absent (*anugata rūpābhāvena*), deviation (*vyabhicāra*) occurs in the cause-and-effect-relation ship when the particular individual contact of ear with mind (*prativyakti*) is admitted to be the cause (*hetu*) of the perception of the particular sound or the impediment (*pratibandhaka*) to the perception of other sounds. On the other hand, when the particularity of the particular contact of ear with mind, is admitted to be the generic property (*jāti*), thecross- connection of generic properties (*jāti saṅkara*) would become contingent; and when the same particularity is admitted to be the facilitating condition (*upādhi*), the same particularity can be admitted to be the cause of the knowledge of the particular sound (*hetu*). Thus, the mind need not be the cause at all.

Bubhutsā and Praṇidhāna are causes of perception

I.X.15. However, the Other Naiyāyikas hold here as follows: It is ruled that in the case of the visual and other types of perceptions of the objects desired to be known, the desire to know the particular object and the close attentive listening are the causes of perception through the contact of mind with organs, which is conducive to the perception; and therefore, the mind becomes connected with them (desire to know the objects and the close attentive listening) in the ear as delimited by the particular sound desired to be known. Thus, only that particular song, and not any other song, is perceived (in the case of recitation of ten songs). However, such a perception of the particular song occurs even without (the mind being connected with) the close attentive listening. Therefore,, in the case of other songs, the mind becomes connected with the action of close attentive listening in the ear, as delimited by the song desired to be known, by being separated from the soul delimited by the song not being heard. Thus, only the song desired to be known, and not all the songs, is perceived.

However, this position is triffle. In the case of the recitation of twenty songs simultaneously, and also in the case of the desire to know all the songs and the close attentive listening of them, the mind becomes connected with both of them (the desire to know all the songs and the close attentive listening) in the ear as delimited by all the twenty songs; and therefore, the perception of all the twenty songs becomes contingent simultaneously. For, the totality of causes of perception of all the individual songs is present; and the sounds of large drums being beaten near by are ruled to be pervading ear.

Explanation

Other Naiyāyikas (*apare*) propose that in the case of the visual and other types of perceptions of objects to be known (*cākṣuṣādi bubhutsita grahe*), the desire to know the particular objects (*bubhutsā*) and the close attentive listening (*praṇidhāna*) are the causes of perception (*pratyakṣa hetu*) through the contact of organs with mind (*indriya manas saṁyoga dvārā*); and hence the mind becones connected with both of them (*bubhutsā* and *praṇidhāna*) in the ear as delimited by the particular sound desired to be known (*bubhutsita śabdāvacchedena*); thus only the particular song, and not any other song (*anya*) can be perceived. However, in the case of other songs, the mind (*manas*) becomes connected with the action of close attentive listening (*praṇidhāna kriyayā*) in the ear as delimited by the song desired to be known (*bubhutsita śabdāvacchedena*), by being separated from the soul delimited by the song not being heard (*aśrūyamāṇa śabdāvacchinnātmanaḥ*); and hence only the song desired to be known, and not all the songs, is perceived .

However, the Mīmāmsakas refute the position. According to them, in the case of recitation of twenty songs simultaneously and also in the case of the desire to know all of them (*tāvad gocara bubhutsāyām*) and the close attentive listening of them(*praṇidhāne*), the mind becomes connected with both of them (*bubhutsā* and *praṇidhāna*) as delimited by all the twenty songs; and therefore, the perception of all the twenty songs becomes contingent, as the totality of causes of the perception of all the individual songs (*pratyeka sāmagrī*) is present.

Knowledge of twenty songs amounts to Upekṣājñāna

I.X.16. The Naiyāyikas may again propose now as follows; That in the case where the sound desired to be known is pereived, even as the noise sound is being heard, the perceptions of both types of sounds would be required to be produced due to the contact of the mind with the ear as delimited by both sounds. And in such cases, the perception of noise-sound amounts to mere knowledge of neglect; and in the same way, here in the case of the recitation of twenty songs too, the perception of all the twenty songs amounts to mere knowledge of neglect.

However, then we the Mīmāmsakas reply as follows : Enough of this creation of wrong theory. We may have to admit that merely the knowledge

of neglect is produced even in the case of the noise-sound not desired to be known. Or rather, we need not admit that even the knowledge of neglect is produced in the case of the noise sound not desired to be known. For, the experience is that 'I have not heard any sound other than this sound'. Otherwise, even in our Mīmāmsakas' theory of the all pervassiveness of the mind, mere knowledge of neglect of sounds not desired to be known would become necessary at the time of invaviable concomitance of the mind with all the sounds.

Explanation

The Naiyāyikas now propose that in the case where the sound desired to be known (*bubhutsita śabda*) is perceived, even as the noise–sound is being heard (*kolāhala*), the perceptions of both types of sounds need to be produced due to the contact of the mind with the ear (*manas samyoga*) as delimited by both types of sounds (*ubhaya śabdāvacchedena*). Also in such cases, the perception of noise–sound (*tat*) amounts to mere knowledge of neglect (*upekṣā jñāna*); and therefore, the perception of all the twenty songs in the recitation of twenty songs (*atra*) amounts to mere knowledge of neglect.

However, the Mīmāmsakas refute the proposal. According to them, merely the knowledge of neglect (*upekṣā jñāna*) may be admitted in the case of the noise–sound not desired to be known (*abubhutsite*); or even the same knowledge of neglect neednot be admitted there, as the experience that 'I have not heard any other sound than this sound'(*ito na śabdāntaram aśrauṣam*) suggests. Otherwise, even in our own Mīmāmsakas theory that the mind is all pervassive (*vaibhave*), mere knowledge of neglect (*upekṣā jñāna*) of sounds not desired to be known woud become necessary at the time of the invariable concomitance (*vyāsaṇga daśāyām)* of the mind with them.

Bubhutsā and Parṇidhāna are causes only at nānā śabdā samavāya

I.X.17. Here we, the Naiyāyikas state our reply. As a matter of fact, the desire to know the objects and the close attentive listening are neither the associate causes of perception of the desired sounds in gereral, nor the impediments to the perception of the sounds that are other than the desired ones. However, both of them have such states (of the causality and impedimentness) respectively in the case of the perception of sounds at the time of close association of various sounds (that are desired to be known and not desired to be known). For, both of them are ruled to have the positive and negative concomitances with sounds that are desired and not desired respectively.

As an alternative, however, Some Naiyāyikas hold as follows: That since the sound desired to be known is perceived even as the noise-sound is being heard, the other sounds which are not desired to be known become only the objects of perception as being the noise-sounds. However, it should be observed that when many sounds are experienced together at the same time(as in the case of noise-sound), or when many sounds are heard simultaneously, the individual generic properties such as the *ka*-ness and the *ga*-ness present in the individual sounds do not become known in the perception of the other individual sounds. For, varous sounds of unknown properties such as the *ka*-ness constitute merely the objects of knowledge of the noise sound. At the time of the hearing of such noise sound, only the desire to know the individual sound is the cause of the perception of the individual property such as the *ka*-ness of the sound which is desired to be known. However, the desire to know many sounds simultaneously at once cannot constitute the cause; for, the same involves deviation.

Explanation

The Naiyāyikas now reply that the desire to know the objects (*bubhutsā*) and the close attentive listening (*praṇidhāna*) are neither the associate causes (*sahakārin*) of the perception of desired sounds in general *(śabda graha mātre)* nor the impediments (*pratibandhaka*) to the perception of other sounds (*itara graha*). However, both of them have the causality and the impedimentness respectively in the case of the perception of sounds at the time of close association of various sounds (*nānā śabda samavāya daśāyām*); both of them are ruled to have the positive and negative concomitances (*anvaya vyatireka niyama*) with the sounds that are desired and not desired respectively.

However, the Naiyāyikas propose an alternative that the sound desired to be known (*bubhutsita śabda*) is perceived even as the noise–sound (*kolā hala*) is being heard; and therefore, the other sounds not desired to be known (*anya*) become the objects of perception *(tadviṣaya)* only as being the noise–sounds (*kolāhalatvena*). However, –difference is that the individual generic properties of sounds such as the *ga*-ness and the *ka*-ness (*tadgata gatva katvādi*) are not perceived in the perception of other individual sounds (*vyakti grahe*) when many sounds are experienced together *(samavāye)* or heard simultaneously (*yugapat sannidhāne*). For, various sounds of unknown properties such as the *ka*-ness (*agṛhīta katvādi nānā śabda*) constitute merely the objects of knowledge of noise sounds (*kalāhala buddhi viṣaya*). Also the Naiyāyikas observe that at the time of the hearing of the noise sound, only the desire to know the particular sound (*bubhutsā*) is the cause of the perception of the individual property such as the *ka*-ness of sound which is desired to be known (*bubhutsita śabda katvādi jāti*). However, the desire to know many sounds at one time (*eka kālīna bahu śabda bubhutsā*) cannot constitute the cause of perception due to deviation.

Śrotra is competent for nānā śabda graha

I.X.18. Some Others hold here as follows: That the ear is not competent for the perception of various individual sounds simultaneously in the case of the hearing of what are other than the noise sound; and, it is competent for the perception of only one sound. And therefore only the desire to know the particular sound constitutes the governing factor as to what is to be perceived.

However, this position is not correct. For, the distinction in the qualities of the happiness etc. is experienced in the case of the hearing of similar songs etc. being sung by many at the same time, as compared to the songs etc. being sung by only one. Hence the ear needs to be competent for the perception of many sounds simultaneously together.

Explanation

Some Others (*yattu*) hold here that the ear (*śrotra*) is not competent (*samartha*) for the perception of many individual sounds (*nānā śabda grahe*) simultaneously in the case of the hearing of what are other than the noise sound.(*kolāhalād anyatra*); and it is competent for the perception of only one sound *(eka śabda grahe)*. And hence the desire to know the particular sound (*bubhutsā*) needs to be the governing factor (*vinigamikā*) with respect to what sound is to be perceived.

However, the Naiyāyikas refute the position. According to them, difference in the qualities of the happiness etc. *(sukhādi vailakṣaṇya)* is experienced in the case of the hearing of similar songs etc.(*sajātīya gītādiṣu*) sung by many persons at the same time, as compared to the songs sung by one (*eka gīyamāna*); and hence the ear needs to be competent for the perception of various sounds simulataneously.

Mīmāmsakas' Objection: Five knowledges are Untenable

I.X.19. It may be objected by the Mīmāmsakas as follows: That how are the five different knowledges of five different qualities (viz.odour, taste, form, touch and sound) produced from the five organs in the eating of large circular cake in the case of automic nature of the mind?. It may be proposed by the Naiyāyikas that an order of sequence exists in the production of five different knowledges of five different qualities. However, this is not correct. For, the knowledge of simultaneity of five qualities is a reality in the absence of impediment.

Here some Naiyāyikas say that suppose the close or intense contact of the mind with any one of the sense organs is an impediment to the perception of different qualities, then let it be admitted that the mind is a whole consititute consisting of many parts; and both types of knowledges, i.e. five different knowledges of five different qualities and one knowledge of one single quality,, become possible due to the expansion and the contraction of association of parts of mind.

However, this possition of the Naiyāyikas is not correct. Suppose the unsean transcendental merit is the cause of the expansion and contraction of the mind, then let both types of knowledges, i.e. five knowledges of five different qualities and one knowledge of one quality be admitted from the same merit; and enough of admitting a separate mind. Also both types of knowledges. i.e. five knowledges and one knowledge cannot be produced from the desire to know five qualities and the desire to know one single quality respectively; for, the desire to know the quality does not constitute the cause of perception. Also suppose the desire to know the quality is the cause of perception, then let the mind be admitted to be all pervassive. Such a position has the better breviey compared to the position of the Naiyāyikas that the mind is a whole constitute consisting of parts.

Explanation

The Mīmāmsakas now raise the objection that the five different perceptual knowledges of five different qualites, viz, form, taste, odour, touch and sound *(paṇca jñānāni)* cannot be explained in the eating of large circular cake in the Naiyāyikas theory of automic nature of mind. Also they refute the suggestion of the naiyāyikas that an order (*krama*) exists in the production of five different perceptual knowledges of qualities. According to them, the knowledge of simultaneity (*yaugapadya pratyaya*) of five knowledges is a reality (*pramā*) in the absence of impediment. The Naiyāyikas suggest now that suppose close or intense contact of mind (*vyāsaṇga*) with any one sense organ is an impediment (*bādhaka*) to the five different perceptual knowledges, then the mind (*manas*) can be admitted to be a whole constitute consisting of five parts (*avayavin*); and both types of knowledges, i.e. all the five different perceptual knowledges of five different qualities, and one single knowledge of one quality can be explained due to the expansion and the contraction (*saṅkoca vikāśābhyām*) of association of parts of mind.

However, the Mīmāmsakas refute the suggestion. According to them, suppose the unseen transcendental merit *(adṛṣṭa)* is the cause of the expansion and contraction of the mind (*saṇkoca vikāśa hetu*), then the same merit can be admitted to produce both types of knowledges (*tadubhaya*); and the mind *(manas)* need not be admitted as a separate sixth sense-organ. Also they refute the position that both types of knowledges are produced from the desire to know the five qualities and the desire to know one quality *(eka pañca bubhutsā)* respectively. According to them, the desire to know the quality is not the cause

of perceptual knowledge of quality (*ahetu*). Also suppose the same desire to know the quality is a cause (*hetutve*), then the mind (*manas*) can be admitted to be all pervassive (*vibhu*), as such a position has the better brevity compared to the position that the mind is a whole constitute consisting of five parts (*avayavitas*).

Bubhutsā etc. do not constitute cause

I:X.20. It may be proposed now as follows: That some times, the contact of the mind with the sense-organs is produced from the intense contact of the sense-organs with the objects on account of the desire to know the objects. In the same way, the desire to know the objects or qualities constitutes the cause of the expansion and the contraction of the intense contact of the mind.However, we, the Mīmāmsakas, state that then all the people would need to have all the five different perceptual knowledges of the five qualities always provided that they have the desire to know the five qualities and also the close attention of the mind. Whereas it must be admitted that an order or sequence occurs in the five knowledges of the five close attentive listenings of the five sounds. From this, the following objection too gets refuted . " That the automic mind be admitted to be five fold; for, this theory has the better brevity compared to the theory that the mind is a whole comprising of parts; and both types of knowledges, i.e. all the five different perceptual knowledges of the five qualities and one single knowledges of one quality become tenable due to the contact of five types of mind with five and one sense organs respectively and also due to the desire to know both of them" For, in the case of five different desires to know five different qualities, all the five types of mind would become connected with the five sense-organs; and therefore, the intense contact of the mind with any one of the five sense organs becomes untenable.Now it may be asked as to how then the after knowledges or the recognition that 'I experience odour, taste, form, touch and sound simultaneously' is possible in the case of the eating of a long circular cake; for, the simultaneous contact of mind is absent in the case of the sequential five fold knowledges?, However, this arguement too is not correct. After- knowledges or recognitions cannot be established to be one; and hence the after-knowledges or recognitions are only five; however, the order or seqsuence of them is not perceived due to the subtleness of time.

Explanation

The Mīmāmsakas now refute the proposal that the desire to know the objects such as the qualities (*bubhutsā*) etc. constitute the cause (*hetu*) of the expansion and the contraction (*vikāśa saṇkocayoḥ*) of the intense contact of the mind (*manas*), like the desire to know the objects constitutes the cause of the contact of the mind with the sense-organs (*indriya manas samyoga*) from

the intense contact of sense-organs with objects (*tīvra viṣayendriya sannikarṣāt*). According to them, then all the people would need to have all the five different perceptual knowledges of the five qualities (*pañca jñānāni*) simultaneously provided that they have the desire to know the five qualities (*pañca bubhutsā*) and also the close attention of the mind (*praṇidhāna*). However, according to them, an order or sequence (*krama*) occurs in the five knowledges of the five close attentive listenings of the five sounds (*pañcāvadhāna jñāna*).

The Mīmāmsakas also state that from the above refutation, the following position too gets refuted: "That the automic mind (*aṇu manaḥ*) is five fold (*pañcataya*) due to the brevity; and both types of knowledges, (*ubhaya*), i.e. all the five different perceptual knowledges of the five qualities and one single knowledge of one quality, become tenable due to the contact of the five types of mind with the five sense-organs and one sense organ(*eka pañcedriya sambandhāt*) respectively and also due to the desore to know both of them (*bubhutsā*)." According to them, in the case of the five desires to know the five different qualites (*pañca bubhutsā*), all the five types of mind would be required to be connected with the five sense organs (*pañcendriya sambandha*); and therefore, the intense contact of the mind (*vyāsaṅga*) with any one of the five sense organs would become untenable.

Also the Mīmāsakas refute the arguement that the after-knowledge or the recognition (*anuvyavasāya*) that 'I experience odour, taste, form, touch, and sound simultaneously' (*gandha-rasa-rūpa-sparśā śabdān pratyemi*) would become untenable in the case of the eating of the long circular cake *(dīrgha śaṣkulī bhakṣaṇe)*, as the simultaneous contact of the mind with the five organs (*yugapan manas sannikarṣa*) is absent in the case of the sequential five fold knowledges (*kramika jñāna pañcataya*). According to them, the after–knowledges or the recognitions (*anuvyavasāya*) are never established to be one (*eka*); and hence they are only five; however, the order or sequnance (*krama*) of the recognitions is not perceived due to the subtleness of time (*samaya saukṣmya*).

Explanation of Recognition And Bādhaka in the Vibhutva of Manas

I.X.21. As an alternative, however, the Naiyāyikas propose now as follows: That the afer-knowledge or recognition that ' I experience simultaneously five objects or five qualities' is produced due to the imposition of the experienceness on the rceollection of the objects, i.e. the qualities of five knowledges from the impression obtained from the five seqnential afer-knowledges or recognitions. Also in the case of the mind being all-pervassive, the experience of the happiness of the soul etc. would not be tenable due to

the absence of the contact of the all pervassive mind with the all pervassive soul and the absence of any cause.

On the other hand, suppose the contact (lit connectedness) of the soul with the mind is established due to the substanceness (of both of them), then the unborn natural contact of the mind with the soul too gets established; and therefore the separation (lit.separatedness) of soul from mind too becomes established due to the substanceness(of both of them). Thus, mutually contradictory contact and separation would always become necessary between the soul and the mind always.

Explanation

Here the Naiyāyikas explain the afer-knowledge or the recognition (*anuvyavasāya*) such as 'I experience simultaneously five qualities' (*yugapat pratyemi*) due to the imposition of the experienceness (*anubhavatvāropa*) on the recollection of five objects, i.e. qualities of five knowledges (*pañca jñāna viṣaya smṛtau*) from the impression obtained from the five sequential after-knowledges or recognitions (*kramikānuvyavasāyāhita samskāra*). Also they state an impediment (*bādhaka*) in the theory of the all pervassiveness (*vibhutva*) of the mind that in the all pervassiveness of the mind, the experience of happiness of soul etc. (*ātma sukhādy upalambha*) would become untenable due to the absence of contact of the all pervassive mind with the all pervassive the soul (*ātma manas saṁyogābhāvāt*) and also due to the absence of cause (*hetvabhāvāt*).

However, the Naiyāyikas observe that suppose the contact of the soul with the mind (*ātma samyogitva*) is established due to the sebstanceness of both the soul and the mind (*dravyatvena*), then the natural contact of the soul with the mind (*aja saṁyoga*) too becomes established; and therefore even the separation of the soul the from mind (*tad vibhāgitva*) too becomes established due to the same substanceness of both of them. Thus, the undesired contiugency of mutually contradictory contact and separation (*paraspara viruddha samyoga vibhāga*) would become necessary between the soul and the mind.

Objection that Vimśati kriyāḥ become untenable

I.X. 22.. Now it may be objected as follows: That suppose the mind is atomic, then the effort causing the bodily movement would have only the automic regionality or mere body- regionality in conformity with the non-inherent cause. However, it would not have the body-regionality or-bodily part-regionality. Therefore the law of movement of body-parts would not be tenable due to the absence of any governing factor.

Also it is not possible to hold that the movement of body and that of bodily-parts etc. are possible due to the effort pervading the act of driving away

and the act of striking away etc.; for, such a view involves the overpervassion or overextension of movements. Also since twenty efforts are not possible in body -parts simultaneously, how can twenty actions or movements be possible in twenty fingers of a body. Also it cannot be suggested that the simultaneity in the case of such actions of fingers is a mere illusion. For, no contradiction would arise in the simultaneity of such actions. Also since the collective knowledge of movements that "The twenty fingers are moving' is not tenable due to the absence of simultaneous contact, the after-knowledge or recognition of twenty knowledges (*of twenty movements of fingers*) becomes impossible at once; but the governing factor is absent in the order or sequence of priority and posteriority of movements. In the production of order or sequence of movements, the dance, of the form of collection of simultaneous many movements of all bodily parts such as eye brows, eyes, hands, and feet etc., would not be perceptible. Thus, the particular pleasure distinct from the pleasure produced from the individual movements of bodily parts would not be possible to experience.

Explanation

The Mīmāmsakas now raise one of the last objections that when the mind is automic in nature (*aṇutve*), the effort causing bodily movement (*cestāhetu prayatva*) would occur only in automic regions *(aṇu deśa)* orin mere body-regions *(śarīra deśa mātra)*; however, it would not occur in both body-regions and body-part-regions (*śarīra tadavayava deśa*); and therefore the law of movements of body-parts (*kriyā niyama*) would not be tenable due to the absence of any governing factor (*niyāmakābhāva*).

Also the Mīmāmsakas refute the position that the movement of body-and that of bodily-parts etc. (*śarīrādi kriyā*) are possible due to the effort pervading the act of striking away (*abhighātādi vyāpino prayatnāt*). According to them, such a view involves overpervasion or over-extension of movements *(ati prasaṅga)*. Also they raise the objection that since twenty different efforts are not possible in body- parts simultaneously, twenty movements (*viṁśatiḥ kriyāḥ*) would not be tenable in twenty fingers of a body simultaneously. And the simultaneity of actions of fingers *(yaugapadya)* cannot be mere illusion *(bhrama)* due to the absence of any contradiction in the simultaneity of actions (*bādhakābhāva*). Further since the collective knowledge of movements (*samūhālambana*) such as 'The twenty fingers are moving' (*aṅgulyaḥ calanti*) is untenable, due to the absence of simultaneous contact (*yugapat sannikarṣābhāvāt*), the recognition (*anuvyavasāya*) of twenty knowledges (*vimśati jñāna*) would become impossible simultaneously; but the governing factor (*vinigamaka*) is absent in the priority and the posteriority (*agra paścād*

bhāve) of movements. Further in the case of the production of oder or sequence of movements (*kramotpāde*), the dance (*nṛtya*) of the form of collection of many movements of all bodily parts (*yugapad vicitra nānā karma samūha rūpa*) such as eye brows, eyes, hands, and feet etc. would become imperceptible. Thus, the particular pleasure (*sukha viśeṣa*), distinct from the pleasure produced from the individual movements of bodily-parts (*pratyeka karma janya sukhāt*), cannot be experienced

Reply that Vimśati kriyāḥ are tenable simultaneously

I.X.23. Here we, the Naiyāyikas, state our reply that the mind can be automic. Only the desire to (perform an) act is the governing factor of the production of the action, like the applying of sandle wood paste is the governing factor of the production of the pleasure. And that action is produced, from that effort, produced from that desire, in which action the desire exists. Therefore, the body and bodily-part movements too are produced from the effort, occurring in mere automic regions and produced in turn from the desire to act or move.

As an alternative, however, it may be proposed as follows: That the effort is produced only in the (body of the) person, who has the desire for the action, as delimited by the body; and therefore, the body-and-bodily part-movements are produced (in the body of the person) from the effort, as delimited by the body. Thus, even the twenty movements of fingers can be simultaneously produced from the effort, occurring in mere automic regions, and produced from the desire for the movements of fingers.

As yet another alternative, again it may be proposed as follows: That since the desire for the twenty-finer-movements is possible, the causes of twenty finger-movements are produced from the twenty efforts, as delimited by twenty fingers; and in the same way, the causes of dance-movements are produced from the efforts in the case of desire for the dance-movements. This way, in accordance with the desire for the finger movements (or dance-movements), the causality of the desire with respect to the effort and the actions must be ascertained. Also this way, when the automic mind gets established, the particular qualities of the soul such as knowledge, happiness, and sorrow etc. become established to be grasped by the automic mind. Therefore, the definition of perceptual knowledge (cf. I.x.1) is not non-pervassive of or non-applicable to the perceptual knowledge of qualities of the soul.

Thus ends the Theory of automic nature of mind in the Perception of the Tattva cintamaṇi composed by śri Gangeśopādhyāya.

Explanation

Gangeśa now concludes his ' Theory of automic nature of mind' with the Naiyāyikas' reply. According to the Naiyāyikas, only the desire to (perform an) act (*cikīrṣā*) is the governing factor of the production of the action (*niyāmikā*). And the action (*sā kriyā*) is produced from the effort, produced from the desire (*taccikīrṣā janyāt prayatnāt*), where in (the action), the desire exists. (*yat kriyāyām cikīrṣā*). Therefore the bodily-part-movements (*śarīra kriyā*) too can be produced from the effort, occuring in the mere automic regions (*aṇumātra deśāt prayatnāt*) and produced from the desire to act (*taccikīrṣā janyat*). As an alternative, however, Gangeśa proposes that the effort (*prayatna*) is produced in the body of the person (*tadavacchedena*) who has the desire for the action (*yasya kriyāyām cikīrṣā*) as delimited by the body; and hence the bodily-movement (*śarīra kriyā*) is produced only from the effort as delimited by the body (*śarīrāvacchedena utpanna prayatnāt*). Thus, the twenty movements of fingers (*vimśati kriyāḥ*) can be simultaneously produced from the effort (*prayatnāt*), occurring in mere automic regions (*aṇumātra-deśāt*), and from the desire for the movements (*cikīrṣā janyāt*).

As yet another alternative, Gangeśa proposes that since the desire for the twenty finger-movements (*angulī vismśati kriyāyām kriyā*) is possible, the causes of finger movements (*vimśati kriyā hetavaḥ*) are produced from the twenty efforts (*vimsati prayatnāt*) as delimited by the twenty fingers (*vimśaty avacchedena*); and in the same way, the causes of dances can be produced from the effort as delimited by the body. Thus, in accordance with the desire for the finger-movements (*etac cikīrṣānuvidhānāt*), the causality of the desire regarding the effort and the action (*kriyā prayatnayoḥ*) can be ascertained. This way, the automic mind (*aṇu manas*) can be established; and therefore the particular qualities of soul (*ātma viśeṣa guṇāḥ*) such as knowledge, and hapiness etc. can be established to be grasped by the automic mind. Thus, the definition of perceptual knowledge (Nyāy Sū. i.1.4) need not be non-pervassive of or non-applicable to the perceptual knowledge of qualities. (*avyāpaka*).

The End of the Mano' ṇutva vāda in the Pratyakṣakhaṇḍa.

I. xi.
Theory of Recognition
(Anuvyavasāya vādaḥ)

Mīmāmsakas' Objection: Jñāna is Svavyavahāra hetu

I.xi.1. The Mīmāmsakas may object here as follows: That the existing simple (first) knowledges (such as 'This is a pot') is known by itself; and it is not (known from) the second mental or after–knowledge, i.e. re-cognition. Rather, the same (simple first knowledge) constitutes the cause of the usage or communication of the self (knowledge) all by itself. For, the usage or communication of the self (knowledge) is quite tenable merely by the persence of the (first) knowledge itself. However, the same (first knowledge) does not require the second (mental) or after knowledge or recognition for the usage of the self (knowledge), as the usage is not in conformity with the presence and the absence of the second (mental) knowledge. Also at the time of the absence of the second (mental) knowledge, the lack of the usage of the self (knowledge) is possible due to the absence of the (first) knowledge itself. Thus, there arises the heaviness in the assumption of the second (mental) knowledge or recognition due to the tenability of the usage of the self (knowledge) by the (first) knowledge itself.

However, let it be admitted that the (second) mental knowledge or re-congnition is required for the usage of the object such as the pot etc. due to the presence and the absence of (second) knowledge. Also one's own past and future knowledges, as well as the other's knowledge, require the second (mental) knowledge for the usage of the selves (past knowledge etc), as the first knowledge is absent at the time of the usage of the selves (past knowledge etc.). Further the use and the lack of usage of the selves (past knowledge etc.) are in conformity with the presence and the absence of second (mental) knowledge or recognition.

Explanation

Gangeśa begins his theory of recognition (*anuvyavasāya vāda*) with the objection of the Mīmāmsakas. According to them, the existing simple (first) knowledge (*vartamānam jñānam*) such as ' This is a pot' (*ayam ggaṭaḥ*) is known all by itself (*svayam*); and hence it is not known from the second

mental knowledge or-re-cognition (*mānasam*); rather, it (the first knowledge) constitutes the cause of the usage or communication of the self (knowledge) all by itself (*sva vyavahāra hetu*), as the usage of the knowledge is quite tenable (*sva vyavahāra*) merely by the presence of the (first) knowledge itself. Also the (first) knowledge does not require second (mental) knowledge or recognition (*jñānāntara*) for the usage, as, the usage of the self (knowledge) is not in conformity with the presence and the absence of second (mental) knowledge (*anvaya vyatirekānanu vidhānāt*). Further, the lack of the usage of the self (knowledge)(*svavyavahāra viraha*) is tenable due to the absence of the simple first knowledge itself (*sva virha*) at the time of the absence of the second (mental) knowledge (*jñānāntara viraha daśāyām*). Thus, the heaviness arises in the assumption of the second (mental) knowledge or re-congnition (*jñānāntara kalpane*), as the usage of the self(knowledge) is tenable even by the (first) knowledge itself.(*svataḥ*).

Nevertheless, the Mīmāmsakas admit that the second (mental) knowledge (*jñānāntara*) may be required for the usage of the pot etc.(*ghṭādi vyavahāre*) due to the presence and the absence of second knowledge (*anvaya vyatirekāt*). Also they hold that one's past and future knowledges (*svīyā tītānāgata*) as well as other's knowledge (*parakīya*) require the second (mental) knowledge due to the absence of the first knowledge at the time of the usage of the selves (past knowledge etc.); also the usage and the lack of the usage of selves are due to the conformity with the presence and the absence of the second (mental) knowledge or recognition (*anvaya vyatirekānuvidhāna*).

Jñāna is Sva viṣayaka

I.xi.2. Now it may be argued as follows: That this way, even desire etc. would not require the knowledge for the usage or communication of the selves (desire etc.). Since they are equal to simple first knowledge, they would be competent of (causing) the use or communication of the selves (desire etc). by themselves. However, this is not correct. Since the usages or communications in general are ruled to be produced only from the knowledge, desire etc. would require the knowledge for (causing) the uses or communications of the selves (desire etc.).

Also it may be argued as follows: That the knowledge does not constitute the cause of the usage of the self (knowledge) in general; rather, only the knowledge referring to the object to be used or communicated constitutes the cause of the usage or communication. Therefore, even the usage or communication of 'knowledge' would be possible only from the second knowledge referring to the first knowledge as its object. However, then we shall reply; yes. The first knowledge alone refers to the self (knowledge) as its object. The knowledge, which is associated with the power conducive to the

usage or communication of the self (knowledge), refers to the self as its object. However, the power of usage or communication is totally a distinct entity; and does not constitute the causality of the cause of the usage; and hence mutual dependence does not arise. Since the first knowledge is competent of the usage or communication of itself (the first knowledge), the same first knowledge refers to the self (first knowledge) as its object. The power of usage or communication and the relation of inherence etc. belong, naturally, to the first knowledge. Also since the infinite regress would become contingent, in the assumption of another relation of inherence etc., they must be resorted, i.e. admitted to be mere nature of the first knowledge.

Explanation

The Mīmāmsakas now refute the argument that in that case, even desire etc. (*icchādika*) need not require any knowledge for the usage or communication of 'desire' etc. (*svavyavahāra jñāna*), as they, being equal to knowledge, can be competent of causing the usage or communication of the selves, i.e. 'desire' etc. (*sva vyavahāra śakta*) by themselves. According to the Mīmāmsakas, the usage etc. ingeneral are ruled to be produced only from the knowledge (*jñāna janyatva niyama*), and hence the desire etc. would require knowledge for the usage of desire etc. (*icchādi vyavahāre*).

Also the Mīmāmsakas refute the arguement that only the knowledge referring to the object to be used (*vyavahartavya viṣaya*), and not the knowledge in general (*jñāna mātra*), constitutes the cause of the usage (*vyavahāra hetu*); and hence only the second knowledge, referring to the first knowledge as its object (*tad viṣaya jñānāntara*), can cause the usage of the first knowledge (*jñāna vyarahāra*). According to them, the first knowledge alone *(svasya)* refers to the self (knowledge) as its object *(sva viṣayaka)*; and the knowledge, which is associated with the power conducive to the usage of the self (knowledge) (*vyavahārānukūla śakti yogin*), refers to the self as its object (*tad viṣayaka*). Here the power of usage (*śakti*) is a destinct entity (*padārthāntara*) and not the causality of the cause of the usage (*kāraṇatā*); and hence mutual dependence does not arise. Also the first knowledge refers to the self (first knowledge) as its object (*sva viṣayaka*), as it is competent of the usage of the self (first knowledge) (*sva vyavahāra*). Also the power of the usage of the self(*vyavahāra śakti*) belongs to the first knowledge (*tadīya*); and it is the very nature of the first knowledge (*svabhāva*); and hence infinite regress does not arise.

Svaviṣayatva is Svabhāvaviśeṣa

I.xi. 3. From the above refutation, even the argument that "The relation of being the object-and the object - referring knowledge is governed by the

difference (between the object and the knowledge); and therefore how can the non-difference, i.e. the identity between the object and the knowledge be possible" gets refuted. For, the state of being competent of the usage of the self (knowledge) is quite possible (for the knowledge) even in the absence of difference from the state of referring to the self (knowledge) as its object.

Or as an alternative, it can be admitted that the state of referring to the self (knowledge) as its object is the very nature of the knowledge itself; for, the particular nature is tenable even without any relation. Just as the knowledge, referring to the pot, is competent of producing the usage of the pot, in the same way, the knowledge, referring to the self as its object, is competent of producing the usage of the self (knowledge).

Now it may be asked, as to what is the particular nature of (first) knowledge (as it cannot be described). However, this is not correct . Though it is difficult to describe, the particular nature of (first) knowledge, which is established by experience, cannot be refuted like the particular sweetness of sugar etc. As a matter of fact, the particular nature of knowledge can be described by the sentence, viz. *svabhāva viśeṣaḥ*; however, it cannot be described by any single word.

Explanation

The Mīmāmsakas now refute the argument that the relation of being the object-and the object-referring knowledge (*viṣaya viṣayibhāva*) is governed by the difference between the object and the knowledge (*bheda niyata*); and hence the non-difference (*abheda*) between them is untenable. According to them, the state of being competent of the usage of the self (knowledge) (*sva vyavahāra śaktatva*) is tenable in the knowledge even in the absence of difference (*abhede*) from the state of referring to the self (knowledge) as its object (*sva viṣayatva*).

Also the Mīmāmsakas propose that the state of referring to the self (knowledge) as its object (*svaviṣayatva*) constitutes the very nature *(svabhāva viśeṣa)* of knowledge, as the same particular nature is tenable even without the relation (*sambandham*). Also the knowledge, referring to the self (knowledge) as its object (*svīya*) is competent of producing the usage of the self (knowledge), like the knowledge referring to the pot (*ghatīya*) is competent of producing the usage of the pot. (*ghaṭa vyavahāra janana yogya*).

Also the Mīmāmsakas refute the argument that the particular nature (*svabhāva viśeṣa*) of (first) knowledge cannot be described. According to them, the particular nature, like the particular sweetness of sugar (*mādhuryādi viśeṣa*), is established by experience; and hence cannot be refuted. Also the particular nature of (first) knowledge, though cannot be described by a single

word, is competent of being described by the sentence, viz. *svabhāva viśeṣa.*

Svaviṣayatva is Svaprakāśatva

I.xi.4. It may be argued now as follows: That the usage or communication (of simple first knowledge) is to be accomplished from the second mental knowledge or recognition, as different from the first knowledge to be used or communicated. And therefore, how can the usage or communication (of first knowledge) be possible without the second knowledge or recognition?.

However, this argument is not correct. The simple first knowledge is the cause of the usage or communication of the self, only as being the knowledge which is to be used or communicated; however, it is not so as being the second(mental) knowledge, which is different from the knowledge to be used or communicated, due to the heaviness in the assumption.

The collective knowledge (such as ' These are jar and clothing') refers to individual objects (such as jar and clothing) separately, as it causes the usage or communicatiion of single individual objects separately; however, it does not refer to all the objects collectively. Since the collection of objects, as distinct from single individual objects, is absent, the collective knowledge cannot have any separate relation with collection of objects.

In the case of illusion of shell to be silver (such as 'This (shell) is silver'), the power conducive to the usage of silver does indeed exist in the illusive knowledge of silver; however, since such a power is produced only as being overcome by the defect, the usage or communication is not made in the case of silver. Also the knowledge of 'this' aspect (such as in 'This (shell) is silver'), produced from the sense-organ, but not the knowledge of silver as such, is the cause of the activity towards shell. Since the lack of knowledge of difference (of shell) from the recollected silver is required for the activity of the person desirous of silver (towards shell), the knowledge of silver is merely the delimitor of the causality of the cause of the activity.

Thus, the state of referring to the self (knowledge) as its object means the state of being the self-conscious or self-manifestation; however, it does not mean the state of not requiring any (second) mental knowledge in the case of the usage or communication of knowledge itself, due to the heaviness in assumption. Otherwise, since the impression of knowledge as referring to the self as its object is absent, the remembrance of objects would become untenable.

Explanation

The Mīmāsakas now refute the argument that the usage or communication of simple first knowledge (*vyavahāra*) needs to be obtained from the second mental knowledge or recognition which is different from the first knowledge to be used (*vyavahartavya bhinna jñāna*); and hence the usage of first knowledge cannot be possible without the second mental knowledge or recognition. According to them, simple first knowledge is the cause of the usage of the self (*hetu*) only as being the knowledge, which is to be used (*vyavahartavya jñānatvena*); but it is not so as being the second mental knowledge which is different from the knowledge to be used (*vyavahartavya bhinna jñānatvena*).

The collective knowledge (*samūhālambana*) such as 'These are jar and clothing' (*ghaṭa paṭau*) refers to individual objects separately such as jar and clothing *(ekaika viṣayaka)* due to producing the usage of single individual objects separately; (*ekaika vyavahāra janakatvāt*); but it does not refer to all the objects collectively together (*samūha viṣayaka*). According to the Mīmāmsakas, the collection of objects, as distinct from single individual objects, (*atirikta*), is absent; and hence the collective knowledge cannot have any separate relation with collection of objects (*sannikarṣābhāvāt*). The Mīmāmsakas point out here that in the case of illusion (*bhramasthale*) such as 'This (shell) is silver' (*idam rajatam*), the power conducive to the usage of silver (*rajata vyavahārānukūla śakti*) exists in the illusive knowledge of silver (*rajata jñāne*); however, since the power is produced as overcome by the defect, the usage of silver (*rajate vyavahāra*) is not made. Also they point out that the knowledge of 'this' aspect (*idam jñānam*) produced from sense, and not the knowledge of silver (*rajata jñānam*), is the cause of the activity (*pravartaka*) towards silver. However, since the lack of knowledge of difference of shell from the recollected silver*(upasthita rajata bhedā graha)* is required for the activity of the one desirous of silver *(rajatārthi pravṛtty artham)* towards silver, the knowledge of silver is merely the delimitor of the causality of the cause of the activity (*kāraṇatāvacchedaka*). The Mīmāmsakas now conclude that the state of referring to the self (knowledge) as its object (*sva viṣayatva*) of the knowledge is the state of being the self conscious or self manifestation (*svaprakāśa tva*); however, it does not mean the state of not requiring second mental knowledge (*jñānāntarānapekṣatva*) in the case of the usage of knowledge itself. Otherwise, since the impression of knowledge (*jñānasya samskāra*) as referring to the self as its object (*svaviṣaya tvena*) is absent, the recollection of object (*smaraṇa*) would become untenable.

Triputī pratyakṣa vāda

I.xi.5. The advocates of the doctrine of triangular perception hold here as follows: That the state of not requiring second mental knowledge, which is spoken off in the case of the usage of knowledge itself, is for facilitating the self- consciousness or self- manifestation of first knowledge. And only the perception constitutes the means of knowledge or proof in the case of knowledge being self-conscious-or self- manifestation.

All the knowledges, which are of the forms of ' I know this' etc., are produced by way of describing the knower, the knowledge and the knowable object. In such case of knowledges, the soul is perceived as the knower, the knowledge is perceived as the action, and the knowable object is perceived as the grammatical object. Therefore the knowledge is experienced to be triangular in nature as referring to the knower, the knowledge itself and the knowable object.

Explanation

Gangeśa now introduces the theory of triangular perception (*triputī pratyakṣa*). According to the advocate of triangular perception (*triputī pratyakṣa vādin*), the state of not requiring second mental knowledge (*jñānāntarānpekṣatva*) of first knowledge in the case of the usage of the self (knowledge) (*sva vyavahāre*) means the state of being the self conscious or self manifestation (*sva prakā śatva*); and the same is proved by only the perception (*pratyakṣa*). Also the Triputīpratyakṣavādins hold that all the knowledges are of the forms (*prakārāḥ*) such as ' I know this' (*idam aham jānāmi*); and describe the knower (*jñātṛ*), the knowable object (*jñeya*) and the knowledge (*jñāna*). According to them, the soul (*ātman*) is perceived as the knower-agent *(kartṛtvena)*, the knowable object (*jñeya*) is perceived as the grammatical object *(karma tvena)* and the knowledge *(jñāna)* is perceived as the action *(kriyātvena)*. Thus, the knowledge is experienced to be triangular in nature as referring to the knower, the knowable object and the knowledge itself.

Paraprakāśakatva is Untenable

I.xi.6. It may be objected by the Naiyāyikas as follows: That the simple first knowledge such as ' This is a pot' is produced first; and then the second knowledge or recognition, which is mental such as ' I know that this is a pot', is produced subsequently.

However, this objection is not correct. When the usages of knowledge are tenable merely from the self-consciousness or self-illumination of simple first knowledge only, the assumption of second mental knowledge or recognition involves the heaviness in assumption. Thus, the self-consciousness

or self-illumination of first knowledge becomes established by means of exclusive specification. Also in the case of the consciousness or illimination of first knowledge by second mental knowledge or recognition, the very (nature of being the) knowledge would become unestablished (in the first knowledge) due to the absence of any proof. Also the knownness of first knowledge cannot constitute the probans of inference (establishing the consciousness or illumination of first knowledge by second mental knowledge or recognition). For, the knownness is absent in the past and future knowledges.

Also the simple first perceptual knowledge cannot be mental, i.e. produced from the mind. For, when the knowledge, which is not desired to be known, is held to be mental, the knowledge would involve the ceaselessness, it would involve infinite regress and also it would lack reference to other objects. Also when the knowledge, which is desired to be known, is to be grasped by the second mental knowledge, the inference that the first knowledge is not mental; for, it possesses the self-nature of being grasped by the desire to know, like the mental impression". would become contradictory.

That is why, the happiness or pleasure etc. are mental only because of the absence of the desire to know them. Also when the desire to know (some thing) needs to be accomplished again from another second knowledge (of something), the infinite regress becomes contingent. Also since the knowledge (of the thing) is destroyed from the knowledge of the thing and the desire (to acquire the thing) etc., the knowledge would not be perceptual.

Explanation

The Mīmāmsakas refute the objection of the Naiyāyikas that the simple first knowledge (*vyavasāya*) such as ' This is a pot' (*idam*) is produced first; and then the second knowledge which is mental (*mānasa*) or recognition (*anu vyavasāya*), such as ' I know that this is a pot' (*idam aham jānāmi*) is produced subsequently. According to them, when the usages of knowledge are tenable from the self cosciousness or self- illimination *(sva prakāśatvena)* only, the assumption of second mental knowledge or recognition (*jñānāntara kalpane*) involves the heaviness. Thus, the Mīmāmsakas establish the self-consciousness or self–illumination of first knowledge (*sva prakāśatva*) by exclusive specification (*pariśeṣāt*); and they state that the very nature of (being) knowledge (*jñāna*) would become unestablished in the simple first knowledge in the case of the cousciousness or illumination by another second mental knowledge (*paraprakāśakatve*) due to the absence of only proof. Further, the Mīmāmsakas state that the knownness of first knowledge (*jñātatā*) cannot constitute the probans of inference (*liṅga*) in establishing the consciousness or illumination of first knowledge by second mental knowledge. According to them, the knownness is absent in the simple past and future knowledges

(*atītānāgatayoḥ*).

The Mīmāmsakas further observe that the simple first perceptual knowledge (*pratyakṣa*) is not mental (*mānasa*). According to them, when the knowledge not desired to be known (*ajijñāsita*) is held to be mental, the knowledge would involve the ceaselessness (*jñānāvirāmāt*). Also on the other hand, when the knowledge which is desired to be known (*jijñasita*) is to be grasped by the second mental knowledge, the inference that "The knowledge is not mental (*jñānam na mānasam*); for, it possesses the self-nature of being grasped by the desire to know (*jijñāsā grāhya dharmatvāt*)" would become contradictory.

Thus, the happiness or pleasure etc. (*sukhādi*) are mental only because of the absence of the desire to know (*jijñāsām vinā*). And when the desire to know (*jijñāsā*) needs to be accomplished from another knowledge (*jñāna sādhya*), the infinite regress (*anavasthā*) becomes contingent. However, since the knowledge of a thing needs to be destroyed by the knowledge of the thing and the desire to acquire the thing (*dharmi jñāncchā*), it cannot be perceptual.

Defect in the Inference of mental perceptuality

I.xi.7. It may be inferred as follows: That 'The simple first knowledge is mental perception; for, it is the perceptual quality of the soul; and it is merely momentary while being the particular quality of the soul like the pleasure'; or that 'The simple first knowledge is the substratum of the comprehensional relation of sense organs producing perception; for, it is perceptual, like the pleasure'.

However, these inferences are not correct. When the simple first knowledge is held to be mental, infinite regress would become contingent. That, is why, the following inferences of the opposing Naiyāyikas that 'The direct knowledge produced from eye does not constitute the object of the knowledge produced from eye; for, it constitutes the perception, like the knowledge produced from sense of taste'; or that 'The direct knowledge produced from eye does not constitute the object of the knowledge of 'this' aspect; for, it is not the substratum of the sense-organ producing the knowledge of 'this' aspect, like the ether, ; or that 'The sense organ of eye does not produce the knowledge regarding visual perception of things; for, it constitutes the external organ of sense , like sense organ of taste" become refuted. For, when the first knowledge is to be manifested or illuminated by another second knowledge, the infinite regress would become contingent; and hence the subject of inference would become unestablished, as the very nature of first knowledge is unestablished. Also the means of knowledge establishing the knowledge constitutes the impediment to the establishment of the subject of inference, as being self-conscious or self-illimination.

Moreover, the state of referring to the self (knowledge) as its object means the state of being competent of producing the usages of the self (knowledge). And such a state is not contradictory both ways in the case of the first knowledge not being produced from the comprehensional relation of the knowledge itself or in the case of the first knowledge not being produced from the knowledge itself. Also it, cannot be argued that the absence of the state of being competent of producing the usages of the self (knowledge) constitutes the probandum; for, such a probandum is useless (in establishing the state of being known by recognition). Also the same probandum is deviating, i.e. absent in the case of the pot etc. which are competent of the uses, but not produced either from the comprehensional relations of themselves or from themselves.

Explanation

The Naiyāyikas now present two inferences which establish mental perceptuality in the simple first knowledge. According to them, 'The simple first knowledge (*jñāna*) is mental perception (*mānasapratyakṣa*), as it is the particular quality of the soul (*ātma viśeṣa guṇatvāt*) like pleasure (*sukhavat*); or 'The simple first knowledge is the substratum of the comprehensional relation of sense organs producing perception (*pratyakṣa janakendriya sannikarṣāśrayaḥ*), as it is perceptual like pleasure' can prove mental perceptuality in the first knowledge.

However, the Mīmāmsakas refute the inferences on the ground that the infinite regress (*anavasthāna*) becomes contingent in the case of mental perceptuality of knowledge. Also, for the same reason, they refute the inferences of the opponents that ' The direct knowledge produced from eye (*cakṣur janyam jñānam*) does not constitute the object of knowledge produced from eye (*na cakṣur janya jñāna viṣayaḥ*); for, it constitutes the perception (*pratyakṣatvāt*)' or that 'The eye (*cakṣuḥ*) does not produce the knowledge regarding the visual perception of things (*na cākṣuṣa jñāna grāhakam*); for, it constitutes the external organ of sense (*bahir indriyatvāt*)'. According to them, when first knowledge is to be manifested by second knowledge (*paraprakāśatve*), the very nature of the first knowledge becomes unestablished (*jñānā siddhi*); and hence the subject of inference would becomes unestablished (*āśrayā siddhi*). Also the means of knowledge establishing the knowledge (*dharmigrāhaka māna*) is an impediment to the establishment of the subject of inference (*tat siddhau*) due to being self-conscious or self illumination (*svaprakāśatvena*).

Also the Mīmāmsakas describe the state of referring to the self (knowledge) as its object (*sva viṣayatva*) as the state of being competent of

producing the usages of the self (knowledge) (*sva vyavahāra śaktatva*); and the same is not contradictory even in the case of the first knowledge not being produced from the comprehensional relation of the knowledge itself (*sva sannikarṣā janyatve*) or in the case of the first knowledge not being produced from the knowledge itself (*svājanyatve*). Further, they state that the absence of the state of being competent of producing the usages of the self (knowledge) (*svavyavahāre śaktatvā bhāvaḥ*) cannot constitute the probandhum of inference, as the same is useless and is absent in the case of the pot etc. (*ghaṭādau*), which are competent of the uses, but not produced from the comprehensional relations of themselves or from themselves.

Indriya sannikarṣaja Jnāna is Pratyakṣa

I.xi.8. Since the simple first knowledge is self-conscious or self illuminated, the state of referring to the object of former knowledge occurs generally only in the recollection or remembrance of objects referring merely to the object experienced earliar such as 'This is that'; for, second knowledge or recognition is not necessary for illumunation of the first knowledge.

It may be argued now that when the simple first knowledge is not produced from itself, how can the same first knowledge have the self for its object? However, this argument is not correct. The simple first knowledge, like the past and future knowledges, has a reference to itself; however, it does not have the self for its object. And the state of having a reference (to the self) is tenable even in the case of non-difference; for, the state of being competent of producing the usages of the self or the state of having a reference (to the self) constitutes the very nature of knowledge.

It should not be argued that the simple first knowledge, not being the object of (another second) knowledge, has the non-existence, like the horn of a hare. The horn of a hare is never conscious or illuminated. Also the state of being the object of the form of being the object of the usages produced from the knowledge is tenable even in the simple first knowledge which is self-conscious or self-illumination. However, the state of being the object of the form of the state of possessing an effect, which is other than being the object of the usages, is unestablished even in the pot etc., as the effect of knownness is refuted in the object by us.

The simple first knowledge, which is produced from the comprehensional relation of sense-organs, independent of (another) knowledge, is the perception; and therefore, all the knowledges are perceptions in ones own self as, they are produced from the comprehensional relation of the mind with the soul independent of (another) knowledge. However, the qualificative

perception is not produced from merely the knowledge of the qualifier; for, mere indeterminate knowledge (without a qualifier) is refuted by us. As an alternative, however the knowledge, which, being determinate, is not produced from another knowledge, can be admitted to be direct perception; and hence the qualificative knowledge, qualified by generic property, which is produced from the indeterminate knowledge, becomes direct perception. However, the knowledge produced from distinct sense-organs etc., cannot be admitted to be self-conscious perception; for the self is conscious or illuminated in the case of inference etc. even without being produced from distinct organs. The sense organs etc. are causes only in the case of the illumination or consciousness of objects of knowledge; for, only the illumination or consciousness of the objects is produced from the causes delimited by the sense-organs.

Explanation

The Mīmāmsakas now explain that since the simple first knowledge is self–conscious or self illuminated (*svaprakāśatvena*), the state of referring to the former knowledge (*pūrvānubhava viṣayatā*) appears only in the case of recollection or remembrance (*smaraṇe*) referring to the object experienced as 'this is that' (*tattānubhūta viṣaye*). According to them, the second knowledge (*jñānāntara*) is not necessary for the illuminatiion of the simple first knowledge.

Also the Mīmāmsakas refute the argument that when the simple first knowledge (*svasya*) is not produced from itself (*svājanyatve*), the same cannot have the self as its object (*svakarmatā*). According to them, the simple first knowledge has a reference to the self (*sva viṣavatva*) like the past and future knowledges (*atītānāgatayor iva*); however, it does not have the self for its object (*karmatva*). For, the state of having a reference to the self (*viṣayatva*) is tenable even in the case of non-difference (*abhedepi*), as the state of being competent of producing the usages of the self (*sva vyavahāra śaktatva*) or the state of having a reference to the self (*viṣayatva*), constitutes the very nature of knowledge (*svabhāva viśeṣa*).

Also the Mīmāmsakas refute the argument that the simple first knowledge, not being the object of another knowledge (*adhī karmatayā*), has the non-existence *(asattva)* like the horn of a hare. According to them, the horn of a hare is never conscious or illuminated (*aprakāśa*). Also they note that the state of being the object (*karmatva*) of the form of being the object of the usages produced from the knowledge (*dhī janya vyavahāra bhāgitva*) is tenable even in the present knowledge which is self-conscious or self-illuminated (*sva prakāśa*). However, the state of being the object of the form of the state of possessing an effect (*phala bhāgitva*), which is other than the

object of the usages, is not established even in the object pot (*ghaṭe*), as the effect of knownness (*jñātatā*) is not admitted.

The Mīmāmsakas state their theory that the knowledge (*jñāna*), which is produced from the comprehensional relation of sense-organs (*indriya sannikarṣa ja*), independent of another knowledge, is the perception (*pratyakṣa*); and hence all the knowledges (*sarva jñāna*), can be the perceptions in one's own self (*svātmani*) due to being produced from the comprehensional relations of the mind with the soul (*ātma manas sannikarṣajatvena*) independent of another knowledge. However, they note that the qualificative perception (*viśiṣta pratyakṣa*) is not produced from the knowledge of the qualifier (*viśeṣaṇa jñāna janya*), as mere indeterminate knowledge (*nirvikalpaka*) without a qualifier cannot be admitted. However, alternatively, it can be admitted that the knowledge which, being determinate, and not produced from another knowledge(*savikalpakatvena jñānājanya jñāna*) is the perception; and hence the qualificative knowledge of generic property, (*jāti viśiṣta jñāna*), which is produced from indeterminate knowledge (*nirvikalpaka janya*), can qualify to be the perception. However, the knowledge produced from distinct sense-organs (*asādhāraṇendriyādi karaṇaka*) cannot be admitted to be self-conscious perception (*pratyakṣa*), as the self is conscious or illuminated (*svātma prakāśa*) in the case of inference etc. even without being produced from the organs. The sense-organs (*indriyādika*) are the causes only in the case of the consciousness or illumination of the objects of knowledge (*artha prakāśe*); for, only the consciousness of the objects is produced from the causes delimited by the sense-organs (*tat pratibaddha hetu*).

Naiyāyikas' Refutation of Svaprakāśatva

I.xi.9. Here, we, the Naiyāyikas, state our reply. The perception cannot constitute the means of valid knowledge that proves the simple first knowledge to be self-conscious or self-illumination. For, the simple first knowledge is not established to have the from such as 'I know this as silver'.

It should not be argued that this way, the common experience (of first knowledge) becomes contradictory. For, the activity etc. (of humans for the objects) are observed only from the ascertainment of the objects of knowledge. The simple first knowledge is merely experinced to be referring to the objects of itself; it is not experienced to be referring to the self (knowledge) as its object. Due to the heaviness in assumption, the simple first knowledge, is not admitted to be the cause of activity, by way of being the knowledge that refers to the self as its obect. Also the experience (of first knowledge) is of the form of 'This is silver' etc. only. Also this way, the Mīmāmsakas' refutation of the experience (of recognition), which has the form such as 'I know this as silver'

does not deserve any overlooking , i.e. pardon. For, such a recognition is obtained after (the experience of) simple first knowledge (such as 'This is silver'). Since the ordinary experience (of first knowledge) is of the form of 'This is silver', we deny such a form as 'I know this as silver' of the first knowledge; however, we do not deny such a form (as 'I know this as silver') of the recognition.

It may be argued now that since infinite regress becomes contingent in the Naiyāyikas' theory that re-congnition is different from first knowledge, only simple first knowledge needs to be recognized as re-cognition. However, then we shall counterargue that since the self-consciousness gets established (in the knowledge) due to the impediment to the consciousness by the other recognition, all the knowledges would become established to have the form such as 'I know this as so and so' only. Thus, when the first knowledge cannot be established to be self-conscious, all the knowledges too cannot be established to have the state of having the form such as 'I know this as so and so'. Therefore, the same knowledge, i.e. 'I know this as so and so' cannot constitute the means of valid knowledge or proof in establishing the self-consciousness of first knowledge.

Explanation

The Naiyāyikas now reply here. According to them, the perception (*pratyakṣa*) cannot constitute the means of valid knowledge (*pramāṇa*) that proves the simple first knowledge to be self-conscious or self-illumination (*sva prakāśa*) as the simple first knowledge (*vyavasāya*) is not established to have the form such as 'I know this as silver' (*idam ahm jānāmi*). The Naiyāyikas refute the argument that the common experience (*anubhava*) becomes contradicted in their theory. According to them, the activity for the object (*pravṛtti*) is observed from the ascertainment of the object (*artha niścaya*). Also according to them, the simple first knowledge (*vyavasāya*) merely refers to the object itself (*artha viṣaya*); however it is not experienced to be referring to the self as its object (*sva viṣaya*); also the first knowledge is not the cause of the activity (*pravṛtty ahetu*), as the same would be heavy in assumption. And the experience of first knowledge is of the form that 'This is silver' (*idam rajatam*). Also the Naiyāyikas note that the Mīmāmsakas' refutation of the experience of recognition (*anubhavāpalāpa*) which has the form such as 'I know this as silver' (*idam aham jānāmi*) cannot be overlooked, i.e. pardoned, as the same recognition is obtained only after the first knowledge (*vyavasāyottaram*) such as 'This is silver' is produced. Thus, the Naiyāyikas establish the theory that the first knowledge (*vyavasāya*) has the form such as 'This is silver' (*idam rajatam*) and the re-cognition has the form such as 'I

know this as silver' (*idam aham jānāmi*). Also the Naiyāyikas refute the argument that the infinite regress (*anavasthāna*) becomes contingent in the admission that re-cognition is different from first knowledge (*bhinnānuvyavasāya*); and therefore, first knowledge (*vyavasāya*) needs to be re-cognition (*anu vyavasāya*) only. According to them, when the self-consciousness or self illumination (*sva prakāśatva*) gets established in the first knowledge, due to the impediment to the theory of the consciousness by the recognition (*para prakāśe*), all the knowledges (*sarva pratīti*) would have only the form such as 'I know this as so and so' *(idam aham jānāmi)*. Now since the silf-consciousness (*sva prakāśatva*) cannot be established in the first knowledge, all the knowledges too cannot be established to have the form such as 'I know this as so and so' (*idam aham jānāmi*); and hence the same first knowledge cannot be proof of the self-consciousness.

Jñāna is not Svaviṣayaka

I.xi.10. Moreover, the state of having the inherence of the action or activity constitutes the agenthood (*lit* the agency). Also the state of possessing the effect of the action inherent in what is other than the object or the state of being the object of the operation of the instrument constitutes the objecthood. And the state of being the verbal root-meaning or the other constitutes the action-hood. The epistemological form such as 'I know this as silver' does not manifest in the first knowledge, due to the absence of the comprehensional relation of the sense-organ producing such a form. However, only the qualification of the knowledge, qualified by the state of being the knowledge referring to 'this' as the object, manifests in the first knowledge. Also such a qualification of the knowledge cannot manifest in the first knowledge which is self-conscious; for, such a qualification cannot be known earliar. Therefore, the knowledge of the form such as 'I know this as silver' does not constitute the first knowledge; rather, it constitutes the re-cognition.

It might be so. Let not the qualification of the knowledge of the agenthood etc. be known in the self (first knowledge); however, when the usage (of 'knowledge') is established to be accomplished from the knowledge referring to the self (first knowledge), the same knowledge would be assumed to be referring to the first knowledge as its object due to the brevity. Also since the self, which is to be known from the awareness of knowledge, too constitutes the object of the first knowledge, all the knowledges shall have the state of referring to the self.

However, this position is not correct. The first knowledge, by way of not being the substratum of the comprehensional relation of sense (knowledge), cannot refer to the self (knowledge) as its object. When the comprehensional relation of sense-organ etc., that regulates or governs the objecthood of a thing, is absent, the first knowledge cannot refer to the self (knowledge) as its object. The effect is not produced without the cause. The first knowledge, which does not produce the perception, cannot be tenable to refer to the perception as its object. The state of referring to the perception as its object, in the non-substratum of the comprehensional relation of the property of the self, is pervaded by the producerness. Since the first knowledge is perceptual, it is the substratum of the comprehensional relation of sense-organs; also since it is the effect to be produced from the relation of the mind, it is mental.

Explanation

The Naiyāyikas now define the agenthood (*kartṛtva*) as the state of having the inherence of the action or activity (*kriyāyāḥ kṛter va samavāyitva*); the objecthood (*karmatva*) as the state of possessing the effect of the action inherent in what is other than the object (*parasamaveta kriyā phala śālitva*) or as the state of being the object of the operation of the instrument *(karaṇa vyāpāra viṣayatva)*; and the actionhood (*kriyātva*) as the state of being the verbal root-meaning (*dhātvarthatva*) or the other. The Naiyāyikas note that the epistemological form such as 'I know this as silver' (*idam aham jānāmi*) does not manifest in the first knowledge *(vyavasāye)* due to the absence of the comprehensional relation of sense-organs producing such a form (*tadudbodhaka sannikarṣābhāva*); but the qualification of knowledge (*jñānasya vaiśiṣṭya*) qualified by the state of being the knowledge referring to the 'this' as the object *(idam viṣayaka jñānatva viśiṣṭa)* manifests in the self: Also the Naiyāyikas observe that such a qualificationof the knowledge (*svasya vaiśiṣṭya*) cannot manifest in the first knowledge which is self-conscious or self-illuminating (*svaprakāśa*), as the same qualification is not known earliar. Thus, the Naiyāyikas establish that the knowledge of the form such as 'I know this as silver' (*idam aham jānāmi*) constitutes the re–congnition (*anu vyavasāya*) and not the first knowledge (*vyavasāya*).

The Mīmāmsakas now argue that the qualification of the knowledge of the agenthood (*kartṛtvādi jñāna vaiśiṣṭya*) need not be known in the self (the first knowledge). According to them, since the usage of the 'knowledge' (*vyavahāra*) is to be accomlished from the knowledge referrring to the self (first knowledge) (*svaviṣayaka jñāna sādhya*), the same knowledge can be assumed to be referring to the first knowledge as its object (*sva viṣayaka*). Also since the self (*ātman*), which is to be known from the awareness of knowledge (*jñāna vitti vedya*), constitutes the object of the first knowledge (*tad viṣaya*), all the knowledges shall refer to the self (*ātma viṣaya*).

However, the Naiyāyikas refute the argument. According to them, the

first knowledge (*svasya*), by way of not being the substratum of the comprehensional relation of sense-organs producing the self (knowledge) (*sva janakendriya sannikarṣāśraya*), cannot refer to the self as its object (*sva viṣaya*). When the comprehensional relation of sense-organs etc., which governs the objecthood of a thing (*viṣayatva niyāmaka*), is absent, the first knowledge cannot refer to the self as the object. Also the Naiyāyikas state that the effect (*kārya*) cannot be produced without the cause (*kāraṇam*); and the first knowledge which does not produce the perception (*pratyakṣājanaka*), cannot refer to the perception as its object (*pratyakṣāviṣaya*). Further, the state of referring to the perception as its object (*pratyakṣa viṣayatā*), in the non-substratum of the comprehensional relation of the property of the self, is pervaded by the producerness (*janakatva vyāpya*). Thus, the first knowledge is perceptual (*pratyakṣa*); and therefore it needs to be the substratum of the comprehensional relation of sense-organs; and the first knowledge is the effect to be produced from the relation of the mind (*manas sannikarṣa janya*); and therefore is mental (*mānasa*).

Form of Syllogisms establishing Anuvyavasāya

I.xi.11. The following constitutes the form of the syllogism establishing re-cognition: That 'The simple first knowledge, constituting the object of dispute and produced from sense-organs, is not the substratum of the object of the (first knowledge) itself; for, it is not the substratum of the comprehensional relation of sense organs producing 'this' simple first knowledge; or, for, it is not the producer of 'this' first knowledge, like the non-proximate or non-connected cause. Or "The simple first knowledge does not refer to 'this' simple first knowledge, as is object; for, it is the direct perceptual knowledge, while not being the substratum of the comprehensional relation of the property of the soul and not being produced from 'this' simple first knowledge. "The simple first knowledge, which is the object of mental perception, is the substratum of the comprehensional relation of organs producing the mental perceptual knowledge of itself; for, it is the object of mental perception; and therefore it is to be grasped through the comprehensional relation of mind". Thus, the visual perceptual knowledge cannot be the object of the first knowledge produced from the eye; for, it is not proximate or connected with the eye, like the pot.

On the other hand, the knowledge of invariable concomitance such as 'The simple first knowledge is knowable, and is the object of mental knowledge' refers to the self (first knowledge) as the object of the recognition through the comprehensional relation of the knowledgeness. Also the knowledge of the lord is self-conscious or self illuminating by referring to all things as its objects due to not being caused.

It may be objected now as follows: That if the simple first knowledge is held to be manifested or illuminated by the after–knowledge, i.e.recognition, then the same simple first knowledge cannot be established to be the knowledge at all due to the infinite regress. Consequently,when the self-consciousness or self-illumination(of the first knowledge) becomes established on account of the means grasping the substratum, i.e. the perceptual knowledge, the same first knowledge, though not comprehensionally related to the sense organ , becomes the object of perception; therefore, all your Naiyāyikas reasons (establishing the first knowledge to be manifest by others) become only contradicted by the means grasping the substratum, i.e. the perceptual knowledge. However, this is not correct. Since all the knowledges such as the recognition do not have the necessary knowability, the infinite regress does not become contignent. Also it cannot be argued that why should not all the knowledges, as soon as produced, have the necessary knowability, as they have the mental knowability through the comprehensional relation of the connected-inherence and also as they do not require any other cause. The necessary knowability is impeded by the totality of causes of the happiness (pleasure) etc. and that of their knowledges. Also the totality of causes of pleasure etc. are stronger (than that of the knowability) due to the observasion of the perception of other objects; and thus the knowability of all the objects is not produced. This is the position of Some.

Explanation

The Naiyāyikas now explain the form of the syllogism establishing the re-cognition (*prayoga*). According to them, the syllogism that "The simple first knowledge produced from sense-organs (*indriya janyamjñānam*) is not the substratum of the object of itself (first knowledge) (*ñaitat jñāna viṣayā śrayaḥ*); for, it is not the substratum of the comprehensional relation of sense-organs producing the simple first knowledge (*etat jñānakendriya sannikarṣā nā śrayatvāt*); or that "The first knowledge does not refer to this first knowledge as its object (*naitat jñāna viṣayakam*); for, it is the dired perceptual knowledge (*sākṣāt kāritvāt),* while not being the substratum of the comprehensional relation of the property of the soul (*ātma dharma pratyāsatty anāśrayatve sati*) and not being produced from 'this' knowledge (etad ajanyatve sati)"; or that "The first knowledge, which is the object of mental perception (*pratyakṣa viṣayo jñānam*), is the substratum of the comprehensional relation of sense-organs producing the mental perceptual knowledge of itself (*svapratyakṣa janakendriya sannikarṣāśrayaḥ*); for, it is the object of mental perception; and hence is the object to be grasped through the comprehensional relation of the mind (*manas sannikarṣa grāhyam*); proves

the fact that the visual perceptual knowledge (*cākṣuṣa jñāna*) is not the object of the knowledge produced from the eye (*cakṣur janya jñāna viṣaya*), as it is not connected with the eye (*cakṣur asannikṛṣṭatvāt*).

Also the Naiyāyikas state that the knowledge of invariable concomitance (*vyāpti jñāna*) such as 'The first knowledge is knowable, and is the object of another mental knowledge' (*jñānam prameyam*), refers to the self (first knowledge) as the object of the recognition *(sva viṣaya)* through the comprehensional relation of the knowledgeness (*jñānatva pratyāsattyā*); and also the knowledge of the lord *(īśvara jñānam)* is self-conscious or self-illuminating (*svaprakāśam*), by referring to all the things as its objects (*sarva viṣayatvāt*).

Now the Naiyāyikas refute the objection of the Mīmāmsakas that when the first knowledge is held to be manifested or illuninated by the second after knowledge, i.e. recognition (*para prakāśakatve*), the same knowledge cannot be established to be the knowledge (*jñāna*) due to the infinite regress; and hence when the self-consciousness or self-illumination of the first knowledge (*svaprakāśakatva*) is established, through the means grasping the substratum, i.e. perception (*dharmi grāhaka māna*), the same first knowledge (*svasya*), dispite not being related to the sense-organs, becomes the object of perception (*pratyakṣa viṣayatvam*). According to them, the knowledges such as recognitioin do not have the necessary knowability (*avaśya vedyatvā bhāva*); and hence the infinite regress does not have any contingency (*anavasthā*). Also they refute the argument that all the knowledges, when produced, need to have the necessary knowability *(avaśya vedyatva)*, as they have the mental knowability (*mano vedyatva*) through the comprehensional relation of the connected inherence (*samyukta samavāyena*). According to them, the necessary knowability is impeded by the totality of causes by the knowledge of the happiness etc.*(sukhādi tadbudhyādi sāmagrī)*,; and hence it need not have the same. Also, the necessary knowability is not produced in the knowledges as the totality of causes of perception of other objects is stronger (*balavattvāt*) than that of the knowability.

Avaśya Vedyatva cannot cause Svaprakāśatva

I.xi.12. Now it may be objected by the Mīmāmsakas as follows: All the knowledges are proved to have the necessary knowability due to the invariable concomitance that "Knowledge is only perception", due to being the competent particular quality of the soul and also due to being the knowledge; and thus the same simple first knowledge has the self-consciousness or self-illumination. However, this is not correct. Such an invariable concomitance is not established. Also the infinite regress would become contingent in the case of the manifestation of all knowledges by the after–knowledge or recognition.

Since the causes of self-consciousness are untenable, in the case of the self-conscious(ness of) knowledge, only the knowledge of things comprehensionally related to sense-organs is perception. Also the invariable concomitance is that the perception is produced from only the objects comprehensionally related to sense-organs. Otherwise, the causality of the causes, which governs the invariable concomitance of the non-production of the effect without the causes, becomes unjustified on account of the non-production of the effect even in the presence of the causes due to the impediment. Also the causality of the causes becomes violated when the effect is produced without the assumed cause; and further the production of the effect becomes untenable.

Moreover, it may be objected by the Mīmāsakas as follows: That since the infinite regress becomes contingent in the case of the manifestation of the simple first knowledge by the after–knowledge, i.e. recognition, the first knowledge has only the self-consciousness by the inference of exclusive specification. However, then we, the Naiyāyikas shall reply that the self-consciousness of the inference, establishing the self-consciousness or self illumination of the first knowledge needs to be known through yet another inference; thus you, the Mīmāmsakas too, would have the infinite regress of inferences through the series of inferences of the self-consciousness or self-illumination. Also suppose you hold that the perception of the other object constitutes an impediment, or that the inference of the self-consciousness or self-illumination continues only upto the speaker's intention to know the self-consciousness or self-illumination, then we shall reply that such conditions are equally applicable even in the case of the illumination by the after–knowledge, i.e. recogition. Also it should not be argued that even the self-consciousness or self-illumination is made to be the object of first knowledge by the inference that "Knowledge is self-conscious" through the comprehensional relation of generic property or universal. The illumination of the first knowledge is equally tenable even in the case of illumination by the after–knowledge, i.e. recognition; however, you would not admit such a theory.

Explanation

The Naiyāyikas now refute the objection that all the knowledges (*vitti*) have the necessary knowability (*avaśyavedyatva*) due to the concomitance (*vyāpti*) that "Knowledge is only perception (*jñānam pratyakṣam*) due to being the competent particular quality of the soul (*ātma viśeṣa guṇatvāt*) and due to being the knowledge (*jñānatvāt*)"; and hence the first knowledge needs to have the self-consciousness or self-illumination" (*svaprakāśatva*). According to them, such an invariable concomitance is not established. Also infinite regress would become contingent in the case of the illumination of knowledge by the after–knowledge, i.e. recognition (*para prakāśakatve*). Also since the

causes of the self consciousness or self-illumination (*svaprakāśe kāraṇa*) are untenable, only the knowledge of things comprehensionally related to sense-organs (*sannikṛṣṭa*) needs to be perception (*pratyakṣa*). Further, the Naiyāyikas state that invariable concomitance *(vyāpti)* is only that perception *(pratyakṣa)* is produced from the objects comprehensionally related to sense-organs *(tad viṣaya janyam)*. According to them, otherwise, the causality of causes (*kāraṇatva*), which governs the invariable concomitance of the non-production of the effect without causes (*kāraṇam vinā kāryānutpatti vyāpti*), becomes unjustified due to the non-production of the effect even in the presence of all the causes by the impediment (*kāraṇasattvepi pratibandhāt kāryānutpāde*). Also the causality of causes (*kāraṇatā*) becomes violated when the effect is produced without the assumed cause (*kḷpta kāraṇam vinā kāryotpāde*). Also the Naiyāyikas refute the objection of the Mīmāmsakas that the simple first knowledge (*jñāna*) is proved to have the self-consciousness or self-illumination (*svaprakāśatva*), by the inference of exclusive specification (*pariśeṣānumāna*), as infinite regress (*anavasthāna*) would occur in the case of the illumination of first knowledge by the after–knowledge, i.e. recognition *(paraprakāśe)*. According to them, even the Mīmāmsakas face the deffeculty of infinite regress of the inference of self-consciousness or self-illumination (*sva prakāśatvānumiti*) as the inference establishing the self-consciousness or self-illumination (*svaprakāśatvānumiti*) of simple first knowledge needs to be known through yet another inference. Also suppose the inference of the self-consciousness (*svaprakāśatvānumiti*) continues only upto the speaker's intention to know the self-consciousness (*yāvaj jijñāsam*), then it can be held that such conditions apply even in the case of the illumination by the after–knowledge, i.e. recognition (*para prakāśatve*). Also the Naiyāyikas refute the argument that eve the self-consciousness (*sva prakāśatva*) is made to be the object of the first knowledge by the inference that 'Knowledge is self-conscious' (*jñānam svaprakāśam*) through the eomprehensional relation of universal *(sāmānya pratyāsattyā)*. According to them, the illumination of the first knowledge is equally contingent even in the theory that the first knowledge is to be illuminated by the second after-knowledge, i.e. recognition; and hence the being the object of knowledge is not the determining factor.

Refutation that simple first knowledge is not dependent And Anuvyavasāya is Untenable

I.xi.13. Moreover, the perceptionness does not exist inthe inference due to the cross-connection with the generic property of the inferenceness. The Mīmāmsakas may argue now as follows: That since the mind, being dependent on the knowledge, cannot be the producer of simple first knowledge, the second mental knowledge, i.e. recognition is not perceptual with respect to the self (first knowledge), like with respect to the object of inference. Therefore the simple first knowledge too is not dependent on the second mental knowledge in the case of reference to the self. However, this argument is not correct. The simple first knowledge is to be produced from the second mental knowledge, i.e. recognition; and therefore the same first knowledge neeeds to be only one, i.e. only dependent on the second mental knowledge, i.e. recognition in the case of reference to the self and its objects. And therefore how can the first knowledge be both dependent and independent on the second knowledge; for, such a position involves contradiction. Also it cannot be argued that the state of referring to what is other than the knowledge as its objects is dependent on the knowledge. For, in that case the knowledge, referring to the external objects, cannot be perception.

It may again be objected as follows: That only the comprehensional relation of sense-organs etc. are the governing factors in the case of the reference of one, i.e. of first knowledge, to another, i.e. objects. Also the same (comprehensional relation etc.) can be so (the governing factor) in the case of the reference (of the first knowledge) to the self; for, overextension or overpervasion does not occur. Also the comprehendional relation cannot be consecutive. Also the state of being competent of producing the usage or communication constitutes the state of referring to the self as its object; and the same states, when identical, are tenable even without the comprehensional relation. However, this objection too is not correct. The comprehensional relation is the cause of perception in general in the case of its reference to the objects. Otherwise, lack of consecutiveness would become contingent.

It may be objected again as follows: That the knowledge, which is not known, is non-existent due to the absence of proof; and therefore all the knowledges extending upto the objects, which are dependent on such a knowability, would have the contingency of non-existence. However, this objection is not correct. We do not admit the series of knowledges, referring to the first knowledge, and connected contineously. However, we do admit that some knowledge is known by some one at some time due to the usages, the recollection and the inference etc. Therefore, all the knowledges need to be only established by proof.

It may again be objected as follows: That this (Naiyāyikas') theory of recognition would be possible provided that the knowledge, which is distinct from the knowledges such as "This is a pot" and "I know this (pot) is a pot", and which is heavy by the weight of hundreds of series of knowledges and their objects such as pot, is experienced to be produced by us. However, such a knowledge is not experienced.

However, this objection too is not correct. The after-knowledge or recognition is to be described only by its object; however, it is not to be described by a series of the objects due to the heaviness in assumption. Thus, all the after-knowledges or recognitions which are produced as being the knowledges of the knowledges are only experienced by us. Also this way, the infinite regress does not become contingent. Even the non-recognition, of the form of the inferential knowledge derived from the invariable concomitance, is admitted to be referring to the self as its object either through the comprehensional relation of the property produced from the concentration (of the mind) or through the relation characterized by the universal.

Explanation

Now the Naiyāyikas state that the perceptionness (*pratyakṣa tva*) can not exist in the inference (*anumiti*) etc. due to the cross-connection with the inferenceness (*jāti saṅkara*). Also they refute the argument ot the Mīmāmsakas that since the mind *(manas)*, as dependent on the knowledge (*jñāna sāpekṣa*), is not the producer of the first knowledge (*janaka*), the second mental knowledge or recognition cannot be perceptual with respect to the self (first knowledge), like it is with respect to the object of inference (*anumiti viṣaya*); and therefore, the first knowledge too does not require another second mental knowledge (*jṇānānapekṣā*) in the case of reference to the self. (*sva viṣayatve*). According to them, the first knowledge cannot be both dependent and independent on the second knowledge (*tad apekṣam tadanapekṣam*) in the case of reference to the self and its objects (*sva viṣaye svātmani*). Also they refute the argument that only the state of referring to what is other than the knowledge as its object (*jñāna bhinna viṣayatva*) is dependent on the knowledge (*sāpekṣa*). According to them, then the knowledge referring to the external objects (*bahir jñāna*) couldnot be perception.

The Naiyāyikas now refute the objection that only the comprehensional relation of sense-organs etc. (*sannikarṣādi*) are the governing factors in the reference of one, i.e. of first knowledge, to another, i.e. to its objects (*anyasya anya viṣayatve*); also the same can be the governing factors in the reference of the first knowledge to the self (*svaviṣayatve*) due to the lack of any over pervasion; further the state of referring to the self as its object (*viṣayatva*) is nothing but the state of being competent of producing the usage (*vyavahāre śaktatva*); and the same is tenable even without the comprehensional relation. According to them, the comprehensional relation (*sannikarṣa*) is the cause of perception in general (*pratyakṣa mātre*); and hence the same needs to be the cause of the reference to the self as well.

Also the Naiyāyikas refute the objection that the knowledge, which is not to be known (*vedyā*), is non-existent (*asatī*); and hence all the knowledges that are dependent on the knowability (*tad adhīna sattva*) are non-existent. According to them, a series of knowledges referring to the first knowledge (*tadvitti vittidhārā*) need not be admitted; rather the same knowledge can be admitted to be known by some one due to the usages, the recollection and the inference (*vitti vyavahāra smaraṇa liṅgādi*); and hence all the knowledges are established by proof only.

Also the Naiyāyikas refute the objection that the knowledge distinct from the knowledges such as 'This is a pot' (*ayam ghaṭaḥ*) and 'I know this (pot) is a pot' (*ghatam aham jānāmi*) is not experienced; and hence this Naiyāyikas' theory of recognition is untenable. According to them, recognition (*anu vyavasāya*) is to be described by its object (*viṣaya nirūpya*); but it is not to be described by the series of its objects (*tad viṣaya paramparā nirūpya*). Thus, all the recognitions (*vitti*) are experienced to be the knowledges of knowledges (*jñāna jñānatvena*). Also this way the infinite regress (*anirmokṣa*) does not become contingent. Even the non-recognition (*ananuvyavasāya*) of the form of the inference produced by invariable concomitance is admitted to be referring to the self as its object through the relation characterized by the universal (*sāmānya lakṣaṇā pratyāsatti*).

Tad vyavahāra śaktatva is not Tadviṣayatva

I.xi.14. Also the state of being competent of producing the usages or communications of the self cannot be admitted to be the state of referring to the self as its object. Since the knowledge of being competent of producing the usages or communications of the self arises only after the knowledge of the causality of the usages of the self by way of referring to the self as its object and the state of being competent of producing the usages of the self constitutes the state of referring to the self as its object, mutual dependence arises. Also since the power or competency (for producing the usages of the self) cannot be known without the knowledge of the causality (of the usages of the self), the knowledge of the silver would be required to refer to the shell in your Mīmāmsakas' theory. For, we , the Naiyāyikas, have already stated that only the knowledge of the silver is the cause of the activity of the one desirous of silver; however, the knowledge of the delimiting adjunct of the silver, i.e. the shell, does not constitute the cause.

Now you may admit as follows: That the first ever knowledge of the object needs to be the cause of the activity towards its object due to the brevity; for, all the philosophers have admitted the knowledge of the object to be the cause in the case of the first ever activity towards its object. However alas,

we shall reply that let this way the knowledge of silver be admitted to be the invalid knowledge; however, let the same knowledge of silver, which is established to be redundant, not be admitted to be the non-cause of the activity.

From this refutation, the following old theory of the Gurus too becomes refuted: "That the word such as *'kuṭa'* (house), analysedas as the Bahuvrīhi, in which the qualities implied are perceived along with the object, conveys, the principle third referent of the house though non-expressible meaning, by including the qualities. In the same way, knowledge too produces the impression and the activity with respect to its object by including the self, though non-object. For, knowledge is the producer of the impression with respect to the object of the activity produced by itself. And both its object and the self (knowledge) are the objects of the activity produced by itself".

However, in the Naiyāyikas' theory, the simple first knowledge is assumed to be producing the impression and the activity with respect to only its object due to the brevity. Also the first knowledge is not assumed to be producing the impression and the activity with respect to both the self (knowledge) and its object. Since the impression and the activity are to be accomplished from the second knowledge or recognition referring to the first knowledge as its object, the same cannot be accomplished from the first knowledge not referring to itself as its object.

Explanation

The Naiyāyikas now state that the state of being the competent of producing the usages of the self (*tad vyavahāra śaktatva*) cannot be the state of referring to the self as its object (*tadviṣayatva*). According to them, such a view would involve the mutual dependence (*anyo'nyāśraya*), as the knowledge of the state of being competent of producing the usages of the self (*tacchaktatva jñāna*) arises only after the knowledge of the causality of the usages of the self (*tadvyavahāra kāraṇatva grahe*); and the state of being competent of producing the usages of the self (*tacchaktatva*) constitutes the state of referring to the self as its object (*tad viṣayatva*). Further, they state that the power or competency for producing the usages of the self (*śakti*) cannot be known without the knowledge of the causality of the usages of the self (*kāraṇatā graha*); and hence the knowledge of the silver (*rajata jñāna*) would be required to refer to the shell *(śukti viṣaya)* in the Mīmāmsakas' theory. For, only the knowledge of the silver (*rajata jñāna*), and not the knowledge of the delimiting adjunct of the silver, i.e. the shell (*tadavacchedaka*), needs to be the cause of the activity of one desirous of silver.

The Naiyāyikas refute the position that the first ever knowledge of the object (*jñāna*) needs to be the cause of the activity towards its object (*svaviṣaye hetu*), as all admit the knowledge of the object to be the cause in the case of the first ever activity (*ādya pravṛtti*). According to them, then the knowledge of the silver would be required to be the invalid knowledge (*anyathākhyāti*) and not the non-cause of the activity (*apravartaka*).

The Naiyāyikas now refute the theory of the Gurus (*guru mata*) that "The word such as *'kuṭa'* (house), established by the Bahuvrīhi where in the qualities implied are perceived (*tadguṇasamvi jñāna*), along with the object, conveys the primary third referent of the house-along with its qualities; in the same way, the knowledge (*jñāna*) produces the the impression and the activity with respect to its object (*svaviṣaye vyavahāram saṁskāram*) by including the self (*ātmānam*). For, the knowledge is the producer of the impression (*samskāra*) with respect to the object of the activity produced from itself (*svajanya vyavahāra viṣaye*). And both the object and the self (knowledge) are the objects of its activity produced from the knowledge (*svajanya vyavahāra viṣaya*)". According to the Naiyāyikas, in the others' theory, the knowledge is admitted to be the producer of the impression and the activity with respect to only the object (*svaviṣaye vyavahāra samskāra janaka*); and it is not admitted to be the producer of the impression and the activity (*vyavahārasamskāra*) of both the self (knowledge) and the object (*svātmani svaviṣaye*). Since the impression and the activity are to be accomplished from the recognition (*svaviṣaya jñāna*) referring to the first knowledge as its object, the same cannot be accomplished from the first knowledge not referring to the self as its object (*svāviṣayaka jñānāsādhya*).

Justification of Viśiṣṭabuddhi

I.Xi. 15. It may be objected now as follows: That when the first simple perceptual knowledge is produced from the mind, how can the second qualificative knowledge or recognition such as 'I know this (pot) is a pot' be tenable?. Since the qualificand, i.e. the qualiticative cognition is absent at the time of the indeterminate knowledge, produced from the indeterminate knowledge knowledgeness, the qualificative knowledge (of the qualifier) could not be produced.

However, this is not correct. The qualificative knowledge of the knowledgeness is produced in the second qualificative knowledge only at the moment of the loss of the first knowledge; for, the qualificand, i.e. the qualificative knowledge is present at the second moment prior to the destruction of the first knowledge. The qualificand cannot be the cause of the first simple perceptual knowledge due to the heaviness by way of being present only at the time of second qualificative knowledge. In the case of the second qualificative knowledge such as 'I know this (pot) is a pot', only a gross condition, as being existent, appears; however, the moment does not appear,

as the same is beyond the sense-organs. Therefore, the second qualificative knowledge of knowledge is produced in the self; for, the knowledge of the qualifier exists before. However, the qualifier does not constitute the cause of the qualificative the second knowledge due to the heaviness in assumption. Rather, only the knowledge of the qualifier constitutes the cause of the second qualificative knowledge due to necessity.

That is why, recognition of the thatness is produced from the knowledge of the 'thatness' even without the 'thatness'.

Explanation

The Mīmāmsakas now object that when the first simple perceptual knowledge (*jñāna*) is held to be produced from the mind (*mānasa*), the second qualificative knowledge (*viśiṣṭa buddhi*) such as 'I know this (pot) is a pot' (*idam jānāmi*) would not be tenable, as the qualificand (*viśeṣya*) is absent at the time of the indeterminate knowledge produced from the indeterminate knowledge ot the knowledgeness (*jñānatva nirvikalpaka janya jñāna*); and hence the qualificative knowledge of the qualifier (*pratyakṣa*) cannot be produced.

However, the NaiyāYikas refute the objection. According to them, the qualificative knowledge of the knowledgeness (*jñānatva viśiṣṭa buddhi*) is produced in the second qualificative knowledge only at the loss of the first knowledge (*jñāna nāśakṣaṇe*), as the qualificand, i.e. the qualificative knowledge is present only at the second moment prior to the loss of the first simple knowledge (*pūrva kṣaṇa*). Further the qualificand (*viśeṣya*) cannot constitute the cause of the first simple perceptual knowledge (*pratyakṣe*) as it is present only at the time of the second qualificative knowledge (*sva samaya*). Also in the case of the second qualificative knowledge such as 'I know this (pot) is a pot" (*jānāmi*), only a gross condition (*upādhi*), as existing, is perceived; however, the particular moment (*kṣaṇa*) is not perceived, as the same is beyond the senses. Thus, the second qualificative knowledge of knowledge (*jñāna viśiṣṭa buddhi*) is produced in the self, as the knowledge of the qualifier (*viśeṣaṇa jñāna*) exists before. It should be noted here that only the knowledge of the qualifier (*viśeṣaṇa jñāna*), and not the actual qualifier (*viśeṣaṇa*), constitutes the cause of the second qualificative knowledge; and therefore, the recognition of the thatness (*pratyabhijñā*) is possible from the knowledge of the thatness (*tadbuddhi*) even without the thatness (*tattā*).

Alternative Explanation of Viśiṣṭa buddhi

I. Xi. 16. Some hold here as follows: That the qualificative knowledge of the knowledgeness is produced in the another (latter) second knowledge produced at the time of the loss of the (former) first knowledge. However,

this is not correct. For, the cause of another (latter) second knowledge is absent at that time. Also, the inferenceness is absent in the second knowledge or recognition such as 'I infer this (pot) is a pot)' etc.

As an alternative, it can be suggested as follows: That both the knowledge and the knowledgeness appear only in the indeterminate knowledge; and therefore, the qualification of the knowledgeness appears in the knowledge and the qualification of the knowledge appears in the self, (soul). For, the qualification of the qualificative knowledge means that the qualifier appears in the qualificand and another qualifier appears in the first qualifier.

Explanation

Some scholars hold here that the qualificative knowledge of the knowledgeness (*jñānatva viśiṣṭa buddhi*) appears in the latter second knowledge (*vyavasāyāntare)* produced at the time of the loss of former first knowledge (*vyavasāya nāśakṣaṇa*). However, Gangeśa refutes the position. According to him, no reason justifying the latter second knowledge (*vyavasāyāntara*) exists; and also since the inferenceness (*anumititva*) does not exist in the recognition such as 'I infer (this pot) is a pot' (*anuminomi*), the knowledgeness (*jñānatva*) cannot be admitted in the latter second knowledge.

Gangeśa now suggests an alternative that both the knowledge and knowledgeness (*jñānam jñānatvam*) appear only in the simple first indeterminate knowledge (*nirvikalpaka*); and hence the qualification of the knowledgeness (*jñānatva vaiśiṣṭya*) appears in the knowledge and the qualification of the knowledge (*jñāna vaiśiṣṭya*) appears in the self (soul) (*ātmani*). According to him, the qualification of the qualificative knowledge (*viśiṣṭa vaiśiṣṭya*) means that the qualifier (*viśeṣaṇa*) appears in the qualificand (*viśeṣye*) and another qualifier appears in the first qualifier.

Conclusion: Anuvyavasāya or Viśiṣṭa jñāna is both Saprakāraka and Niṣprakāraka

I.Xi. 17. As a matter of fact, the first knowledge, like absence, is only the object of qualificative knowledge or re-cognition (but not the object of indeterminate knowledge). This is so because, the totality of causes of qualificative knowledge, which renders re-cognition to be what is to be accomplished from the simple first knowledge referring to the qualifier such as the object, is very much present. Also the knowledgeness appears only in the recognition, as the totality of causes of the knowledgeness is present there. Thus, the recognition, being qualificative in certain aspect, and non-qualificative in certain other aspect, is of the double form of man-lion.

Also the qualification of the knowlegeness appears in the same qualificative knowledge, i.e. re-cognition. However, the qualification of the knowledgeness does not appear in the inference such as 'I infer the fire'. For, the inferenceness is absent in the re-cognition.

Thus ends the Theory of Recognition in the Perception in the Tattvacintāmaṇi composed by Śri Gangeśopādhyāya.

Explanation

Now, Gaṅgeśa concludes his theory of recognition (*anuvyavasāya vāda*) by presenting his final view. According to him, the simple first knowledge (*jñāna*), like absence (*abhāva*), needs to be the object of qualificative knowledge, i.e. recognition (*viśiṣṭa jñāna viṣaya*), and not that of indeterminate knowledge (*nirvikalpaka*), due to the presence of the causes of the qualificative knowledge (*viśiṣṭa jñāna sāmagrī*) rendering the recognition what is to be accomplished from the first simple knowlege. Also the knowledgeness (*jñānatva*) appears only in the recognition, as the totality of causes of the knowledge of the thatness (*tajjñāna sāmagrī*) is present. Thus, the recognition, being both qualificative in certain aspect (*saprakāraka*) and non-qualificative in certain other aspect (*niṣprakāraka*), is of a double form of man-lion (*nara simhākāra*).

Gangeśa further notes that the qualification of the knowledgeness (*jñānatva vaiśiṣṭya*) appears in the qualificative knowledge or recognition (*tatra*); whereas the same qualification of the knowledgeness does not appear in the inference such as 'I infer the fire' (*anuminomi*), as the inferenceness (*ānumititva*) is absent in the recognition (*anuvyavasāye*).

The End of the Anuvyavasāya vāda
in the Pratyakṣakhaṇḍa.

I. Xii

Theory of Indeterminate Knowledge (Nirvikalpaka Vādaḥ)

Definition of Nirvikalpaka pratyakṣa

I.Xii. 1. That such a perceptual knowledge or perception is twofold as indeterminate and determinate. Between them, the perceptual knowledge, which is devoid of association of name, generic property and others, and which does not involve any qualification and is without a qualifier, is indeterminate knowledge.

It may be objected now as follows: That what is the proof that the knowledgeness exists even in what is other than determinate, i.e. indeterminate knowledge?. And the perception cannot be the proof; for, it involves non-establishment and also the state of being beyond the congnizance of senses is admitted in the indeterminate knowledge. Also the usage or communication cannot be the proof; for, the same is to be accomplished from the determinate knowledge. Also the qualificative knowledge and perceptual knowledge, validated by the experience that 'This was not distinguished before and now I shall distinguish', cannot be the proofs; for, the same (qualificative knowledge and perceptual knowledge) can be tenable only from the knowledge of many qualifiers and the non-knowledge respectively.

Explanation

Gangeśa, after establishing the theory of recognition (*anuvyavasāya vāda*), begins the theory of indeterminate knowledge (*nirvikalpaka vāda*). However, overruling the objection that qualificative and non-qualificative knowledges are untenable, he divides perceptual knowledge or perception (*pratyakṣa*) twofold as indeterminate (*nirvikalpaka*) and determinate (*savikalpaka*). Further, he defines indeterminate knowledge as one that is devoid of associaton of name, generic property and others (*nāmajātyādi yojanārahita*), and not involving the qualification of the qualifier (*vaiśiṣṭyānavagāhi*) and without any qualifier (*niṣprakāraka*).

The Pūrvapakṣin now raises the objection that no proof (*māna*) can justify that the knowledgeness (*jñānatva*) can exist even in what is other than determinate, i.e. indeterminate knowledge (*savikalpaka bhinna vṛtti*). According to him, perception (*praryakṣa*) cannot be the proof, as the state of

being beyond the cognizance of senses (*atīndriyatva*) is admitted there. Also the usage (*vyavahāra*) cannot be the proof, as it is to be accomplished only by the determinate knowledge (*savikalpaka sādhya*). Also the qualificative knowledge (*vikalpa*) and the perceptual knowledge (*ālocana*), produced from the experience such as 'This was not destinguished earliar and now I shall destinguish' cannot be the proofs, as they are possible only from the knowledge of many qualifiers (*bahu viśeṣaṇa jñāna*) and the non-knowledge (*ajñāna*).

Viśiṣṭa jñāna is produced from Viśeṣaṇa jñāna

I. Xii. 2. It can be inferred now that "The qualificative perception such as 'This (cow) is a cow' is produced from the knowledge of the qualifier; for, it constitutes the qualificative knowledge like the inference." (Andthe same knowledge of the qualifier is the determinate knowledge).

It may be argued now as follows: That a single qualificative knowledge, referring to both the semantically competent qualifier and the qualificand, is produced merely from the totality of causes conducive to the knowledge of the qualifier and the qualificand. It should be noted that the previously unknown qualifier appears in the case of perception on account of the comprehensional relation of competent organ; it appears, in the case of inference, as being the qualifier of the delimitor of the pervaderness on account of being the property of the subject; and it appears, in the case of verbal cognition, as being the delimetor of the word-meaning ness on account of the semantic competency etc. Also the qualifier appears in the same way even in the case of analogy; and therefore, the knowledge of the qualifier is not the producer of any knowledge anywhere. Also the experience of the 'thatness' is not the cause in the case of recognition. For, the impression (of the 'thatness') is not manifest dispite the experience of the 'thatness'. Or since the recognition is not produced due to the loss (of the impression of the thatness), only the manifest impression, by way of being comprehensional relation, needs to be the associate cause of senses in producing the knowledge of the qualifier. Also in the case of perceptual knowledge such as 'Sandle wood is fragrant', the knowledge of the impression, by functioning as the comprehensional relation, constitutes the associate cause of senses in producing the knowledge of the qualifier. Further, the illusion cannot constitue the qualificative knowledge at all.

However, then we shall reply. That the establishment of probandum, the recollection of word-meaning, the knowledge of the expressedness and experience of the thatness constitute the causes of inference, verbal cognition, analogical knowledge and recognition respectively. For, inference etc. are not possible without the establishment of the probandum etc. Since the

probandumetc. constitute the qualifiers, the knowledge of the qualifier constitutes the cause of inference etc. Actually, the knowledge of the qualifier, as being the knowledge of the particular qualifier such as the probandum, does not have the causality with respect to the particular effect such as the inference. However, it, as being the knowledge of the qualifier in gernral, has the causality with respect to the qualificative knowledge in general due to the absence of any impediment.

Exaplanation

Gaṅgeśa establishes that the qualificative perception (*viśiṣṭa jñāna*) is produced from the knowledge of the qualifier (*viśeṣaṇa jñāna*). According to him, the inference that "The qualificative perception such as 'This (cow) is a cow' (*gaur iti pratyakṣa*) is to be produced from the knowledge of the qualifier (*viśeṣaṇa jñāna*) due to being the qualificative knowledge (*viśiṣṭa jñānatvāt*)" is the proof of such a theory. And the same knowledge of the qualifier is the determinate knowledge. The Pūrvapakṣin now argues that a single qualificative knowledge (*ekam viśiṣṭa jñānam*), referring to both the semantically competent qualifier and the qualificand (*sākṣaṅkṣobhaya viṣayam*), is produced from the totality of causes conducive to the knowledges of the qualifier and the qualificand (*viśeṣaṇa viśeṣya jñāna sāmagrī*). For instance, the previously unknown qualifier (*apūrva viśeṣaṇa*) appears in the perception (*pratyakṣa*) due to the comprehensional relation of the competent organ (*yogyendriya sannikarṣa*); in the same way, the qualifier appears in the inference etc. due to being the property of the subject of inference (*pakṣadharmatā balāt*) etc. Thus, the knowledge of the qualifier (*viśeṣaṇa jñāna*) is not the cause of the qualificative knowledge anywhere. Also the expeience of the 'thatness' (*tattānubhava*) is not the cause of recognition (*pratyabhijñā*), as the impression of the thatness (*saṃskāra*) is not manifest despite the experience of the same thatness. Also in the case of the perceptual knowledge such as 'Sandle wood is fragrant' (*surabhi candanam*), the knowledge of the impression (*tajjñānam*), only by functioning as the comprehensional relation (*pratyāsatti sthānīyam*), constitutes the associate cause of sense in producing the knowledge of the qualifier (*viśeṣaṇa jñānārtham*).

However, Gaṅgeśa replies that the establishment of probandum (*sādhya prasiddhi*), recollection of word meaning (*padārthopasthiti*), knowledge of the expressedness (*vācyatva jñāna*) and experience of the thatness (*tattānubhava*) constitute the causes of inference, verbal cognition, analogical knowledge and recognition respectively (*anumityādi*). According to him, inference etc are not possible without the establishment of probandum etc. Further, Gaṅgeśa states

that probandum etc. constitute qualifiers; and hence only knowledge of qualifier(*viśeṣaṇa jñāna*) is the cause of qualificative knowledge such as inference (*anumityādi hetu*). However, he notes that the knowledge of the qualifier (*viśeṣaṇa jñāna*), as being the knowledge of the particular qualifier(*viśeṣaṇa jñānatvena*) such as the probandum, does not constitute the cause (*kāraṇa*) of the particular effect such as the inference (*anumityādi pratyekam*); however, it, as being the knowledge of qualifier in general (*viśeṣaṇa jñānatvena*), constitutes the cause of the qualificative knowledge in general (*viśeiṣṭa jñāna mātram*).

Refutation of the Objection that Viśeṣaṇa jñāna is not cause

I.Xii. 3. It might be so. However, the knowledge of the fire, as being the knowledge of the qualifier, does not constitute the cause of the inferential knowledge of the fire such as 'Mountain has fire'; for, the inferential knowledge of the fire such as 'Mountain has fire' is not produced dispite the knowledge of the fire as being the substance. Rather therefore, only the knowledge, as being the knowledge referring the delimitor of the qualifierness as its qualifier, is the cause of the qualificative knowledge. Thus, the knowledge of the qualifier does not constitute the cause of the qualificative knowledge. Further, it cannot be stated that the state of being the knowledge of the qualifier exists in the knowledge constituting the cause. Such a state is overpervassive and is rendered redundant. Also the state of being the knowledge to be produced from the knowledge of the qualifier cannot be established in the qualificative knowledge; for, such a state involves contradiction.

However, this objection is not correct. The knowledge, which has the delimitor of the qualifierness as its qualifier, is established to be the cause of the qualificative knowledge of the qualification in both the theories. Thus, it must be admitted that the knowledge of the qualifier is the cause of the qualificative knowledge in general. The general knowledges of the two entities are ruled to have the cause-and -effect-relationship, if the particular knowledges of the two entities are established to have the cause-and -effect-relationship without contradiction. Otherwise, the cause-and-effect-relationship in general would be lost. Also this rule does not involve any overpervasion or overapplication. The particular effects are not produced without the totolity of cuases of the particular effects. Also the state of being what is beyond the senses cannot be an impeding condition.of inference. (T.C.I.Xii. 2). For, such a state does not have the pervaderness with respect to the probandum in the case of recognition. Also the state of having or referring to the qualified-qualifier cannot be established to be the condition; for, such a state occurs in what is other than the subject of inference.

Explanation

Now the Pūrvapakṣin objects that the knowledge of the fire (*vahni jñāna*), as being the knowledge of the qualifier (*viśeṣaṇa jñānatvena*), is not the cause of the inferential knowledge of the fire such as 'Mountain has fire' (*vahnimān iti jñāna*), as it is not produced from the knowledge of the fire (*vahni jñāna*) as being the substance (*dravyatvena*). Accoridng to him, only the knowledge, as being the knowledge referring to the delimitor of the qualifierness as its qualifier (*viśeṣaṇatāvacchedaka prakāratvena*), is the cause of the qualificative knowledge; and therefore, the knowledge of the qualifier (*viśeṣaṇa jñāna*) is not the cause of the qualificative knowledge (*viśiṣṭa jñāna*). Further, the Pūrvapakṣin refutes that the state of being the knowledge of the qualifier (*viśiṣṭa jñānatva*) can exist in the knowledge constituting the cause, as it is overpervassive and redundant. Also the state of being the knowledge to be produced from the knowledge of the qualifer (*tādṛśa viśeṣaṇa jñāna janyetva*) cannot be established (*sādhya*) in the qualificative knowledge due to the contradiction (*bādha*).

However, the Siddhāntin refutes the objection. According to him, the knowledge (*jñāna*), which has the delimitor of the qualifierness as its qualifier (*viśeṣaṇatāvacchedaka prakāraka*) is established to be the cause of the qualificative knowledge; and hence the knowledge of the qualifier (*viśeṣaṇa jñāna*) is the cause of the qualificative knowledge (*viśiṣṭa jñāna*) in general. Also the general knowledge of the two entities (*tatsāmānyayoḥ*) are ruled to have the cause–and–effect-relationship (*kārya kāraṇa bhāva*) when the particular knowledges of the two entities (*yad viśeṣayoḥ*) are established to have the cause-and-effect–relationship. And this is necessary to abide by the law of general cause-and -effect–relationship (*sāmānya kārya*). Also there does not arise any overpervasion or overapplication (*atiprasaṅga*), as the particular effects (*tattat kārya viśeṣa*) are not produced without the totality of causes of particular effects (*viśeṣa sāmagrī viraheṇa*). Also the Siddhāntin notes that the state of being what is beyond the senses (*paro' kṣatva*) cannot constitute any impeding condition of inference (*upādhi*) (T.C.I.Xii. 2), as the same state does not pervade the probandum (*sādhyāvyāpaka*) in the case of re-cognition. Also the state of having or referring to the qualified qualifier (*viśiṣṭa viśeṣaṇakatva*) cannot constitute the condition, as it occurs in what is other than the subject of inference (*pakṣetara*).

Objection that Inference is Untenable.

I. Xii. 4. The inference is not tenable. Further, you, the Siddhāntin, must admit that the pervious experience of the qualifier, like the remembarance, produces the qualificative knowledge through the impression. Thus, the

establishment of the state of being produced from the knowledge of the qualifier in the qualificative perception (T.C. I. Xii. 2) involves the fault of the establishment of the already established. Also the state of being produced from the knowledge of the immediate qualifer cannot be the probandum in the inference. For, such a state (probandum) is useless. Also the desired objective of establishing the qualificative knowledge can be tenable merely from the remembarance like re-cognition. Also, that is why, it cannot be argued that the state of being produced from the experience of the immediate qualifier is the probandum; for, such a state would have the unestablishedness and would involve deviation in the case of recognition etc.

It may be argued that in the case of the qualificative perecption of form etc., which is produced immediately or instantly, the remembarance of the qualifier is absent due to the absence of the impression of the qualifier. Therefore, only the indeterminate perception gets established in such a case on the strength of the state of being the property of the subject of inference. Thus, the indeterminate knowledge gets established in other cases as well due to the similarity of the totality of causes. (i.e. remembarence of the qualifier cannot be the cause).

However, this is not correct. You, the Siddhāntin should answer as to whether the qualificative knowledge of the white colour, qualified by the whiteness, or the qualificative knowledge of the white colour, not qualified by the whiteness, is produced in the case of the (knowledge of the) present qualifier. In the first aption, the recollection of the property such as the white ness arises first; and then the knowledge of the white colour qualified by the whiteness arises through perception; and thus finally the qualificative knowledge of white colour qualified by the whiteness arises in the substance; and so what is so untenable? Or let only the recollection of the generic property such as the whiteness be admitted as referring to all the white colours through the comprehensional relation of the universal. In the second option, no experience would arise. For, no one experiences the knowledge of the white substance qualified by the white colour which is different from the knowledge of the whiteness etc. Thus the inference is not tenable.

Explanation

The Pūrvapakṣin now states that the previous experience (*pūrvānubhava*) of the qualifier needs to be admitted as the cause of the qualificative knowledge (*janaka*) through the impression. Thus the establishment of the knowledge of the qualifier as the cause of of the qualificative knowledge involves the fault of the establishment of the already established (*siddha sādhana*) (T.C. I. Xii. 2). Also he states that the state of being produced from the knowledge of the

immediate qualifier (*avyavahita viśeṣaṇa jñāna janyatva*) cannot be the probandum in the inference, as it is useless and also as the qualificative knowledge can be tenable merely from the recollection of the qualifier (*smṛti*). That is why, the state of being produced from the experience of the immediate qualifier (*avyavahita viśeṣaṇānubhava janyatva*) cannot be the probandum, as the same has the unestablishment (*aprasiddhi*) and involves deviation in the case of recognition.

The Siddhāntin however, argues that in the qualificative perception of form etc. (*rūpādi viśiṣṭa pratyakṣe*) produced immediately, the remembarance of the qualifier (*samskāra*), is absent; and therefore, the indeterminate perception (*nirvikalpaka*) becomes established in such a case on the strength of being the property of the subject of inference (*pakṣadharmatā*); thus, the indeterminate knowledge can be established in other cases as well; i.e. the remembarence of the qualifier cannot be the cause.

However, the Pūrvapakṣin refutes the argument on the ground that the Siddhāntin cannot answer as to whether the qualificative knowledge of the white colour, qualified by the whiteness (*śuklatvādi viśiṣṭa śukla vaiśiṣṭa bodha*) or the qualificative knowledge of the white colour, not qualified by the whiteness (*aviśiṣṭa tadviṣṭa bodha*) is produced in the case of the knowledge of the present qualifier (*pratyutpanna viśeṣaṇa sthale*). According to him, in the fist option, the qualificative knowledge is quite tenable, as the recollection of the whiteness (*śuklatvādi jāti smaraṇa*) can arise first; and then the knowledge of the white colour qualified by the whiteness (*tadviśiṣṭa śukla bodha*) can arise through the perception; and finally the qualificative knowledge of white colour qualified by the whiteness (*śuklatvādi viśiṣṭa śuklādi vaiśiṣṭya bodha*) arises in the substance. Also in the second option, no experience is tenable (*ananubhava*), as no one experiences the knowledge of the white substance qualified by the white colour (*śukla rūpādi viśiṣṭa bodha*), which is distinct from the knowledge of the whiteness (*śuklatvādi pratyaya*). Thus, the inference is not tenable.

Ādyaviśiṣṭānubhava is Viśeṣaṇa jñāna janya and Viśeṣaṇa Samskāra is tenable from only Viśiṣṭa jñāna.

I. Xii. 5. It might be stated that the first ever qualificative experience, in the waking state, is to produced from the knowledge of the qualifier; for, it constitutes (the cause of) the qualificative knowledge. Also in such a case, neither the previous experience of the qualifier, nor the remembarence of the qualifier, produced from the same experience of the qualifier, is possible through the impression. For, the impression of the qualifier does not have any competency for producing either the remembarence of the qualifier or the

qualificative knowledge of the qualifier wothout the manifestor. Therefore, a manifestor must be stated to be present. And since the knowledge is admitted to be the manifestor elsewhere, only the same knowledge needs to be stated as the manifestor here as well. However, the qualificative knowledge cannot constitute the manifestor. Since yet another knowledge of the qualifier would be required for producing such a manifestor, i.e. the qualificative knowledge, infinite regress would become contingent. Thus, the perception (i.e. the knowledge of the qualifier) gets established to be the manifestor.

However, this position is not correct; i.e. the knowledge of the qualifier cannot be the manifestor. The impression is not manifested inspite of the knowledge (of the qualifier). Also it cannot be stated that only the particular knowledge, from which the effect is produced, is the manifestor. For, such a particular knowledge would be non-consecutive. Now you may state that only that particular knowledge, though non-consecutive after which the effect is perceived to be produced, would be assumed to be the manifestor on the strength of the effect. However then we shall reply that since the manifestation of the impression occurs after the cause, i.e. the knowledge of the qualifier in the waking state, let the same knowledge of the qualifier be admitted to be the cause, as the same has already been assumed. That is why, it has been proclaimed that no fixed or regular cause exists in the manifestation of the impression. Thus, it has been admitted that the similar merit and the thinking (mental perception) etc. convey, i.e. constiture the cause of the origin of the remembarance.

This way, the aphorism conveying the contemplation etc. (as the cause of the impression) (viz. *nirantarābhyāsa*) too becomes construed.

Explanation

Some Naiyāyikas state that the first ever qualificative experience (*ādya viśiṣṭānubhava*) at the waking state is to be produced from the knowledge of the qualifier (*viśeṣaṇa jñāna*), as the same is the qualificative knowledge (*viśiṣṭa jñāna*). Also they state that in such a case, the previous experience of the qualifier (*pūrva viśeṣaṇānubhava*) or the remembarence of the qualifier produced from the same experience (*tajjanya viśeṣaṇa smaraṇa*) is not possible through the impression. According to them, the impression of the qualifier (*saṃskāra*) is not competent of producing either the remembarance of the qualifier or the qualificative knowledge without a manifestor (*udbodhaka*). And hence the knowledge (*jñāna*) must be admitted to be the manifestor. However, the qualificative knowledge of the qualifier (*viśiṣṭa jñāna*) cannot constitute the manifestor. For, then the infinfite regress (*anavasthā*) would become contingent, since yet another qualificative knowledge of the qualifier

would be required for producing such a manifestor. Thus, they establish that only the perceptual knowledge (*ālocana*) of the qualifier is the manifestor.

The Pūrvapakṣin objects that the impression is not manifested (*saṃskārānudbodha*) inspite of the presence of the knowledge of the qualifier; and hence the same knowledge cannot be the manifestor. Also the particular knowledge, from which the effect (*phala*) is produced, cannot be the manifestor, as the same is non-consecutive. Now the knowledge, though non-consecutive, but after which the effect is produced, can be the manifestor due to the effect. However, some Naiyāyikas state that since the manifestation of the impression (*saṃskārodbodha*) occurs after the cause, i.e. the knowledge of the qualifier in the waking state (*jāgara kāraṇa*), only the same must be admitted to be the cause of the qualificative knowledge. And therefore no fixed cause exists in the manifestation of the impression.

Thus, even the statement that the similar merit and the thinking etc. (*sadṛśādṛṣṭacintādyāḥ*) convey, i.e. constitute the cause or origin of the remembarence (*smṛti bīja*) too becomes explained.

Objection: Viśiṣṭa jñānatva cannot be defined

I. Xii. 6. However, it may be objected now as follows: That Moreover, in the inference "The qualificative perception such as 'This is a cow' is produced from the knowledge of the qualifier; (T.C. I. Xii. 2), for, it constitutes the qualificative knowledge", the object to be distinguished is the non-qualificative knowledge; and the same non-qualificative knowledge is not established. And suppose the same is already established, then the inference establishing such a non-qualificative knowledge would become useless. And the knowledgeness is of unestablished concomitance by itself due to the deviation in the case of indeterminate knowledge. Further, then the infinite regress would arise.

Moreover, the state of being the qualificative knowledge cannot be the state of being the knowledge referring to the qualificand and the qualifier; for, deviation arises in the case of the perception. Also it cannot be the state of being the knowledge referring to the qualifierness; for, the qualifierness, of the form of being the object of the knowledge producing the exclusion of what is other than that, does not manifest there. Also, it cannot be the state of being the knowledge referring to the qualification (of the qualifier); for, in that case, the infinite regress would become contingent in the qualificative knowledgeness, as even the perception that the qualification is the qualifier in the determinate knowledge such as 'This (cow) is a cow', refers to the qualification.

Also the state of being the qualificative knowledge cannot be stated to be the state of being the knowledge referring to the qualifier; wherein the qualifier constitutes the particular kind of objecness. For, the objectness, which is distinct from being the nature of the object of knowledge, is absent. Also the state of being the knowledge referring to the qualifier cannot be the state of being what is produced from the knowledge of the qualifier. The same entity is the qualifier in the same knowledge, from the knowledge of which (qualifier) the qualificative knowledge is produced; and therefore, only the same qualifier is to be established in the qualificative perception such as 'This is a cow'. Further, the knowledge of the lord would have the contingencey of being the knowledge without referring to the qualifier. Also the state of being the qualificative knowledge cannot be the state of being the object of the exclusion from what is other than that; for, such a state cannot be established in the qualificative perception such as 'This (cow) is a cow' due to the refutation of the theory of exclusion. Also such a state cannot be the state of producing the knowledge of exclusion from what is other than that; for, the state of producing the knowledge of exclusion from what is other than that cannot be grasped apart from the consecutive form excluded from the qualificative perception. Also such a state cannot be established from the inference that 'The qualificative perception such as "This is a cow' is different from the indeterminate knowledge which is other than the determinate knowledge different from itself; for, it is the object of valid knowledge"; or (such a state cannot be established from) the inference that "The eye is the producer of the knowledge which is different from the qualificative knowledge produced by the eye; for, it constitutes the sense-organ". For, such an establishment is useless. Also a third type of knowledge (other than both determinate and indeterminate knowledges) would be required to be established, as the term 'indeterminate' etc. is used after the use of the term 'determinate' in the case of probandum.

Explanation

However, the Pūrvapakṣin objects that in the inference that "The qualificative perception such as 'This is a cow' is produced from the knowledge of the qualifier; for, it constitutes the qualificative knowledge (*viśiṣṭa jñānatvāt*)' (T.C. I. Xii. 2), the object to be distinguished (*avacchedya*) is non-qualificative knowledge (*aviśiṣṭa jñāna*); and the same is not established; also suppose the same is already established, then the inference establishing such a non-qualificative knowledge would be useless. Further, the knowledgenewss (*jñānatva*) is of the unestablished concomitance (*asiddha vyāptika*) due to the deviation in the case of the indeterminate knowledge.

The Pūrvapakṣin states that the state of being the qualificative knowledge (*viśiṣṭa jñānatva*) cannot be the state of being the knowledge referring to the qualifier and the qualificand (*viśeṣaṇa viśeṣya viṣayaka jñānatva*), as the deviation arises in the case of perception. Also it cannot be the state of being the knowledge referring to the qualifierness (*viśeṣaṇatva viṣayakatva*), as the qualifierness does not manifest there. Also it cannot be the state of being the knowledge referring to the qualification (of the qualifier) (*vaiśiṣṭya viṣayaka jñānatva*), as then the infinite regress would arise in the qualificative knowledgeness (*viśeṣaṇa jñānatve*).

The Pūrvapakṣin further states that the state of being the qualificative knowledge (*viśiṣṭa jñānatva*) cannot be the state of being the knowledge referring to the qualifier (*saprakāraka jñānatva*) wherein the qualifier means the particular type of objectness (*viṣayatā viśeṣa*). According to him, the objectness (*viṣayatā*) different from being the nature of the object of the knowledge is absent. Also the state of being the knowledge referring to the qualifier (*saprakāratva*) cannot be the state of being what is produced from the knowledge of the qualifier (*viśeṣaṇa jñāna janyatva*). For, the same entity (*saḥ*) is the qualifier (*prakāra*) in the same knowledge, from the knowledge of which (qualifier), the qualificative knowledge is produced; and thus the same qualifier needs to be established in the qualificative perception. Also the state of being the qualificative knowledge cannot be the state of being the object of the the exclusion from what is othe than that (*atad vyāvṛtti viṣayatva*), as such a state cannot be established in the qualificative perception such as 'This (cow) is a cow' (*gaur iti vikalpe*). Also such a state cannot be the state of producing the knowledge of exclusion from what is other than that (*atad vyāvṛtti bodha janakatva*); as the state of producing the knowledge of exclusion cannot be grasped. Also such a state cannot be established from the inference that "The eye (*cakṣuḥ*) is the producer of the knowledge which is different from the qualificative knowledge produced by the eye (*cākṣuṣa savikalpaka jñānātirikta jñāna janakam*); for, it constitutes the sense-organ (*indriyatvāt*)"; as the same establishment is useless. Also the knowledge being established would be a third type of knowledge different from both determinate and non-determinate.

Gaur iti Pratyakṣa is Nirvikalpaka

I. Xii. 7. Here we, the Siddhāntins, state our reply: "The first ever perceptual knowledge such as 'This (cow) is a cow' is to be produced from the knowledge of the qualifier cowness to be produced; for, it is the qualificative knowledge to be produced, like the inference". However, the remembarence (of the qualifier cowness) is not tenable here in such a case of perception;

for, the experience of the qualifier cowness is not produced from such a knowledge of the qualifier in ones life before.

Now it may be argued as follows: That a boy may obtain a remembarence of the concomitance (of the activity) due to the previously produced impression (of the activity) an account of the first ever activity; in the same way, here in the first perceptual knowledge of the cow too let the remembarence of the qualifier cowness be admitted to be produced from the impression (of the cowness) of the privious birth on account of the first ever qualificative knowledge. However, this argument is not correct. Let the remberance of the concomitance of the activity be admitted there (in the case of the boy) due to the manifestation of the impression (of the activity) on account of the fate or destiny of life; however, here the remembarance of the cowness cannot be admitted, as no distinct manifestor of the cowness is present. Otherwise, thus, the remembarence of the cowness would become necessary even in the absence of the comprehensional relation of the senses with the cowness.

Now it may be argued as follows: That the comprehensional relation of the sense organ with the cowness, which you admit to be the cause of the indeterminate knowledge of the cow, can be admitted to be the manifestor of the impression of the cowness. However, then we shall reply that only the experience of the cowness would be produced here due to the presence of the assumed cause, viz. the comprehensional relation of the senses with the cowness; and the totality of causes of the experience of the cowness is stronger than the totality of causes of the remembarence of the same.

Also such a first perceptual knowledge (as 'This (cow) is a cow') is not fully qualificative knowledge, as the knowledge of the qualifier (cowness) is absent before; and therefore the same perceptual knowledge constitutes partly indeterminate knowledge by implication. That is why, the imference of the qualificative knowledgeness (determinate knowledgeness) cannot be tenable there in the perceptual knowledge as being the knowledgeness; for, such an inference is contradicted by the contradiction of the causes. Suppose remembarence is produced from the totality of causes of experience, then only a remembarence of the eternal Vedas and the Vedic activities would be produced,; however, the experience of the same would never be produced.

Explanation

The Siddhāntin, Gangeśa, now replies that the first ever perceptual knowledge *(prāthamikam)* such as 'This (cow) is a cow' *(gaur iti pratyakṣam)* is to be produced from the knowledge of the qualifier to be produced *(janya viśeṣaṇa jñāna janyam)*, as it is the qualificative knowledge to be produced

(viśiṣṭajñānatvāt). Thus it is partly qualificative knowledge. However, he suggests that the remembarence of the qualifier cowness *(smaraṇa)* is not tenable in such a case, as the experience of the cowness *(gotva)* is not produced in the life. before.

The Siddhāntin now refutes the argument that in the first perceptual knowledge of the cow, the remembarence of the cowness *(gotva smaraṇa)* can be produced from the impression of the cowness of the previous birth *(janmāntarīya samskāra)* on account of the first ever qualificative knowledge. According to him, the remembarence of the cowness cannot be tenable, as the distinct manifestor of the cowness *(vilakṣaṇam udbodhakam)* is absent; and otherwise the same remembarence of the cowness would become necessary even in the absence of the comprehensional relation of the senses with the cowness *(gotva sannikarṣe)*.

Also the Siddhāntin refutes the argument that the comprehensional relation of the senses with the cowness *(gotvendriya sannikarṣa)*. which is admitted to be the cause of the indeterminate knowledge of the cow *(nirvekalpake)*, can be admitted to be the cause of the manifestation of the impression of the cowness *(samskārodbodhaka)*. According to him, only the experience of the cowness *(gotvānubhava)* would be produced from the comprehensional relation of the senses with the cowness, as the totality of causes of the experience *(anubhava sāmagrī)* is stronger than the totality of causes of the remembarence *(smaraṇa sāmagrī)*.

Now the Siddhāntin clarifies that such a perceptual knowledge as 'This (cow) is a cow' *(gaur iti pratyakṣa)* cannot be fully qualificative knowledge *(viśiṣṭa jñāna)* due to the absence of the knowledge of the qualifier *(viśeṣaṇa jñānābhāvāt)*; and hence it constitutes partly the indeterminate knowledge *(nirvikalpaka)*. Also therefore, he states that the inference of the qualificative knowledgeness *(viśiṣṭa jñānatvānumāna)* cannot be tenable in the perceptual knowledge as the same is contradictory. *(bādhāt)*. Also it should be noted that remembarence *(smaraṇa)* is never possible from the totality of causes of experience *(anubhava sāmagrītaḥ)*, as otherwise only the remembarance, and never the experience of the eternal Vedas would be produced.

Gotva vaiśiṣṭya does not appear in Gaur iti pratyakṣa

I. Xii. 8. It should not be argued here that it has been observed elsewhere that the knowledge of the cowness (the qualifier) is to produced from the knowledge of the cowness (the qualifier), or it is to be produced from the knowledge (of the cowness) which is to be produced, or it is to be produced from the knowledge of the qualifier (the cowness) which is to be produced; and hence the experience of the cowness (the qualifier) need not be produced

first. For, one and the same (knowledge of the qualifier cowness) cannot be the delimitor of both the producedness and the producerness; and otherwise, infinite regress would become contingent.

Also it should not be argued that in the case of the perceptual knowledge such as 'This (cow) is a cow', the qualification of the (qualifier) cowness appears in the cow; and thus, only the knowledge of the qualification of the cowness would be produced in the cow; and such a knowledge is indeterminate. For, only the cowness, and not the qualification of the cowness, constitutes the qualifier there in such a perception.

It should be noted here that the qualifier (i.e.the cowness) cannot appear as qualified by its own property (i.e. the cowness-ness) in such a qualificative perceptual knowledge, produced from the knowledge of the qualifier, as the same property of the qualifier (i.e.the cowness-ness) is not known before?. Also suppose the same property (i.e. the cowness-ness) is known before, then the same too would need to constitute the qualifier as qualified by yet another qualifier (i.e. the cowness-ness-ness); and thus, the infinite regress would become contingent. For, the cowness, qualified by the cowness-ness, does not appear in the qualificative perceptual knowledge such as 'This (cow) is a cow'. It may be proposed now as follows: That all the qualifiers are only the possessers of other qualifiers. For, even the individual etc. are qualifiers in the case of the cowness etc. Then we shall reply that let it be so. However, the rule cannot be that a qualifier appears only as possessing another qualifier. Otherwise, the objects of reference would have the contingency of endlessness in the case of the perceptual knowledge such as 'This (cow) is a cow' by referring to the endless series of qualifier(s) and their qualifier(s.). However, suppose a qualifier can appear as not possessing another qualifier sometimes, then the qualifier can appear so (as not possessing another qualifier) even at the first instance of perceptual knowledge due to the lack of difference.

Explanation

The Siddhāntin now refutes that the knowledge of the cowness (i.e. the qualifier) (*gotva jñāna*) is to be produced from the knowledge of the cowness (i.e. the qualifier) or from the knowledge of the cowness which is to be produced (*janya jñāna janya*) or from the knowledge of the qualifier which is to be produced (*janya viśeṣaṇa jñāna janya*); and hence the experience of the cowness (i.e. the qualifier) need not be produced first. According to him, one and the same knowledge of the cowness (i.e. the qualifier) cannot be the delimitor of both the producedness and the producerness (*janya janakatva*).

Also the Siddhāntin refutes that in the case of the perceptual knowledge such as 'This (cow) is a cow' (*gaur iti pratyakṣa*), the qualification of the

qualifier cowness (*gotva vaiśiṣṭya*) appears in the cow; and hence only the knowledge of the qualification of the cowness (*tad vaiśiṣṭya*) is produced there and the same is an indeterminate knowledge (*nirvikalpaka*). According to him, only the cowness, and not the qualification of the cowness, can be the qualifier in such a perception.

Also the Siddhāntin refutes that the qualifier cowness (*viśeṣaṇa*) can appear in such a qualificative perceptual knowledge (*viśiṣṭa jñāne*) as qualified by its property of the cowness-ness (*sva dharma viśiṣṭa*). According to him, such a property is unknown there before. Also when such a property of the cowness-ness is known, the same property too would be required to constitute the qualifier as qualified by yet another qualifier, i.e. the cowness-ness-ness (*vīśeṣaṇāntara*); and thus the infinite regress would become contingent. According to him, the cowness (*gotva*), as qualified by the cowness-ness (*viśiṣta*), does not appear in such a perceptual knowledge as 'This (cow) is a cow'.

The Siddhāntin now clarifies that while all the qualifiers (*sarvam viśeṣaṇam*) are only the possessors of the qualifiers (*viśeṣaṇa vad*), the rule that a qualifier (*viśeṣaṇam*) appears only as possessing another qualifier (*viśeṣaṇa vad*) cannot be admitted. According to him, then the objects of reference (*viṣaya*) would have the endlessness (*aparyavasāna*) in the perceptual knowledge such as 'This (cow) is a cow', as it (the knowledge) refers to the endless series of qualifiers and their qualifiers (*viśeṣaṇa tadviśeṣaṇānanta paramparā*). Also if a qualifier can appear as not possessing another qualifier some times, then the qualifier of the cowness too can appear as not possessing another qualifier of the cowness-ness in the first instance of perceptual knowledge as well.

Viśeṣaṇa is Sārthaka

I. Xii. 9. Also, the probans, viz. "For, it constitutes the qualificative knowledge" in the inference (cf T. C. I. Xii. 2), cannot be held to possess the useless qualifier. For, only that qualifier, without which the concommitance cannot be known, is useful. And the same princeple is the basis in establishing the usefulness of the qualifier which avoids the deviation (of the probans). In the present case of inference (cf. T. C. I. Xii. 2), the concommitance between the (qualificative) knowledgeness and the state of being produced from the knowledge of the qualifier cannot be known without the qualifier; for, otherwise the infinite regress would arise and also deviation is known in general.

That is why, the qualifier, which removes the non-establishment in the inference establishing the lightness of the eye such as 'The eye is light'; for, only the form is the manifestor or illuminator among the qualities such as

form', is useful. For, without such a qualifier, the probans, such as "For, only the form is the manifestor or illuminator among the qualities such as form" becomes unestablished; and hence the concommitance would become untenable due to the non-establishment. However, the state of having the useless qualifier occurs in the case of the probans where the concommitance becomes known even without the qualifier. For, instance, such a state occurs in the case of the probans such as the smokeness, the cowness and the non-body-producedness.

The relation, which is the relation of an entity with an other entity, is the qualification of that entity with another entity; therefore, the qualified entity manifests as excluded from the non-related entity. For, instance, in the qualificative knowledge such as 'The person is a staff-holder', the relation of the staff-with the person is known as the qualification of the person; and therefore, the person becomes known as excluded from the non-staff-holder. In the same way, in the perceptual qualificative knowledge such as 'This is a cow' too, (the cow becomes known as excluded from the non-cowness - possessor). Thus, the state of being the qualificative knowledge means the state of being the knowledge of the qualified entity as possessing the qualifier. And the same state is the delimitor of the producerness of the knowledge of exclusion from what is other than the qualified.

It may be pointed out now that the relation of the qualifier, i.e. the staff with the qualified person is cognized in the case of the expression such as 'The relations of the staff and the person' as well; and therefore, the qualificative knowledge of the qualified person as excluded from the non-staff-holding person would be necessary. However, then we shall reply that yes, indeed it does arise. For, the relation of the qualifier staff with the qualified person would not be known without the knowledge of the qsualifer staff. However, the knowledge is partly indeterminate in the case where the totality of causes of qualificative knowledge is absent. The state of being produced from the knowledge of the qualifier exists in all the cases of qualificative knowledges produced from the causes of the qualificative knowledge; and since the perceptual knowledge such as 'This is a cow' is not such a qualificative knowledge produced from the knowledge of the qualitier, the same is only a perception and not a determinate. knowledge.

Explanation

The Siddhāntin states that the probans, viz. "For, it constitutes the qualificative knowledge" (*viśiṣṭa jñānatvāt*) in the inference (cf. T.C. I. Xii. 2) does not possess any useless qualifier.; and only the qualifier, without which the concommitance cannot be known, is useful; and hence in the present inference, the concommitance between the qsualificative knowledgeness (*jñānatva*) and the state of being produced from the knowledge of the qualifier (*viśeṣaṇa jñāna janyatva*) cannot be known without the qualifier.

Also the Siddhāntin states that the qualifier (*viśeṣaṇa*), which removes the non-establishment (*asiddhi vāraka*) in the-inference establishing the lightness of the eye (*cakṣuḥ taijasatva*) such as 'The eye is light; for, only the form is the manifestor or illuminator among the qualities such as form' (*rūpādiṣu madhye rūpasyaiva vyañjakatvāt*), is useful. According to him, the probans becomes unestablished without such a qualifier; and hence the concommitance (*vyāpti*) would become untenable due to the non-establishment. Also the state of having the useless qualifier (*vyartha viśeṣaṇatva*) occurs in the case where the concommitance becomes known without the qualifier.

The relation (*sambandha*), which constitutes the relation of an entity with another entity, is the qualification (*vaiśiṣṭya*) of that entity with another entity; and hence the qualified entity appears as excluded from the non-related entities (*svāsambaddhebhyaḥ*). For instance, in the case of the qualificative knowledge such as 'The person is a staff-holder'(*daṇḍī puruṣaḥ*), the relation of the staff with the person is the qualification of the person; and hence the person becomes known as excluded from the non-staff-holder. Also in the perceptual qualificative knowledge such as 'This is a cow' (*gaur iti vikalpe*), the cow becomes excluded from the non-cowness-possessor. Therefore, the state of being the qualificative knowledge (*viśiṣṭa jñānatva*) means the state of being the knowledge of the qualificand possessing the qualifier (*viśeṣaṇavad viśeṣya jñānatva*); and such a state is the delimitor of the producerness of the knowledge of exclusion from what is other than the qualified. (*atadvyāvṛtta bodha janakatāvacchedaka*).

The Siddhāntin points out that the relation of the qualifier staff with the qualified person can be cognized in the expression 'The relations of the staff and the person' (*daṇḍapuruṣa sambandhāḥ*) as well; and hence the qualificative knowledge of the qualified person as excluded from the non-staff-holding person (*adaṇḍa vyāvṛtta puruṣa*) is necessary. According to him, the relation of the qualifier staff with the qualified person cannot be known without the knowledge of the qualifying staff. (*daṇḍa sambandha*). However, the same knowledge is partly indeterminate (*nirvikalpaka*) where the totality of causes of the qualificative knowledge (*viśiṣṭa jñāna sāmagrī*) is absent; and since the perceptual knowledge such as 'This is a cow' (*gaur*) is not produced from the knowledge of the qualifier, the same is merely a perception (*pratyakṣa*) and not a determinate knowledge .

Nirvikalpaka is not Produced with respect to Abhāva

I. Xii. 10. That is why, indeterminate knowledge is not possile in the case of absence. Since the knowledge of the counterpositive and that of the substratum constitute the causes of the knowledge of absence, the totality of causes of the qualificative knowledge, consisting of those two knowledges, is ruled to be necessary (for the production of knowledge of absence). Suppose the indeterminate knowledge is tenable in the case of absence, then the knowledge of the absence such as 'The ground is the possessor of the absence of the pot' would not be tenable. For, such a knowledge of absence cannot be possible without the knowledge of the qualifier. Also suppose the knowledge of absence such as 'The ground is the possessor of the absence of the pot', is tenable, then too the indeterminate knowledge would not become established. Also you cannot argue that the qualificative knowledgeness is deviating in the case of the knowledge of absence. First, the simple knowledge that 'The pot does not exist on the ground' is produced; and in such a knowledge, the ground is the grammatical qualifier and the absence of the pot is the grammatical qualificand; however, the knowledge of the qualificand, i.e. the absence of the pot is not the cause of the knowledge. Then, finally the qualificative knowledge of the absence such as 'The ground is the possessor of the absence of the pot' which has the ground as the actual substratum and the absence of the pot as the qualifier, is produced.

Now it may be objected as follows: That you have stated that the absence (of the pot) is known to be the qualifier of the ground through the qualification connected with the organ of sense; and therefore, how can the same absence constitute the grammatical qualificand in the statement '*bhūtale ghaṭābhāvaḥ*'. However, then we shall reply that such a statement means that the absence (of the pot) is known to be the superstratum of the ground through the comprehensional relation of self-linking nature. However, it does not mean that the absence (of the pot)) is known as the qualifer. That is why, Udayanācārya has stated that the absence has the perceptibility due to the knowledge such as 'The absence of form exists in the wind'. The sense organ has no competency for grasping the substratum which is not competent to be grasped.

Explanation

Gangeśa now points out that indeterminate knowledge (*nirvikalpaka*) is not possible in the case of the absence (of the pot etc.) *(abhāve)*. According to him, the knowledge of the counterpositive and that of the substratum (*pratiyogy adhikaraṇa jñānayoḥ*) constitute the causes (*kāraṇa*) of the knowledge of absense (*tadbuddhi*); and therefore, the totality of causes of qualificative knowledge consisting of those two knowledges (*tad ubhaya viśiṣṭa sāmagrī*) is necessary for the knowledge of absence. Also suppose the indeterminate knowledge is tenable in the case of absence, then too the knowledge of the absence such as 'The ground is the possessor of the absence of the pot' (*ghaṭābhāvavad bhūtalam*) would become untenable, as the same is not possible without the knowledge of the qualifier *(viśeṣaṇa jñāna)*. Also suppose the knowledge of the absence such as 'The ground is the possessor of the absence of the pot' is tenable (*bhāve*), then too the indeterminate knowledge does not become established (*nirvikalpaka siddhi*). Gangeśa refutes the argument that the qualificative knowledgeness (*viśiṣṭa jñānatva*) is deviating in the knowledge of absence. According to him, first the simple knowledge such as 'The pot does not exist on the ground' (*bhūtale ghaṭo nāsti*) is produced; wherein the ground is the grammatical qualifier (*viśeṣaṇa*) and the absence of the pot is the grammatical qualificand (*viśeṣya*); and then the qualificative knowledge of absence such as 'The ground is the possessor of the absence of the pot' (*bhūtalam ghaṭābhāvavat*), which has the ground as the actual substratum and absence of the pot as the qualifier, is produced.

The Siddhāntin, Gangeśa, refutes the argument that the absence of the pot (*abhāva*) is known to be the qualifier of the ground through the qualification connected with sense organ (*indriya sambaddha viśeṣaṇatayā*); and therefore the same absence cannot be the grammatical qualificand in the statement '*bhutale ghaṭābhāvaḥ*' According to him, such a statement means that the absence of the pot is known to be the superstratum of the ground (*bhūtale viśeṣaṇatayā*) through the comprehensional relation of self-linking nature (*svabhāva pratyasatti*); however, it does not mean that the absence of the pot is known as the qualifier (*viśeṣaṇatayā*). And Udayanācārya has supported this view by stating that the absence has the perceptibility (*cākṣuṣatva*).

Gaur iti Pratyakṣa is both Nirvikalpaka and Savikalpaka

I. Xii. 11. Recognition (T.C. I. Xi. 17) is indeterminate with respect to the knowledgeness; however, it is determinate with respect to the state of being qualified by the objects of knowledge. Since recognition is to be produced from the first knowledge, the qualifier of the form of the object is regularly known before.

In the same way, it is not contradictory that one and the same perceptual knowledge such as 'This is a cow' is both indeterminate and determinate in the case of the same knowledge. For, the lack of contradiction can be explained by taking into account the two different aspects of the knowledgeness and the qualification. That is why, the delimitors such as the

indeterminateness and the determinateness are not generic properties; for, then the cross-connection would become contingent with the visual perceptionness. etc. Also the determinate knowledge such as 'This is a cow' is only indeterminate with respect to the cowness-aspect; for, no qualifier appears there in such a cowness. On the other hand, suppose some qualifier (such as the cowness-ness) does appear there, then only the infinite regress would result. Further, indeterminate knowledge would become unestablished.

Explanation

Gaṅgeśa states now that recognition (*anuvyavasāya*) (T.C. I. Xi. 17) is indeterminate (*nirvikalpaka*) with respect to the knowledgeness (*jñānatve*); but it is determinate *(savikalpaka)* with respect to the state of being qualified by the objects of knowledge (*viṣaya viśiṣṭatvāmśe*). According to him, recognition is to be produced from first knowledge (*vyavasāya janyatvena*); and therefore the qualifier such as the object (*viṣaya rūpa viśeṣaṇa*) regularly appears before. Therefore, one and the same perceptual knowledge such as 'This (cow) is a cow' can be both determinate and indeterminate by taking into account the two different aspects; i.e. the knowledgeness and the qualification.

Also he states that the delimitors such as the indeterminateness (*nirvikalpakatva*) and the determinateness (*savikalpakatva*) are not generic properties (*jātī*); as the cross-connection (*saṅkara*) arises with the visual perceptionness (*cākṣuṣatvādinā*). Also he states that the determinate knowledge such as 'This is a cow' (*gaur iti savikalpaka*) is indeterminate with respect to the cowness-aspect (*gotvāmśe*); as no qualifier (cowness-ness) appears there; and suppose the qualifier appears, the infinite regress would become contingent.

Prakāra is twofold as Viśeṣaṇa and Upalakṣaṇa

I. Xii. 12. Qualifying entity or qualifier is twofold due to the distinction of simple qualifier and adventitious qualifier.

It may be objected now that how can the distination be tenable between the qualifiers in the absence of distinction between the exclusivenesses. And it may be held that the qualifier, which is present, while being exclusive, is the simple qualifier; and the qualifier, which is absent, while being exclusive, is the adventitious qualifier. For instance, the present staff is the simple qualifier in the case of 'The person is a staff-holder' and the absent Kurus are the adventitious qualifiers in the case of 'The land is the Kurukṣetra by the Kurus'. However, this is not correct. For, the crow, which is present by roaming above the house in the case of 'The building, which has the crow roaming above, is the house of Devadatta', and the braided hair, which is absent in the case of 'He is an ascetic by braided hair', are not simple qualifiers, but are only adventitious qualifiers.

From this, the following argument too becomes refuted: "That the qualifying entity or qualifier, which is present while being exclusive at the time of the knowledge of exclusion, is the simple qualifier; and the entity or qualifier, which is absent at the time of the knowledge of exclusion, is adventitious qualifier. Therefore, the crow etc., which are present at the time of the knowledge of exclusion, are only the simple qualifiers; however, the others, which are absent at the time of the knowledge of exclusion, are adventitious qualifiers. For, in the case of expressions such as 'The building, which has the crow roaming above, is the house of Devadatta', 'He is an ascetic by braided hair' and 'The land is the Kurukṣetra by the Kurus' etc, the instrumental cases are assigned by the rule 'Any attribute, by which is indicated the existence of a state is put in the third case, (P. ii. 3. 21)." This is so because, the crow etc., though present at the time of the knowledge of exclusion by roaming above, are only adventitious qualifiers, and not qualifiers.

Explanation

Gaṅgeśa now sets out to distinguish qualifying entity or qualifier (*prakāra*) as simple qualifier (*viśeṣaṇa*) and adventitious qualifier (*upalakṣaṇa*). According to him, the twofold distinction of qualifying entity as simple qualifier and adventitions qualifier is real and must be maintained for explaining qualificative or determinate knowledge.

The Pūrvapakṣin, however raises the objection that destinction between the simple qualifier and the adventitious qualifier (*tayor bheda*) is not tenable, as the exclusiveness (*vyāvartakatva*) is not distinguished. According to him, the position that "The qualifier, which is present, while being exclusive (*vyāvartakatve sati sat*), is the simple qualifier (*viśeṣaṇa*); and the qualifier, which is absent while being being exclusive (*vyāvartakatve sati asat*) is the adventitious qualifier (*upalakṣaṇa*)" is untenable; for, despite that the staff, which is present while being exclusive in "The person is a-staff-holder, (*daṇḍi puruṣaḥ*), may be the simple qualifier; and the Kurus, who are absent while being exclusive in 'The land is the Kurukṣetra by the Kurus' (*kuruṇā kṣetram*), ,may be the adventitions qualifier"; both the crow, which is present by roaming above the house in "The building, which has the crow roaming above, is the house of Devadatta" (*kākavad devadattagṛham*), and the braided hair, which is absent in "He is an ascetic by braided hair" (*jaṭābhis tāpasaḥ*), are only adventitions qualifiers and not qualifiers.

Also the Pūrvapakṣin refutes the position that "The qualifying entity, (*prakāra*), which is present while being exclusive (*vyāvartakam sat*) at the time

of the knowledge of exclusion (*vyāvṛtti bodhakāle*) is the simple qualifier (*viśeṣaṇa*); and the qualifying entity, which is absent (*asat*) at the time of exclusion, is the adventitious qualifier (*upalakṣaṇa*); and hence the crow etc. which are present at the time of exclusion, are only the qualifiers (*viśeṣaṇa*); whereas the others, which are absent at the time of exclusion, are adventitious qualifiers (*upalakṣaṇa*); for, in the case of the expressions such as 'The building, which has the crow roaming above, is the house of Devadatta' (*kākaiḥ*), ' He is an ascetic by the braided hair' (*jaṭābhiḥ*) and 'The land of the Kurus is by the Kurus' (*kuruṇā*), the instrumentals cases are only instrumentals assigned by the rule 'ittham bhūtalakṣaṇe.' (P. ii. 21). According to him, the crow etc., though present at the time of exclusion (*vyāvṛtti samaye*), by roaming above, are only adventitious qualifiers and not simple qualifiers.

Viśeṣaṇa is not merely Vyāvartaka

I. Xii. 13. Also it cannot be held that , that which is exclusive, while existing in the qualificand and while sharing the community of locus with the exclusion of what is to be known, is the simple qualifier; or that which manifests in the qualificand, while sharing the community of locus with the exclusion of what is to be known either through the delimitation of the qualificandness or through the exclusion, is the simple qualifier in that qualificand. For, the qualificandness constitutes the state of being the substratum of the exclusion of that which is to be known; and therefore, such a definition (of the simple qualifierness) involves overapplication in the case of the adventitious qualifier such as the braided hair in the expression 'He is an ascetic by braided hair' etc. And it cannot be held that the braided hair is not present in the ascetic.

Also it cannot be held that the qualifierness is the state of having the same case ending as that of the (word expressing the) qualificand. For, such a state is overapplicable to evan the adventitious qualifier such as the crow in the case of 'The building which has the crow roaming above is the house of Devadatta'. Also then the qualifier would have the contingency of becoming the non-qualifier at the time of non-expression by the instrumental case.

Explanation

The Pūrvapakṣin now refutes the view that the simple qualifier is that which is exclusive (*vyāvartaka*), while existing in the qualificand (*viśeṣya vṛttive sati*) and while sharing the community of locus with the exclusion of what is to be known (*pratyāyya vvāvṛtti samānādhikaraṇatve*) or that the simple qualifier is that which manifests in the qualificand while sharing the community of locus with the exclusion (*yat samānādhikaraṇatvena*) either

through the delimitation of the qualificandness (*viśeṣyatvāvacchedena*) or through the exclusion (*vyāvṛttyā*). For, according to him, the definition of the simple qualifierness involves over-application (*atiprasaṅga*) in the case of the adventitious qualifier such as the braided hair in the expression, 'He is an ascetic by braided hair' (*jaṭābhis tāpasaḥ*).

Also the Pūrvapakṣin refutes the view that the qualifierness (*viśeṣaṇatva*) is the state of having the same case ending as that of the word expressing the qualificand (*viśeṣaṇa samāna vibhaktikatva*). According to him, such a state is overapplicable to even the adventitious qualifier such as the crow in the expression 'The building which has the crow roaming above is the house of Devadatta' (*kākavad devadatta gṛham*).

Upalakṣaṇa needs to be the object of Viśiṣṭa jñāna

I. Xii. 14. Now it may be proposed as follows: That the state of being the object of the qualificative knowledge, while being exclussive, is the qualifierness. However, the qualificative knowledge does not have any reference to the qualifierness; rather, it has the reference to only the qualifier. For, otherwise, the doubt regarding the qualifier and the adventitious qualifier would become untenable.

That is why, the visual perceptibility etc. are contradictory (to the qualifierness and to the adventitious qualifierness). In the case of the adventitious qualification, only the adventitiously qualified aggregate, i.e. the building, but not the state of possessing the crow, becomes the object of qualificative knowledge; for, the knowledge of the building has the form of the state of possessing the crow even in the absence of the state of being the object of qualificative knowledge of the crow. Otherwise, such a qualificative knowledge (as 'The building, which has the crow raoming above, is the house of Devadatta) would become illusory. It should not be argued that how can the state of possessing the crow, which is conveyed by the word (*kākavat*) be the non-object of the verbal knowledge (by not being the object of knowledge)?. For, the epistemological rule prescribes only such a non-objecthood (to the adventitious qualifier). Also, the current or flow of the Ganges does not appear as the delimitor of the bank of the Ganges in the case of the statement of indication such as 'The village exists on the (bank of) Ganges'. Rather, only the particular bank, as being the bank appears to be the delimitor of the Ganges. Otherwise, such an indication would not have the similarity with the indication without leaving the primary expressed meaning. Also it should not be argued that the word 'adventitious qualifier' has indicatoryness, as the aggregate etc., i.e. the building etc, which are not the expressed meanings, are referred by the word '*kākavat*'. Since the reference to the aggregate, i.e. the building, is produced from another cause, which is referred by the knowledge of adventitious qualifier, speaker's intention is meant only to relate semantically

such an aggregate (to the house of Devadatta).

No, this position is not correct. The rule prescribing the non-objecthood to the adventitious qualifier is not established. That no word, other than the adventitious qualifier-word, refers to the adventitiously qualified, i.e. the building; and hence the adventitious qualifier-word (*kākavat*) refers to the adventitiously qualified, i.e. the building only after referring to its expressed meaning, i.e. that which has the crow roaming above; and hence only an indication of the adventitious qualifier-word needs to be admitted in the adventitiously qualified item. Otherwise, the very concept of indication would be lost; for, the adventitious qualifier such as the counter positive (pot) is the object of the knowledge of the absence of the pot in the negative statement such as 'The pot does not exist'. Also the regular adventitiously qualified item does not exist.

Also it cannot be admitted that that which relates to an action, while being exclussive, is the simple qualifier; and that which is other than such a qualifier is the adventitious qualifier. For, then the staff etc. would become the non-qualifiers in the case of the verbal expression such as 'This fortunate one holding the staff has long arms'. Further, the state of relating to an action exists even in the adventitious qualifier indirectly.

Explanation

Now the Siddhāntin proposes that the qualifierness (*viśeṣaṇatva*) can be the state of being the object of the qualificative knowledge (*viśiṣṭa dhī viṣayatva*), while being exclussive (*vyāvartakatve*). However, the qualificative knowledge (*viśiṣṭa buddhi*) refers to only the qualifier (*viśeṣaṇa gocarā*) but does not refer to the qualifierness (*viśeṣaṇatva gocarā*), as othewise the doubt regarding the qualifier and the adventitious qualifier (*viśeṣaṇopalakṣaṇa sandeha*) would become untenable.

Further the Siddhāntin points out that the visual perceptibility (*cākṣuṣatva)* etc. are contradictory to the qualifierness. According to him, only the adventitiously qualified aggregate (*upalakṣita*), i.e. the building, and not the state of possessing the crow (*kākavattva*), becomes the object of qualificative knowledge (*viśiṣṭa dhī viṣaya*) in the case of the adventitious qualification such as '*kākavad devadatta gṛham*', as the knowledge of the building has the form of the state of possessing the crow even in the absence of the state of being the object of qualificative knowledge (*tadabhāvepi*) in the state of possessing the crow (*kākavatve*). And otherwise, the qualificative knowledge such as 'The building having the crow roaming above is the house of Devadatta' (*kāka vad devadatta gṛham*) would become illusory. Also he refutes the argument that the state of possessing the crow above (*kākavattva*), referred to by the word '*kākavat*', cannot be the non-object of verbal

knowledge, as the epistemological rule (*vyutpatti*) prescribes only the non-objecthood to the adventitious qualifier. Also the Siddhāntin refutes that the current of the Ganges (*pravāha*) appears as the dilimitor of the bank of the Ganges (*tīrāvacchedakatayā*) in the statement of indication such as 'The village exists on the (bank of) Ganges' (*gaṅgāyāmghoṣoḥ*). According to him, only the particular bank (*tīra viśeṣa*), as being the bank (*tīratvena*), appears as the delimitor of the Ganges, as otherwise such an indication would not have the similarity (*sāmya*) with the indication without leaving the primary expressed meaning (*ajahat svārtha lakṣaṇā*). Further, he refutes the argument that the word adventitious qualifier (*upalakṣaṇa pada*) has indicatoryness (*lākṣaṇikatva*), as the non-expressed aggregate etc. (*saṁsthāna*) such as the building are referred to by the word '*kākavat*'. According to him, the reference to the aggregate, i.e. the building (*saṁsthānopashiti*), is produced by another cause, which in turn is referred to by the knowledge of the adventitious qualifier (*upalakṣaṇabuddhy upasthāpita*); and hence speaker's intention (*tātparya*) is meant only to relate such an aggregate, i.e. building to the house of Devadatta.

However, the Pūrvapakṣin refutes the Siddhāntin's position. According to him, the rule (*vyutpatti*) prescribing the non-objecthood to the adventitious qualifier is not established. Also the word, which is other than the adventitious qualifier-word (*upalakṣaṇa padātirikta*), does not refer to the adventitiously qualified; and hence the adventitious qualifier-word, *i.e. kākavat* first refers to the expressed meaning, i.e. that which has the crow roaming above (*kākavat*)'; and then refers to the adventitiously qualified, i.e. the building (*upalakṣya*); and thus indication (*lakṣaṇā*) needs to be admitted in the adventitious qualifier-word. Also according to the Pūrvapakṣin, the adventitious qualifier (*upalakṣaṇa*) such as the counterpositive pot (*pratiyogin*) is the object of the knowledge of absence (*abhāva dhī viṣaya*) in the negtative statement such as 'The pot does not exist' (*ghaṭo nāsti*); and hence, indication needs to be admitted.

Also the Pūrvapakṣin refutes the view that that which relates to an action (*kriyānvayi*) while being exclusive (*vyāvarta katve*) is the simple qualifier (*viśeṣaṇa*); and that which is other than such a qualifier (*anyad*) is the adventitious qualifier (*upalakṣaṇa*). According to him, then the staff (*daṇḍa*) in the expression 'This fortunate one holding the staff has long arms' (*subhago' yam daṇḍī mahābāhuḥ*) would not be the qualifier, as it does not relate to any action. Also the state of relating to an action (*kriyānvayitva*) is deviating as it exists even in the adventitious qualifier.

Viśeṣana is not Pratyāyya vyāvṛtti samānādhikaraṇa

I. Xii. 15. It may be proposed now as follows: That the qualifiedness or

qualification means the exclusion from what is other than the object: Thus, only the exclusion from what is other than the object, but not the qualifier or the adventitious qualifier, constitutes the object of qualificative knowledge. Therefore, that, which has the community of locus with the exclusion from what is other than the object to be known, while being the object of the knowledge of the cause of qualificative knowledge, is the simple qualifier.

However, this position is not correct. The exclusion from what is other than the blue lotus is not referrred in the event of non-description of what is other than the blue lotus in the case of the qualificative statement such as 'This lotus is a blue lotus'. For, such an exclusiòn is contradictory to the recognition such as 'I know this (lotus) to be a blue lotus'; and also the qualification would amount to be mere exclusion from what is other than the object.

Explanation

The Siddhāntin now proposes that the exclusion from what is other than other than the object (*atad vyāvṛtti*) constitutes the qualifiedness or qualification (*vaiśiṣṭya*); and thus only the exclusion from what is other than the object (*vaiśiṣṭya*), but not the qualifier (*viśeṣaṇa*) or the adventitious qualifier (*upalakṣaṇa*), is the object of qualificative knowledge (*viśiṣṭa jñāna viṣaya*). According to him, therefore, the qualifier (*viśeṣaṇa*) can be defined to be that which has the community of locus with the exclusion from what is to be known (*pratyāyya vyāvṛtti samānādhikaraṇa*), while being the object of the knowledge of the cause of qualificative knowledge (*viśiṣṭa jñāna dhī kāraṇa jñāna viṣaya*).

The Pūrvapakṣin, however, refutes the position. According to him, the exclusion from what is other than the blue lotus (*atad vyāvṛtti*) is not referred in the qualificative statement such as 'This lotus is a blue lotus' (*nīlam utpalam*), provided that what is other than the blue one (*anīla*) is not described. Also according to him, such an exclusion is contradictory to the recognition (*anu-vyavasāya*) such as 'I know this (lotus) to be a blue lotus' (*nīlam jānāmi*); and hence the qualifier cannot be defined to be that which has the community of lotus with the exclusion from what is other than the object to be known.

Śivāditya Miśrās' Position: Sākṣāt sambaddha is Viśeṣaṇa

I., Xii. 16. It may be proposed now as follows: That the exclusive simple qualifier such as the blue colour is directly related (to the lotus); whereas the exclusive adventitious qualifier such as the crow roaming above the building is indirectly related (to the house); and both of them exist in what is to be excluded. Also therefore, that, which is directly related, is the qualifier and that, which is other than the directly related, is the non-qualifier. In the qualificative knowledge such as 'The person is a staff-holder' the staff is the qualifier of the person; however, the generic property of the staff-ness is the non-qualifier; and it is only the qualifier of the staff by existing in the staff. Thus, only the relation, while constituting the relation in the case of the absence consisting of the relation different from the two related items, i.e. the relational adjunct and the relational subjunct, is the direct relation; and such a direct relation, which is common to the contact, to the inherence and to the self-linking relations, constitutes the relation of the object in the case of knowledge, that of the inherence in the case of inherently related, and that of the absence in the case of the empty substratum; and thus the items having such direct relations constitute the simple qualifiers. And this is the position of the Śivāditya Mishra.

However, this position is not correct. In the cases of the perceptions such as 'The handsomely formed cow is non-eternal', 'The handsomely formed cow moves', and 'The taste exists in the earth possessing the form', the form is only the adventitious qualifier (and not the simple qualifier) dispite the same having the direct relations. Also on the contrary, in the case of the perception such as 'Crystal is red', the redness is the simple qualifier (and not the adventitious qualifier) dispite having an indirect relation.

Explanation

Śivāditya Mishra now proposes that the exclusive simple qualifier (*vyāvartaka*) such as the blue colour (*nīlādi*) is directly related to the lotus (*sākṣāt samabaddha*); and the exclusive adventitious qualifier (*upalakṣaṇa*) such as the crow roaming above the building (*gṛhopari bhramat kākādi*) is indirectly related to the house (*paramparā sambaddha*); and the same exist in what is to be excluded (*vyāvartanīya*). Also further he proposes that the qualifying item, which is directly related (*sākṣāt*), is the qualifier (*viśeṣaṇa*) and the qualifying item, which is other than the directly related (*viparīta*), is the non-qualifier. For instance, in the qualificative perception such as 'The person is a staff -holder' (*daṇḍī pumān*), the staff (*daṇḍa*) is the qualifier of the person; however, the generic property of the staffness (*jāti*) is the non-qualifier of the person and it is only the qualifier of the staff by existing in the staff (*anu daṇḍam*). Now, only such a relation (*sambandha*), while constituting the relation in the case of the absence consisting of the relation diffeent from the two related items (*sambandhi dvayātirikta sambandha ghaṭakābhāve*), is the direct relation (*sākṣāt sambandha*). The direct relation is common to the contact, to the inherence and to the self-linking relations (*samyoga samavāya svarūpa sādhāraṇa*); and it constitutes the relation of the object in the case of knowledge (*jñāne viṣayasya*), that of the inherence in the case of inherence related (*sambandhini samavāyasya*) and that of the absence in the case of the

empty substratum (*abhāvasya adhikaraṇe*); and thus, the items having such direct relations, are the qualifiers.

However, the Pūrvapakṣin refutes the position. According to him, the form (*rūpa*) in the case of 'The handsomely formed cow is non-eternal', and 'The handsomely formed cow is moving' (*gaur anityo rūpavāṅ calati*), is merely an adventitious qualifier (*upalakṣaṇa*) and not the simple qualifier (*viśeṣaṇa*) dispite having the direct relation. Also, on the contrary, the redness (*lohita tva*) in the case of 'Crystal is red' (*lohitaḥ sphaṭikaḥ*), is the simple qualifier and not the advantitious qualifier dispite having the indirect relation.

Sākṣādanvita or Viśeṣya sambaddha is Viśeṣaṇa

I. Xii. 17. Now it may be proposed as follows: That, which is related, as manifesting the relational adjunct, is the adventitious qualifier; and that, which is related directly, is the simple qualifier. This is so because, the adventitious qualifier such as the crow has the adventitious qualitifierness by being usefull, i.e. by manifesting the relational adunct such as the aggregate of building; whereas the simple qualifier such as the staff has only the qualifierness by being otherwise, i.e. by relating only directly.

However, this view is not correct. For, then the word ' adventitious qualifier' would become only indicative; and also the counterpositive such as the pot would not be adventitious qualifier due to not manifesting any property other than the counterpositiveness itself, i.e. the relational adjuct.

It may again be proposed now as follows: That, which is exclusive as related to the qualificand, at the time of knowledge of exclusion, is the simple qualifier; and that which is exclusive as not related to the qualificand at the time of exclusion, is the adventitious qualifier. Also it should be noted that the braided hair, when it is absent, is the adventitous qualifier in the case of ascetic. That is why, one and the same exclusive entity is both the simple qualifier and the adventitious qualifier; it is the simple qualifier at the time of its relation with the qualificand; but it is the adventitious qualifier there at the time of the absence of its relation with the qualificand.

However, this position too is not correct. For, in that case, the form too would become the simple qualifier in the perception such as 'Taste exists in the pot possessing the form'. Also the staff would become merely the adventitious qualifier in the past perception such as 'The staff-holder was there'. From this, the following position too becomes refuted: "That the exclusive factor is the simple qualifier there in such a knowledge where it appears to be having the community of locus with ether the property delimiting the qualificand or the exclusion".

Explanation

Some scholars state now that that, which is related (*anvita*) as manifesting the relational adjunct (*anvaya pratiyog upasthāpakatayā*), is the adventitious qualifer (*upalakṣaṇa*); and that, which is related directly (*sākṣād anvita*), is the simple qualifier (*viśeṣaṇa*). According to them, the adventitious qualifier such as the crow has the adventitious qualifierness by being useful in manifesting the relational adjunct (*pratiyogi*) such as the aggregate of building (*samsthāna*); and the qualifer such as the staff has only the qualifierness (*viśeṣaṇatva*) by being only directly related.

The Pūrvapakṣin, however, refutes the position. According to him, then in that case, the word 'adventitious qualifier'(*upalakṣaṇa*) would become merely indicative (*lākṣaṇika*) by indicating the relational adjunct; and also the counter positive (*pratiyogin*) would not be an adventitious qualifier by not manifesting any other property than the relational adjunct in the case of absence (*abhāve*).

Also Some scholars state now that that, which is exclusive as related to the qualificand (*viśesya sambaddham vyāvartakam*), is the simple qualifier and that which is exclusive as not related to the qualificand (*viśeṣyāsambaddham vyāvartakam*) is the adventitious qualifier. According to them, thus, one and the same entity is both the simple qualifier and the adventitions qualifier; it is the qualifier at the time of the relation of the qualifier with the qualificand (*viśeṣaṇa sambandha samaye*); and it is the adventitious qualifier at the time of the absence of the relation with the qualificand. Thus, braided hair, which is absent, is the adventitious qualifier.

However, the Pūrvapakṣin refutes even scuh a position. According to him, then the form (*rūpa*) too would become only the simple qualifier in the case of 'Taste exists in the pot possessing the form' (*rūpavati ghaṭe rasaḥ*). Also then the staff would become merely the adventitious qualifier in the past perception such as 'The staff-holder was there' (*daṇḍy āsīt*). Thus it is not correct to observe that the exclusive factor is the simple qualifier in the case where it appears to be having the community of locus (*samānādhikaraṇatvena*) with either the property delimiting the qualificand (*viśeṣyāvacchedaka dharmeṇa*) or the exclusion (*vyāvṛttyā*).

Naiyāyikas' Reply: Pratyāyyavyāvṛtty adhikaraṇatve sati Vyāvartaka is Viśeṣaṇa

I. Xii. 18. Here, we, the Naiyayikas, reply: That (in the case of the knowledge of the qualifier) the exclusion of the non-staff-holder is known in the staff-holder from the qualificative knowledge 'The person is a staff-holder'; and therefore, the state of being the substratum of the exclusion of what is to

be known in the person is delimited by only the simple qualifier, i.e. the staff, and not by the personness, due to the overapplication. On the other hand, in the case of the knowledge of the adventitious qualifier, the state of being the substratum of the exclusion of what is to be known, resident in the house (of Devadatta) and ascetic etc. , is delimited by the possession of the particular aggregate etc. and not by the adventitious qualifier, i.e. the crow or the braided hair etc.; for, the exclusion is known even in the case where the crow etc. are absent.

Thus, the exclusive factor, while being the delimitor of the state of being the substratum of the exclusion of what is to be known, is the simple qualifier; whereas the exclusive factor, other than that, is the adventitious qualifier.

Explanation

Gangeśa now states the Naiyāyikas' reply: According to them, in the qualificative knowledge such as 'Person is a staff-holder' (*daṇḍī puruṣaḥ*), the exclusion of the non-staff-holder (*adaṇḍa vyāvṛtti*) is known in the staff-holder (*daṇḍavati*); and hence the state of being the substratum of the exclusion of what is to be known (*prayāyya vyāvṛtty adhikaraṇatā*) in the person is delimited by only the simple qualifier such as the staff (*daṇḍena*), and not by the personness (*puruṣatvena*) due to the deviation. Whereas in the case of the knowledge of the adventitious qualifier (*upalakṣane*) such as '*kākavad devadattagṛham*' etc., the state of being the substratum of theexclusion of what is to be known in the house of Devadatta is delimited by only the possession of the particular aggregate (*samsthānavattva*), and not by the adventitous qualifie, i.e. the crow etc., due to the knowledge of the exclusion even where the crow is absent.

Thus, the Naiyāyikas conclude that the exclusive factor (*vyāvartaka*), while being the delimitor of the state of being the substratum of the exclusion of what is to be known (*pratyāyya vyāvṛtty adhikaraṇatāvacchedokatve*), is the simple qualifier (*viśeṣaṇa*); and the exclusive factor other than that (*tad anyat*) is the adventitious qualifier (*upalakṣaṇa*).

Udayana's Justification

I. Xii. 19. Also the knowledge of the state of being the qualifier arises only after the description of the exclusion (of what is to be known). And in justification of this theory, Udayanācārya states as follows: "That, which excludes (what is to be known), while being present or absent, and having the community of locus with it, is the simple qualifier; and that, which excludes, while not having the community of locus with it, is the adventitious qualifier". And such a statement means as follows: "That the qualifierness is

the state of conveying the exclusion (of what is to be known) resident in only the substratum of itself, or it is the state of conveying the exclusion (of what is to be known) having the community of locus with what is delimited by itself; or it is the state of conveying the exclusion while not conveying the exclusion, not having the community of lucus with itself. Whereas the adventitious qualifier conveys the exsclusion even in the non-substratum of itself.

Explanation

Gangeśa now presents the justification of his theory by quoting Udayanāchārya. According to Udayana, that which excludes (what is to be known), while being present or absent and having the community of lucus with itself (*sad asad vā samānādhikaraṇam vyavacchedakam*), is the simple qualifier (*viśeṣaṇa*); and that which excludes (what is to be known), while not having the community of locus with itself (*vyadhikaraṇa vyavacchedakam*), is the adventitious qualifier (*upalakṣaṇa*). Also according to him, it means that the qualifierness (*viśeṣaṇatva*) is either the state of conveying the exclusion (of what is to be known) resident in only the substratum of itself (*svādhikaraṇa mātra vṛtti vyāvṛttibodhakatva*); or it is the state of conveying the exclusion (of what is to be known) having the community of locus with what is delimited by itself (*svāvacchinnādhikaraṇatāka vyāvṛttibodhakatva*) or it is the state of conveying the exclusion (*vyāvṛtti bodhakatva*), while not conveying the exclusion, not having the community of locus with itself; and the adventitious qualifier (*upalakṣaṇa*) conveys the exclusion (*vyāvṛtti*) even in the non-substratum of itself (*svānadhikaraṇe*).

Conclusion: Alternative Definitions

I. Xii. 20. As an alternative, however, it can be proposed as follows: That the delimitor of the relational adjunctness, described by the relation of one with the intended qualificand, is the qualifier; and the staff is so in the qualificative knowledge such as 'Bring the person who is the staff holder'. Whereas the non-delimitor of the relational adjunctness (described by the relation of one with the intended qualificand) is the adventitous qualifier; and the crow is the non- delimitor of the relational adjunctness described by the relation of Devadatta with the house in the qualificative knowledge such as 'The house of Devadatta is the one which has the crow'. For, the relation of Devadatta with the house can be known even in the absence of the crow (roaming above). Rather, only the particular house (of Devadatta) is known from the adventitious qualifier, i.e. the crow. Thus, the adventitious qualifier is not useless dispite not being the (delimitor of the) relational adjunct.

As yet another alternative, it can be proposed as follows: That, which excludes the knowledgeof relation of what is other than the intended qualifier

of the qualificand, known to be the relatum of the qualifier, is the qualifier ; and that, which is other than that, is the adventitious qualifier. For, the relation of the intended object is known with the qualificand, to be known, though not delimited by the adventitious qualifier. And this is what is meant by the statement "That, which is related to the effect, to be accomplished, is the qualifier; and that, which is not related to the effect, to be accomplished, is the adventitious qualifier. However, the qualifierness cannot be defined as the state of being the object of the knowledge of what is intended to be the qualificand or the state of being the object of the qualificative knowledge; for, such a state is absent in the quaifier in the theory that the counterpositive is the object of the knowledge of absence.

As yet another alternative, it can be proposed as follows: That, which is the delimitor of what relates to the one relating to the qualificand, is the qualifier; and that, which is other than that, is the adventitious qualifier. Therefore, that exclusive factor which relates to the one relating to the qualificand due to the relation with the qualificand to be qualified, is the qualifier; and that, which is other than that is the adventitious qualifier. Or as yet another alternative, it can be proposed as follows: That property, which constitutes the relational adjunct of the relation with the object of speaker's intention, or the property, which constitutes the relational adjunct of the relation with the qualificand, is the qualifier; and that which is other than the property, is the adventitious qualifier. Thus enough of elaboration.

Thus, ends the Theory of indeterminate knowledge in the Perception of the Tattvacintāmaṇi composed by Śri gangeśopādhyāya.

Explanation

Gangeśa concludes now his theory of indeterminate knowledge (*nirvikalpaka vāda*) with many alternative difinitions of the qualifier (*viśeṣaṇa*). According to him, the delimitor of the relational adjunctness described by the relation of one with the intended qualificand (*vivakṣitānvaya pratiyogitāva-cchedaka*) is the qualifier *(viśeṣaṇa)*; and the staff is the qualifier in 'Bring the one who is the staff-holder' (*daṇḍinam ānaya*) as the staff is the delimitor of the relational adjunctness. Also the non-delimitor of the relational adjunctness (*tad anavacchedaka*) is the adventitious qualifier (*upalakṣana*); and the crow is the adventitious qualifier in 'The house of Devadatta is the one which has the crow' (*kākena devadattasya gṛham*), as the crow is not the delimitor of the relational adjunctness. Here only the particular house is known from the adventitious qualifier. Thus, the adventitious qualifier is not useless dispite not being the delimitor of the relational adjunct of relation (*anvayāpratiyogitve*).

Also Gangeśa presents another alternative definition of them. According to him, that, which excludes the knowledge of relation of what is other than the intended qualifier (*tātparya viṣayetarānvaya dhī vyāvartaka*) of the qualificand (viśeṣye), is the qualifier; and that, which is other than that (*anavam bhūta*) is the adventitious qualifier. This is so because the realtion of the intended object (*tātparya viṣayībhūtānvaya*) is konwn with the qualificand to be known (*vipalakṣye*), though not delimitted by the adventitious qualifier (*upalakṣaṇānavacchinne*). And the statement 'That which relates to the effect to be accomplished (*kāryānvayi*) is the qualifier; and that which does not relate to the effect to be accomplished (*tad ananvayi*) is the adventitious qualifier' too means the same.However, he states that the qualifierness (*viśeṣaṇatva*) cannot be the state of being the object of the knowledge of what is intended to be related to the qualificand (*tātparya viṣayībhūta viśeṣyānvayabodha viṣayatva*) or the state of being the object of the qualificative knowledge (*viśiṣta jñāna viṣayatva*); as the same state is absent in the qualifier in the theory that the counterpositive is the object of the knowledge of absence (*pratiyogyabhāvabuddhi viṣaya*).

Also Gangeśa presents yet another alternative definitions of them. According to him, that, which is the delimitor of what relates to the one relating to the qualificand (*yasya viśeṣyānvayinā anvayaḥ tad avacchedaka*), is the qualifier; and that, which is other than that (*tad anyad*), is the adventitious qualifier. Or, that exclusive factor (*vyāvartaka*), which relates to the one relating to the qualificand (*viśeṣyānvayinā*), is the qualifier; and that, which is other than that (*tad anyad*), is the adventitious qualifier.

Finally Gangeśa presents yet another alternative definitions of the qualifier and the adventitious qualifier. According to him, the property (*dharma*), which constitutes the relational adjunct of the relation with the object of speaker's intention (*tātparya viṣayānvayānvaya pratiyogin*), or the property (*dharma*), which constitutes the relational adjunct of the relation with the qualificand (*uddeśyānvaya pratiyogin*), is the qualifier; and that, which is other than such a property (*tad anyad*), is the adventitious qualifier.

The End of the Nirvikalpaka vāda
in the Pratyakṣakhaṇḍa.

XIII

Theory of Determinate Knowledge (Savikalpaka vādaḥ)

Savikalpaka jñāna is Pratyakṣa and Constitutes Pratyabhijñā

I.Xiii. 1. Determinate knowledge is a qualificative knowledge; and it may be described, for instance, as 'This (cow) is a cow'. Such a determinate knowledge is perception, as the objects such as the generic property of the cowness etc. are ultimately real; and also as the same knowledge is produced from (the comprehensional relation of) the sense organs with the objects.

In some cases, however, such a determinate knowledge constitutes a qualificative re-cognition such as 'I know that this cow is that cow' (*so'yam*), produced from the sense-organs, which describes the identity of the object 'cow' qualified by the 'thatness' with the object 'cow' qualified by the 'thisness' due to the help of the associate cause of impression.

Explanation

Gangeśa now begins the last chapter, viz. The theory of determinate knowledge (*savikalpaka vāda*) with the explanation of determinate knowledge. According to him, determinate knowledge (*savikalpaka*) is a qualificative knowledge (*viśiṣta jñāna*) such as 'This (cow) is a cow' *(gaur ayam)*. Also he clarifies that such a determinate knowledge is a perception (*pratyakṣa*), as the objects such as the generic property of the cowness etc. are ultimately real *(paramārtha sat)*; and also as the same knowledge is produced from the comprehensional relation of sense organs with the object (*indriyārtha sannikarṣaja*). Also such a determinate knowledge (*vikalpa*), in some cases, constitutes a qualificative recognition (*pratyabhijñā*) produced from the senses such as 'I know that this cow is that cow' (*so' yam*) which describes the identity (*abheda*) of the object 'cow' qualified by the 'thatness' (*tattā viśiṣṭa*) with the object 'cow', qualified by the 'thisness' (*idantāviśiṣṭa*) due to the help of the associate cause of impression (*samskāra sahakārin*).

Saṅkalpaka is Ekajñāna and can include Pratyabhijñā

I.Xiii. 2. It may be objected now as follows: That the state of having the single associate cause producing single effect may exist in the qualificative determinate knowledge such as 'This (cow) is a cow'. However, the after-

knowledge or re-cognition (such as 'I know that this is that cow') cannot be a single knowledge. Since the perceptibility and the non-perceptibility are experienced in the this-aspect and in the that-aspect of recognition respectively, the two contradictory properties need to be superimposed on the re-cognition. Also such a relation, i.e. superimposition of the contradictory properties cannot be real or valid. The relation of one with many places and times is contradictory in the case of a single entity. Like the relation of one with certain time and its absence is excluded, i.e. contradictory, the relation of one with another time , which is invariably connected with the lack of relation with certain time, too is excluded, i.e. contradicted. And suppose this law of contradiction is held to be invalid, then many difficulties would arise.

However, this objection is not correct. Both the perceptibility and the non-perceptibility cannot be established in the re-cognition. Since the recognition is being produced from sense-organs, it is ruled to be only perceptual. Also since the thatness-aspect of recognition can be obtained from the remembarence, the qualifierness of the object connected with sense-organs can qualify to be comprehensional relation in the recognition.

Also relation of one with certain time of an entity is not invariably connected with the absence of relation of the same with another time. For, then relation of one with various spaces would become contradictory in one entity. Also the state of referring to many objects would become contradictory in one knowledge. Also the recognition such as 'I directly perceive this cow as that cow' is not contradictory.

Explanation.

The Pūrvapakṣin, who opposes the inclusion of after-knowledge or re-cognition (*pratyabhijñā*) in determinate knowledge or qualificative knowledge, raises the objection that the qualificative knowledge such as 'This (cow) is a cow' (*iyam gauḥ*) may be single; and hence may have single associate cause (*ekasahakārin*) such as the comprehensional relation of sense with objects; however, the after-knowledge or recognition such as 'I know that this cow is that cow' (*so' yam gouḥ*) is not single (*eka*) knowledge; and hence cannot have single associate cause. According to him, both the perceptibility (*apārokṣya*) and non-perceptibility, (*pārokṣya*) are experienced in the 'this aspect' (*idam amśe*) and in the 'That aspect' (*tad amśe*) of recognition respectively; and hence the two contradictory properties (*viruddha dharma*) are superimposed on the re-cognition. And the superimposition of the contradictory properties cannot be valid (*yathārta*), as the relation of many places and times is contradictory in one entity. It should be noted that, like the relation of one with both certain time and its absence (*ekakālādi samsarga*

tadabhāva)is contradictory, the relation of one with another time (*kālāntarādi sambandha*), though invariably related, is contradictory.

However, the Siddhāntin Gaṅgeśa, who intends to include recognition in qualificative knowledge, refutes the objection. According to him, both the perceptuality (*apārokṣya*) and the non-perceptuality (*pārokṣya*) are not established in the recognition. Further, since the recognition is being produced from the sense-organs (*indriya janyatvena*), it is ruled to be only perceptual (*aparokṣatva niyama*). Also since the thatness-aspect of recognition (*tattāṁśa*) is obtained from the remembarence (*smṛtyupanīta*), the qualifierness of the object connected with sense-organs (*indriya sambaddha viśeṣaṇatā*) can funtion as the comprehensional relation in recognition.

Also the Siddhāntin notes that the relation of one with certain time (*ekakāla sambandha*) of an entity need not be invariably connected with the absence of relation of the same with another time (*kālāntarasambandhābhāva*). This is necessary, as otherwise the relation of one with various spaces (*nānādik sambandha*) would become untenable in one entity; and also the reference to many objects (*anekaviṣayatva*) would become untenable in a knowledge. Lastly, the recognition such as 'I know that this cow is that cow' (*sākṣātkaromi*) is not contradictory.

Definittion of Tattā as Atīta samayasambandha

I. Xiii. 3. Since both the thatness and the thisness of the object are recognized in re-cognition, it may be enquired now as follows: That what is the thatness of the object (in the case of recognition)?. And it cannot be the relation (of one) with what exists in the past time. For, the remembarence and the recognition, referring to the future object, describe the thatness. Also the knowledge and the designation of the thatness are absent in the pot etc, which are being experienced perceptually, in the case of the inference delimited by the past time. Also dispite the knowledge of the relation of one with what exists in the past time, the doubt as to 'Whether this pot is that pot or not' may arise; also the opposite contrary knowledge as to 'This pot is not that pot' may also arise then. Further, dispite the knowledge of the absence of the relation of one with what exists in the past, the recognition as to 'This pot is that pot' may arise; also further the co-usage as to 'This pot qualified by the past time is that pot' is possible. Also the thatness does not exist in the past time. From this explanation, even the position that the thatness is the state of being what is qualified by some other previously known property too gets set aside.

Also it cannot be held that the thatness is the quality etc. existing in the past object. For, the thatness is not known at times even in the case of the kownledge of such a quality etc.. Also the thatness is known at times even in the case of not knowing such a quality. Also the thatness cannot be held to be the state of being what is qualified by the past knowledge of the object. For, the usage of recognition such as 'This pot is that pot' is not made dispite the knowledge that the pot is previously known by the other. Also the thatness cannot be held to be the state of being what is qualified by ones past knowledge of this life. For, the doubt and the opposite negative knowledge of the thatness are observed dispite the past knowledge of the object. Also the co-usage of the recognition such as 'This pot qualified by the past knowledge is that pot' is observed. Also since the state of being the object of past experience is not the object of (present) experience, the state of being the object of past experience cannot be described by the remembarence.

Explanation

Gaṅgeśa now presents various Pūrvapakṣa definitions of the thatness (of the object in the case of recognition) (*tattā*) and refutes them. According to him, the thatness of the object cannot be the relation of one with what exists in the past time (*atītasamaya sambandha*); for, the remembarence and the recognition (*smṛti pratyabhijñayoḥ*) referring to the future object (*anāgata gocara*) too describe the thatness. Also the knowledge and the designation of the thatness (*tattādhī vyapadeśa*) are absent in the pot etc. (*ghaṭādau*), which are being experienced, in the case of inference delimited by the past time. (*atīta samayāvacchedena*). Also dispite the knowledge of the relation of one with what exists in the past time (*atīta samaye sambandhāvagame*), the doubt as to whether this pot is that pot or not (*so'yam na vā*) may arise; and also dispite the knowledge of the absence of the relatiion of one with what exist in the past time (*tad abhāvāva game*), the recognition as to 'This pot is that pot' (*so'yam*) arises; thus the thatness does not exist in the past time. Also therefore, the definition that the thatness is the state of being what is qualified by some other previously known property (*jñāta dharmāntara vaiśiṣṭya*) gets refuted.

Also Gaṅgeśa refutes that the thatness (*tattā*) is the quality etc. existing in the past object (*tadvṛtti guṇādika*). According to him, the thatness is not known at times even in the case of the knowledge of such a quality etc. (*tad avagame*); also the thatness is known at times even in the case of the non-knowledge of such a quality etc. (*tad anavagame*). Also the thatness is not the state of being what is qualified by the past knowledge of the object (*atīta jñāna vaiśiṣṭya*). For, the usage of recognition such as 'This pot is that pot' (*saḥ*) is not made, dispite the knowledge that the pot is previously known by the other (*pareṇa jñātaḥ*). Also the thatness is not the state of being what is qualified by one's past knowledge of this life (*etad janmātīta svajñāna vaiśiṣṭya*). For, the doubt and the opposite knowledge of the thatness (*tattā saṁśaya viparyaya*) are observed, dispite the past knowledge of the object

(*tad avagame*). Also the state of being the object of past experience (*atītānubhava viṣayatva*) is not the object of experience; and therefore, the state of being the object of past experience cannot be described by remembarence.

Atītānubhava viṣayatva is Tattā

I. Xiii. 4. Some hold here as follows: That the thatness of the object in the case (of recognition) is the state of being the object of the past experience. And the past experience is the remembarence of the pot such as 'This pot is that pot' at the time when the pot is grasped by some other knowledge as the non-object of experience; and suppose this were not so, then the pot would be one which is bereft of the aspect of the thatness.

However, this position is not correct. Although the state of being the object of past experience is grasped in the inference, the knowledge and the designation of the thatness such as 'This pot is that pot' are absent in the inference of the same. Also dispite the ascertainment of the state of being the object of past experience, the doubt and the opposite contrary knowledge of the thatness are observed. Further, the co-usage of recognition (such as 'The pot, qualified by the past knowledge, is that pot') would become untebable. Further, the reference to the thatness would become contingent in the case of the grasping of the state of being the object of the past experience by another knowledge.

Explanation

Some hold here that the thatness (*tattā*) is the state of being the object of the past experience (*atītānubhava viṣayatva*). According to them, the past experience is the remembrance (*smaraṇa*) of the pot such as 'This pot is that pot' (*sa ghaṭaḥ*) at the time when the same pot is grasped by some other knowledge (*jñānāntareṇa*) as the non-object of experience (*anubhavā viṣayatvena*). Otherwise, the pot would become one which is deviod of the thatness (*pramuṣṭa tattāka*).

However, Gangeśa refutes such a definition of the thatness (*tattā*). According to him, the state of being the object of past experience (*atītānubhava viṣayatva*) may be grasped in the inference; however, the knowledge and the designation of the thatness (*dhī vyapadeśa*) such as '*sa ghṭaḥ*' are absent in the inference. Also dispite the ascertainment of such a state of being the object of past experience, the doubt and the opposite contradictory knowledge of the thatness (*tattāsamiśaya viparyaya*) can be observed. Also the co-usage (*saha-prayoga*) such as 'The pot, qualified by the past knowledge, is that pot' would become untenable. Also the reference to the thatness (*tattollekha*) would become necessary even in the grasping of such a state by another knowledge (*jñānāntareṇa*).

Atītadharma vaiśiṣṭya is Tattā

I.Xiii. 5. Some others may propose now as follows: That the thatnesss(of the object in the case of recognition) is the state of being the object qualified by the past property. And such a past property is at times the past time and at other times the past knowledge.

Also the co-usage such as 'That one is qualified by the past property' need not become untenable. For, the co-usage is tenable by taking into account the particular property; and such a co-usage as 'That one is qualified by the past property' cannot be established in the absense of the knowledge of the past property. Also it should not be argued that the thatness cannot be the state of being the object qualified by the past property, as the doubt such as 'Whether this pot is that pot or not' and also the opposite contradictory knowledge such as 'This pot is not that pot' are possible even in the case of the knowledge of the one as qualified by the past property. For, both the doubt and the opposite knowledge are tenable only as referring to the property which is other than the ascertained property and the particular property respectively.

However, this, position is not correct. Suppose the thatness (of the object of recognition) is the state of being the object qualified by the past property in actuality, then the description of the thatness would become necessary even in the case of the experience of the property at the present time, as the same experience refers to the past property in actuality. Also the thatness (of the object of recognition) cannot be defined to be the state of being the object qualfied by the property, which appears as the past one; for, the property, which appears, cannot be the object of experience as belonging to the post. Rather, it appears as belonging to the present. Also in such a case, the description of the thatness would become untenable in the case of remembrance. Also it should not be argued that the description of the thatness is necessary in the remembrance only in the case when the state of being qualified by the past property appears by another knowledge, and not otherwise. For, the description of the thatness would then become contingent in the case of inference of the past property.

Explanation

Yet Some others hold here that the thatness (*tattā*) is the state of being the object qualified by the past property (*atīta dharma vaiśiṣṭya*). According to them, such a past property (*dharma*) is at times the past time (*samaya*) and at other times the past knowledge etc. (*jñānādi*).

They explain that the co-usage (*saha-prayoga*) such as 'That one is qualified by the past property' (*atīta dharma viśiṣṭaḥ saḥ*) can be tenable by taking into account the particular property (*dharma viśeṣa*). Further, they refute the argument that the thatness cannot be the state of being the object qualified by the past property as the doubt such as 'Whether this pot is that pot or not' (*sa na veti saṁśāya*) and the opposite knowldedge such as 'This pot is not that pot' (*sa nāyamiti viparyaya*) are possible even in the knowledge of the one qualified by the past property. According to them, the doubt and the opposite knowledge are tenable only as referring to what is other than the ascertained property (*niścitadharmetara*) and the particular property (*dharma viśeṣa*) respectively.

However, Gangeśa refutes such a position of Others. According to him, suppose the thatness is the state of being the object qualified by the past property, in actuality, (*vastugatyā yo atīto dharmaḥ tadvaiśiṣṭya*), then the description of the thatness (*tattollekha*) would become necessary, even in the experience of the property at the present time (*tadānubhava*), as the experience refers to the past property in actuality. Also the thatness cannot be defined as the state of being the object qualified by the property which appears as the past one (*atītatvena bhāsamāna vaiśiṣṭya*). For, the property, which appears, cannot be the object, of experience as belonging to the past; rather, it appears as belonging to the present. Also then the description of the thatness would become untenable in remembrance.

Also Gangeśa refutes the argument that the description of the thatness (*tattollekha*) is necessary only in the case where the state of being the object qualified by the past property (*atīta dharma vaiśiṣṭya*) appears by another knowledge. According to him, then the description of the thatness would become necessary in the case of the inference of the past property (*anumiti*).

Tanmātravṛtti guṇādika is Idantā

I. Xiii. 6. Also the 'Thisness' of re-cognition cannot be the quality or the property existing in only this one. For, the designation such as 'This one' is not made dispite the knowledge of the quality etc existing in this one through inference. Also, it cannot be argued that the designation 'This one' is made only in the case where the quality etc. are known through perception. Since the expressed sense (of designation) is the object of means of knowledge (i.e. the word), the designation cannot be restricted to perception alone.

Also when the designation of the thisness is described in the case of the quality etc. , the lack of consecutiveness would become contingent. Also the thisness cannot be the state of being the one subsiding in the individual here in front. For, the words 'This' (*idam*) and 'this one there' (*etad*) are synomymns.

Also the thisness cannot be the state of being the object of perceptual knowledge. For, then the thisness would become non-visual. Also the knowledge and the designation such as 'this one' are absent in the case of the inference of this one in the past. Further, the description of the thisness would become necessary even by the remembrance.

Explanation

Also Gangeśa refutes the position that the thisness of recognition (*idantā*) may be the quality etc. existing in only this one (*tanmātra vṛtti guṇādika)*. According to him, the designation such as 'this one' (*ayam iti vyapadeśa*) is not made dispite the knowledge of the quality etc. existing in this one through inference.

Also, it is not correct to suggest that the designation such as 'this one' is made only in the case where the quality etc. are known through perception. For, the designation cannot be restricted to only perception, as the expressed sense of desgination (*vācya*) is the object of means of knowledge (*pramāṇa gocara*) such as word. Further, Gangeśa refutes that the 'thisness' *(idantā)* may be the state of being the one subsiding in the individual here in front. According to him, the words 'this' (*idam*) and 'this one here' *(etad)* are synonymns. Also the thisness cannot be the state of being the object of perceptual knowledge (*pratyakṣa jñāna gocaratva*). For, then the thisness would become non-visual (*acākṣuṣa*). Further, the knowledge and the desgination such as 'this one' (*ayam iti buddhi vyapadeśa*) are absent in the case of the inference of this one in the past (*tatīte tadanumāne*).

Tattā and Idantā are Akhaṇḍopādhis

I. Xiii.7. Some state here as follows: That the thatness and the thisness of recognition, which are manifested by the remembrance and the experience respectively, are only indivisible imposed properties; and hence, they are distinct from the already assumed properties. This way, only the thisness is recollected to be the thatness on account of the impression of the thisness.

It should not be argued that since the thatness is never imposed any where, how can the same be imposed on the thisness.?. In the case of the recognition such as 'This one is thatone', the imposition of the thatness is real with respect to the this one. However, only the property, which is other than the thisness, appears to be the thatness in the case of the remembrance, produced from the experience, not describing the thisness. That is why, the knowledge such as 'This one is pot' cannot be the remembrance; and also therefore, all the remembrances are only unreal or have unreal experiences as their sources. However, the recollection of gods such as Hari and Hara etc. is produced from the knowledge of the expected objects and is of the form of

mere experience, like the knowledge of the ideas based on the poetry of poets and like the knowledge of the mental concepts.

However, this position of Some scholars is not correct. The imposition of the thatness on the thisness is not possible without the reference to the thisness prior to the remembrance. Also there exists no valid proof in the theory that the thisness is recollected as the thatness in the case of the remembrance transgressing the boundary of the impression by way of referring to the non-experienced thisness in the case of the thatness. Thus, let it be admitted, due to the brevity, that (this) pot is merely remembered as being the that pot in the recognition.

Explanation

Some scholars (*kecit*) hold that the thatness and the thisness of recognition (*tattendante*), manifested by the remembrance and the experience (*smṛtyanubhava bhāsinyau*), are indivisible imposed properties (*akhaṇdo pādhī*). And therefore, only the thisness appears to be the thatness on account of the impression of the thisness (*idantā samskāreṇa*).

Also they refute the argument that the thatness (*tattā*) cannot be imposed on the thisness (*idantā*), as the same is never imposed. According to them, in the case of the re-cognition such as 'This one is that one' (*pratyabhijñā*), the imposition of the thatness is real. However, they note that only the properry which is other than the thisness *(dharmāntara)* appears to be the thatness (*tattayā*) in the case of the remembrance not describing the thisness. (*idantānullekha*). Hence the knowledge 'This is a pot' (*ayam ghaṭaḥ*) cannot constitute the remembrance; and also all the remembrances are unreal (*ayathārthā*) and are produced from unreal experiences (*ayathārthānubhavā*). However, the recollection of gods such as Hari and Hara (*hari harādicintana*) is only real experience *(anubhava rūpa)* produced from the knowledge of expected objects (*sākāṅkṣa padārtha jñāna prabhava*).

Gangeśa, however, refutes the position of Some scholars. According to him, the imposition of the thatness (*tattāropa*) is not possible on the thisness without the reference to the thisness (*idantopasthiti*) prior to the remembrance. Also according to him, no proof exists to prove that the thisness (*idantā*) is recollected as the thatness (*tattayā*) in the remembrance transgressing the boundary of the impression (*saṁskāra sīmollaṅghane*) by referring to the non-experienced thisness in the case of the thatness (*tattāṁśe*). Thus, Gangeśa states that (this) pot is merely remembered as the that pot. in the recognition.

Naiyāyikas' Reply: Pronoun Tat is used in the Object

I. Xiii. 8. Here, we the Naiyāyikas, state our reply: Time or some other property, which is referred to as the object as existing in the present tense, in the experience (knowledge), functions as the object as existing in the past tense in the remembrance. Despite the fact that both the direct experience (knowledge) and the remembrance refer to one and the same object, the demonstrative word 'that' *(tat)* is used in the sense of the object in the case of the remembrance. For, only the after-knowledge or recognition produced from the impression (of experience) constitutes the cause of the use of the demonstrative pronoun 'that' (*tat*). That is why, the demonstrative pronoun 'that' (*tat*) is used in the sense of the object in the recognition; and the other demonstrative pronoun 'this' (*idam*) is used in the same sense of the object in the case of direct perceptual knowledge. However, the difference between the direct perceptual knowledge and the recognition is caused (by the presentness and the pastness of the object), but not by the actual difference between the objects.

That is why, the remembrance such as 'This (pot) is a pot' *(ayam ghaṭaḥ)* is not produced from the direct experience such as 'This (pot) is a pot'; and also the direct experience such as 'That (pot) is a pot' (*sa ghaṭaḥ*) is not the cause of the remembrance such as 'That (pot) is a pot'.

Explanation

The Naiyāyikas now reply that the time or someother property (*kālo dharmāntaram*), which is referred to as the object as existing in the present tense in the case of the experience (*anubhave*), functions as the object as existing in the past tense in the remembrance (*smaraṇasya*). According to them, that is why, dispite the fact that the direct experience and the remembrance (*anubhava smaraṇayoḥ*) have one and the same (*pot*) as the object (*ekaviṣaya*), the demonstrative pronoun 'that' (*tat*) is used in the sense of the object (*tatra*) in the case of remembrance; and the after-knowledge or recognition produced from the impression (*samskāraja jñāna*) functions as the cause of the use of the demonstrative pronoun 'that' (*tat*). Thus, the demonstrative pronoun 'that' (*tat*) is used in the sense of the object (pot) even in the case of recognition (*pratyabhijñāna*); and the other demonsstrative pronoun 'this' *(idam)* is used in the same sense of the object in the case of direct perceptual knowledge (*pratyakṣānubhava*). It should be noted that the difference between the direct perceptual knowledge and the recognition *(viśeṣa)* is (due to the presentness and the pastness of the object), but not due to the actual difference between the objects (*viṣaya kṛta*).

Thus, the remembrance such as 'This (pot) is a pot' (*ayam ghaṭaḥ*) cannot be produced from the direct experience such as 'This (pot) is a pot' (*ayam ghaṭaḥ*); and also the direct experience such as 'That (pot) is a pot'

(*sa ghaṭaḥ*) cannot be the cause of the remembrance such as 'That (pot) is a pot'(*sa ghaṭaḥ*).

Tattā is Atītatva: And the form of remembrance

I. Xiii. 9. Gaṅgeśa states now his conclusive view as follows: That the thatness is the pastness of that property as qualified by which, the object appears in the case of the experience such as 'This is a pot'. However, the qualification by such a property, though not experienced, becomes the object of the remembrance.

It may be objected now as follows: How can the remembrance of the thatness be possible from the impression (of experience) referring to the object qualified by the thisness?. However, this is not correct. The impression needs to be assumed only that way (as referring to the object as qualified by the thisness) so that the causality of the experience (such as 'This is the pot') can be tenable with respect to the remembrance such as 'This pot is that pot'. For, the remembrance such as 'This is a pot' and the experience such as 'This pot is that pot' are not observed. Since the remembrance and the experience have the same thing as the object, the remembrance cannot be of the form that 'This is a pot'; and the experience cannot be of the form that 'This pot is that pot'.

It should not be objected that this way, the remembrance would merely become the experience with respect to the thatness which is not experienced (at the first stage of simple knowledge). For, the recognition is the remembrance only due to being produced from the extraordinary cause such as the impression. And the co-usage (of first simple experience such as *ayam ghaṭaḥ* and remembrance such a) '*sa ghaṭaḥ*' needs to be explained by taking into account the particular property. That is why, the established conclusion of all the schools of philosophy is that the remembrance is invalid, though it is valid indirectly through the validity of the experience constituting the cause of the impression.

Explanation

Gaṅgeśa now provides the conclusive definition of the thatness (in recognition) (*tattā*). According to him, the thatness is the pastness (*atītava*) of that property as qualified which, the object appears in the case of experience such as 'This is a pot' (*yaddharma vaiśiṣṭya*); however, the qualification by such a property, dispite not being experienced, is the object of the remembrance.

Also Gaṅgeśa refutes the objection that the remembrance of the thatness (*tattā smṛti*) is not possible from the impression referring to the object as qualified by the thisness (*idamtā viśiṣṭa gocara samskāra*). According to him,

the impression (*samskāra*) needs to be assumed to be referring to the object as qualified by the thisness to facilitate the causality of experience (*anubhavasya hetutva*) with respect to the remembrance (*smṛti*). And neither the remembrance is observed to be of the form that 'This is a pot' (*ayam ghaṭaḥ*), nor the experience is observed to be of the form that 'This pot is that pot' (*sa ghaṭaḥ*). Since the remembrance and the experience refer to the same thing as the object (*samāna viṣaya*), the form of the remembrance cannot be 'This is a pot' (*ayam ghaṭaḥ*), and the form of experience cannot be 'This (pot) is that pot' (*sā ghaṭaḥ*).

Also he refutes the objection that the remembrance (*smṛti*) would merely become the experience (*anubhava*) with respect to the thatness not experienced before (*ananubhūta tattāmśe*). According to him, the recognition is the remembrance only as being produced from the extraordinary cause such as the impression (*samskārāsādhāraṇa kāraṇa*). Also the co-usage (*saha prayoga*) of first experience and the remembrance such as '*ayam ghaṭaḥ*' and '*sa ghaṭaḥ* needs to be explained by taking into account the particular property. Thus, the established conclusion of all the schools of philosophy (*sarvatantra siddhānta*) is that the remembrance, dispite being valid (*yathārtha*) indirectly through the validity of the experience causing the impression (*samskāra hetu anubhava prāmāṇya*), is invalid (*apramā*).

Ayathārtha smṛti refers to the Vartamānatva

I. Xiii. 10. As yet another alternative, it can be proposed now as follows: That the remembrance is not valid. For instance, it can be inferred that the remembrance refers to the presentness of the object which constitutes the object of the (experience) itself; for, it constitutes the knowledge not referring to the past and the future objects, like the re-cognition. Or, it (the remembrance) refers to the presentness; for, it constitutes the knowledge, like the knowledge 'The pot exists'. The knowledge is ruled to refer to the particular time as its object. The remembrance can refer to the particular aspect of non-experienced present time through the power of totality of causes of knowledge in general; however, the impresion need not function there as the operation in the case of reference to the present time due the redundancy. That is why, the knowledge such as 'This pot is black' is practically held to be invalid with respect to the pot reddened by baking; for, the ordinary people perceive the blackness of the unbaked pot to belong to the present time. From this, the following position too becomes refuted: "That the knowledge such as 'This pot is black' is only valid. with respect to the pot reddened by baking; for, the blackness exists there in the pot sometimes before baking; and the knowledge such as 'The pot is black now' does not have any form at all."

That is why, the activity of the one desirous of fire (*vahnyarthi pravṛtti*) for fire becomes tenable on account of the ascertainment of fire now at present; for, the inference of fire such as 'The fire exists on the mountain on account of the present smoke' refers to the present fire as its object, as the same cannot refer to the past and the future fires as its object. Otherwise, supposing the doubt regarding the fire persists now, then the activity would become untenable. And in spite of the presence of the invariable concomitance such as 'Fire exists where ever smoke exists', the activity for fire would not be tenable otherwise in the case of the absence of the knowledge of the invariable concomitance.

Explanation

As an alternative, Gangeśa states that the remembrance (*smṛti*) is not valid (*na yathārthā*). Also he states that the remembrance can be infered to refer to the presentness (of the object) which constitutes the object of the experience itself (*svaviṣaya vartamānatva viṣayā*); for, it constitutes the knowledge not referring to the past and the future objects (*atītānāgatā gocara pratītitvāt*) like re-cognition. Also it (remembrance) can be inferred to refer to the presentness; for, it constitutes the knowledge (*pratītitvāt*) like the knowledge such as 'The pot exists' (*ghaṭo' stīti pratītivat*). According to him, the knowledge is ruled to refer to the particular time as its object (*samaya viśeṣa viṣaya*). Also the remembrance can refer to the particular aspect of non-experienced present time (*ananubhūte samayāmśe*) through the power of tatality of causes of knowledge in general (*jñāna sāmargrī*); however, the impression (*samskāra*) does not function there as the operation (*vyāpāra*) in the reference to the present time. Also therefore, the knowledge such as 'This (pot) is black' (*śyāmo'yam*) is practically ruled to be invalid (*ayathārthatva vyavahāra*), as the blackness of the unbaked pot is perceived to belong to the present time. Thus, Gangeśa refutes the position that the knowledge such as 'This pot is black' (*śyāmo' yam*) is only valid (*yathārtha*) with respect to the pot reddened by baking (*pākarakte*), as the blackness exists there in the pot some times before baking.

Gangeśa now explains the activity of one desirous of fire (*vahnyarthi pravṛtti*) for fire from the ascertainment of the fire now at present (*vahniniścaya*) due to the inference of fire such as 'The fire exists on the mountain on account of the present smoke' (*vidyamāna dhūmena parvate vahniḥ*) referring to the present fire as its object (*vartamāna vahni viṣayatvāt*). According to him, otherwise supposing the doubt regarding fire persists now (*tatsandehe*), then the activity for fire (*pravṛtti*) would become untenable. Also the activity for fire would become untenable in the case of the lack of knowledge of the invariable concomitance dispite having the concomitance such as '*yadā dhūmaḥ tadā vahniḥ*'. Thus, the ascertainment of fire at present leads to the activity for the obtainment of fire.

Smṛti is only Ayathārthā

I. Xiii. 11. As a conclusive alternative, it can be proposed as follows: That in the case of the remembrance such as 'This pot is that pot', the pot, as qualified by the thatness, appears to have the presentness. For, the impression, only as associated with the totality of causes of the present knowledge, constitutes the cause. And such a causality is already assumed in the case of the re-cognition such as 'This pot, which is that pot', exists now'. Further, the doubtless (certain) activity for the pot is observed on account of the remembrance, i.e. ascertainment of existence such as 'That pot exists in the house'. Otherwise, the activity for the pot would not be tenable in the case of the doubt regarding the pot as qualified by the thatness at present. The state of being the non-experienced object cannot be admitted in the case of the presentness. For, the future-present object is experienced before as being present.

Thus, the presentness of the thatness-qualified item needs to be the object of the remembrance by referring to the thatness-qualified item as its object. For, both the qualified and the qualificand items do not possess the presentness in the remembrance. Thus, the remembrance is only invalid. Also it cannot be held that the remembrance has the validity on the ground that (it refers to the) the object (pot) as existing before. For, in that case, the knowledge such as 'This (red pot) is black', which refers to the pot reddened by the baking, would need to become valid. The delimitation by the non-existent property (such as the blackness) cannot appear in the case of the remembrance bereft of the reference to the thatness. In support of this, Ācārya (Pariśuddhi, p. 10) states that why should the validity be admitted in the remembrance?'.

Thus ends The theory of determinate knowledge in the first chapter of Perception in the Tattvacintāmaṇi composed by Shri Gangeśopādhyāya.

The End of the first chapter of Perception.

Explanation

Gangeśa now concludes his theory of determinate knowledge (*Savikalpaka vāda*) with the proposal that the object such as the pot (*ghaṭa*) in the remembrance such as 'This pot is that pot' (*sa ghaṭaḥ*), which is qualified by the thatness (*tattā viśiṣṭa*), appears to have the presentness (*vartamānata*). According to him, the impression (*samskāra*), only as associated with the totality of causes of the present knowledge (*vartamāna jñāna sāmagrī sahita*), constitutes the cause. And such a causality is already

assumed in the case of the re-cognition such as 'This pot, which is that pot, exists now' (*so' yam idānīm*); also the doubtless (certain) activity (*niśśaṅka pravṛtti*) for the pot arises from the remembrance of the pot, i.e. the ascertainment such as 'That pot exists in the house' (*gehe sa ghaṭaḥ*). Also the activity for the pot would not be tenable in the case of the doubt regarding the pot qualified by the thatness (*tattā viśiṣṭa*) now. And the state of being the non-experienced object (*ananubhūta viṣayatā*) cannot be admitted in the presentness (*vartamānatvāṁśe*) as the future-present object (*anāgata vartamāna*) is experienced before as present.

Thus, Gaṅgeśa concludes that the presentness (*vartamānatā*) of the thatness-qualified item constitutes the object of the remembrance (*smṛti*) referring to the thatness-qualified item as its object. According to him, both the qualifier and the qualificand (*viśaṣyesya viśeṣaṇasya*) in the remembrance cannot possess the presentness; and thus, the remembrance (*smṛti*) is only invalid (*ayathārthā*). Also it should be noted that the remembrance cannot have the validity (*yathārthatva*), dispite its reference to the object (pot) being in the past time. For, in that case, the knowledge such as 'This (red pot) is black' (*śyāmo' yam*), referring to the pot reddened by baking (*pākarakte*), would become valid. The delimitation by the non-existing property (*avidyamāna dharmāvaccheda*) such as the blackness cannot appear in the remembrance bereft of the reference to the thatness (*pramuṣṭa tattāmśe*). And thus Ācārya (*Pariśuddhi, p. 10*) states that the remembrance need not have the validity (*smṛteḥ yāthārthyam api kutaḥ*).

The End of the Savikalpaka vāda.

The End of the Pratyakṣa khaṇḍa.

in the Tattvacintāmaṇi

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